Judgment Tapan Kumar Dutt, J. The facts of the case, briefly, are as follows: The plaintiff/respondent filed a suit being Title Suit No. 769 of 1996 against the defendant/appellant praying, inter alia, for a decree for possession of the suit premises by ejecting the defendant therefrom, damages and/or mesne profits etc. The said suit was placed before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) 2nd Court, Sealdah. The suit property as described in the plaint is 18 cottas of land situate at 77B, or 77/A or 77/1 Christopher Road, Calcutta-700046, having thereon originally one tin-shed or mud-shed godown converted into pucca shed or sheds along with the raising of a twostoried pucca structure consisting of several rooms. The case of the plaintiff was that one Dr. Shyama Charan Mitra was the owner of half of the premises No.77, Christopher Road, Calcutta-700046 and on and from 01.10.1954 he leased out his portion of the said premises to one Aaron Morris for 30 years with the option of renewal for a further period of 20 years and the said Aaron Morris died on September 21, 1969 leaving behind his son Harry Morris and the leasehold property vested in Harry Morris. The plaintiff further stated in the plaint that in September 1973, the said Harry Morris let out 18 cottas of leasehold land with kutchha and temporary one-storied structure surrounded by brick-build walls to M/s. Capital Rubber Works at a certain monthly rent and the said Capital Rubber Works subsequently promoted the defendant company which is now in wrongful occupation of the suit property. The plaintiff’s case is that the said Harry Morris did not exercise the said option for extension or renewal of the lease before or after the expiry of the lease but he continued to occupy the leasehold with his tenant or tenants. The plaintiff’s further case is that on or about 21.05.1987 the said Dr. Shyama Charan Mitra by a registered deed sold and conveyed out of his portion of the said premises No.77, Christopher Road, Kolkata 700046, land measuring about 2 bighas 10 cottas, 7 chittacks and 27 sft. with structures thereon along with tenant or tenants to the plaintiff. The plaintiff duly mutated its name in the records of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and it has been re-numbered as 77B, Christopher Road, Kolkata 700046. The plaintiff has also pleaded that the said Dr. with structures thereon along with tenant or tenants to the plaintiff. The plaintiff duly mutated its name in the records of the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and it has been re-numbered as 77B, Christopher Road, Kolkata 700046. The plaintiff has also pleaded that the said Dr. Shyama Charan Mitra also transferred and/or sold his remaining portion of the said premises No.77, Christopher Road, Kolkata-700046 to one Industrial Powders Manufacturing Syndicate and the said plot has been numbered as 77A, Christopher Road, Kolkata-7000046. It is the plaintiff’s case that the said Harry Morris surrendered his tenanted land with structures thereon to the said Dr. Shyama Charan Mitra who informed the plaintiff. The plaintiff has alleged that the said Harry Morris had informed the defendant that he had transferred his right to the tenancy to M/s. Eastern Chemical Industries and requested the defendant to pay rent to the said M/s. Eastern Chemical Industries. The plaintiff has further alleged that the plaintiff was surprised to find that the tenanted land was converted by the defendant in the meantime to a pucca shed or sheds along with the raising of a two storied brick built building with several rooms therein. It is the plaintiff’s case that the defendant illegally deposited the rent with the learned Rent Controller, Calcutta for the month of April, 1988 to the credit of the executors and trustees to the estate of late Arron Morris. It is the plaintiff’s case that Dr. Shyma Charan Mitra by a letter dated 28.06.1988 had informed the defendant that the portion of the premises No. 77, Christopher Road, Calcutta which fell in his share and conveyed to the plaintiffs, the defendant was and is in occupation of the same as a tenant in respect of a part thereof and requested the defendant to pay rent with all arrears since May, 1987 to the plaintiff and attorn its tenancy in favour of the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had neither paid rent nor attorned its tenancy nor surrendered the same to the plaintiff. According to the plaintiff, the defendant had neither paid rent nor attorned its tenancy nor surrendered the same to the plaintiff. The plaintiff’s further allegation was that the defendant has caused substantial changes in the character of the suit premises and caused demolition of existing kutchha and other one-storied temporary structures in respect of which the defendant was inducted as a sub-tenant and had built in place thereof pucca sheds with brick walls, iron structures and concrete beam along with two storied brick built building with several rooms therein without the knowledge and consent of the then landlord as also the plaintiff and as such the defendant is guilty of violation of the provisions of (M), (O), and (P) to Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The plaintiff has also pleaded in the plaint, by way of amendment, that the plaintiff reasonably requires the suit premises for its own use and occupation and the plaintiff has mutated its name with the Calcutta Municipal Corporation and on mutation the said Corporation has given the premises number as 77B, Christopher Road, wherein the defendant’s tenancy is continuing. According to the plaintiff, the defendant did not have any tenancy at 77A, Christopher Road and the plaintiff has alleged that Ravi and Shashi, after completing their education, became partners of the plaintiff firm and, accordingly, the partnership has been reconstituted and there are as many as six partners in the plaintiff firm. The plaintiff has stated that the plaintiff has decided to expand the present business in manufacturing goods and new machineries are lying idle and uninstalled since there is no sufficient space for installation in the present existing shed. The plaintiff has also alleged that the plaintiff intends to start three plants and one office room with Latrine and toilet and as such the suit premises is reasonably required by the plaintiff and the plaintiff has no other reasonably suitable alternative accommodation. The plaintiff has also pleaded that a notice to quit dated 10th June, 1996 was served upon the defendant but the defendant has neither replied to the said notice nor vacated the suit premises and hence the said suit. The defendant contested the said suit by filing a written statement denying the material allegations made in the plaint. The defendant has disputed the alleged ownership of the plaintiff and the plaintiff was put to strict proof thereof. The defendant contested the said suit by filing a written statement denying the material allegations made in the plaint. The defendant has disputed the alleged ownership of the plaintiff and the plaintiff was put to strict proof thereof. The defendant has alleged that the defendant prior to the functioning of its works made necessary construction in accordance with the terms of agreement. The defendant has also alleged that neither the plaintiff nor Harry Morris ever intimated the defendant to attorn the tenancy to the plaintiff. The defendant has pleaded in the additional written statement that the defendant was inducted by erstwhile owner/landlord at premises No.77A, Christopher Road. The defendant had denied the allegation that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property by purchase. The defendant has alleged that there are several spaces still vacant at 77, Christopher Road, Calcutta and there is no dearth of space. The defendant has pleaded that he has been inducted by the erstwhile owner and continuing business therein on payment of the monthly rent. According to the defendant, during the continuance of the suit the plaintiff has rented out of a portion of 77, Christopher Road which is alleged to be 77B, Christopher Road to one M/s. Safrroy and the question of expansion is also a myth. The said suit ultimately came up for hearing before the learned Trial Court when the learned Trial Court by judgment and decree dated 26th September, 2006 dismissed the said suit. The learned Trial Court found, inter alia, that there is no dispute with regard to relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and that the defendant became a tenant under the plaintiff by operation of law. The learned Trial Court found that it is a first-time default on the part of the defendant and, therefore, the defendant is entitled to protection under Section 17(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956. The learned Trial Court found that the notice to quit was served upon the defendant in accordance with law and that the said ejectment notice dated 10.06.1996 is legal, valid and sufficient. The learned Trial Court found that the plaintiff has failed to prove the allegation of addition and alteration against the defendant. The learned Trial Court found that the notice to quit was served upon the defendant in accordance with law and that the said ejectment notice dated 10.06.1996 is legal, valid and sufficient. The learned Trial Court found that the plaintiff has failed to prove the allegation of addition and alteration against the defendant. The learned Trial Court also found that in the absence of any cogent document as evidence it cannot be held that the defendant has changed the nature and character of the property without the consent of the plaintiff and as such no decree can be passed on the ground of Clause (M), (O) and (P) of Section 108 of the Transfer of Property Act. The learned Trial Court found in its judgment that the premises No. 77, Christopher Road has been purchased by husband and wife separately and separate premises numbers have been allotted after mutation. The learned Trial Court has recorded that the husband of Kalawati Devi has deposed as P.W.1 who has claimed ownership of premises No. 77A, Christopher Road and the said P.W.1 has also admitted in evidence that M/s. Eastern Chemical Industries is his family business. The learned Trial Court has also observed that if the said P.W.1 at all desires to expand the business, the question that would arise is why the premises No. 77A, Christopher Road has not been utilized, particularly, when the said P.W.1 himself is the owner of premises No.77A, Christopher Road. The learned Trial Court has observed in its judgment that it is astonishing that instead of expanding business the P.W.1 has started construction of G+11 storied building at the said premises No.77A, Christopher Road for selling out the flats. The learned Trial Court came to the conclusion that it is unable to hold that the plaintiff requires more space for expansion of business or that without evicting the defendant such expansion is not possible. The learned Trial Court found that the plaintiff has no other suitable reasonable accommodation elsewhere but the plaintiff has failed to prove that it reasonably requires the suit premises. Challenging the said judgment and decree dated 26th September, 2006 the plaintiff filed an appeal being T.A. 129 of 2006 which was placed before the learned Fast Track Court, 1st Court, Sealdah, 24Pgs (South). Challenging the said judgment and decree dated 26th September, 2006 the plaintiff filed an appeal being T.A. 129 of 2006 which was placed before the learned Fast Track Court, 1st Court, Sealdah, 24Pgs (South). The learned First Appellate Court by judgment and decree dated 4th December, 2008 allowed the said appeal and granted the plaintiff a decree for eviction on the ground of reasonable requirement against the defendant and the defendant was directed to vacate the suit premises in favour of the plaintiff within a stipulated period of time, and, in default, the plaintiff was at liberty to get possession of the suit premises in accordance with law. The learned First Appellate Court found, inter alia, that there is no sufficient evidence to show as to what was the nature of the suit premises at the time of induction. The learned First Appellate Court found that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant has made alleged construction in the suit premises. The learned First Appellate Court found that if the defendant had taken electricity in the suit premises from the authorities concerned the plaintiff cannot stand in the way and that the plaintiff has failed to prove that the defendant has caused damage to the suit property. The learned First Appellate Court found that the learned Trial Court has rightly given the protection under Section 17(4) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 in favour of the defendant. With regard to the ground of reasonable requirement the learned First Appellate Court found that the defendant has not challenged the finding of the learned Trial Court that the plaintiff has no other reasonable accommodation elsewhere. The learned First Appellate Court found that not a single document has been admitted into evidence to show that the plaintiff firm is the owner of 77A, Christopher Road and it also found that the plaintiff firm has existing business and that it wants to expand such business and as such the suit property is required. The learned First Appellate Court proceeded on the basis that the landlord is the best judge to decide the suitability of the premises which may be required for its own use and occupation and the landlord has complete freedom in this regard. The learned First Appellate Court proceeded on the basis that the landlord is the best judge to decide the suitability of the premises which may be required for its own use and occupation and the landlord has complete freedom in this regard. The learned First Appellate Court also found that the plaintiff has been able to prove that it is not in a position to install the machineries and plants already purchased for expansion of the business due to dearth of suitable and sufficient accommodation. The learned First Appellate Court found that the learned Trial Court made peculiar findings regarding premises 77A, Christopher Road being given to a developer for construction of multistoried building which was not the subject-matter of the suit. The learned First Appellate Court ultimately found that the plaintiff has been able to prove the requirement of the suit premises for expansion of its business it has also been proved that the plaintiff has no alternative suitable accommodation elsewhere. The learned First Appellate Court affirmed the view of the learned Trial Court with regard to the notice of eviction and that the plaintiff is not entitled to claim any mesne profits against the defendant. The learned First Appellate Court thus decreed the suit on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree dated 4th December, 2008 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track 1st Court, Sealdah in title appeal No. 129 of 2006 (re-numbered as title appeal No. 11 of 2007) the defendant has preferred the instant second appeal. Being aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the said judgment and decree dated 4th December, 2008 passed by the learned Additional District Judge, Fast Track 1st Court, Sealdah in title appeal No. 129 of 2006 (re-numbered as title appeal No. 11 of 2007) the defendant has preferred the instant second appeal. By order dated 11.02.2009 an Hon’ble Division Bench of this Court was pleased to admit the second appeal on the following substantial questions of law: “a) Whether the learned courts below committed substantial error of law in overlooking the fact that the suit having been instituted by a Partnership Firm by describing itself as landlord but having failed to prove that such partnership firm is the owner of the property, the suit for eviction on the ground under Section 13(1)(ff) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act was not maintainable; b) Whether the learned courts below committed substantial error of law in overlooking the fact that the P.W.1 admitted that his wife had purchased the half portion of premises No.77 which is renumbered at 77B, Christopher Road, the suit property and as such the suit filed by a partnership firm of which she was merely a partner on the ground of reasonable requirement was not maintainable; c) in view of the fact that the P.W.1 in his evidence admitted that he could not remember whether his wife as proprietor of firm transferred the same by any instrument and further admission that from Exhibit 2, the names of the partners of the firm were not available, whether the learned courts below committed substantial error of law in not holding that the plaintiff by production of Exhibit 19 could not establish that the registered firm, namely, the present plaintiff purchased the property by virtue of Exhibit 19.” It appears by an order dated 11.4.2014 the following additional grounds were formulated for the purpose of hearing of the appeal. “(1) Whether or not the learned First Appellate Court committed any error in not holding that the suit filed by the respondent was not a validly instituted suit and the respondent could not have relied upon the plaint which was not validly filed and the amended plaint remained unsigned. “(1) Whether or not the learned First Appellate Court committed any error in not holding that the suit filed by the respondent was not a validly instituted suit and the respondent could not have relied upon the plaint which was not validly filed and the amended plaint remained unsigned. (2) Whether or not the learned First Appellate Court should have taken into consideration the effect of the death of Kalawati Soni on the constitution of the plaintiff firm and whether or not any decree could be passed on the ground of reasonable requirement in favour of the plaintiff firm when the very existence of the plaintiff firm came under question. (3) Whether or not the impugned decree can be sustained in view of the fact that subsequent event developed during the pendency of the present appeal i.e. the plaintiff had allegedly inducted one M/s. Pristine Beverages at Premises No.77B, Christopher Road, P.S. Tangra, Kolkata – 700046 during the pendency of the instant appeal.” In the instant second appeal the defendant/appellant filed an application being CAN 5507 of 2010 for a direction upon the Thika Controller, Calcutta Thika Tenancy to dispose of a certain matter admitted on May 17, 2010 and for adjourning the second appeal sine die with liberty to the parties to mention after final orders are passed in the matter which was pending before the said Thika Controller. The defendant/appellant had also prayed for interim stay of all further proceedings in the instant second appeal and connected applications. By order dated 25.04.2011 this Court had disposed of the said application by holding, inter alia, that the hearing of the second appeal should be adjourned till the disposal of the proceeding which was pending before the Thika Controller concerned and thus adjourned the hearing of the second appeal till the disposal of the proceeding which was pending before the Thika Controller concerned or until further orders whichever was earlier and the parties were given liberty to mention with regard to the hearing of the second appeal after the disposal of the aforesaid proceedings before the Thika Controller concerned. It appears that challenging the said order dated 25.04.2011 the plaintiff/respondent filed a petition for special leave to appeal (Civil) No. 16135 of 2011 before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India and the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India by order dated 08.08.2011 was pleased to dispose of the said special leave petition by the following order: “Heard Mr. A.K. Ganguli, learned senior advocate appearing for the petitioner, and Mr. Prateek Jalan, learned advocate appearing for the respondent, and with their consent, this special leave petition is disposed of in the following terms: The impugned order passed by the High Court staying the hearing of Second Appeal No. 105 of 2009 filed before the High Court at the instance of the respondent is set aside. The hearing of the second appeal shall now proceed in accordance with law. The proceedings in Misc. Case No. 30 of 2010 before the Thika Controller, Kolkata under the provisions of West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Act, 2001 shall proceed independently and on its own merits. The Thika Controller shall try to dispose of the proceedings expeditiously and shall not grant any unnecessary adjournments to any side. It is also made clear that the pendency of the Second Appeal No. 105 of 2009 shall not be a ground for staying the proceedings of Misc. Case No. 30 of 2010. In case any final order is passed in Misc. Case No. 30 of 2010 before the final disposal of the second appeal, it will be open to the respondent to take appropriate steps in light of that order. In case, however, the second appeal is disposed of earlier than the thika proceedings and in case the judgment is adverse to the respondent, it will not foreclose the respondent’s remedy under the Thika Act.” The Controller, Calcutta Thika Tenancy passed a final order in the proceedings before it and found that the undivided premises No.77 Christopher Road (presently 77A and 77B) is a thika land and the land along with the interest of the landlord therein have been vested in the State with effect from 18.01.1982 by operation of law. The said Controller, Kolkata Thika Tenancy declared that Harry Morris was a thika tenant in respect of the undivided 77 Christopher Road and the appellant was declared as a Bharatia in respect of the 18 cottahs of land being a portion of premises No. 77B Christopher Road. It further appears that the Thika Controller declared that a certain sale deed No. 8172 of 1987 registered in the office of Sub-Registrar Sealdah with Harry Morris as a confirming party is declared as invalid and another deed of conveyance No.8169 of 1987 registered in the office of the Sub-Registrar Sealdah has no effect as that was made on a Government land and the structures of Harry Morris on the undivided 77 Christopher Road do forfeit to the State in terms of Section 6(2), Section 8(4) Section 8(8) and Rule 7 and Rule 14 of the West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition and Regulation) Rules, 2004. The said Controller, Kolkata Thika Tenancy held that the appellant herein be granted licence for the area occupied by it in terms of Section 6(5) of the Act concerned and the appellant will submit necessary application along with requisite papers in the thika tenancy office concerned. It appears that the respondent has filed an appeal against the final order of the Thika Controller and the said appeal is pending hearing. It also appears that in connection with the said appeal against the final order of the Thika Controller the matter had come up before this Court before an Hon’ble Division Bench when by an order dated 9.02.2013 in WPLRT No. 229 of 2012 the said Hon’ble Division Bench was pleased to pass the following orders: “After hearing the learned Counsel appearing for the parties and on the basis of suggestion made by the Court a consensus has been arrived at and on that basis the following order is passed. The respondent No.2 shall withdraw the applications, pending before the learned Single Judge taking up the second appeal, registered as C.A.N. No. 7620 of 2012 and CAN No. 7621 of 2012 with liberty to apply afresh after the thika proceedings are concluded finally. Needless to mention, the State shall not assert its right nor shall seek to take possession until the thika proceedings are concluded finally. Needless to mention, the State shall not assert its right nor shall seek to take possession until the thika proceedings are concluded finally. It is clarified that the petitioner before us shall also not take any step to evict the respondent No.2 till both the proceedings are finally concluded as indicated above. We have merely made an interim arrangement so that the rights of the parties can be decided in accordance with law. We should not be deemed to have expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter. The Appellate Authority shall try to dispose of the matter expeditiously. The application being C.A.N. 9247 of 2012 is dismissed as not pressed with liberty to apply afresh before the appropriate forum. The writ petition is, thus, disposed of. Let Xerox plain copies of this order, duly counter-signed by the Assistant Registrar Court, be given to the learned Advocates for the parties on usual undertakings.” It may be recorded here that the learned Advocates for the respective parties have submitted their respective written notes of argument. The learned Advocate for the defendant/appellant made the following submissions: (1) The ground of reasonable requirement was sought to be introduced in the plaint by way of amendment of the plaint in the year 2003 and the learned First Appellate Court has allowed the suit only on the ground of reasonable requirement of the plaintiff even though the appellant has not admitted the relationship of landlord and tenant and the appellant has never paid rent to the respondent except under the provisions of law which required the appellant to pay rent in order to defend the suit. (2) The schedule of the suit property mentioned in the plaint is vague and on the basis of such vague description the suit filed by the respondent could not have been allowed. (3) The plaint appears to be verified in 1996 and the date of verification typed on the copy of the amended plaint is that of 2003 and even though Ravi Soni appears to be the deponent the said Ravi Soni has never given any evidence although his father Giridharilal Soni had given evidence. (3) The plaint appears to be verified in 1996 and the date of verification typed on the copy of the amended plaint is that of 2003 and even though Ravi Soni appears to be the deponent the said Ravi Soni has never given any evidence although his father Giridharilal Soni had given evidence. (4) A Registered partnership firm can only sue through its partners whose names are recorded in the Register maintained by the Registrar of Firms and a person whose name does not appear in such register cannot sue on behalf of or in the name of the registered partnership firm. (5) Even though the said Giridharilal Soni has stated that there are six partners in the plaintiff firm but in fact there were only two partners of the registered partnership firm, namely, S.K. Varma and Kalawati Soni, but Kalawati Soni died in the year 2007, and the name of Ravi Soni does not appear in the register maintained by the Registrar of Firms. (6) Ravi Soni was never competent to institute any suit or proceeding in the name of the registered partnership firm and neither Giridharilal Soni nor Ravi Soni had any locus standi to institute the suit on behalf of the plaintiff. (7) During the pendency of the present second appeal the appellant received a notice from the Thika Controller, Kolkata Thika Tenancy to produce relevant records in respect of the premises which is occupied by the appellant and subsequently Misc. case No.30 of 2010 was filed by the appellant before the learned Thika Controller and the learned Thika Controller has held that the property in dispute is a thika tenancy property and an appeal has been filed against such order of the Thika Controller but the judgment of the Thika Controller has not been stayed. (8) Ravi Soni while giving evidence in the said Misc. (8) Ravi Soni while giving evidence in the said Misc. case No. 30 of 2010 has stated that he did not sign the plaint in the suit, he cannot take the responsibility of the averments made in the plaint which according to Ravi Soni was signed by his father, he cannot say whether the plaint contains true and correct facts, he did not sign or verify the plaint in the suit on behalf of the plaintiff, he has not signed any vakalatnama on behalf of Eastern Chemical Industries and he does not recollect whether his father had authorized him to sign in any proceeding or affidavit or any paper connected with any legal proceeding except the proceeding before the Thika Controller. The subsequent explanation attempted to be given by Ravi Soni was not bona fide and it was a product of afterthought. (9) If the entirety of the evidence of Ravi Soni before the Thika Controller is taken into consideration one has to conclude that Ravi Soni did not have any knowledge in respect of the plaint or the context the thereof. (10) In view of the application filed by the respondent to adduce additional evidence for the purpose of proving its ownership one can conclude that evidence adduced by the plaintiff was not sufficient to prove that the said registered partnership firm is the owner of the property, and the learned Courts below could not have come to the conclusion that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property. (11) Since the ground of reasonable requirement was sought to be incorporated in the plaint by way of amendment of the plaint and the plaint was not even signed and/or verified by any person, the suit is not maintainable and no leave can be granted to the said Ravi Soni to sign the amended plaint as the name of Ravi Soni does not appear as partner of the plaintiff in the office of the Registrar of Firms. (12) Since one of the partners has died the said firm became a proprietorship firm and a serious doubt has been cast upon the very existence of the plaintiff firm, no decree could be passed in the said suit for eviction. (12) Since one of the partners has died the said firm became a proprietorship firm and a serious doubt has been cast upon the very existence of the plaintiff firm, no decree could be passed in the said suit for eviction. (13) There is no supporting pleading and/or evidence in support of the argument advanced on behalf of the respondent that although Kalavati Soni might have purchased the suit property but by reason of the fact that Kalavati Soni had brought in such suit property to the till of the partnership firm, the registered partnership firm should be presumed to have become the owner of the suit property. There is also no supporting pleadings and evidence that by virtue of Ext.19 the registered partnership firm became the owner of the suit premises. A third case has been made out that since the property was purchased out of the funds of the partnership, the same belongs to the registered partnership firm but such case has not been made out in the plaint. (14) The requirement of Giridhari Lal Soni and his family members cannot be the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff firm in which the Kalavati Soni was a partner along with a complete stranger, S.K. Verma. (15) Only to fill up the lacuna in the evidence of the plaintiff the application for additional evidence has been filed by the plaintiff/respondent. (16) Before the learned Trial Court attempt was made by the plaintiff to recall P.W. 1 to bring in additional documents to prove ownership of the registered partnership firm but such attempt failed and the learned Trial Court had rejected such application. Thereafter no appeal was preferred against the said order of the learned Trial Court. The said Giridhari Lal Soni has admitted that he does not have any document to show that Kalawati Soni has transferred the property purchased by her to the partnership firm. (17) There was no attempt from 1996 till 2009 to plead or prove that Kalawati Soni, after purchasing half of premises No.77 Christopher Road, had transferred the same into the assets of the partnership firm and it will be clear from the evidence on record that the plaintiff could not prove that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit premises and as such no decree for eviction can be passed in favour of the plaintiff. The Thika Controller has held that the suit premises comprises thika land and thus the appellant cannot be treated to be a premises tenant under the plaintiff and as such the decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court is not sustainable. (18) Since neither Ravi Soni nor Giridhari Lal Soni has any authority to represent the registered partnership firm no leave can be granted to the said Ravi Soni to re-affirm the amended plaint and the said Giridhari Lal Soni has completely suppressed the fact that one S.K. Varma was a partner of the plaintiff firm and in view of such suppression of material fact the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief. (19) No decree for reasonable requirement can be passed in the present suit as the plaintiff being a registered partnership firm has not led any evidence to prove reasonable requirement of the persons whose names appear in the register of firms as partners. The learned First Appellate Court overlooked the fact that during the pendency of the suit the business of Industrial Powder Manufacturing Syndicate was shifted out of premises No. 77A and was accommodated within premises No.77B which was also under the occupation of Giridhari Lal Soni and other members of the Soni family and the plea of reasonable requirement was incorporated after such business was shifted and it was thus clear that there was no requirement at all. (20) The plaintiff’s witness having admitted that a part of available space was given away to M/s. Industrial powder Manufacturing Syndicate and since the learned First Appellate Court assumed such proprietorship firm to be a separate entity the learned First Appellate Court should have held that the plaintiff had no reasonable requirement. The finding of the learned First Appellate Court that the property of Industrial Powder Manufacturing Syndicate is that of a separate entity is perverse and the learned First Appellate Court has overlooked the fact that the business of Industrial Powder Manufacturing Syndicate was shifted out from premises No. 77A, Christopher Road to 77B, Christopher Road. The finding of the learned First Appellate Court that the property of Industrial Powder Manufacturing Syndicate is that of a separate entity is perverse and the learned First Appellate Court has overlooked the fact that the business of Industrial Powder Manufacturing Syndicate was shifted out from premises No. 77A, Christopher Road to 77B, Christopher Road. With regard to CAN 5355 of 2013 the learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that the alleged requirement of the plaintiff partnership firm is not a bona fide requirement and the plaintiff partnership firm has let out the area of the land on which the plaintiff had permission to do business to one Pristine Beverages for a monthly rent and this will show that the plaintiff’s requirement is not bona fide. The said learned Advocate further submitted that records will show that the plaintiff was not carrying on any business prior to the passing of the impugned judgment and decree. The learned Advocate for the appellant submitted with regard to CAN 5356 of 2013 that the plaintiff had suppressed the fact that it had let out a part of the suit premises to the said Pristine Beverages. With regard to CAN 8128 of 2013 the said learned Advocate submitted that it is necessary to bring on record in the instant appeal the deposition of Ravi Soni before the Thika Controller concerned and the documents tendered before the Thika Controller. The said learned Advocate while making a comparison between the plaint case of the respondent and the case of the respondent before the Thika Controller, submitted that the respondent’s case is self-contradictory. The said learned Advocate put emphasis on the fact that Ravi Soni has stated before the Thika Controller that he did not sign the plaint in T.S. No. 769 of 1996 and that he cannot take the responsibility of the contents of such plaint and that Ravi Soni did not execute any vakalatnama on behalf of the respondent in connection with the said suit and that Ravi Soni did not read the plaint save and except once which was around the year 2008-2009. With regard to CAN 6366 of 2009 the said learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that it is a product of an afterthought only to fill up a lacuna. With regard to CAN 6366 of 2009 the said learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that it is a product of an afterthought only to fill up a lacuna. With regard to CAN 4241 of 2012 the said learned Advocate for the appellant submitted that since Ravi Soni not appear in the register of firms and since Ravi Soni has not been authorized by the registered partnership firm, no leave should be granted to the said Ravi Soni to sign and verify the amended plaint. The said learned Advocate submitted that the amended plaint has not been verified at all as it bears no signature. The said learned Advocate also submitted that the impugned judgment and decree was passed on the basis of the amended plaint which has not been verified at all and no leave can now be granted to the said Ravi Soni to sign and verify the amended plaint as the time under Order 6 Rule 18 C.P.C. has already expired and no application has been filed by the respondent for enlargement of such time. The said learned Advocate also submitted that unless the amendment has been done on the plaint originally filed in accordance with law there is no question of now permitting the said Ravi Soni to sign or verify the plaint. The said learned Advocate further submitted that in view of the final order passed by the Thika Controller concerned declaring the suit property to be a thika tenancy property and that the land along with interest of the landlord has vested in the State with effect from 18.01.1982, the plaintiff/respondent cannot now be declared to be the owner of the suit premises and thus the plaintiff/respondent also cannot get a decree for eviction against the defendant/appellant accordingly. The said learned Advocate also referred to the order of the Thika Controller wherein the Thika Controller in its final order dated 03.07.2012 passed in Miss Case No. 30 of 2010 held: “That the undivided premises No.77, Christopher Road (Presently 77A and 77B, Christopher Road) is a Thika land and the land alongwith interest of Landlord therein have been vested in the State w.e.f. 18.01.1982 by operation of law. That Harry Morris is declared as Thika Tenant in respect of undivided 77, Christopher Road in terms of section 2(14) of the Act. That Harry Morris is declared as Thika Tenant in respect of undivided 77, Christopher Road in terms of section 2(14) of the Act. He did occupy the said land directly under the State in terms of section 5(1) w.e.f. 18.01.1982. The Applicant FRPL is declared as a Bharatia in respect of 18.k. of land being a portion of presently 77B, Christopher Road as prayed. That the impugned deed of sale no. 8172/1987 registered in the Office of Sub-registrar Sealdah with Harry Morris as a confirming party is declared as invalid in terms of section 6(2) of the Act. The another deed of conveyance no.8169/1987 dt. 21.05.1987 registered in the Office of Sub-Registrar Sealdah has no effect as that was made on a Government land. The structures of Harry Morris on the undivided 77, Christopher Road (presently re-numbered as 77A & 77B, Christopher Road) do forfeit to the State in terms of section 6(2), Section 8(4), Section 8(8) and Rule 7 & Rule 14 of West Bengal Thika Tenancy (Acquisition & Regulation) Rules, 2004.” The learned Advocate for the appellant cited a decision reported at AIR 1986 Calcutta 143 in support of his contention that since the plaint filed by the respondent without complying with Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act is a void one the question of amendment of such plaint does not arise and the Court cannot entertain a suit the filing of which has ignored the requirement of Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. The said learned Advocate cited another judgment reported at AIR 2002 Kerala 33 (Popular Automobiles v. G.K. Chami) in support of his contention that no suit can be filed by or on behalf of a firm unless the person suing is or has been shown in the register of the firms as would appear in Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2011 (11) SCC 524 (State Bank of Travancore v. Kingston Computers India Private Limited) in support of his contention that Ravi Soni does not have the power to file the plaint in the absence of the proper authority. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 2012 (8) SCC 516 (Ahmedsaheb (Dead) By Lrs. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 2012 (8) SCC 516 (Ahmedsaheb (Dead) By Lrs. And Others V. Sayed Ismail with Shaikh Ahmed v. Mohd Ismail) in support of his contention that the admission made by Ravi Soni before the Thika Controller that he had never signed the plaint nor he was authorized to act for or on behalf of the respondent and that he had no knowledge of the plaint clearly operate as an admission on the part of Ravi Soni. According to the said learned Advocate, it is clear that Ravi Soni did not have any knowledge of the contents of the plaint which was filed in the year 1996. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 1977 Calcutta 37 (Ram Kumar Shew Chandrai, a firm V. The Dominion of India Now Union of India, representing the Railway Administration) in support of his contention that Section 69(2) of the Indian Partnership Act can be said to have been fulfilled only when the names of the persons have been shown in the register of the Registrar of Firms as partners in the firm. According to the said learned Advocate, since the respondent failed to comply with the said provision of law the filing of the suit for eviction was barred. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 1976 Calcutta 471 (Sunderlal and Sons v. Yagendra Nath Singh and another) in support of his contention that the suit filed by the respondent was a nullity and the impugned judgment and decree is in-executable in view of the Section 69 of the Indian Partnership Act. The said learned Advocate also submitted that since in the instant case the plaintiff/respondent happens to be allegedly a registered partnership firm the cases cited on behalf of the respondent regarding unregistered partnership firm is of no application. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 1981 (3) SCC 36 (M.M. Quasim V. Manohar Lal Sharma And Others) in support of his contention that subsequent rents should be taken into consideration to find out whether the eviction suit can be sustained. Paragraph 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the said reports are quoted below: “13. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 1981 (3) SCC 36 (M.M. Quasim V. Manohar Lal Sharma And Others) in support of his contention that subsequent rents should be taken into consideration to find out whether the eviction suit can be sustained. Paragraph 13, 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18 of the said reports are quoted below: “13. Now, probing the merits of the contention, the first thing that stares in the face is whether where a suit is filed by a person claiming to be landlord on the ground that he in good faith requires the suit premises for his own use and occupation, would he still be entitled to a decree for possession on this ground even if during the course of proceedings his interest in the suit premises has come to an end and on the date of the final decree he had no subsisting interest in the suit premises? In other words, how should the Court approach a proceeding under the Rent Act while taking into consideration the subsequent events which would non-suit the plaintiff? 14. The expression 'landlord' has been defined in s. 2(d) of the Rent Act which reads as under: "landlord" includes the persons who for the time being is receiving, or is entitled to receive, the rent of a building whether on his own account or on behalf of another, or on account or on behalf or for the benefit, or himself and others or as an agent, trustee, executor, administrator, receiver or guardian or who would so receive the rent, or be entitled to receive the rent if the building were let to a tenant." The inclusive definition is couched in very wide language. However this wide amplitude of the expression has been cut down by the explanation appended to clause (c) of sub-section (1) of s. 11 which reads as under: 11. Eviction of tenants: (a) Notwithstanding anything contained in any contract or law to the contrary but subject to the provisions of the Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 and to those of section 12, where a tenant is in possession of any building, he shall not be liable to eviction there-from except in execution of a decree passed by the Court on one or more of the following grounds;- ... ... ... ... ... (c) Where the building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the building is held by the landlord; Provided that where the Court thinks that the reasonable requirement of such occupation may be substantially satisfied by evicting the tenant from a part only of the building and allowing the tenant to continue occupation of the rest and the tenant agrees to such occupation the Court shall pass a decree accordingly, and fix proportionately fair rent for the portion in occupation of the tenant, which portion shall thenceforth constitute the building within the meaning of clause (aa) of section 2, and the rent so fixed shall be deemed to be the fair rent fixed under section 5; Explanation: In this clause the word "landlord" shall not include an agent referred to in clause (d) of section 2." Therefore, while taking advantage of the enabling provision enacted in s.11(1)(c), the person claiming possession on the ground of his reasonable requirement of the leased building must show that he is a landlord in the sense that he is owner of the building and has a right to occupy the same in his own right. A mere rent collector, though may be included in the expression landlord in its wide amplitude cannot be treated as a landlord for the purposes of s. 11(1)(c). This becomes manifestly clear from the explanation appended to the sub-section. By restricting the meaning of expression landlord for the purpose of section 11(1)(c), the legislature manifested its intention namely that landlord alone can seek eviction on the ground of his personal requirement if he is one who has a right against the whole world to occupy the building himself and exclude any one holding a title lesser than his own. Such landlord who is an owner and who would have a right to occupy the building in his own right can seek possession for his own use. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the building for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. The latter part of the section envisages a situation where the landlord is holding the building for the benefit of some other person but in that case landlord can seek to evict tenant not for his personal use but for the personal requirement of that person for whose benefit he holds the building. The second clause contemplates a situation of trustees and cesti que trust but when the case is governed by the first part of sub clause (c) of sub-section (1) of s.11, the person claiming possession for personal requirement must be such a landlord who wants possession for his own occupation and this would imply that he must be a person who has a right to remain in occupation against the whole world and not someone who has no subsisting interest in the property and is merely a rent collector such as an agent, executor, administrator or a receiver of the property. For the purposes of s. 11(1)(c) the expression landlord could, therefore, mean a person who is the owner of the building and who has a right to remain in occupation and actual possession of the building to the exclusion of everyone else. It is such a person who can seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he requires possession in good faith for his own occupation. A rent collector or an agent is not entitled to occupy the house in his own right. Even if such a person be a lessor and, therefore, a landlord within the expanded inclusive definition of the expression landlord, nonetheless he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants to personally occupy the house. He cannot claim such a right against the real owner and as a necessary corollary he cannot seek to evict the tenant on the ground that he wants possession of the premises for his own occupation. That can be the only reasonable interpretation one can put on the ingredients of sub-clause(c) of s. 11(1) which reads: "Where building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation..". That can be the only reasonable interpretation one can put on the ingredients of sub-clause(c) of s. 11(1) which reads: "Where building is reasonably and in good faith required by the landlord for his own occupation..". Assuming that the expression 'landlord' has to be understood with the same connotation as is spelt out by the definition clause, even a rent collector or a receiver of the property appointed by the Court in bankruptcy proceedings would be able to evict the tenant alleging that wants the building for his own occupation, a right which he could not have claimed against the real owner. Therefore, the explanation to clause (d) which cuts down the wide amplitude of the expression 'landlord' would unmistakably show that for the purposes of clause (c) such landlord who in the sense in which the word 'owner' is understood can claim as of right to the exclusion of everyone, to occupy the house, would be entitled to evict the tenant for his own occupation. 15. The next step to be taken is whether where a person claiming to be such a landlord has sought to evict the tenant for his own occupation of the building but lost his interest in entirety in the building during the pendency of the appeal which is a continuation of the suit. Would he still be entitled to maintain or continue the action after the cessation or extinguishment of his interest in the building? To examine this contention on merits one feature of the proceedings under the Rent Act may be taken into consideration. To what extent and in what circumstances the court can take notice of events subsequent to the institution of the action is the core problem. This is no more res integra and need not be examined in depth. In Pasupuleti Venkataeswarlus' case this Court examined this question in relation to a proceeding under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The landlord in that case sought to evict the tenant as he wanted to start his own business in the demised premises. In other words, action was for eviction for personal requirement. In Pasupuleti Venkataeswarlus' case this Court examined this question in relation to a proceeding under the Andhra Pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960. The landlord in that case sought to evict the tenant as he wanted to start his own business in the demised premises. In other words, action was for eviction for personal requirement. In the zig-zag course of proceedings it transpired that subsequent to the commencement of the action the landlord had come into possession of another shop which would meet with his requirement and on this subsequent event tenant requested the court to non-suit the plaintiff. At that stage the proceedings were pending before the High Court in a revision petition at the instance of the landlord questioning a remand to the trial court by the first appellate court for investigation of certain facts. In this revision at the instance of the landlord the High Court took notice of the subsequent event that the landlord's requirement had been fully satisfied as he had come in possession of another shop. In appeal by the landlord to this Court, a serious exception was taken that the High Court could not have taken into consideration an event subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings and non-suit the landlord and that too at a stage when the proceedings were pending in revision at the instance of the landlord. Negativing this contention and dismissing the appeal this Court, after referring to the decision in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul v. Keshwar Lal Chaudhri quoted with approval the following passage from Patterson v. State of Alabama: "We have frequently held that in the exercise of our appellate jurisdiction we have power not only to correct error in the judgment under review but to make such disposition of the case as justice requires. And in determining what justice does require, the Court is bound to consider any change, either in fact or in law, which has supervened since the judgment was entered." In the leading judgment in Lachmeshwar Prasad Shukul's case Varadachariar, J. observed that an appeal being in the nature of a re-hearing the Courts in India have in numerous cases recognized that in moulding the relief to be granted in a case on appeal, the Court of appeal is entitled to take into account even facts which have come into existence after the decree appealed against was made. Krishna Iyer, J. summed up the position in Pasupuleti Venkateswarlu's case: "It is basic to our processual jurisprudence that the right to relief must be judged to exist as on the date a suitor institutes the legal proceeding Equally clear is the principle that procedure is the handmaid and not the mistress of the judicial process. If a fact, arising after the lis has come to court and has a fundamental impact on the right to relief or the manner of moulding it is brought diligently to the notice of the tribunal, it cannot blink at it or be blind to events which stultify or render inept the decretal remedy. Equity justifies binding the rules of procedure, where no specific provision or fair play is violated, with a view to promote substantial justice-subject, of course, to the absence of other disentitling factors or just circumstances. Nor can we contemplate any limitation on this power to take note of updated facts to confine it to the trial Court. If the litigation pends, the power exists, absent other special circumstances repelling resort to that course in law or justice... We affirm the proposition that for making the right or remedy claimed by the party just and meaningful as also legally and factually in accord with the current realities, the court can, and in many cases must, take cautious cognizance of events and developments subsequent to the institution of the proceeding provided the rules of fairness to both sides are scrupulously obeyed." To sum up, there was a proper and regular application to meet with the requirements of order 41 rule 27, CPC for additional evidence inviting the Court's attention to a subsequent event of vital importance cutting at the root of the plaintiff's right to continue the action. Coupled with it, there was evidence in the form of a certified copy of the decree showing that the plaintiffs, even if they had some shade of title to commence action, they having lost all interest in the property and the property having become one of exclusive ownership of a person not a party to the proceedings, were no more entitled to continue the proceedings for their own benefit. 16. Have the first appellate court and the High Court acted in accordance with law in ignoring this subsequent event of vital importance? 16. Have the first appellate court and the High Court acted in accordance with law in ignoring this subsequent event of vital importance? The first appellate court, as pointed out earlier, proceeded to examine the contention on merits and rejected it on the ground that this being an event subsequent to the passing of the decree by the trial court, no notice could be taken of it, a view contrary to the law laid down by this Court. Same is true of the High Court when it said that even if the landlord who commenced action lost all interest in the property subsequent to the passing of the decree, the decree does not become a nullity and at any rate no note of the subsequent events can be taken in the absence of a proper application under order 41, rule 27, C.P.C. But the next observation of the High Court that where the plaintiff landlord's interest in the property is extinguished subsequent to the decree by the trial court, he does not lose his right to maintain and continue the action, is opposed to the very scheme of the Rent Act and the provisions contained in ss. 11(1)(c) and 12. Both the courts were, therefore, clearly in error in ignoring this vital piece of evidence which goes to the root of the matter and would surely non-suit the plaintiffs. 17. Once this subsequent event of landlord's interest in the property getting extinguished as the property in question is allotted as an exclusive owner to a sharer upon a partition amongst co-sharers, is properly evaluated, unless some proper explanation is offered by the landlords who are parties to the proceedings, the plaintiffs are liable to be non-suited. This does not require much of a discussion because plaintiffs sought possession for personal requirement of respondent 1 Manohar Lal Sharma. Monohar Lal Sharma wanted to start his clinic, as he is a qualified medical practitioner, in the suit premises. Manohar Lal Sharma is neither an owner nor a co-owner nor has he any interest in the suit property since the date of partition effected by compromise between the co-sharers in Suit No. 4/75. Monohar Lal Sharma wanted to start his clinic, as he is a qualified medical practitioner, in the suit premises. Manohar Lal Sharma is neither an owner nor a co-owner nor has he any interest in the suit property since the date of partition effected by compromise between the co-sharers in Suit No. 4/75. If action were to start today or day after the decree for partition, could Manohar Lal Sharma ever file a suit for evicting the present appellant from the suit shop on the ground that he wanted to start his clinic in the suit shop? If Manoharlal Sharma can bring such an action he can as well evict any tenant from any premises with which he has no connection. Even if at the commencement of the action Manoharlal Sharma was a co-owner alongwith his brother and uncle and, therefore, he had a semblance of title to commence action for eviction, once the co-owner parted company, partitioned the property by metes and bounds and the suit property came to be allotted to Pyarelal as an exclusive owner Manoharlal Sharma cannot claim eviction of the tenant from such property in which he has no subsisting interest. And even if this event occurred subsequent to the passing of the decree by the trial court, this subsequent event should have been noticed at the appellate stage because the appeal is nothing else but a continuation of the suit and in a proceeding under the Rent Act the relief has to be moulded according to the situation on the date of the decree; the decree would mean the decree which is final and not correctible by any judicial proceeding. Manoharlal Sharma, therefore, cannot seek to evict the tenant for his personal requirement. Therefore, the suit for eviction under s.11(1)(c) would ordinarily fail on this ground. However, as the fresh evidence is being taken into consideration and as both the appellate courts and the High Court, have erred in approaching the matter by ignoring the subsequent event, it would be presently pointed out that in order to do justice between the parties the matter will have to be remanded to the first appellate court. 18. Before turning to the next topic, a word about the judicial approach to the question of personal requirement of the landlord under the Rent Act would not be out of place. 18. Before turning to the next topic, a word about the judicial approach to the question of personal requirement of the landlord under the Rent Act would not be out of place. The learned judge of the first appellate court while upholding the claim of personal requirement of respondent 1 has observed as under: "It is for the plaintiffs to decide whatever they think fit and proper. It is not for the defendant to suggest as to what they should do. The defendant has led evidence to show that the plaintiffs have got some more houses at Girdih.... The defendant appellant has also filed certified copy of judgment of one suit No. 47/73 which is Ext. D only to show that plaintiffs have got a decree for eviction with respect to the other house at Giridih. I have already pointed out earlier that it is for the plaintiffs to decide which of the houses is suitable for them. It is not for the defendant to suggest that the house which will fall vacant in the near future is most suitable house for the plaintiffs". This approach betrays a woeful lack of consciousness relatable to circumstances leading to enactment of Rent Acts in almost all States in the country. The time honoured notion that the right of re-entry is unfettered and that the owner landlord is the sole judge of his requirement has been made to yield to the needs of the society which had to enact the Rent Acts specifically devised to curb and fetter the unrestricted right of re-entry and to provide that only on proving some enabling grounds set out in the Rent Act the landlord can re-enter. One such ground is of personal requirement of landlord. When examining a case of personal requirement, if it is pointed out that there is some vacant premises with the landlord which he can conveniently occupy, the element of need in his requirement would be absent. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison de'etre of the Rent Act. To reject this aspect by saying that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose the premises is to negative the very raison de'etre of the Rent Act. Undoubtedly, if it is shown by the tenant that the landlord has some other vacant premises in his possession, that by itself may not be sufficient to negative the landlord's claim but in such a situation the Court would expect the landlord to establish that the premises which is vacant is not suitable for the purpose of his occupation or for the purpose for which he requires the premises in respect of which the action is commenced in the Court. It would, however, be a bald statement unsupported by the Rent Act to say that the landlord has an unfettered right to choose whatever premises he wants and that too irrespective of the fact that he has some vacant premises in possession which he would not occupy and try to seek to remove the tenant. This approach would put a premium on the landlord's greed to throw out tenants paying lower rent in the name of personal occupation and rent out the premises in his possession at the market rate. To curb this very tendency the Rent Act was enacted and, therefore, it becomes the duty of the Court administering the Rent Act to bear in mind the object and intendment of the legislature in enacting the same. The Court must understand and appreciate the relationship between legal rules and one of necessities of life-shelter-and the way in which one part of the society exacts tribute from another for permission to inhabit a portion of the globe. In 'The Sociology of Law', edited by Pat Carlen, the author examines the rent and rent legislation in England and Wales and observes as under: "The prevailing paradigms of neo-classical economics and empiricist political theory have determined the conceptual insularity of law and legal institutions, with the result that they and other social events appear as random existences independent of their historical formation. The force of any theory of law must of course lie in its explanatory power, and this in turn depends on the wider image of social relations which produces it". The force of any theory of law must of course lie in its explanatory power, and this in turn depends on the wider image of social relations which produces it". The said learned Advocate submitted that the subsequent events which took place before the Thika Controller concerned during the pendency of the instant appeal has to be taken into consideration by this Court while deciding the second appeal as the said developments before the Thika Controller strike at the root of the matter and poses the question as to whether or not the plaintiff/respondent is at all entitled to obtain a decree for eviction against the defendant/appellant on the ground of reasonable requirement when the final order passed by the Thika Controller clearly indicates and establishes the fact that the plaintiff/respondent has no manner of ownership in respect of the suit premises and the right, title and interest of the superior landlord in respect of the suit premises had vested in the State way back in the year 1982. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2012 (8) SCC 148 (Union of India v. Ibhrahim Uddin and another) in support of his contention that even if it is assumed for the sake of argument that the defendant has failed to prove his defence it cannot amount to an admission nor does it reverse or discharge the burden of proof of the plaintiff. The said learned Advocate submitted that in the instant case it has not been pleaded that Kalawati Soni had purchased the suit property out of the funds of the partnership firm, and, therefore, no evidence in this regard can be taken into consideration and in this regard Paragraph 77 of the said reports should be noted. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 2013 (9) SCC 152 (Vathsala Manickavasagam and others v. N. Ganesan and another) in support of his contention that admission by a party construe a substantial piece of evidence and in the absence of proper explanation by the party making such admission it will be presumed to be true. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 2013 (9) SCC 152 (Vathsala Manickavasagam and others v. N. Ganesan and another) in support of his contention that admission by a party construe a substantial piece of evidence and in the absence of proper explanation by the party making such admission it will be presumed to be true. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 1995 (1) CHN 27 (Hindustan Fertilizer Corporation Ltd. V. Ocean Blue Compagnia Maritime S.A. & Ors.) in support of his contention that extension of the time to file amended plaint under Order 6 Rule 18 C.P.C. cannot be granted as a matter of course and unless the amended plaint is filed within the time stipulated under the law the order for amendment of the plant will cease to have effect. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 2007 (15) SCC 155 (Hameed (Dead) By Lrs. And Others V. Kummottummal Kunhi P.P. Amma (Dead) By Lrs. And Others) in support of his contention that the respondent should not be permitted to rely upon additional evidence to fill up a lacuna in the evidence already on record. The said learned Advocate cited a judgment reported at 1993 (2) SCC 185 (Salil Dutta V. T.M. And M.C. Private Ltd.) in support of his contention that there is no absolute rule that a party can disown its advocate at any time and seek relief, and that no such absolute immunity can be recognized. The said learned Advocate submitted that in the decision reported at 1993 (2) SCC 185 the Hon’ble Supreme Court was pleased to observe to the effect that the observations made in Raffiq’s case ( AIR 1981 SC 1400 ) must be understood in the facts and circumstances of that case and cannot be understood as an absolute proposition. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 1977 (3) SCC 559 (State of West Bengal and others V. Indira Debi And Another) in support of his contention that Section 151 C.P.C. does not confer any additional power. It may be recorded here that the learned Advocate for the appellant has tried to distinguish the judgments relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondent. It may be recorded here that the learned Advocate for the appellant has tried to distinguish the judgments relied upon by the learned Advocate for the respondent. The learned Advocate for the appellant also submitted that the appellant has been depositing Rs.20,000/- per month since June, 2009 which the respondent is not entitled to claim and as such appropriate orders should be passed in the present second appeal. The learned Advocate for the plaintiff/respondent submitted the suit was instituted by a registered partnership firm which is the owner of the suit property and the plaint was properly verified and the eviction of a tenant is a statutory right of the plaintiff and not a contractual right and the bar of Section 69(2) of the Indian partnership Act is not applicable in the instant case. The said learned Advocate submitted that it will appear from the written statement filed by the defendant/appellant that the ownership of the plaintiff firm in respect of the suit property has not been specifically denied and thus the defendant is not entitled to deny the said ownership of the plaintiff in respect of the suit property. The said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at 70 CWN 399 (Sahu Jain Ltd. V. Deputy Secretary, Mr. Nistry of Finance & Ors.) in this regard in support of his submission that merely saying ‘not admitted’ is no denial and bare denial does not serve any purpose where an allegation of fact need to be specifically denied. The said learned Advocate submitted that the materials on record would show that the consideration money for the purchase of the suit property was paid from the bank account of the plaintiff/respondent and the relevant balance sheet also would support such fact as it would appear from the said balance sheet that the suit property was as an asset of the plaintiff firm. The said learned Advocate submitted that materials on record would also show that the property in question was transferred to the plaintiff/respondent and the defendant/appellant was requested to pay the rent to the plaintiff/respondent including the arrear rent. The said learned Advocate submitted that it will appear from Ext. The said learned Advocate submitted that materials on record would also show that the property in question was transferred to the plaintiff/respondent and the defendant/appellant was requested to pay the rent to the plaintiff/respondent including the arrear rent. The said learned Advocate submitted that it will appear from Ext. 21 being a letter written by said Shyma Charan Mitra to the appellant that by a registered deed of conveyance dated 21.05.1987 the said Shyma Charan Mitra had sold the portion of premises No.77, Christopher Road, to the plaintiff/respondent and the defendant/appellant was asked to pay rent with all arrears to the plaintiff/respondent. The said learned Advocate referred to two partnership deeds dated 01.04.1995 and 01.04.1999 being Exts. 1 and 1A and submitted that the said partnership firm has filed the eviction suit in the year 1996. The said learned Advocate submitted that the respondent is a registered firm of which Kalawati Soni was a partner and there are other partners as well and that the plaintiff was a purchaser from Shyama Charan Mitra and the defendant was a tenant at 77B, Christopher Road together with structures. The said learned Advocate submitted that it will appear from CAN 6366 of 2009 that the plaintiff firm is the owner of the suit property. The said learned Advocate further submitted that since Kalawati Soni was a partner and the partnership deed contained a clause that it will not dissolve in case of death of a partner but will continue, the question of non-existence of the partnership firm does not arise. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that the suit was validly instituted and the plaint was affirmed by Ravi Soni and such plaint was subsequently amended and there is no suppression of fact on the part of the plaintiff/respondent. The said learned Advocate referred to Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872. The said learned Advocate submitted that unless there is a proper pleading no evidence can be looked into of which there is no foundation in the pleadings. The said learned Advocate referred to AIR 1930 Privy Council 57 (Siddik Mahomed Shah V. Mt. Saran and others) in this regard. The said learned Advocate submitted that in any event in view of Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act the evidence given by Ravi Soni before the Thika Controller is inadmissible. The said learned Advocate referred to AIR 1930 Privy Council 57 (Siddik Mahomed Shah V. Mt. Saran and others) in this regard. The said learned Advocate submitted that in any event in view of Section 33 of the Indian Evidence Act the evidence given by Ravi Soni before the Thika Controller is inadmissible. The learned Advocate submitted that the conditions laid down in Section 33 of the said Act of 1872 are not satisfied in the facts of the instant case. The said learned Advocate referred to AIR 1966 SC 1072 (Kalyan Peoples’ Co-operative Bank Ltd. V. Dulhan Bibi Aqual Aminsaheb Patil and others) and 1975(3) SCC 529 (Mitthulal and another V. The State of Madhya Pradesh) in support of his contention that the evidence given by Ravi Soni before the Thika Controller cannot be allowed to be a part of the record in the present second appeal and the present second appeal should be decided on the evidence recorded in the suit and thus the evidence recorded before the Thika Controller cannot be taken into account while deciding the present second appeal. The said learned Advocate submitted that there is no question of fraud being perpetrated by Ravi Soni on the Court and that the evidence before the Thika Controller is irrelevant and it in no way demolishes the case of the plaintiff. The said learned Advocate submitted that it is the reasonable requirement of the plaintiff at the time of filing of the suit which the plaintiff has to prove, and the plaintiff is not required to prove that such requirement has existed throughout. The said learned Advocate cited judgments reported at 2004 (8) SCC 490 (Pratap Rai Tanwani and another V. Uttam Chand and another) and 2005 (8) SCC 252 (Sait Nagjee Purushotham & Co. Ltd. V. Vimalabai Prabhulal And Others) in this regard. The said learned Advocate submitted that no question on the point of reasonable requirement was formulated by the Hon’ble Court while admitting the second appeal but subsequent evidence have been referred to by the Court during the hearing of the second appeal. The said learned Advocate submitted that so far as the Pristine Beverages was concerned it consisted of the same partners as in the case of the plaintiff/respondent. The said learned Advocate submitted that so far as the Pristine Beverages was concerned it consisted of the same partners as in the case of the plaintiff/respondent. The learned Advocate for the respondent referred to 26 CH D 700 (Cropper V. Smith) in support of his contention that the mistake that the amended plaint was not verified was a mistake of the lawyer concerned who was appearing on behalf of the plaintiff in the Trial Court and hence it is curable and that the Courts should adjudicate the rights of the parties and not punish the parties owing to any mistake of their lawyers. The said learned Advocate cited decisions reported at AIR 1981 Supreme Court 1400 (Rafiq and another V. Munshilal and another) and 2010 (1) SCC 391 (Ram Kumar Gupta and others V. Har prasad and another) in this regard. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that an appeal is pending before the learned Tribunal concerned against the final order passed by the Thika Controller but it appears that the appellate authority has not granted any stay of operation of the Thika Controller’s order. The said learned Advocate submitted that it is necessary that the respondent’s application for leave to adduce additional evidence should be allowed to prove that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit property and the respondent’s application praying for leave to sign and verify the amended plaint should also be allowed as the plaintiff should not be made to suffer because of a mistake on the part of a learned lawyer. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that the eviction suit filed by the respondent was by virtue of a statutory right and not a contractual right and, thus, the restrictions under Sections 69(2) of the Partnership Act do not apply since the said restrictions are confined to the enforcement of a contractual right. The said learned Advocate submitted that Ravi Soni is a partner of the respondent and his name appears in the two partnership deeds, as aforesaid. The said learned Advocate submitted that it is not necessary for a partnership firm to be registered in order to file an eviction suit or the names of the partner must be shown in the register of the firms when a contractual right is not being enforced. The said learned Advocate submitted that it is not necessary for a partnership firm to be registered in order to file an eviction suit or the names of the partner must be shown in the register of the firms when a contractual right is not being enforced. The said learned Advocate referred to Order 30 Rule 1 C.P.C. in support of his contention that the plaintiff was justified in filing the suit as a partnership firm and the partnership firm means all the persons who are partners at a given point of time. With regard to the concept of partnership the said learned Advocate cited a decision reported at AIR 1966 SC 1300 (Addanki Narayanappa and another v. Bhaskara Krishnappa (Dead) and thereafter his heirs and others) wherein it has been held inter alia to the effect that whatever property is brought in by the partners when the partnership is formed or which may be acquired in the course of business of partnership it becomes the property of the firm and it would cease to be the exclusive property of the person who brought it in. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at AIR 1926 Madras 1040 (Chitturi Venkataratnam and others V. Siram Subba Rao and others). It appears that the real question at issue in the said reports was whether a particular document was in fact a document surrendering an interest in immovable property. It appears that it was also observed in the said reports that before a partner releases his right in the partnership property, that property belongs to the partnership and incidentally to him as a member of the partnership but not in his individual capacity. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 76 CWN 528 (Sm. Durga Devi Bhagat and anr. V. J.B. Advani & Co. Ltd.) wherein it has been observed, inter alia, that an immovable property loses its character when it forms part of the trading assets of a firm as between the partners and, therefore, if a firm, as a going concern, is allotted to a partner with all its trading assets as his share of the partnership business the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act relating to the transfer and of acquisition of immovable property cannot apply as between the partners. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that while dealing with the application for leave to sign the amended plaint mentioning of a particular Section should not be given undue importance but the merits of the case should be looked into. The said learned Advocate submitted that Section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code would show that non-signing of the amended plaint is only an irregularity not affecting the merits or jurisdiction. The said learned Advocate submitted that since the question of ownership of the suit property has been formulated in the instant appeal the respondent should be granted leave to adduce further evidence in this regard. The said learned Advocate cited another decision reported at 2010 (13) SCC 487 (Malayalam Plantations Limited V. State of Kerala And Another) in support of his contention that this Court should deal with the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. on merits so as to find out whether the documents or evidence sought to be adduced as additional evidence have any relevance and/or bearing on the issues involved, and the respondent should be allowed to adduce additional evidence in the interest of justice. The said learned Advocate cited another judgment reported at 2009 (17) SCC 465 (Jatinder Singh And Another V. Mehar Singh And Others with Balbir Singh And Another V. Jatinder Singh And Another) also in this regard. The said learned Advocate submitted that the plaintiff/respondent had given a mere license to the said Pristine Beverages in respect of a part of the suit premises. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that this Court in the second appeal stage should only deal with substantial questions of law. In this regard, the said learned Advocate cited decisions reported at 2001 (3) SCC 179 (Santosh Hazari V. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) By Lrs.) and 1997 (4) SCC 713 (Panchugopal Barua And Others V. Umesh Chandra Goswami And Others). The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that the so called admission by G.L. Soni, that his wife Kalawati had purchased the suit property is inadmissible as the deed of conveyance speaks for itself and no oral evidence is admissible in this regard to add to or vary the same. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that the so called admission by G.L. Soni, that his wife Kalawati had purchased the suit property is inadmissible as the deed of conveyance speaks for itself and no oral evidence is admissible in this regard to add to or vary the same. In this regard, the said learned Advocate relied upon the provisions of Section 91 and Section 61 to Section 65 of the Evidence Act and also upon the decision reported at AIR 1958 SC 448 (Bai Hira Devi and others V. Official Assignee of Bombay). The said learned Advocate submitted that since in the written statement there is no pleading with regard to thika tenancy the appellant cannot be permitted to adduce additional evidence in this regard and, that apart, the provisions of Section 33 of the Evidence Act need to be considered. The said learned Advocate also cited a decision reported at 1975 (3) SCC 529 (Mitthulal and Another V. The State of Madhya Pradesh) in support of his contention that each case must be decided on the evidence recorded in it and evidence recorded in another case cannot be taken into account in arriving at the decision. The said learned Advocate cited decisions reported at 2000 (7) SCC 104 (S. Saktivel (Dead) By Lrs. V. M. Venugopal Pillai And Others) and 2003 (6) SCC 595 (Roop Kumar V. Mohan Thedani) while making his submissions on the provisions of Section 91 of the Evidence Act, as already indicated above. The said learned Advocate submitted that evidence before the Thika Controller was not in accordance with law as the said evidence was taken in a narrative form and not viva voce and, thus, it is difficult to say accurately as to what questions were put by the counsel appearing for the applicant in the thika proceeding. The said learned Advocate submitted that a copy of the plaint was shown to the said Ravi Soni and a question was asked whether he had signed the plaint but such procedure is not sanctioned by law as one cannot ask questions about contents of a document without showing the document itself and this Court should not place any reliance on whatever had transpired before the Thika Controller on such issue. The said learned Advocate submitted that the original plaint was not available before the Thika Controller and such plaint was also not called for. The said learned Advocate submitted that the plaint was lying with the lower court records in connection with the instant second appeal in the High Court at Calcutta. The learned Advocate for the appellant has placed reliance upon the order dated 20.09.2006 passed by the learned Trial Court where the learned Trial Court finds that the plaintiff-firm has been represented by the proprietor Kalawati Soni in the sale deed dated 21.05.1987 and, therefore, the plea of reasonable requirement should fail and the alleged ownership of the business remains unproved. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that the said observation of the Trial Court was in an interlocutory order which merged with the final decree and the plaintiff has proved its ownership of the suit property. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that the application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. has been filed by the respondent not to fill up any lacuna as there is no lacuna in respect of facts which have already been proved. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that Section 69(2) of the Partnership Act is applicable only in contractual matters, and absence and/or presence of registration does not affect this principle. The learned Advocate for the respondent has submitted that as per the order dated 08.08.2011 passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India the two proceedings “i.e. the instant second appeal and the proceedings before the Thika Controller” must go on simultaneously and independently. It is true that as per the said order dated 08.08.2011 it was observed that the proceedings in the said Misc. Case No. 30 of 2010 before the Thika Controller, Kolkata shall proceed independently and pendency of the Second Appeal shall not be a ground for staying the proceedings of the said Misc. Case No. 30 of 2010. But on perusal of the order dated 08.08.2011 it does not appear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to direct that second appeal should proceed independently irrespective of the final decision in the said Misc. Case No. 30 of 2010 before the Thika Controller, Kolkata. Case No. 30 of 2010. But on perusal of the order dated 08.08.2011 it does not appear that the Hon’ble Supreme Court has been pleased to direct that second appeal should proceed independently irrespective of the final decision in the said Misc. Case No. 30 of 2010 before the Thika Controller, Kolkata. On the other hand, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the said order dated 08.08.2011 has been pleased to observe that in case any final order is passed in the said Misc Case No. 30 of 2010 before the final disposal of the second appeal, it will be open to the appellant herein to take appropriate steps in light of that order. The Hon’ble Supreme Court has also been pleased to observe that in case the second appeal is disposed of earlier than the thika proceedings and in case the judgment is adverse to the appellant herein, it will not foreclose the appellant’s remedy under the Thika Act. In such circumstances, this Court is of the view that the appellant is entitled to bring on record of this case the proceedings before the Thika Controller including the Thika Controller’s final order. This Court, thus, cannot shut its eyes to the developments which took place before the Thika Controller including the Thika Controller’s final order. The learned Advocate for the respondent submitted that premises No. 77A, Christopher Road is quite distinct from the suit property and thus the two premises cannot be connected. In this regard it may be noted that in the original plaint the suit property has been described as 18 cottas of land situate at 77B or 77/A, or 77/1 Christopher Road, Calcutta. It is not known how the three premises have been tagged together while describing the suit property. This creates a cloud over description of the suit property and provides ample scope for confusion over the identity of the suit property. With regard to CAN 6366 of 2009 it appears that the respondent has prayed for an order under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. so that the respondent may be permitted to bring on record additional evidence so that the question with regard to the ownership of the suit property, that is, as to whether or not the respondent partnership firm is the owner of the suit property can be effectively adjudicated. It appears from Paragraph 12 of the application that certain documents are intended to be adduced by way of additional evidence. This Court is of the view that even though the appellant has taken a point that the respondent is intending to fill up the lacuna in its evidence, such stand taken by the appellant is not justified. Since a very pertinent question has been raised with regard to the ownership of the suit property this Court is of the view that the plaintiff/respondent should be permitted to adduce such additional evidence. This application is accordingly allowed. With regard to CAN 8128 of 2013 which is an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. filed by the appellant, this Court is of the view that the subsequent events which took place before the Thika Controller, Kolkata should also be brought on record, particularly, the evidence recorded in the proceedings before the Thika Controller and the orders passed by the Thika Controller concerned which strike at the root of the matter with regard to ownership of the suit property. This Court is of the view that the appellant should be permitted to adduce additional evidence as may be required to decide the real dispute between the parties effectively and completely. The learned Advocate for the respondent has taken an objection that the proceedings before the Thika Controller not being part of the records of the present eviction proceedings such proceedings before the Thika Controller cannot be looked into. This Court is of the view that such objection cannot be allowed to stand in the way of doing complete justice to the parties. This Court is of the view that the appellant is fully justified in making an application for bringing such proceedings before the Thika Controller on records of the eviction proceedings by way of additional evidence. This application is accordingly allowed. This Court is of the view that the appellant is fully justified in making an application for bringing such proceedings before the Thika Controller on records of the eviction proceedings by way of additional evidence. This application is accordingly allowed. With regard to CAN 5356 of 2013 which is also an application under Order 41 Rule 27 C.P.C. filed by the appellant this Court is of the view that the appellant should be permitted to adduce additional evidence since according to the appellant during the pendency of the second appeal, subsequent to the evidence adduced in the suit, the plaintiff has parted with possession of a portion of 77B, Christopher Road, Calcutta which was under its possession and the plaintiff is no longer carrying on any business from any part or portion of premises No.77B, Christopher Road, Calcutta. The appellant also alleged that the portion which was in occupation of the plaintiff was parted with in favour of Pristine Beverages which carried on a business which was in no way connected with the plaintiff’s alleged business. The stand taken by the respondent that Pristine Beverages was only a licensee can be effectively decided only after the parties are given opportunity to adduce relevant evidence in this regard. This application of the appellant also stands allowed and the appellant is permitted to lead further evidence in support of its contention with regard to the plaintiff’s alleged parting of possession of a part of the premises No. 77 B, Christopher Road, Calcutta in favour of Pristine Beverages. With regard to CAN 5355 of 2013 this Court is of the view that the said application of the appellant for amendment of the written statement should also be allowed and, accordingly, it is allowed since it is necessary to bring on record the effect of the allegation made by the defendant that the plaintiff, during the pendency of the eviction proceedings has parted with possession of a portion of premises No. 77B, Christopher Road in favour of the said M/s. Pristine Beverages. The question whether Pristine Beverages was a licensee or not or whether it had been occupying a part of the said premises No. 77B in some other capacity can only be ascertained after proper pleadings and evidence form part of the record. The question whether Pristine Beverages was a licensee or not or whether it had been occupying a part of the said premises No. 77B in some other capacity can only be ascertained after proper pleadings and evidence form part of the record. The question raised by the defendant/appellant with regard to the existence of Pristine Beverages is such a question which cannot be effectively answered unless appropriate pleadings and evidence are on record. With regard to CAN 4241 of 2012 filed by the respondent for granting leave to the respondent to sign and verify the amended plaint should also be allowed as this Court is of the view that for any mistake, on the part of the learned lawyer concerned, as argued on behalf of the respondent, the litigant should not be penalized. This Court cannot accept the argument made on behalf of the appellant in this regard and it appears that if such argument is accepted then it would result in denial of justice. The question whether Ravi Soni’s name appears in the register of firms is a matter of evidence and whether Ravi Soni is competent to sign the amended plaint can be argued even after Ravi Soni is permitted to sign the amended plaint, as by permitting Ravi Soni to sign the amended plaint, as prayed for by the plaintiff/respondent, this Court is not deciding the question as to whether or not Ravi Soni has been duly authorized by the plaintiff to verify the amended plaint. Order 6 Rule 18 C.P.C. cannot be interpreted to mean that under no circumstances time for filing amended plaint can be enlarged and the fate of the plaintiff is sealed after the statutory time expires. With regard to CAN 3931 of 2013 filed by the appellant with a prayer for an order that the plaint in T.S. 769 of 1996 as eviction suit amended in the year 2003 be dismissed this Court is of the view that such application cannot be allowed and it deserves dismissal. With regard to CAN 3931 of 2013 filed by the appellant with a prayer for an order that the plaint in T.S. 769 of 1996 as eviction suit amended in the year 2003 be dismissed this Court is of the view that such application cannot be allowed and it deserves dismissal. Even if the evidence given by Ravi Soni before the Thika Controller and the fact that the amended plaint was not signed by Ravi Soni are taken into consideration the prayer of the dismissal of the plaint cannot be allowed as this Court is of the view that the plaintiff/respondent should be permitted to sign the amended plaint and the evidence of Ravi Soni before the Thika Controller is yet to be brought on record in the eviction proceedings by way of additional evidence. Thus the application being CAN 3931 of 2013 stands dismissed. With regard to CAN 2367 of 2012 which is an application filed by the appellant praying for an order that the plaint in the said eviction suit as amended in the year 2003 should be dismissed, is without any merit and as such the said application is dismissed. It will appear from the said application and also the said CAN 2367 of 2012 that the appellant has sought to rely upon the evidence of Ravi Soni before the Thika Controller, Kolkata and the allegation that Ravi Soni’s name did not appear in the register of the Registrar of Firms. The evidence of Ravi Soni before the Thika Controller is yet to be brought on record in the eviction proceedings by way of additional evidence and the question as to whether or not the name of Ravi Soni was required to appear in the register of the Registrar of Firms for the purpose of filing the eviction suit is a question which has to be decided by the appropriate Court after the additional evidence are brought on record by the respective parties. With regard to CAN 2386 of 2012 it appears that it is an application filed by the appellant whereby the appellant has prayed for an order restraining the respondent from withdrawing any sum deposited by the appellant to the credit of the respondent before the learned Civil Judge (Junior Division) 2nd Court at Sealdah in terms of the order dated 08.05.2009 passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court. The appellant has also prayed for a direction upon the said learned Civil Judge(Junior Division), 2nd Court, at Sealdah to invest the amounts already deposited and to be deposited in future by the appellant in short term fixed deposit accounts with any nationalized bank and keep such fixed deposit renewed from time to time. In view of the subsequent developments in this matter, that is, before the Thika Controller, Kolkata, this Court is of the view that it will not be proper to allow the respondent to withdraw any such deposits to be made by the appellant before the said learned Court of Civil Judge(Junior Division), 2nd Court, at Sealdah henceforth. This Court is also of the view that appropriate directions should be given to the said learned Court of Civil Judge (Junior Division), 2nd Court, at Sealdah to keep the said amounts invested in fixed deposit accounts with any nationalized bank and keep the same renewed from time to time until such further orders that may be passed by the said Court. In such circumstances, the said CAN 2386 of 2012 is disposed of by directing that the respondent shall not be entitled to withdraw the amounts to be deposited by the appellant month by month before the learned Court concerned henceforth and the learned Court concerned shall invest the said amounts in short term fixed deposit accounts with any nationalized bank and keep the said accounts renewed from time to time until further orders to be passed by the said Court. This order is being passed in view of the order which is proposed to be passed in the present second appeal as indicated below. The learned Trial Court concerned should pass appropriate orders at appropriate stage with regard to such deposits which the appellant shall continue to make in the said suit as indicated in the aforesaid order dated 08.05.2009. In view of the discussions made above, this Court is of the view that the said suit for eviction being T.S. No. 769 of 1996 out of which the present second appeal arises should be sent back on remand to the learned Trial Court with appropriate directions. In view of the discussions made above, this Court is of the view that the said suit for eviction being T.S. No. 769 of 1996 out of which the present second appeal arises should be sent back on remand to the learned Trial Court with appropriate directions. Accordingly, the present second appeal is disposed of by setting aside the impugned judgment and decree passed by the learned First Appellate Court and also the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial Court and sending the said T.S. No. 769 of 1996 back on remand to the learned Trial Court concerned with the following directions: The learned Trial Court shall allow both the parties to amend their respective pleadings so that the real dispute between the parties can be effectively and completely adjudicated. The learned Trial Court shall allow both the parties to adduce additional evidence as discussed above. If necessary, the learned Trial Court shall also allow the parties to take out an application for local inspection in respect of the suit premises and if such application is filed the learned Trial Court shall decide the same in accordance with law. While disposing of the suit the learned Trial Court shall pass appropriate orders with regard to the deposits to be made by the appellant month by month in terms of the aforesaid order dated 08.05.2009 and till such order is passed invest the amounts to be deposited month by month by the appellant in short term fixed deposit accounts with any nationalized bank and keep the same renewed from time to time. The learned Trial Court, after giving both the parties proper opportunities for taking necessary steps as indicated above, shall dispose of the suit in accordance with law on merits. It is made clear that since the subsequent developments in the matter, as indicated above, are yet to be brought on record of the eviction suit by way of additional evidence this Court has refrained from making any observation on the merits of the matter as it appears that the issue involved would strike at the root of the dispute between the parties. It is only after the subsequent events, particularly, the proceedings before the Thika Controller and the final order of the Thika Controller are brought before the learned Trial Court by way of additional evidence the learned Trial Court will be able to decide such issue which strikes at the root of the matter. With regard to CAN 2542 of 2009 learned Advocates for the respective parties do not dispute the fact that there nothing remains to be decided on such application and such application should be formally disposed of. Accordingly, such application stands disposed of. Let a copy of this judgment be communicated to the learned Trial Court concerned and the Lower Court records be sent down to the learned Trial Court concerned by Special Messenger at the cost of the appellant. Let such Special Messenger cost be put in by the appellant within two weeks. Urgent certified Xerox copy of this Judgment, if applied for, be given to the parties on compliance of all necessary formalities.