ORDER : 1. This petition is filed under Section 18 of the Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act, 1964, challenging the dismissal of S.C. No. 1474 of 2011 filed by the petitioner herein seeking ejectment of the defendant from the suit schedule property. 2. The suit schedule property is described as premises bearing No. 5/46, Pipeline Road, Chowdeshwari Nagar, Laggere, Bengaluru. Plaintiff is the wife of one Pravardhan Rao. Defendant is the son of brother of Pravardhan Rao. According to the plaintiff, she is the absolute owner of the suit property having purchased the same from one P. Babu S/o Poongavanam by a registered sale deed dated 24-3-2003. She claims to have put up ground and first floor for her use and occupation. It is her case that as the defendant was related to her and was known to the family, in order to help him on humanitarian grounds, the plaintiff leased the schedule property on a monthly rent of Rs. 6,000/- per month. The lease started from 1-8-2008. The tenant paid monthly rent upto 31-3-2009 and collected cash receipts from the plaintiff. Subsequently, he stopped paying rents. Defendant was called upon to vacate the premises. He did not accede to the request. Plaintiff got issued a legal notice dated 6-12-2010 terminating the tenancy of the defendant and called upon him to pay entire arrears of rent. However, the defendant refused to receive the legal notice, and therefore, she was constrained to file the suit. 3. Defendant denied the case of the plaintiff. He contended that the plaintiff was his aunt. Plaintiff's respondent was his uncle being the younger brother of his father. He urged that father of the defendant-Janardhana Rao died in the year 1991 leaving behind his mother Ningamma and Pravardhana Rao - the younger son of Ningamma/uncle of the defendant. Pravardhana Rao became the kartha of the joint family. Ningamma had borrowed money during her lifetime by mortgaging one of the properties for the purpose of incurring legal expenditure to get her second son Pravardhana Rao released from jail. Upon the death of Ningamma during 1976, the defendant along with his paternal aunt mustered financial help from the relatives and repaid the debts of Ningamma and redeemed the property that was mortgaged. Upon the death of Ningamma during 1976, the defendant along with his paternal aunt mustered financial help from the relatives and repaid the debts of Ningamma and redeemed the property that was mortgaged. After Pravardhana Rao was released from jail, as he had no issues, plaintiff and Pravardhana Rao treated the defendant as their son showing all love and affection to him. Later on defendant and his uncle jointly constructed the residential house consisting of four floors in the year 1991-1992 in the property that was got released from mortgage. They all started staying together in the top floor and the remaining floors were rented out. Both defendant and his uncle jointly purchased the vacant Site No. 5 situated at Laggere Gram Tana - suit schedule property from one P. Babu by investing the funds of the joint family. The property was registered in the name of the plaintiff-aunt of the defendant as per the sale deed dated 24-3-2003. Due to misunderstanding between the defendant's wife and the plaintiff, defendant's uncle orally told him to get the premises constructed on the vacant site bearing No. 5 (present suit schedule property). Accordingly, the defendant constructed premises on the vacant site by collecting funds from friends, relatives and selling his wife's jewellery. The construction was commenced in September 2004 and completed by June 2005. The newly constructed building consists two floors measuring approximately 12 squares. The defendant performed gruhapravesha and started living in the ground floor and first floor was rented out. It is further contended that as the dispute between the wife of the defendant and the plaintiff resurfaced, Pravardhana Rao and the plaintiff in the presence of other well-wishers jointly executed gift deed dated 9-9-2008 transferring the suit schedule property in favour of the defendant to avoid further misunderstanding in the family. It was thus contended by the defendant that he is the absolute owner of the suit schedule property and there was no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and the defendant. 4. Plaintiff examined herself as P.W. 1. Exs. P. 1 to P. 16 were produced and marked. Defendant examined himself as D.W. 1. Exs. D. 1 to D. 13 were produced and marked. 5. The Court of Small Causes has found that the plaintiff has failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant. The documents produced in the form of counterfoils vide Ex. Exs. P. 1 to P. 16 were produced and marked. Defendant examined himself as D.W. 1. Exs. D. 1 to D. 13 were produced and marked. 5. The Court of Small Causes has found that the plaintiff has failed to establish the relationship of landlord and tenant. The documents produced in the form of counterfoils vide Ex. P. 2 to show that rent has been paid by the defendant to the plaintiff in respect of the premises could not be made basis for establishing the relationship of tenant because they contained only the signature of the plaintiff and there was nothing to show that the defendant had anything to do with it. Even though it was contended that defendant stopped payment of rent from April 2009 and that soon thereafter, plaintiff asked him to vacate the premises, no action was taken by the plaintiff until 6-12-2010, wherein she got issued legal notice to the defendant through her Counsel. It was clear from the evidence of P.W. 1 that he has not chosen to initiate legal proceedings for nearly one year eight months. The Court below has no doubt held that Ex. D. 13-gift deed could not be relied upon to establish that defendant was in possession of the suit schedule property as absolute owner of the same because the gift deed which was compulsorily registerable had not been registered, and therefore, it could not be treated as admissible document. 6. Learned Counsel appearing for the plaintiff contends that in his cross-examination, D.W. 1 has admitted the agreement of lease. Indeed, though legal notice was issued, the defendant has failed to reply the same and therefore, the relationship of landlord and tenant stood established although the defendant had taken up a contention that he had become the owner of the property under a gift deed, as gift deed was not registered, it did not have any evidentiary value and therefore, the defendant had failed to establish his defence that he was the owner of the property under the said gift. Hence, he further contends that rent receipts ought to have been taken note of by the Trial Court. 7. Hence, he further contends that rent receipts ought to have been taken note of by the Trial Court. 7. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent contends that the Small Causes Court had no jurisdiction as the question raised was with regard to the title to the property and therefore, in terms of Section 8 of the Act read with Schedule, the suit before the Small Causes Court was barred. He contends that the gift deed was required to be looked into to find out the nature and character of possession though it was unregistered. Elaborating this submission, he urges that the gift deed was marked without any objection and the duty and penalty had been collected, therefore for collateral purpose it ought to have been looked into. He refutes the contention of the plaintiff that there was any admission regarding the lease and the defendant was not in possession of the property as a lessee. In support of his contention that once the document is admitted in evidence and marked without any objection, later on, no objection could be taken for placing reliance on it, he has relied upon the judgment of this Court in the case of Smt. Malliga Paneer Selvam vs. Raja Sathyanarayana Shetty and Others, 2007 (5) Kar. L.J. 222 : ILR 2007 Kar. 2786. That such document can be looked into for collateral purpose for finding out the nature and character of the possession of the defendant, he has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Mahadeva vs. Commissioner, Mysore City Corporation and Others, 2003 (1) Kar. L.J. 518 : ILR 2003 Kar. 1653 : AIR 2003 Kant. 217. In support of his contention that under Section 8 of the Act read with Schedule, the suit was not maintainable, he has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Baduvakunhi Beary vs. Venkatesha Shanbhongue, 1972 (1) Mys. L.J. 211. 8. In the light of the respective contentions taken, the first point that requires to be considered is:- Whether the suit was maintainable in the light of the provisions contained under Section 8(1) read with Schedule appended to Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act, 1964? 9. Section 8(1) of the Act reads as under:- "8. L.J. 211. 8. In the light of the respective contentions taken, the first point that requires to be considered is:- Whether the suit was maintainable in the light of the provisions contained under Section 8(1) read with Schedule appended to Karnataka Small Cause Courts Act, 1964? 9. Section 8(1) of the Act reads as under:- "8. Cognizance of suits by Courts of Small Causes - (1) A Court of Small Causes shall not take cognizance of the suits specified in the Schedule as suits excepted from the cognizance of a Court of Small Causes." 10. Clause (4) of Schedule appended to the Act states as under:- "(4) A suit for the possession of immovable property or for the recovery of an interest in such property but not including a suit for ejectment where:- (a) The property has been let under a lease or permitted to be occupied, by a written instrument or orally. (b) The Court of Small Causes would be competent to take cognizance of a suit for the rent of the property. (c) The only substantial issue arising for the decision is as to whether the lease has been determined by efflux of the time limited thereby or has been determined by a notice in accordance with the law for the time being in force in respect of such lease, or the permission to occupy has been withdrawn." 11. A conjoint reading of Section 8(1) with clause (4) of the Schedule would make it clear that a Court of Small Causes will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the suits specified in the schedule i.e. a suit filed for possession of the immovable property or for recovery of interest in such property, but in respect of a suit for ejectment where the only substantial issue arising for decision making is, whether the lease had been determined by efflux of time or has been determined by notice in accordance with law applicable to such lease the same can be maintained before the Small Causes Court. Therefore, the question that falls for determination in this case is:- Whether the present suit filed is only regarding determination of lease by efflux of time or by issuing notice in accordance with law for the time being applicable to the lease? 12. As adverted to above, plaintiff claims that she is the owner of the property and the defendant is the tenant. 12. As adverted to above, plaintiff claims that she is the owner of the property and the defendant is the tenant. Whereas, defendant asserts that he is the absolute owner of the property. It is his contention that the property was indeed purchased by him and his uncle out of the joint family funds in the name of the plaintiff who is none other than his aunt. It is his further case that out of the funds generated by him, through his friends and relatives and by selling his wife's jewellery, he has put up construction of ground and first floor over the suit property and has continued to occupy the same. It is in this background, in the wake of such pleadings, the issue that would crop up for consideration would be regarding title to the property. Whether it is the plaintiff who is the absolute owner of the same or the defendant could establish that he is the absolute owner of the property. The substantial issue arising between the parties would not be confined to consideration of the question whether the lease had been determined by efflux of time or by issuance of notice. The larger question that falls for consideration is to determine the title to the property which has been disputed and denied by the defendant. 13. In the case of Baduvakunhi Beary, this Court interpreting Section 8 read with clause (4) has laid down in paragraphs 7 and 8 as under:- "7. On a reading of the above provisions, it is clear that the contention of Sri Gopalakrishna Setty is well-founded. Sub-clause (c) of clause (4) of the Schedule provides that a Court of Small Causes can take cognizance of a suit for possession of immovable property only where a substantial issue arises as to whether the lease has been determined by efflux of time limited thereby or has been determined by a notice in accordance with law for the time being in force in respect of such lease or permission to occupy has been withdrawn. 8. In the present case, the substantial issue that arose for consideration before the lower Court was whether the petitioner was in possession of the suit house as a tenant under the respondent. 8. In the present case, the substantial issue that arose for consideration before the lower Court was whether the petitioner was in possession of the suit house as a tenant under the respondent. The question whether the lease had been determined by efflux of time limited thereby or had been determined by a notice in accordance with law for the time being in force in respect of such lease or permission to occupy had been withdrawn, it is clear from the pleadings in the suit, did not arise for consideration. It is, therefore abundantly clear that the issue which arose for decision before the lower Court and which it decided was one which is excepted from the cognizance of the Court of Small Causes in view of the provisions contained in Section 8 and clause (4) of the Schedule to the Act." 14. It is thus clear that as the issue that arises for consideration is not merely regarding to determination of lease by efflux of time or issuance of notice, but a larger issue regarding title to the property and indeed the defendant has produced and relied upon a gift deed in support of his claim that has been marked in evidence, the matter does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Small Causes Court. The plaintiff ought to have instituted a suit for possession before the Court of competent jurisdiction and not before the Small Causes Court. Hence, on this ground alone, this revision petition deserves to be dismissed. 15. It is unnecessary to go into the other questions as it is held that the Small Causes Court did not have any jurisdiction to entertain the suit. 16. Though it is contended by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-revision petitioner that in the cross-examination, defendant has admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant, on careful perusal of the evidence, particularly cross-examination of D.W. 1, do not find any such admission by the defendant. What all he has stated is, that the Xerox copy of the rent agreement which the plaintiff had enclosed to the notice that was served on him by the plaintiff was with him and that he would produce the same before the Court on the next date of hearing. What all he has stated is, that the Xerox copy of the rent agreement which the plaintiff had enclosed to the notice that was served on him by the plaintiff was with him and that he would produce the same before the Court on the next date of hearing. This, by no stretch of imagination can be said to be an admission on the part of the defendant that an agreement had been entered into between the plaintiff and defendant and the Xerox copy was with the defendant. This is nothing but misreading of the cross-examination of D.W. 1. 17. Hence, for all the reasons stated above, this revision petition is dismissed. It is needless to observe that it will be open for the plaintiff to file a proper suit and agitate his grievance to establish her rights and seek possession of the property in accordance with law.