JUDGMENT : Hasnain Massodi, J. 1. Letter Patent Appeal on hand is directed against Writ Court judgment dated 4th October 2012 in SWP No. 232/2010 titled Zulfakar Ahmad v. State of J & K and others. Background facts need to be noticed in first place. Shri Zulfakar Ahmad - respondent herein, responded to Advertisement Notice dated 26th June 2006, issued by Director General of Police, J & K State - appellant No. 2 in present appeal, to fill up available posts of Constable Followers in appellant department. He participated in selection process and was selected as Constable, and posted, as such, in 13 Battalion J & K Armed Police. However, he was not allowed to join on ground that he was accused in criminal case titled State v. Zulifkar Ahmad under Section 376 RPC FIR No. 59/1994 P/S Gursai. 2. Respondent, aggrieved with reluctance on part of appellants to allow him to join duty pursuant to appointment order, issued in his favour, filed writ petition, being SWP No. 1621/2007. Writ petition was dismissed as withdrawn vide order dated 3rd June 2009, on the statement that as respondent/writ petitioner had been assured by appellant department that his grievance would be redressed, he did not want to prosecute the matter. Writ Court while dismissing writ petition as withdrawn granted liberty to respondent to reagitate the matter in the event his grievance was not redressed. 3. Respondent, expecting appellants to allow him to join, made successive representations, detailing reasons that, according to him, were to persuade appellants to allow him to join and serve appellant department. Representations, so filed, did not evoke any response. In the meantime, respondent earned acquittal on 29th December 2008 in case FIR No. 59/1994 titled State v. Zulfikar Ahmad under Section 376 RPC. This fact was also brought to notice of appellants, Appellant No. 2, ultimately, vide Order No. 73 of 2010 dated 7th January 2010, rejected respondent's representation. View taken by appellant No. 2 was that though respondent was acquitted in aforementioned case, yet commission of offence was not disputed at any stage of trial. It was further observed that as respondent was "indisputably involved in anti-social and criminal act, which is highly abhorrent, his enrolment in the department would be highly detrimental to the disciplined force as such". 4. It was further observed that as respondent was "indisputably involved in anti-social and criminal act, which is highly abhorrent, his enrolment in the department would be highly detrimental to the disciplined force as such". 4. Respondent aggrieved with order No. 73 of 2010 dated 7th January 2010, filed writ petition, registered as SWP No. 232/2010. He sought quashment of order on the grounds detailed in paragraph 06 of petition. It was averred that order impugned in petition was "shrouded with legal infirmities" inasmuch as it held respondent guilty of charge levelled against him, unmindful of his acquittal by court of law. 5. Writ petition was resisted by appellants on the ground that mere selection and appointment would not entitle respondent to join as Constable in Battalion where he was posted unless and until as provided in appointment order, his antecedents were verified. It was insisted that appellants were within their rights to verify respondent's antecedents, so as to record satisfaction that he was suitable for appointment in Police Department. Mere acquittal, according to appellants, would not debar appellants to find out whether selectee/appointee is suitable for appointment in disciplined force. 6. Writ Court was impressed by case set up by respondent, did not find merit in grounds urged in opposition to writ petition, and allowed writ petition. Vide judgment dated 4th October, Order No. 730 of 2010 dated 7th January 2010 was quashed and appellants directed to consider allowing respondent to join against post of Constable in J & K Armed Police. Consideration order, in terms of Writ Court judgement, was to be passed within two months from the date copy was served on appellants. 7. Writ Court judgment is questioned in Letters Patent Appeal on hand on the grounds that Writ Court has erroneously drawn distinction between militancy related cases and other criminal cases and held that while in militancy related cases, appellants would be free to review appointment even on selection, such option would not be available in other criminal cases. It is insisted that appointing authority is not to be led by any such distinction and is required to determine suitability of person to a public post. Writ Court is said to have failed to appreciate that respondent was not involved in a minor or trivial offence but an offence involving moral turpitude. It is insisted that appointing authority is not to be led by any such distinction and is required to determine suitability of person to a public post. Writ Court is said to have failed to appreciate that respondent was not involved in a minor or trivial offence but an offence involving moral turpitude. Writ Court is also said to have failed to notice law laid down by Supreme Court in Sushil Kumar's case that subsequent acquittal or discharge of selectee would be of no significance. Case law relied upon by Writ Court, according to appellants, does not have application in present case and, therefore, ought not to have been relied upon to arrive at conclusions drawn by Writ Court. 8. We have gone through memo of Appeal as well as writ record, and have heard learned counsel for parties at length. 9. Learned Writ Court, while dealing with the matter, has identified controversy in paragraph 07 of judgement. It reads: "Now the question for consideration is: whether pendency of a criminal case can be a ground for not allowing the petitioner to join on the post? Keeping in view the facts of the case and in the given circumstance, the answer has to be negative for the following reasons" 10. Writ Court proceeded to draw distinction between militancy related offences and other offences and observed: "It is not the case of respondents that the petitioner was involved in any militancy related activity. Only objection raised in the objections is that he was allegedly involved in a criminal case." 11. Learned Single Judge, thereafter, noticing Trial Court's judgment dated 29th December 2008, whereby respondent was acquitted of charge under Section 376 RPC, relying on law laid down in State of West Bengal and others v. S. Nazrul Islam [2011 AIR SCW 6558] and Commissioner of Police and Ors. v. Sandeep Kumar [ 2011 (4) SCC 644 ], held order impugned in petition to be bad in law and unsustainable. It opined that once respondent was acquitted of charge, there was no reason to deny him appointment. It, again referring to observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sandeep Kumar's case (supra), held that "authorities should condone the minor indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for rest of their lives". It was, in effect, held that minor indiscretions attributed to present respondent were to be condoned. It, again referring to observations made by Hon'ble Supreme Court in Sandeep Kumar's case (supra), held that "authorities should condone the minor indiscretions made by young people rather than to brand them as criminals for rest of their lives". It was, in effect, held that minor indiscretions attributed to present respondent were to be condoned. Support to conclusions, arrived at, was also drawn from Ram Kumar v. State of U.P. [2012 (1) JKJ 113 [SC]]. 12. We are in agreement with Mr. Basotra, learned Senior Additional Advocate General, that distinction between militancy related offences and other criminal cases is entirely irrelevant in a matter like one in hand. Distinction drawn is not only irrational and illogical but fraught with danger to overall discipline in a government department and in particular in police force. There are a number of offences under various penal enactments, like Narcotics Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, Suppression of Immoral Trafficking Act, Prevention of Corruption Act, which, if not more heinous than militancy related offences, are equally grave and raise alarm in society. Appellants, while recruiting Constables or officers at different levels in Police Department, are under onerous duty to verify their antecedents, so that police force, to deal with ever increasing crime rate in society, is free from elements with suspicious background. Having said so, let us focus attention on other aspect of the matter. 13. A case can be visualised where a person is acquitted of charge by Trial Court before he aspires for an appointment against public post and at the time he responds to advertisement notice, he, if required, faithfully and honestly points to his alleged involvement in criminal case and acquittal earned by him. In such a case, if charge levelled against such person is minor in nature and may very well be labelled as "minor indiscretion", it may be ignored by competent authority while verifying antecedents of aspirant for public post. Situation, however, may be different, where candidate at the time he applies for post under government, is facing trial on a criminal charge but keeps back information in this regard from employer and the charge is one of commission of heinous offences and not "minor indiscretion. Situation, however, may be different, where candidate at the time he applies for post under government, is facing trial on a criminal charge but keeps back information in this regard from employer and the charge is one of commission of heinous offences and not "minor indiscretion. In such a case, a candidate, if required, to indicate his involvement in any criminal case, withholds such information, employer even on selection may not be impressed by subsequent acquittal as candidate did not only face criminal charge on the date he was selected but fraudulently withheld such information from employer. 14. In the present case, respondent was charged of offence punishable under Section 376 RPC on the date he responded to advertisement notice. He did not disclose this information in his application and faced criminal trial on aforesaid charge even on the date he was selected and adjusted in 13 Battalion JKAP. His subsequent acquittal, therefore, would not debar appellants from undertaking exercise to find out whether respondent was suitable for appointment as Constable in Police Department. Appellant No. 2 acted well within his power while he, notwithstanding Trial Court judgment dated 29th December 2008, took decision not to issue formal appointment order in favour of respondent having regard to nature of charge, he faced before Trial Court. 15. Acquittal of criminal charge and judgment of acquittal recorded by Trial Court does not ipso facto make selected candidate entitled to seek appointment against government post and in particular Police Department, and does not debar appointing authority from verifying antecedents of selected candidate, more so when offence alleged is not "minor indiscretion" but grave and heinous offence involving moral turpitude. 16. We are aware that criminal charge against accused may fail on a number of grounds, like failure of prosecution to make witnesses cross witness box, witnesses turning hostile to prosecution, failure on part of investigating agency to adhere to rules and regulations, while conducting investigation and failure on part of experts, who help investigating agency, like FSL experts, doctors, to adhere to rulebook, while playing their role in investigation. Acquittal, in all such cases, would be on technical grounds but would not entirely absolve him of the guilt. Acquittal, in all such cases, would be on technical grounds but would not entirely absolve him of the guilt. It would be dangerous, therefore, to command an employer to appoint accused, acquitted of a criminal charge, against a post under the Government, depriving such employer of taking an independent view of the matter, in the interests of overall discipline in department and particularly in Police Department. 17. In the present case, respondent was alleged to have overpowered a girl, while she was working in field, at Village Salwah Tehsil Mendhar District Poonch and to have committed rape on her and left her pregnant. Victim delivered a baby after alleged occurrence. Trial Court acquitted respondent taking victim as a consenting party and further on the ground that there was possibility of a boy - victim's cousin, who was married to her, after pregnancy surfaced, to have access to her. Appellant No. 2, in the said background, was right in rejecting respondent's representation for appointment as Constable upon his selection in Police Department and concluding that his appointment was likely to affect discipline in the force. Interference with the decision taken and quashment of Order No. 73 of 2010 dated 7th January 2010, by Writ Court, was, therefore, unwarranted. Letters Patent Appeal is, accordingly, allowed and Writ Court order dated 4th October 2012 in SWP No. 232/2010, set-aside. Resultantly, writ petition - SWP No. 232/2010, is dismissed. 18. Before parting with judgement, we and it necessary to express pain and anguish over mode and manner in which learned Trial Judge has dealt with the matter. Trial court judgment depicts traditional mind-set that victim in a rape case has to establish her non-involvement in offence. Such mind-set is writ large on the body of Trial Court judgement. 19. Mode and manner, in which Trial Court has dealt with the matter, makes us sceptical about impact of refreshal training courses, seminars, symposia, undertaken by National Judicial Academy and State Judicial Academies on the approach and mind-set of our judicial officers. 20. In first place, Investigating Officer failed to appreciate that victim of alleged offence was left pregnant and later delivered a baby. Therefore, there was no difficulty in identifying culprit. The Investigating Officer could have very conveniently resorted to DNA Test and identified the person, who committed criminal assault and left victim pregnant. 20. In first place, Investigating Officer failed to appreciate that victim of alleged offence was left pregnant and later delivered a baby. Therefore, there was no difficulty in identifying culprit. The Investigating Officer could have very conveniently resorted to DNA Test and identified the person, who committed criminal assault and left victim pregnant. If Investigating Officer failed to make use of an important tool in investigation, the Trial Court was not powerless or debarred from considering this aspect of the case. The Trial Judge, instead, acquitted respondent on an imaginary and self-conceived defence that some other person could have access to victim. Be that as it may we do not consider it proper to dilate on lacunae in Trial Court judgment as it is likely to prejudice outcome of criminal acquittal appeal, if any preferred by the State. If no such appeal has been filed till date, we again leave it to the State and victim to work out remedy against the Trial Court judgment whatever available under law. Allowed.