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2015 DIGILAW 875 (CAL)

Gour Hari Mondal v. State of West Bengal

2015-10-13

DEBASISH KAR GUPTA, MD.MUMTAZ KHAN

body2015
JUDGMENT Md. Mumtaz Khan, J. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant assailing the judgment, order of conviction and sentence dated July 8, 2002 passed by the Ld. Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Diamond Harbour, South 24Parganas in S.T. NO. 10(3) 2002 arising out of S.C. No. 6(7) 2002 [G.R. Case No. 1331/96]. By virtue of the impugned judgement and order appellant has been convicted for the commission of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to suffer imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs. 10,000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two years while Menoka Mondal was found not guilty of the offence punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and was acquitted under Section 235 Cr.P.C. and was discharged from bail bond. The prosecution case, in brief, as follows:- On November 13, 1996 at 18.15 hours Basudeb Purkait (P.W.1) lodged a complaint at the Mathurapur P.S., District South 24-Parganas stating therein that on that date at about 2.30 p.m. while he was running his grocery shop in his village his neighbour Mohadeb Mondal came running there and informed him that a while ago at about 2.00 p.m. appellant, Gour Hari Mondal and his wife have hacked his brother Tapas brutally in the paddy field of Karindra Kayal situated at Sharatnagar Village on the eastern side of the village path about 16/18 ‘Rashi’ from their village. On hearing this he started running towards the place and on the way he saw the village people were brining his brother on a van in bleeding condition to the P.S. He also joined them and went to the P.S. According to his letter of complaint, he came to learn from Dulal Chandra Halder, (P.W.2), an eye witness to the occurrence, the manner in which appellant with the assistant of his wife assaulted his brother by a sharp cutting weapon and if he (P.W.2) had not shouted calling the villagers they would have killed his brother on the spot. On the basis of the above complaint a case was started at Mathurarpur P.S. against the appellant and his wife U/s. 326/307/34 IPC and investigation ensued and on completion of investigation charge sheet was submitted against the appellant and his wife Smt. Menoka Mondal U/s. 326/307/34/302 IPC. On the basis of the above complaint a case was started at Mathurarpur P.S. against the appellant and his wife U/s. 326/307/34 IPC and investigation ensued and on completion of investigation charge sheet was submitted against the appellant and his wife Smt. Menoka Mondal U/s. 326/307/34/302 IPC. Charge was framed against the appellant and his wife Menoka Mondal on March 18, 2002 U/s. 302/34 IPC and when they pleaded not guilty to the charges, trial commenced. Prosecution examined 15 witnesses including the complainant, his brother, wife of the victim, villagers, doctors and the police officers and also produced and proved the FIR, rough sketch map with index, surathal report, injury report, P.M. report etc. (Exbts. 1-7). Thereafter on completion of trial and after examination of the appellants U/s.313 Cr.P.C. learned court bellow passed the impugned judgement. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the impugned judgement, order of conviction and sentence appellant has preferred the instant appeal and the ground raised in the appeal is that learned court bellow did not take into consideration the facts and circumstances on the case and evidence-on-record on proper perspective and passed the impugned judgement, order of conviction and sentence and accordingly prayed for setting aside the impugned judgement, order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned court bellow. It is submitted by the learned advocate for the appellant, at the very outset, that the guilt of the appellant was not proved on the basis of the deposition of eye witnesses and the case of the prosecution was full of contradictions and lacuna and as such appellant is entitled to get the benefit of the same. According to the learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the appellants the impugned judgement, order of conviction and sentence passed by the Ld. Court bellow are liable to set aside for the following reasons : 1. The place of occurrence was not identified beyond doubt and it differs from witness to witness, as according to FIR reported incident took place in the paddy field but according to P.W.3, an eye witness, it took place in the marshy land. 2. According to FIR, P.W.1 got the news of hacking of his brother at his grocery shop from his neighbour, Mahadeb Mondal but during examination before the court he has deposed that he got the news at his house from Biswanath Haldar and Samar Haldar. 3. 2. According to FIR, P.W.1 got the news of hacking of his brother at his grocery shop from his neighbour, Mahadeb Mondal but during examination before the court he has deposed that he got the news at his house from Biswanath Haldar and Samar Haldar. 3. According to FIR, P.W.1 after getting the news of hacking of his brother rushed towards the P.O. but on the way he saw the village people bringing his brother on a van and there is no whisper that he saw the place of occurrence but during examination in court P.W.1 has deposed that he went to the place of occurrence and saw the body of his brother lying in the paddy field. There is no whisper by him about any such van. 4. According to FIR, P.W.1 heard from Dulal Halder (P.W.2) the manner of hacking his brother by the appellant with the assistance of his wife but P.W.2, Dulal Chandra Halder, has not corroborated the same. 5. P.W.2 and P.W.3, the reported eye witnesses have not mentioned the nature of the weapon used in the commission of the alleged offence and the use of katari has been introduced only by P.W.4 only to fill up the lacuna. Even P.W.10, who conducted post mortem examination over the dead body of the victim and opined that the injuries found on the person of the victim may be caused by a sharp cutting weapon like katari and sickle could not single out which injuries were caused by katari and which injuries by a sickle. 6. No such weapon of offence was seized by the I.O. nor any blood stained earth, control earth or the wearing apparel of the victim were seized. 7. According to P.W.5, victim told him that he was assaulted by the appellant while according to P.W.6 victim told him that appellant and Menoka (wife of the appellant) inflicted injuries on his person. P.W.8, wife of the victim has also deposed that her husband told her that he was assaulted by appellant and his wife Menoka whereas P.W.11, the doctor who first attended the victim at Mathurapur Hospital has clearly stated that patient did not state him the name of the assailants and on seeing the report he can say the patient was not in a position to talk. So, in view of the evidence of P.W.11, the evidence of P.W.5, P.W.6 and P.W.8 could not be believed. 8. According to P.W.1, victim was wearing one lungi and gamchha at the time of incident, according to P.W.2, victim was wearing gangi but he could not say what was wearing on the lower part of his body and according to P.W.3, victim was wearing one gamchha. But from the surathal report it appears that there was no clothes on the person of the deceased and even no such wearing apparel of the victim was seized by the I.O. nor any explanation has been given for the same. According to learned advocate for the appellant prosecution has miserably failed to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt and as such appellant is liable to be acquitted. Learned advocate representing the state submitted that prosecution case is based on the evidence of eye witnesses namely P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 and the incident as narrated by P.W.4 has been fully corroborated by P.W.2 and P.W.3 and there is no confusion or contradiction in respect of the place of occurrence as the incident started from the marshy land and ended in the paddy field. Learned advocate representing the state further submitted that dying declaration was made by the victim immediate after the incident before he has taken to the hospital. According to the doctor, P.W.11, it may be that victim was not in a position to talk but the said dying declaration was made earlier near the place of occurrence and there was no scope to record the dying declaration and in such circumstances there was no reason to disbelieve the version of P.W.6 and P.W.8 whose evidence have not been demolished during cross-examination. Learned advocate representing the state also submitted that prosecution case had been proved on the testimony of eye witnesses, hence failure on the part of the I.O. to recover and seize weapon of offence, blood stained earth, control earth, wearing apparel is not fatal for the prosecution case. He also submitted that the contradiction in respect of the wearing apparel is natural as witnesses came to deposed after six years of the occurrence. He also submitted that the contradiction in respect of the wearing apparel is natural as witnesses came to deposed after six years of the occurrence. According to learned advocate representing the state prosecution has been able to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt and as such the judgment, order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned court bellow do not require any interference from this court. We have considered the submissions advanced by learned advocates for both sides. We have also given our thoughtful consideration to the evidence of the prosecution witnesses and other materials-on-record for examining the propriety of the impugned judgement, order of conviction and sentence passed by the learned court bellow. A close and piercing look at the evidence of the P.Ws. on record together with the evidence of the doctor, P.W.10 and the P.M. report, Ext.3 it was crystal clear that the death of the victim was due to the effects of the injuries sustained by him which were ante-mortem and homicidal in nature. According to the doctor those types of injuries found on the person of the victim could be caused by a katari or sickle. Interestingly he was not challenged by the defence on this score. Defence had also not disputed or denied the injuries found on the person of the victim by the doctor, P.W.10, on November 14, 1996 at the time of conducting post-mortem examination and/or the cause of his death. So the question had arisen how victim sustained those injuries on his person and/or who caused those injuries? In this regard it was the specific allegations of the prosecution that appellant inflicted those injuries on the person of victim by a sharp cutting weapon resulting in his death. Defence had denied the above allegations of the prosecution and had taken the plea of innocence and false implication. Now let us see how far the prosecution had been successful to bring home the charge against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt before the learned court bellow. Defence had denied the above allegations of the prosecution and had taken the plea of innocence and false implication. Now let us see how far the prosecution had been successful to bring home the charge against the appellant beyond all reasonable doubt before the learned court bellow. Learned court bellow took into consideration the evidences of P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4, the eye witnesses, P.W.5, P.W.8 and P.W.9 witnesses immediate after the occurrence, P.W.10, the doctor who conducted post-mortem examination over the dead body of the victim and found eight incised wounds on different parts of his body and the P.M. report (Ext.3) where the doctor had opined that death was due to shock and haemorrhage following ante-mortem homicidal injuries which could be caused by a sharp cutting weapon like katari, sickle to arrive at a conclusion that prosecution had been able to prove the charge against the appellant for committing murder of the victim. With regard to the discrepancies, as pointed by the learned advocate for the appellant, it is the settled proposition that the discrepancies found in the evidences of eyewitnesses cannot affect their credibility unless such discrepancies are so vital. Corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases and trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence and the court will have to bear in mind that different witnesses react differently under different situations. One can not come across a witness whose evidence does not contain some exaggeration or embellishment. Reference may be made to the decision of Leela Ram vs. State of Haryana, reported in (1999) 9 SCC 525 and the relevant portions of the above decision are quoted bellow:- “9. Be it noted that the High Court is within its jurisdiction being the first appellate court to reappraise the evidence, but the discrepancies found in the ocular account of two witnesses unless they are so vital, cannot affect the credibility of the evidence of the witnesses. There are bound to be some discrepancies between the narrations of different witnesses when they speak on details, and unless the contradictions are of a material dimensions, the same should not be used to jettison the evidence in its entirety. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefor should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Incidentally, corroboration of evidence with mathematical niceties cannot be expected in criminal cases. Minor embellishment, there may be, but variations by reason therefor should not render the evidence of eyewitnesses unbelievable. Trivial discrepancies ought not to obliterate an otherwise acceptable evidence. In this context, reference may be made to the decision of this Court in State of U.P. v. M.K. Anthony. In para 10 of the Report, this Court observed: (SCC pp.514-15) “10. While appreciating the evidence of a witness, the approach must be whether the evidence of the witness read as a whole appears to have a ring of truth. Once that impression is formed, it is undoubtedly necessary for the court to scrutinise the evidence more particularly keeping in view the deficiencies, drawbacks and infirmities pointed out in the evidence as a whole and evaluate them to find out whether it is against the general tenor of the evidence given by the witness and whether the earlier evaluation of the evidence is shaken as to render it unworthy of belief. Minor discrepancies on trivial matters not touching the core of the case, hyper technical approach by taking sentences torn out of context here or there from the evidence, attaching importance to some technical error committed by the investigating officer not going to the root of the matter would not ordinarily permit rejection of the evidence as a whole. If the court before whom the witness gives evidence had the opportunity to form the opinion about the general tenor of evidence given by the witness, the appellate court which had not this benefit will have to attach due weight to the appreciation of evidence by the trial court and unless there are reasons weightily and formidable it would not be proper to reject the evidence on the ground of minor variations or infirmities in the matter of trivial details. Even honest and truthful witnesses may differ in some details unrelated to the main incident because power of observation, retention and reproduction differ with individuals.” With regard to the submissions of the learned advocate for the appellant that the place of occurrence was not identified beyond doubt and differs from witness to witness does not appear to be correct as we find from the F.I.R., rough sketch map with index (Ext.6) as well as evidences of the PW.1, P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 that P.O. is a paddy field. P.W.3 though during cross-examination stated that assault started on the road and finished on the marshy land but that can not be said to a vital discrepancy to affect the credibility of other eye witnesses. P.W.1, is the brother of the victim and maker of the F.I.R. According to him he heard the incident from Biswanath Haldar and Samar Haldar at his house and rushed with them to the P.O. and found the victim lying in the paddy field in a pool of blood though in the FIR he had claimed that he got the news of hacking of his brother at his grocery shop from his neighbour, Mahadeb Mondal. Admittedly he was not the witness to the occurrence and his statements about the involvement of the appellant in the commission of the offence is based on hearsay evidence. He had merely set the law in motion by lodging the F.I.R. With regard to the contradiction relating to the wearing apparel of the victim, we find that those are natural as witnesses deposed after six year of incident but certainly those are not so vital to affect the prosecution case. Therefore, in view of the settled proposition of law as discussed hereinabove the above discrepancies cannot affect the credibility of the evidence of the witnesses concerned. Now comes the question of non disclosure of the description of the weapon of offence in the F.I.R. or to the I.O. during investigation or during trial before the court by most of the eye witnesses, as submitted by the learned advocate for the appellant. It is not in dispute that neither the F.I.R. nor P.W. 2 or P.W. 3, the eye witnesses had specifically disclosed the description/name of the weapon of offence in course of adducing evidences and it was P.W.4 only who had disclosed the weapon of offence as Katari and also the doctor, P.W.10 who opined that injuries found on the person of the victim can be caused by sharp cutting weapon like katari, sickle. It may be also true that the description of the weapon of offence was also not mentioned in their statements recorded under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. But it cannot be a ground for disbelieving the above witnesses in view of the proposition of law that law would not expect mentioning minutest details either in FIR or statement under Section 161 of Cr.P.C. Reference may be made to the decision of State of U.P. vs. Krishna Master, reported in (2010) 12 SCC 324 and the relevant portion of the above decision is quoted bellow:- “72. It is relevant to notice that six brutal and gruesome murders had taken place wherein firearms were used. The hard reality of life is that the person who has lost kith and kin in an horrific incident is likely to suffer great shock and therefore law would not expect him to mention minutest details either in his FIR or statement under Section 161. The question before the Court is whether the assertion made by the witness that soon after the incident he had gone to the place where his injured brother was lying and on enquiry by him, his brother had told him that the respondents were his assailants, inspires confidence of the Court. 73. Reading the evidence of the witness as a whole, this Court points that it has a ring of truth in it. There is nothing improbable if a brother approaches his injured brother and tries to know from him as to how he had received the injuries nor is it improbable that on enquiry being made the injured brother would not give reply/information sought from him. There is nothing improbable if a brother approaches his injured brother and tries to know from him as to how he had received the injuries nor is it improbable that on enquiry being made the injured brother would not give reply/information sought from him. The assertion by witness Jhabbulal that after the incident was over he had gone near his injured brother and tried to know as to who were his assailants, whereupon his injured brother had replied that the appellants (sic respondents) had caused injuries to him, could not be effectively challenged during cross-examination of the witness nor could it be brought on record that because of the nature of the injuries received by Baburam he would not have survived even for a few minutes and must have died immediately on the receipt of the injuries.” Reference may also be made to the decision of Jitender Kumar –Vs.– State of Haryana, reported in (2012) 6 SCC 204 and the relevant portions of the above decision are quoted bellow : “18. The court has also to consider the fact that the main purpose of the FIR is to satisfy the police officer as to the commission of a cognizable offence for him to conduct further investigation in accordance with law. The primary object is to set the criminal law into motion and it may not be possible to give every minute detail with unmistakable precision in the FIR. The FIR itself is not the proof of a case, but is a piece of evidence which could be used for corroborating the case of the prosecution. The FIR need not be an encyclopaedia of all the facts and circumstances on which the prosecution relies. It only has to state the basic case. The attending circumstances of each case would further have considerable bearing on application of such principles to a given situation. Reference is this regard can be made to State of U.P. v. Krishna Master and Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P.” It is also a settled proposition of law of evidences that examination of any particular number of witnesses is not required for proving the prosecution case and reliance can be placed on the solitary witness, if the court comes to the conclusion that the said statement is true and correct version of the case of prosecution. Reference may be made to the decision of State of U.P. vs. Krishna Master (supra) and the relevant portion of the above decision is quoted bellow:- “47. It is a well-known principle of law that reliance can be placed on the solitary statement of a witness if the court comes to the conclusion that the said statement is the true and correct version of the case of the prosecution. The courts are concerned with the merit and the statement of a particular witness and not at all concerned with the number of witnesses examined by the prosecution. The time-honoured rule of appreciating evidence is that it has to be weighed and not counted. The law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, where the court finds that the testimony of the solitary witness is neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable, it may, in a given set of facts, seek corroboration, but to disbelieve reliable testimony of a solitary witness on the ground that others have not been examined is to do complete injustice to the prosecution.” As discussed herein above, the learned trial court took into consideration the corroboration of the evidences of the eyewitnesses, i.e. PW nos.2, 3 and 4 with the post mortem report and the evidence adduced by PW 10 who had prepared the post mortem report and also the evidence of P.W.5, P.W.8 and P.W.9 witnesses immediate after the occurrence. It is evident from the evidence of above eye witnesses, who are co-villagers having no individual interest involved in this case, that they had fully corroborated the prosecution case and their statements-in-chief remained unshaken during cross-examination and nothing brought on record to discredit them and as such there was no reason to discard their evidences. The evidence of above eye witnesses had also been fully corroborated by P.W.5, P.W.8 and P.W.9 who are the witnesses immediate after the occurrence as well as by the doctor, P.W.10. After considering the lower Court’s record, we do not find any substance in the submissions made on behalf of the appellant that the case of the prosecution is full of contradictions and lacunae which goes to the root of the case. Therefore, the impugned judgment need not require our interference on the above ground. After considering the lower Court’s record, we do not find any substance in the submissions made on behalf of the appellant that the case of the prosecution is full of contradictions and lacunae which goes to the root of the case. Therefore, the impugned judgment need not require our interference on the above ground. Now with regard to the dying declaration it is well-settled that acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone and every motive to falsehood is silenced. The man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Since there is no scope of cross-examination, the Court insists that the dying declaration should be of such nature as to inspire full confidence of the Court in its truthfulness and correctness. The another cardinal principle is this that the Court is always under obligation to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. It is also the function of the Court to assert that the deceased was in fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Once the Court is satisfied with regard to the fulfillment of the above conditions, communication of an oral dying declaration by words or by signs or otherwise will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite. Reference may be made to the decision of a Constitution Bench in the matter of Laxman vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (2002) 6 SCC 710 and the relevant portions of the decision are set out bellow:- “3. The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every hope of this world is gone, when every motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced by the most powerful consideration to speak only the truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. Notwithstanding the same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to be given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of many circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in which a man is on the deathbed in so solemn and serene, is the reason in law to accept the veracity of his statement. It is for this reason the requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed with. Since the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist that the dying declaration should be of such a nature as to inspire full confidence of the court in its truthfulness and correctness. The court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or a product of imagination. The court also must further decide that the deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to satisfy itself whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the dying declaration looks up to the medical opinion. But where the eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious state to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can it be said that since there is no certification of the doctor as to the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral or writing and any adequate method of communication whether by words or by signs or other will suffice provided the indication is positive and definite.” It is also settled proposition of law that the Court while passing an order of conviction on the basis of a dying declaration look for some corroborating evidences only in the event there exists any suspicion as regards correctness or otherwise of such dying declaration. Reference may be made to the decision of Ranjit Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2006) 13 SCC 130 and the relevant portions of above decision are set out bellow: “13. Reference may be made to the decision of Ranjit Singh & Ors. vs. State of Punjab, reported in (2006) 13 SCC 130 and the relevant portions of above decision are set out bellow: “13. It is now well settled that conviction can be recorded on the basis of a dying declaration alone, if the same is wholly reliable, but in the event there exists any suspicion as regards correctness or otherwise of the said dying declaration, the courts in arriving at the judgment of conviction shall look for some corroborating evidence. It is also well known that in a case where inconsistencies in the dying declarations, in relation to the active role played by one or the other accused persons, exist, the court shall lean more towards the first dying declaration than the second one.” In the case at hand we find that only P.W.5, P.W.6 and P.W.8 have made the claim of dying declaration by the victim. According to P.W.5 at the time of lifting the body of the victim at the P.O. by P.W.3 and P.W.4, victim told him in a very low voice that he was assaulted by the appellant but admittedly he did not say this to the I.O. nor his above claim has been corroborated by P.W.3 or P.W.4. According to P.W.6, at the time lifting the body of the victim in the auto for shifting him to the Diamond Harbour hospital from Mathurapur hospital victim told her in presence of P.W.3, P.W.7 and one Kashinath that appellant and Menoka inflicted him injuries but admittedly she also did not say this to the I.O. nor her above claim has not been corroborated by the above witnesses. Similarly claim of dying declaration of P.W.8 also does not find any corroboration from other witnesses present there. Moreover, P.W.11, the doctor who first attended the victim at the Mathurapur hospital and provided him preliminary treatment and referred him to Diamond Harbour hospital for better treatment has clearly stated that patient was not in a position to talk. Under the circumstances, there was suspicion in the mind of the learned Court bellow with regard to correctness of such dying declaration and accordingly learned Court bellow ignored the same. Therefore, the decision of the learned court bellow on the above score does not require our interference. Under the circumstances, there was suspicion in the mind of the learned Court bellow with regard to correctness of such dying declaration and accordingly learned Court bellow ignored the same. Therefore, the decision of the learned court bellow on the above score does not require our interference. Admittedly, no such weapon of offence, blood stained earth, controlled earth or the wearing apparel of the victim were seized by the I.O. In this regard it is the evidence of P.W.14, the I.O., that he conducted raid at the house of the appellant but failed to arrest him and accordingly after completion of investigation he submitted charge-sheet against the appellant showing him absconder. It is also evident from the record that appellant surrendered before the court bellow after more than two years of the incident. So there was no scope to recover the weapon of offence. It also appear from the surathal report that there was no cloth on the person of the victim, so the question of seizure of wearing apparel of the deceased does not arise. Moreover, there was also no cross-examination by the defence in the matter of non production of wearing apparel, blood stained earth or the weapon of offence. Be that as it may, failure to recover weapon of assault is not fatal for the prosecution case when the prosecution case is otherwise proved based on the testimony of the independent eye witnesses. Reference may be made to the decision of Ram Singh vs. State of Rajasthan, reported in (2012) 12 SCC 339 . Now what we find from the record that the learned Court bellow relied upon the evidences of P.W.2, P.W.3 and P.W.4 who were independent eye witnesses of the village being corroborated by the evidence of P.W.5, P.W.8 and P.W.9, witnesses immediate after the occurrence with the post mortem report and the evidence of the doctor, P.W. 10 who had prepared the post mortem report to arrive at the conclusion that prosecution had been able to prove the charge against the appellant for committing murder of the victim. Therefore, there was no impropriety on the part of the learned Court bellow to pass the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence in this case against the appellant. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt was drawn cannot be interfered with. Therefore, there was no impropriety on the part of the learned Court bellow to pass the impugned judgment and order of conviction and sentence in this case against the appellant. The circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt was drawn cannot be interfered with. In view of the above, we have no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the conviction of the appellant Gour Hari Mondal under section 302 IPC and the sentence imposed thereunder is fully justified. We, therefore, dismiss the appeal and affirm the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant. The bail granted the appellant on April 7, 2013 in CRAN 410 of 2014 is, therefore, cancelled and the appellant is directed to surrender before the Trial Court within a period of fortnight from the date of this judgement to serve the sentence and in case of failure on the part of the appellant to comply the said direction, learned Trial Court shall take appropriate steps in the matter. Copy of this judgement along with the lower court records be sent down to the trial court forthwith by a special messenger for information and taking necessary action. Urgent photostat certified copy of this judgement, if applied for, be given to the parties, as expeditiously as possible, upon compliance with the necessary formalities in this regard. I agree