JUDGMENT : Heard Mr. T.J. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel assisted by Mr. P.J. Saikia, learned counsel for the petitioner and Mr. S. Nath, learned Standing Counsel, Life Insurance Corporation of India (LICI) appearing for the respondents. 2. By filing this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, petitioner seeks quashing of order dated 29.10.2014, whereby, he has been transferred from Jorhat LIC Divisional Office to the Branch Office at Sivasagar. 3. Case of the petitioner is that he is serving at Jorhat as Assistant Administrative Officer (PG). By the impugned order dated 29.10.2014, he has been transferred to Sivasagar Branch Office. Contending that the transfer order, if given effect to, would cause immense hardship to him, petitioner has filed the present writ petition challenging the legality and validity of the same. Petitioner had represented before the higher authorities, requesting for withdrawal of the transfer order. In this connection a number of communications were exchanged. Ultimately, the Senior Divisional Manager, Jorhat informed the petitioner vide letter dated 08.04.2015 that he was being relieved from the Jorhat Office and he was advised to take over charge of his new assignment at Sivasagar Branch Office. 4. This Court by order dated 10.04.2015 had issued notice and, in the meanwhile, had stayed the impugned order dated 29.10.2014 in respect of the petitioner as well the communication dated 08.04.2015. 5. Respondents have filed affidavit as well as an application for vacation/modification of the aforesaid order dated 10.04.2015, which has been registered as IA No.75/2015. 6. Mr. Mahanta, learned Senior Counsel submits that it is the practice in the LICI that transfers are effected on three conditions, viz- i) on promotion, ii) on own request, and iii) in the public interest i.e. as a measure of discipline. Referring to the impugned order, he submits that out of the four persons transferred, two are on promotion and the third one is as per his own request. In the case of the petitioner, nothing has been mentioned. This will affect the petitioner inasmuch as, it may convey a meaning that petitioner has been transferred as a disciplinary measure since it is neither a transfer on promotion nor on his own request. He further submits that his mother is very old and he has to look after her at his Jorhat residence. His son is preparing for his 10th standard SSC examination. He further submits that his mother is very old and he has to look after her at his Jorhat residence. His son is preparing for his 10th standard SSC examination. In such circumstances, it will jeopardize his family life in the event of his transfer to Sivasagar at this stage. He submits that since his son is in the midst of academic session, respondents should defer the transfer till completion of the academic session. In this connection, learned Senior Counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Director of School Education, Madras & Ors. Vs. O. Karuppa Thevan & Anr., reported in 1994 Supp. (2) SCC 666. 7. On the other hand, Mr. Nath, learned counsel for the respondents submits that apprehension expressed by the petitioner that his transfer is on account of disciplinary reasons is totally unfounded. Transfer order has been issued on account of administrative exigency as Sivasagar Branch Office is in need of adequate and competent man power. Nothing more should be read into it. He submits that question of petitioner’s son being in the midst of academic session does not arise in this case as because the impugned order was issued as far back as on 29.10.2014. He, further submits that distance between Sivasagar and Jorhat being very minimal, question of causing any inconvenience to the petitioner does not arise. No fundamental or legal right of the petitioner has been infringed by the impugned transfer. Learned counsel for the respondents has referred to and relies upon the following decisions: - i) State of UP Vs. Gobardhan Lal, (2004) 11 SCC 402 , ii) Airports Authority of India Vs. Rajeev Ratan Pandey & Ors., (2009) 8 SCC 337 , iii) Registrar General, High Court of Judicature of Madras Vs. R. Perachi & Ors., (2011) 12 SCC 137 . 8. Submissions made have been considered. Decisions cited at the Bar have been perused. 9. A careful perusal of the impugned order dated 29.10.2014 as well as the relieving intimation dated 08.04.2015 do not disclose any arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of power. No mala fide is discernible. Petitioner has been transferred from Jorhat to Sivasagar. The distance between the two places would be about 60 kilometer. Decisions cited at the Bar have been perused. 9. A careful perusal of the impugned order dated 29.10.2014 as well as the relieving intimation dated 08.04.2015 do not disclose any arbitrary or unreasonable exercise of power. No mala fide is discernible. Petitioner has been transferred from Jorhat to Sivasagar. The distance between the two places would be about 60 kilometer. The fact that the respondents had given due consideration to the request of the petitioner, as would be evident from the relieving intimation being issued after about 5 (five) months, is indicative of lack of any ill will or malice towards the petitioner. It goes without saying that it is the prerogative of the employer to decide where to post or where to transfer whom. Scope of judicial review in such matters, though not excluded, is however limited. While the petitioner may have good and genuine personal reasons to seek modification of the transfer order before the authority, the same cannot be a ground of judicial review. Question of petitioner’s children being in the midst of academic session, also would not arise in view of the fact that the transfer order was issued on 29.10.2014 and effect was sought to be given from 09.04.2015 i.e., after about five months. 10. It is in the petitioner’s own interest that he should comply with the transfer order and continue to serve the organization as before. 11. In the light of the above, this Court is not inclined to interfere in the matter. Writ petition is accordingly dismissed. No costs. 12. Interim order passed earlier stands vacated.