1. In this writ petition, the petitioners are seeking the intervention of this Court to direct the respondent authorities to pay their salaries with effect from different dates of 2001 when they joined as Assistant Teachers of M.E. Schools situated within Dhakuakhana Sub-Division, Lakhimpur District. Copies of their appointment orders are annexed at Annexure-A Series. 2. According to the petitioners, they were appointed against the posts created by the Government order No. PMA/337/95/Pt-1/152, dated 24-4-1998 under the Operation Black Board Scheme (“OBB Scheme”). They were, however, never paid their salaries whereupon the Block Elementary Education Officer, Dahkuakhana, Lakhimpur District (respondent 4) by his letter dated 9-8-2002 submitted the detail particulars of the petitioners to the District Elementary Education Officer, Lakhimpur District (respondent 3) for retention of their posts, and the respondent No. 3, in turn, by his letter dated 16-8-2002 forwarded the proposal to the respondent No. 2 (Director of Elementary Education, Assam) for necessary action. The respondent No. 3 vide his letter dated 20-12-04 submitted the detailed particulars of 33 teachers including the names of the petitioners who were appointed in ME Schools under the OBB Scheme at Lakhimpur District wherein it was clearly mentioned that the posts were filled up by appointing the candidates duly selected by the Advisory Board: the names of the petitioners are found at Serial No. 27, 28, 29, 30, 32 and 32 of the list so prepared by the respondent No. 3. The Headmasters of the concerned schools where the petitioners were serving also issued certificates vide Annexures-F series to the effect that they were regularly serving in their respective schools till now. The representations submitted by them to the respondent authorities to pay their salaries for the services rendered by them and regularise their services did not yield any tangible results. 3. According to the petitioners, the colleague entrusted by them include their names in the writ petitions filed by similarly situated persons thereby making left out of consideration by this Court regularization of their services and for payment of their salaries. 3. According to the petitioners, the colleague entrusted by them include their names in the writ petitions filed by similarly situated persons thereby making left out of consideration by this Court regularization of their services and for payment of their salaries. This Court by the judgment and order dated 8-4-2002 in WP(C) No. 8764/2001 and others filed by their colleagues disposed of the said writ petition by directing the State-respondents to regularize the services of those petitioners, not to terminate their services pending regularization of their services and pay their monthly salaries together with their salary arrears for the period during which they had actually rendered their services. The appeal being WA No. 376/02 preferred by the State authorities from the said judgment was dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court vide the judgment and order dated 1-7-2008. By this writ petition, the petitioners are now claiming similar reliefs. 4. In my judgment, the petitioners are fence sitters, and it will be highly inequitable at this belated stage to grant them the reliefs granted to the other litigants, who were otherwise alert and assertive of their rights, and had promptly approached this Court for such reliefs. Two decisions of the Apex Court immediately come to mind to repel the claims of the petitioners herein, namely, U.P. Jal Nigam and another v. Jaswant Singh and another, (2006) 11 SCC 464 and M/s Rup Daimonds and others v. UOI and ors., (1989) 2 SCC 356 . In UP Jal Nigam case (supra), all the respondents were the employees of the Uttar Pradesh Jal Nigam and they retired from service on attaining the age of superannuation at 58 years. Some of them filed writ petitions in the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad challenging the retirement of the employees of the Nigam on attaining the age of 58 years whereas the State Government employees were allowed to continue up to the age of 60 years and therefore, they should also be allowed to continue up to the age of 60 years. The writ petitions filed before the High Court failed and against that Civil Appeal No. 7840 of 2002 and batch of other appeals were filed before the Apex Court. The Apex Court disposed of the case of Harwindra Kumar1 (supra) along with other appeals and held that the employees of the Nigam are entitled to continue up to 60 years. 5. The Apex Court disposed of the case of Harwindra Kumar1 (supra) along with other appeals and held that the employees of the Nigam are entitled to continue up to 60 years. 5. It appears that during the pendency of those appeals and writ petitions before the Apex Court and after disposal of the same by the Apex Court, a spate of writ petitions followed in the High Court by the employees who had retired long back. Some of the petitions were filed by the employees who retired on attaining the age of 58 years long back. However, some were lucky to get interim orders allowing them to continue in service. A number of writ petitions were filed in the High Court in 2005 on various dates after the judgment in Harwindra Kumar1 and some between 2002 and 2005. All those writ petitions were disposed of in the light of the judgment in Harwindra Kumar (supra) and relief was given to them for continuing in service up to the age of 60 years. Hence, appeals were preferred against the various orders passed by the High Court from time to time. The only question which arose for consideration before the Apex Court was about the grant of relief to such other persons who were not vigilant and did not wake up to challenge their retirement and accepted the same but filed writ petitions after the judgment of this Court in Harwindra Kumar (supra). While allowing the appeals, this is what the Apex Court said in paras 12, 13, 16 and 17 of the report: “12. The statement of law has also been summarised in Halsbury's Laws of England, para 911, p. 395 as follows: “In determining whether there has been such delay as to amount to laches, the chief points to be considered are: (i) acquiescence on the claimant's part; and (ii) any change of position that has occurred on the defendant's part. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. Acquiescence in this sense does not mean standing by while the violation of a right is in progress, but assent after the violation has been completed and the claimant has become aware of it. It is unjust to give the claimant a remedy where, by his conduct, he has done that which might fairly be regarded as equivalent to a waiver of it; or where by his conduct and neglect, though not waiving the remedy, he has put the other party in a position in which it would not be reasonable to place him if the remedy were afterwards to be asserted. In such cases lapse of time and delay are most material. Upon these considerations rests the doctrine of laches.” 13. In view of the statement of law as summarised above, the respondents are guilty since the respondents have acquiesced in accepting the retirement and did not challenge the same in time. If they would have been vigilant enough, they could have filed writ petitions as others did in the matter. Therefore, whenever it appears that the claimants lost time or whiled it away and did not rise to the occasion in time for filing the writ petitions, then in such cases, the court should be very slow in granting the relief to the incumbent. Secondly, it has also to be taken into consideration the question of acquiescence or waiver on the part of the incumbent whether other parties are going to be prejudiced if the relief is granted. In the present case, if the respondents would have challenged their retirement being violative of the provisions of the Act, perhaps the Nigam could have taken appropriate steps to raise funds so as to meet the liability but by not asserting their rights the respondents have allowed time to pass and after a lapse of couple of years, they have filed writ petitions claiming the benefit for two years. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence? *** *** *** 16. That will definitely require the Nigam to raise funds which is going to have serious financial repercussions on the financial management of the Nigam. Why should the court come to the rescue of such persons when they themselves are guilty of waiver and acquiescence? *** *** *** 16. Therefore, in case at this belated stage if similar relief is to be given to the persons who have not approached the court that will unnecessarily overburden the Nigam and the Nigam will completely collapse with the liability of payment to these persons in terms of two years' salary and increased benefit of pension and other consequential benefits. Therefore, we are not inclined to grant any relief to the persons who have approached the court after their retirement. Only those persons who have filed the writ petitions when they were in service or who have obtained interim order for their retirement, those persons should be allowed to stand to benefit and not others. We have been given a chart of those nine persons, who filed writ petitions and obtained stay and are continuing in service. They are as follows: 1. Shri Bhawani Sewak Shukla 2. Shri Vijay Bahadur Rai 3. Shri Girija Shanker 4. Shri Yogendra Prakash Kulshresht 5. Shri Vinod Kumar Bansal 6. Shri Pradumn Prashad Mishra 7. Shri Banke Bihari Pandey 8. Shri Yashwant Singh 9. Shri Chandra Shekhar And the following persons filed writ petitions before retirement but no stay order was granted: 1. Shri Gopal Singh Dangwal (WP No. 35384 of 2005 vide order dated 5-5-2005) 2. Shri R.R. Gautam (WP No. 45495 of 2005 vide order dated 15-6-2005) 17. The benefits shall only be confined to abovementioned persons who have filed writ petitions before their retirement or they have obtained interim order before their retirement. The appeals filed against these persons by the Nigam shall fail and the same are dismissed. Rest of the appeals are allowed and orders passed by the High Court are set aside. There would be no order as to costs.” 6. In Rup Diamond case (supra), Messrs Rup Diamonds, a Registered Export House, assailed the validity of the decisions dated 9-4-1986 and 5-8-1986 of the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports declining to revalidate and endorse six Imprest Licences for import of Open General Licence items upon the fulfilment by the petitioners of their export obligations under the Imprest Licences. In Rup Diamond case (supra), Messrs Rup Diamonds, a Registered Export House, assailed the validity of the decisions dated 9-4-1986 and 5-8-1986 of the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports declining to revalidate and endorse six Imprest Licences for import of Open General Licence items upon the fulfilment by the petitioners of their export obligations under the Imprest Licences. Petitioners sought for issue of appropriate writs to the authorities to revalidate the six Imprest Licences, with appropriate endorsement for the import of Open General items under the Import-Export Policy of 1982-83 (A-M 1983). The petitioners therein claimed that in terms of para 185(4) of Import-Export Policy, 1982-83, they were entitled to the facility for the import of OGL items as was available in the case of replenishment licences issued to export houses under clauses (1) and (3) of para 185 of A-M 1983 policy. Para 185(4) of the A-M 1983 provided: “(4) The facility for import of OGL items available in sub-para (3) above, may also be allowed, on merits, to Export Houses against their advance/imprest licences on account of which they are rendered ineligible to obtain REP licence. In such cases, however, the value up to which the OGL import may be allowed, will not exceed the value to which the Export House would have been eligible to the REP licence, had he not obtained advance/imprest licence in question. This facility will be available to the Export House after he has discharged the export obligation imposed on the advance/imprest licence. Therefore, if by the time, the Export House becomes eligible to this facility, the advance/imprest licence has expired, or, if the original validity left unused by that time is less than six months, the licensing authority will revalidate the licence simultaneously so as to give to the licence-holder a time of six months for the purpose of importing OGL items under this facility.” 7. However, the petitioners did not choose to seek the revalidation and endorsement for OGL items for quite some time thereafter. It was only in the year 1986 that they sought for such revalidation and endorsement. That was after a lapse of several years from the completion of their export obligations. However, the petitioners did not choose to seek the revalidation and endorsement for OGL items for quite some time thereafter. It was only in the year 1986 that they sought for such revalidation and endorsement. That was after a lapse of several years from the completion of their export obligations. The Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports by his two decisions, one dated 5-8-1986 pertaining to the Imprest Licence 2927607 dated 29-4-1980 and the other dated 9-4-1986, pertaining to the other five Imprest Licences declined the request. These two orders were challenged before the Apex Court in a writ petition filed under Article 32 of the Constitution. The grounds for refusal in both the decisions were similar, except for the reference to certain relevant dates. One of the grounds for the challenge, with which we are now concerned here, was the inordinate delay in seeking revalidation and endorsement. The request was rejected by the Joint Chief Controller of Imports and Exports as under: “…… In other words, you have made a request for revalidation and endorsement under para 185 of A-M 83 policy after 4 years and 7 months from the discharge of the export obligation. It is, therefore, obvious that you have not cared to apply immediately after discharge of export obligation and as such your request is grossly time-barred....” 8. The Apex Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground of laches in the following manner: 8. Apart altogether from the merits of the grounds for rejection - on which it cannot be said that the mere rejection of the special leave petitions in the cases of M/s Ripal Kumar & Co., and M/s H. Patel & Co., could, by itself, be construed as the imprematur of this Court on the correctness of the decisions sought to be appealed against - there is one more ground which basically sets the present case apart. Petitioners are re-agitating claims which they had not pursued for several years. Petitioners were not vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till somebody else's case came to be decided. Their case cannot be considered on the analogy of one where a law had been declared unconstitutional and void by a court, so as to enable persons to recover monies paid under the compulsion of a law later so declared void. Their case cannot be considered on the analogy of one where a law had been declared unconstitutional and void by a court, so as to enable persons to recover monies paid under the compulsion of a law later so declared void. There is also an unexplained, inordinate delay in preferring this writ petition which is brought after almost an year after the first rejection. From the orders in Ripal Kumar & Co. case and H. Patel & Co. case it is seen that in the former case the application for revalidation and endorsement was made on 12-3-1984 within four months of the date of the Redemption Certificate dated 16-11-1983 and in the latter case the application for revalidation was filed on 20-6-1984 in about three months from the Redemption Certificate dated 9-3-1984. 9. On a consideration of the matter we think that, apart altogether from the merits of the other grounds for rejection, the inordinate delay in preferring the claim before the authorities as also the delay in filing the writ petition before this Court should, by themselves, persuade us to decline to interfere.” 9. In this writ petition also, the petitioners chose to approach this Court after an inordinate delay and only some six years after somebody else's came to be decided. As already noticed elsewhere, though they were appointed as teachers in 2001, they were never paid their salaries. In fact, the very genuineness of their appointment is called into question by the respondent authorities. Be that as it may, they were never vigilant but were content to be dormant and chose to sit on the fence till some of their colleagues who were otherwise vigilant and alert promptly approached this Court and obtained reliefs. The principle of Laches has been considered to be an important factor in exercise of the discretionary relief under Article 226 of the Constitution. When the petitioners are not vigilant of their rights and acquiesces in to the situation, their writ petition cannot be heard after a couple of years on the ground that the same relief should be granted to them as was granted to persons similarly situated who were vigilant about their rights and challenged the non-payment of their salaries. When the petitioners are not vigilant of their rights and acquiesces in to the situation, their writ petition cannot be heard after a couple of years on the ground that the same relief should be granted to them as was granted to persons similarly situated who were vigilant about their rights and challenged the non-payment of their salaries. The explanation given by them that the person entrusted by them to file a writ petition let them down, is hardly convincing inasmuch as they failed to mention details such as to whom the entrustment was made, when was it made or where or how was it made are never disclosed by them. There has to be satisfactory explanation for any delay in filing the writ petition. 10. For the afore-mentioned reasons, this writ petition is not maintainable, and is, therefore, dismissed. The parties are, however, directed to bear their respective costs. It is, however, made clear that the dismissal of this writ petition will not preclude the respondent authorities from considering their cases sympathetically. After all, the principle of laches, unlike the Court of law, does not always come in the way of the executive authorities to grant any relief whenever and wherever they choose to do so.