JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. State has appealed against the judgment dated 20.11.2007 of the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Kangra at Dharamshala, Himachal Pradesh, passed in Sessions Case No. 22-D/VII/2007, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh v. Sher Singh, challenging the acquittal of respondent Sher Singh (hereinafter referred to as the accused), who stands charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Narcotic Drugs & Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). 2. It is the case of prosecution that on 19.6.2007, a police party, headed by ASI Geeta Parkash (PW-12), comprising of Constables Jai Singh (PW-3) and Ramesh Kumar (PW-5) and other police officials, was on traffic checking duty towards Chamunda Tang. At 4 p.m., accused, who was carrying a bag, seeing the police party, got perplexed and tried to flee away. He hid himself in the bushes. On suspicion, he was apprehended and in the presence of independent witnesses Ashwani Kumar (PW-1) and Surinder (PW-2), was searched. From the bag carried by the accused, Charas was recovered, which on weighment was found to be 3.750 kgs. Scales were brought from the shop of Anil Kumar (PW-4). Two samples, each weighing 25 grams, were drawn. Samples and the bulk parcel were sealed with seal of seal impression 'K'. Ruka (Ex. PW- 6/A) was sent to Police Station, Dharamshala, on the basis of which FIR No.122/07, dated 19.6.2007 (Ex. PW- 6/B), under the provisions of Section 20-61-85 of the Act was registered. With the completion of proceedings on the spot, accused was arrested. Contraband substance was produced before SI Gulzari Lal (PW-6), who sealed the same with his own seal of seal impression 'A' and deposited the same in the Malkhana. MHC Anil Kumar (PW-9) kept the same in safe custody. Also, Special Report (Ex. PW-7/A) was sent to the Superior Officer through Constable Madan Lal (PW-7). With the completion of investigation, which, prima facie, revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. With the completion of investigation, which, prima facie, revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 20 of the Act, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to establish its case, prosecution examined as many as 12 witnesses and statement of the accused, under the provisions of Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, was also recorded, in which he took the following defence: "I was travelling in a bus from Mandi and was going to see my handicapped nephew at handicapped school at Dari. I was taken out from the bus along with 4-5 other passengers when the police recovered bag Ex. P1 from the rack of the bus which did not belong to me. It was taken to the Police Station and thereafter false case has been made against me." Accused led evidence in his defence and examined one witness. 5. Based on the testimonies of witnesses and the material on record, trial Court acquitted the accused of the charged offence. Hence, the present appeal by the State. 6. We have heard Mr. Ashok Chaudhary, learned Additional Advocate General, on behalf of the State as also Mr. N.S. Chandel, Advocate, on behalf of the accused. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find that the judgment rendered by the trial Court is based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. 7. It is a settled principle of law that acquittal leads to presumption of innocence in favour of an accused. To dislodge the same, onus heavily lies upon the prosecution. Having considered the material on record, we are of the considered view that prosecution has failed to establish essential ingredients so required to constitute the charged offence. 8. In Prandas v. The State, AIR 1954 SC 36 , Constitution Bench of the apex Court, has held as under: "(6) It must be observed at the very outset that we cannot support the view which has been expressed in several cases that the High Court has no power under Section 417, Criminal P.c., to reverse a judgment of acquittal, unless the judgment is perverse or the subordinate Court has in some way or other misdirected itself so as to produce a miscarriage of justice. In our opinion, the true position in regard to the jurisdiction of the High Court under Section 417, Criminal Procedure Code in an appeal from an order of acquittal has been stated in - 'Sheo Swarup v. Emperor', AIR 1934 PC 227 (2) at pp.229, 230 (A), in these words: "Sections 417, 418 and 423 of the Code give to the High Court full power to review at large the evidence upon which the order of acquittal was founded, and to reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the order of acquittal should be reversed. No limitation should be placed upon that power, unless it be found expressly stated in the Code. But in exercising the power conferred by the Code and before reaching its conclusions upon fact, the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate Court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses. To state this, however, is only to say that the High Court in its conduct of the appeal should and will act in accordance with rules and principles well known and recognised in the administration of justice." 9. It is well established principle of law that (i) the appellate Court should not ordinarily set aside a judgment of acquittal in a case where two views are possible, though the view of the appellate court may be more probable; (ii) while dealing with a judgment of acquittal, the appellate court must consider entire evidence on record, so as to arrive at a finding as to whether views of the trial court are perverse or otherwise unsustainable; (iii) the appellate court is entitled to consider whether in arriving at a finding of fact, trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible fact; and (iv) the trial Court failed to take into consideration any admissible evidence and/or had taken into consideration evidence brought on record contrary to law. (Balak Ram & Anr. v. State of U.P., AIR 1974 SC 2165 ; Allarakha K Mansuri v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 3 SCC 57 ; Raghunath v. State of Haryana, (2003) 1 SCC 398 ; State of U.P. v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors., (2007) 13 SCC 102 ; S. Rama Krishna v. S. Rami Reddy (D) by his LRs. & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 2066 ; Sambhaji Hindurao Deshmukh & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 ; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh @ Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 ). 10. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra, (2008) 11 SCC 186 ; Arulvelu & Anr. v. State, (2009) 10 SCC 206 ; Perla Somasekhara Reddy & Ors. v. State of A.P., (2009) 16 SCC 98 ; and Ram Singh @ Chhaju v. State of Himachal Pradesh, (2010) 2 SCC 445 ). 10. In Sheo Swaroop and Ors. v. King Emperor, AIR 1934 PC 227 , the Privy Council held that: "the High Court should and will always give proper weight and consideration to such matters as (1) the views of the trial Judge as to the credibility of the witnesses, (2) the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused, a presumption certainly not weakened by the fact that he has been acquitted at his trial, (3) the right of the accused to the benefit of any doubt, and (4) the slowness of an appellate court in disturbing a finding of fact arrived at by a Judge who had the advantage of seeing the witnesses." 11. In Chandrappa and Ors. v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 SCC 415 , the apex Court observed as under: "(1) An appellate court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. (2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. (3) Various expressions, such as, "substantial and compelling reasons", "good and sufficient grounds", "very strong circumstances", "distorted conclusions", "glaring mistakes", etc. are not intended to curtail extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of "flourishes of language" to emphasise the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. (4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal, there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial court. (5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial court." 12. In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Banne @ Baijnath & Ors., (2009) 4 SCC 271 , the apex Court gave illustrations of certain circumstances in which the Court would be justified in interfering with a judgment of acquittal by the High Court, which principle, in our considered view, would squarely apply to the judgment under review by us. The circumstances include; (i) The High Court's decision is based on totally erroneous view of law by ignoring the settled legal position; (ii) The High Court's conclusions are contrary to evidence and documents on record; iii) The entire approach of the High Court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal leading to grave miscarriage of justice; (iv) The High Court's judgment is manifestly unjust and unreasonable based on erroneous law and facts on the record of the case; (v) Apex Court must always give proper weight and consideration to the findings of the High Court; and (vi) the apex Court would be extremely reluctant in interfering with a case when both the Sessions Court and the High Court have recorded an order of acquittal. The apex Court further held that :- "Thus, the law on the issue can be summarised to the effect that in exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances, and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court's acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference with the decision of the trial court in a routine manner, where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for such interference." (Emphasis supplied) 13. We find defence of the accused to have been probablized by Tikkam Ram (DW-1), who has deposed that an unclaimed bag was recovered by the police from the bus. 14. That apart, we find versions of police officials, Geeta Parkash (PW-12), Ramesh Kumar (PW-5) and Jai Singh (PW-3), to have been not supported, in fact contradicted, by independent witnesses Ashwani Kumar (PW-1), Surinder (PW-2) and Anil Kumar (PW-4). 15. According to Geeta Parkash, on suspicion, the accused was searched. Significantly, Geeta Parkash does not disclose the basis of suspicion. In fact from the testimony of Jai Singh, it is quite apparent that police wanted the accused to be searched in the presence of independent witnesses. Now, if that were so, then why is it that he was not informed of his statutory right and prior consent obtained? Since recovery of the contraband substance is not from the person of the accused, hence, this fact may not be fatal, but it renders the genesis of the prosecution case to be highly doubtful. 16. Be that as it may, Ashwani Kumar and Surinder Kumar, who did not support the prosecution and were extensively cross-examined, have categorically deposed that police got the papers signed from them in the police station. Also, no papers were signed by the accused in their presence. Further Anil Kumar denies any weighing machine having been taken by Jai Singh from his shop. 17. Police having set up a naka for traffic checking, also does not inspire confidence, for there is nothing on record to establish that the police party had actually left the police station for such purpose. 18. From the material placed on record, prosecution has failed to establish that the accused is guilty of having committed the offence, he has been charged with. The circumstances cannot be said to have been proved by unbroken chain of unimpeachable testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The guilt of the accused does not stand proved beyond reasonable doubt to the hilt. From the material placed on record, prosecution has failed to establish that the accused is guilty of having committed the offence, he has been charged with. The circumstances cannot be said to have been proved by unbroken chain of unimpeachable testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The guilt of the accused does not stand proved beyond reasonable doubt to the hilt. The chain of events does not stand conclusively established, leading only to one conclusion, i.e. guilt of the accused. Circumstances when cumulatively considered do not fully establish completion of chain of events, indicating to the guilt of the accused and no other hypothesis other than the same. 19. Hence, it cannot be said that prosecution has been able to prove its case, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence so as to prove that the accused was found in conscious and exclusive possession of 3.750 kgs of Chaas. 20. For all the aforesaid reasons, we find no reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence so placed on record by the parties. 21. The accused has had the advantage of having been acquitted by the Court below. Keeping in view the ratio of law laid down by the Apex Court in Mohammed Ankoos and others v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh, Hyderabad (2010) 1 SCC 94 , it cannot be said that the Court below has not correctly appreciated the evidence on record or that acquittal of the accused has resulted into travesty of justice. No ground for interference is called for. The present appeal is dismissed. Bail bonds, if any, furnished by the accused are discharged. Appeal stands disposed of, so also pending applications, if any.