JUDGMENT These two appeals arise out of two separate judgments of conviction and orders of sentence all dated 18.08.2007 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge FTC - II, Munger in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 and Sessions Case No. 230A of 1999, both arising out of Muffasil P.S.Case No. 244 of 1997, by which the two appellants in each of the two appeals were held guilty of committing offence under Section 302 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code (for short IPC) as also Section 27 of the Arms Act. Each of the four convicts was sentenced to undergo R.I. for life under Section 302 read with 34 IPC and R.I. for three years under Section 27 of the Arms Act. The sentences were ordered to run concurrently. 2. At the very outset, let it be mentioned that these appeals had been heard analogous by a Division Bench of this Court but the learned Judges were divided in their opinion expressed in the order dated 12.03.2015 on the scope and ambit of Section 319(4) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (for short the Code‘), and the result of the appeal (Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1134 of 2007). The matters have thus been referred to this Bench by Hon‘ble the Chief Justice in terms of Section 392 of the Code, and that is how this Bench has been called upon to decide, determine and adjudicate the appeals as mandated by section 392 of the Code. 3. At this stage, I think it appropriate to record that both the learned Judges of the Division Bench have set aside the judgment of conviction by the court below so far as it relates to the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1083 of 2007, namely, Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav and directed for their retrial by taking evidence of all the witnesses afresh. To that extent, there is no conflict in the opinion of the two learned Judges. However, the conflicting views as regards the retrial of the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1134 of 2007, namely, Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav, expressed by the two learned Judges of this Court, as also their conflicting views on the scope and ambit of section 319(4) of the Code, has occasioned reference of the matter before this Single Bench under section 392 of the Code. 4. 4. Both the learned Judges were of the view in Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1083 of 2007 that in the light of the provisions prescribed under section 319(4) of the Code the proceedings in respect of the newly added accused has to commence afresh and the evidence (examination-in-chief), which was recorded in absence of the appellants Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav ought not have been used against them for recording their conviction. 5. However, in respect of the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1134 of 2007 Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav, in the opinion of learned Brother Dharnidhar Jha,J., the trial ought to have been held afresh together with the newly added accused summoned under section 319 of the Code. He has set aside the judgment of conviction passed by the trial court and directed the retrial of all the four appellants together in one trial by taking evidence of all the witnesses afresh. The operative part of the order recorded by him in paragraphs 10 to 12 are as under :- “10. In that view of the matter I hereby set aside the judgment of conviction passed by the learned court below and direct the re-trial of all the four appellants together on one trial by taking evidence of all the witnesses afresh. 11. The judgment of conviction and order of sentence are accordingly set aside by allowing the appeal and by ordering re-trial of the accused persons. 12. While perusing the records, what I found was that the original accused, namely, Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav had been tried in Sessions Trials No.230 of 1999, but the other two accused, namely, Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav were charged together in a separate case bearing Sessions Trial No.230A of 1999. I could not appreciate as to how the trial of the newly added accused, summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C, could be initiated by numbering his trial separately from that which was numbered for the trial of Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav. I could not appreciate as to how the trial of the newly added accused, summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C, could be initiated by numbering his trial separately from that which was numbered for the trial of Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav. The summoning order under Section 319 Cr.P.C. was passed in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 and the newly summoned or newly added accused persons had appeared in that trial and as I have discussed with reference to the Supreme Court judgment, the trial of all the accused persons have to be held afresh by examining the witnesses which means that all the accused persons have to be tried together at one trial. The trial of newly added accused by summoning him under Section 319 Cr.P.C. separately was a gross violation of the provision of Section 319 and settled principles of law and indicate the ignorance of procedure in that behalf. 6. Learned Brother Aditya Kumar Trivedi, J., however, differed with the opinion of Brother Jha, J. According to him, from perusal of Section 319(4) (a) and (b) of the Code, it would be apparent that the law does not mandate de novo trial of the newly added accused to be held along with the accused already present on record. He was of the view that a de novo trial has to be held only in respect of the accused, who has subsequently been summoned as an additional accused in terms of 319(1) of the Code. Brother Trivedi, J. was of the view that since the appellants Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav had faced full fledged trial, simply because their trial was bifurcated at some stage, has caused no prejudice to them. Accordingly, he has directed Cr.Appeal (DB) No.1134 of 2007 to be listed for hearing on merit. 7. In view of the division of opinion expressed in the order dated 12.03.2015, the learned Judges observed as under in the concluding paragraph of the order :- “In view of the conflicting orders as regards the re-trial of four appellants of the two appeals, as also due to conflicting views on the scope and ambit of Section 319(4) Cr.P.C. as discussed herein, let the matter be placed before Hon‘ble the Chief Justice for the needful. 8. 8. The prosecution case is based on the fardbeyan of one Pinki Devi recorded by the Sub Inspector-cum-Officer-in-Charge of Muffasil Police Station, namely, Nand Bihari Singh on 22.09.1997 at 6.00 a.m. in village Nandlalpur, Munger. In the fardbeyan, the informant has stated that on that day at 5.30 a.m. while she was going along with her husband Sanjiva Yadav (deceased) to attend the call of nature in an open field situated on the eastern side of ITI building, and when they came on the road near the house of Akhilesh Gupta, the accused persons, namely, Hirday Yadav, Dasrath Yadav, Rama yadav, Shyama Yadav and Naresh Yadav all armed with pistols came there, surrounded her husband and one after the other fired shots at him, as a result of which he fell down and died. After assault, the accused persons ran away towards north. The informant has further stated that the accused Hirday Yadav used to pressurize her husband to vacate the house and leave the village and even on the fateful day he was the person who fired first shot at her husband. She has stated that on hulla, co-villagers, Anpi Devi, Neelam, Devi, Krishna Yadav, Mukesh Yadav and others arrived at the place of occurrence. 9. The fardbeyan has been witnessed by Sunil Yadav and Krishna Yadav. It would appear from the record that after recording the fardbeyan, the inquest report of the deceased was prepared at 6.30 a.m. and a seizure memo of blood-stained earth was also prepared at the place of occurrence itself and thereafter Muffasil P.S.Case No. 244 of 1997 was instituted at 1.00 p.m. on 22.09.1997 against five accused persons, namely, Hirday Yadav, Dasrath Yadav, Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav, Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav, and Naresh Yadav, and the Officer-in-Charge Nand Bihari Singh took up investigation of the case himself. The FIR was transmitted to the court through special messenger and it was received in the court on 23rd September, 1997. From perusal of the record, I find that the inquest report of the deceased was witnessed by the aforesaid Sunil Yadav and Krishna Yadav and the seizure list bears the signature of Diwakar Yadav and Sunil Yadav. 10. The FIR was transmitted to the court through special messenger and it was received in the court on 23rd September, 1997. From perusal of the record, I find that the inquest report of the deceased was witnessed by the aforesaid Sunil Yadav and Krishna Yadav and the seizure list bears the signature of Diwakar Yadav and Sunil Yadav. 10. On completion of investigation, the police found the case true against three of the five named accused and submitted charge sheet against the accused Naresh Yadav, Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav vide charge sheet no.153 dated 30th June, 1998. However, the FIR named accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav were found innocent during investigation and hence they were not sent up for trial. The aforesaid police report was submitted by the Investigating Officer of the case in the court of the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Munger on 17th July, 1998 along with the case diary. Let it be mentioned that at the time of filing of the charge sheet accused Naresh Yadav was in custody, whereas the accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav were absconding and hence they were shown as absconders in the police report. 11. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Munger, after looking into the materials collected in course of investigation and the police report submitted under section 173(2) of the Code, took cognizance of the offence as against accused Naresh Yadav, Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav and discharged the other two accused persons, namely, Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav, who were found innocent in course of investigation. As noted above, since the accused Naresh Yadav was in custody and the other two accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav were absconding, the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Munger committed the case to the court of Sessions on 11th March, 1999 after complying with the mandatory requirements prescribed under section 207 of the Code. 12. After the commitment proceeding, the case was numbered as Sessions Trial No. 230 of 1999. 13. At this stage, in my opinion, before appreciating the issues involved in these appeals, it would be apposite to record the manner in which Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 got split up. 12. After the commitment proceeding, the case was numbered as Sessions Trial No. 230 of 1999. 13. At this stage, in my opinion, before appreciating the issues involved in these appeals, it would be apposite to record the manner in which Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 got split up. In order to bring clarity, it would be appropriate to record the relevant proceedings of the trial court in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 in a tabular form, which is as under :- Sessions Trial No. 230 of 1999 14.06.1999 An application was filed under section 193 of the Code by the informant Pinki Devi for summoning Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama yadav as additional accused in the case. 24.08.1999 The trial Judge rejected the application of the informant filed under section 193 of the Code. 19.11.1999 An application was filed by the accused Naresh Yadav, who was in jail, for splitting the case of the absconder accused persons from the original case so that his trial may not be delayed. 19.11.1999 The trial Judge allowed the prayer of accused Naresh Yadav and directed that the case of accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav be split up from the original Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999. 14. The proceedings of the trial court as recorded hereinabove would demonstrate as to how the case of absconding accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav got separated from the original Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999. The split up case of accused Dasrath Yadav and Hirday Yadav was numbered as Sessions Case No.230A of 1999. 15. From here on, in order to bring clarity as to how the two separate Sessions cases proceeded before the court below, it would be appropriate to record the relevant proceedings of the court below of the two trials in separate tabular form, respectively. Firstly, I would record the relevant proceedings of Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999, which is as under :- Sessions Trial No. 230 of 1999 06.12.1999 Charges under sections 302 read with 34 IPC and section 27 of the Arms Act were framed against accused Naresh Yadav. 15.01.2000 P.W.1 Diwakar Kumar Yadav and P.W.2 Mukesh Kumar Yadav were examined, cross-examined and discharged. 04.02.2000 P.W.3 Krishna Yadav was examined, cross-examined and discharged. 16.06.2000 P.W.4 Anpi Devi was examined and cross-examined in part. 29.06.2000 P.W.4 Anpi Yadav was further cross-examined and discharged. 15.01.2000 P.W.1 Diwakar Kumar Yadav and P.W.2 Mukesh Kumar Yadav were examined, cross-examined and discharged. 04.02.2000 P.W.3 Krishna Yadav was examined, cross-examined and discharged. 16.06.2000 P.W.4 Anpi Devi was examined and cross-examined in part. 29.06.2000 P.W.4 Anpi Yadav was further cross-examined and discharged. 17.08.2000 P.W.5 Pinki Devi was examined, cross-examined and discharged. 21.11.2000 P.W.6 Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey, who had conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased, was examined. As the defence declined to cross-examine him, he was discharged. 06.12.2000 On the prayer of the defence, P.W.6 Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey was re called for cross-examination. 09.03.2001 The informant Pinki Devi filed an application under section 319 of the Code for summoning the FIR named accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav as additional accused. 16.03.2001 The trial Judge granted bail to accused Naresh Yadav. 09.04.2002 Finding a prima facie case to be made out against the accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav, the trial court summoned them as additional accused to face trial and allowed the application filed under section 319 of the Code. 22.05.2002 Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav appeared before the court and were granted bail by the trial Judge. 02.07.2002 Charges were framed against Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav under sections 302 read with 34 IPC and 27 of the Arms Act. 04.07.2002 Newly added accused filed an application with a prayer to recall all the six witnesses, who were examined on behalf of the prosecution, for cross-examination, which was allowed by the court. 31.07.2002 On recall, P.W. 5 Pinki Devi was cross-examined in part by newly added accused persons. 05.09.2002 P.W.5 Pinki Devi was further cross-examined and discharged. 09.09.2002 P.W.1 Diwakar Kumar Yadav and P.W.3 Krishna Yadav were cross-examined by the newly added accused and discharged. 11.10.2002 P.W.2 Mukesh Yadav was cross-examined and discharged. 21.01.2003 P.W.4 Anpi Devi was cross-examined and discharged. 06.03.2003 P.W.6 Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey was cross-examined and discharged. 16. From the proceedings of the trial court narrated hereinabove, it would be apparent that though five persons were named in the FIR, only three of them were sent up for trial. Out of the three, two were absconding. The case of the absconding accused persons was separated from the original case. Krishna Mohan Purvey was cross-examined and discharged. 16. From the proceedings of the trial court narrated hereinabove, it would be apparent that though five persons were named in the FIR, only three of them were sent up for trial. Out of the three, two were absconding. The case of the absconding accused persons was separated from the original case. Hence, initially charges were framed in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 only against accused Naresh Yadav. In course of trial of Naresh Yadav, after examination of six witnesses, an application was filed by the informant Pinki Devi under section 319 of the Code for summoning Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav, who despite being named in the FIR were not sent up for trial in the charge sheet, as additional accused. The application filed by the informant under section 319 of the Code was allowed by the trial court vide order dated 09.04.2002. The operative part of the order dated 09.04.2002 passed by the learned trial Judge in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 whereby Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav were summoned to face trial, reads as under :- “In the instant case, P.W.4 and P.W.5 have categorically stated about the complicity and involvement of Rama Yadav and Shyama Yadav in the murder of Sanjeev Yadav. Therefore, there is prima-facie evidence against them in the record. Therefore, the petition u/s 319 Cr.P.C. of the informant is fit to be allowed. In view of the discursions made above, the petition dt 01.02.2001 filed u/s 319 Cr.P.C. by the informant is allowed. The office is directed to issue summons against Rama Yadav and Shyama Yadav for appearance in the case. (Emphasis supplied) 17. Thus, it would appear that the trial court summoned Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 for trial along with the accused Naresh Yadav. The facts narrated hereinabove further demonstrate that the trial court had summoned P.W.1 to P.W.6, who had already been examined, cross-examined and discharged earlier during trial proceeding of accused Naresh Yadav, only for cross-examination at the request of the newly added accused Rama Yadav and Shyama Yadav. Those six witnesses were cross-examined by the aforesaid newly added accused from time to time between 31st July, 2002 and 6th March, 2003. 18. Those six witnesses were cross-examined by the aforesaid newly added accused from time to time between 31st July, 2002 and 6th March, 2003. 18. After cross-examination of P.W.1 to P.W.6, by the appellants Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav, Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 proceeded in the following manner :- 24.02.2005 P.W.7 Nand Bihari Singh (Investigating Officer) was examined, cross-examined and discharged. 30.03.2005 P.W.8 Neelam Devi was examined, cross-examined and discharged. 21.09.2005 Bail bond of Naresh Yadav was cancelled for want of pairvi. 07.05.2007 Counsel appearing for the accused Naresh Yadav filed an application along with the death certificate of Naresh Yadav. It was contended that Naresh Yadav died on 02.10.2006 07.05.2007 The case against original accused Naresh Yadav abated due to his death. 17.05.2007 Statements of Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav were recorded under section 313 of the Code. 19.05.2007 to 18.08.2007 Final arguments were made from time to time by the respective counsel for the parties. 18.08.2007 Judgment of conviction and order of sentence against accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav were passed. 19. The facts narrated hereinabove would demonstrate that the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1083 of 2007 Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav could get opportunity to participate in the proceedings of Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 before P.W.7 Nand Bihari Singh and P.W.8 Neelam Devi were examined and cross-examined during trial. It further stands demonstrated that during trial the original accused Naresh Yadav died on 02.10.2006 and the case against him abated vide order dated 07.05.2007 passed by the trial court. Apparently, summoning of the appellants Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav under section 319 of the Code was made in original Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 in which accused Naresh Yadav alone was charged and was facing trial from before. 20. As noted above, vide order dated 19.11.1999 passed by the trial court, the case of absconding accused Dasrath Yadav and Hirday Yadav was ordered to be separated from the original Session Trial No.230 of 1999 by the trial Judge and hence in respect of them a separate case being Sessions Case No.230A of 1999 was opened. 20. As noted above, vide order dated 19.11.1999 passed by the trial court, the case of absconding accused Dasrath Yadav and Hirday Yadav was ordered to be separated from the original Session Trial No.230 of 1999 by the trial Judge and hence in respect of them a separate case being Sessions Case No.230A of 1999 was opened. The relevant proceedings of Sessions Case No.230A of 1999 are being summarised hereinbelow in tabular form :- Sessions Case No. 230A of 1999 14.02.2001 By filing an application the informant Pinki Devi brought to the notice of the trial court that the absconding accused Hirday Yadav was arrested in connection with G.R.Case No.1681 of 1997 pending before the learned Judicial Magistrate 1st Class, Munger. Accordingly, the trial Judge issued production warrant for producing accused Hirday Yadav from jail before the court. 20.02.2001 The accused Hirday Yadav was produced from jail before the trial court and was remanded to judicial custody in Sessions Case No.230A of 1999. 17.05.2001 Another absconding accused Dasrath Yadav surrendered before the trial court and was remanded to judicial custody. 19.12.2001 Charges were framed against accused Hirday yadav and Dasrath Yadav. 31.07.2002 P.W.1 Pinki Devi was examined and cross-examined in part. 20.08.2002 to 05.09.2002 P.W.1 Pinki Devi was further cross-examined on different dates and was discharged on 05.09.2002. 09.09.2002 P.W.2 Krishna Yadav and P.W.3 Diwakar Kumar Yadav were examined, cross-examined and discharged. 10.10.2002 P.W.4 Mukesh Yadav was examined, cross-examined and discharged. 17.12.2002 P.W.5 Anpi Devi was examined and cross-examined in part. 21.01.2003 P.W.5 Anpi Devi was further cross-examined and discharged. 06.03.2003 P.W.6 Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey was examined, cross-examined and discharged. 23.02.2005 P.W.7 Nand Bihari Singh (Investigating Officer) was examined and cross-examined in part. 24.02.2005 After further cross-examination, P.W.7 was discharged. 30.03.2005 P.W.8 Neelam Devi was examined, cross-examined and discharged. 22.09.2005 Accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav were examined under section 313 of the Code. 18.08.2007 Impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence were passed. 21. The summary of the relevant proceedings of the trial court narrated hereinabove would make it evident that the accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav were separately charged in Sessions Case No.230A of 1999. All the witnesses on behalf of the prosecution were examined in their presence separately. They had been given opportunity to cross-examine them and there was no illegality in their trial. 22. All the witnesses on behalf of the prosecution were examined in their presence separately. They had been given opportunity to cross-examine them and there was no illegality in their trial. 22. While these two appeals were taken up by the Division Bench, somehow or the other the learned Judges appears to have construed that the accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav had been tried in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 and the accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav were charged in a separate case bearing Sessions Case No.230A of 1999. 23. Apparently, this is an error of record. In Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999, initially it was accused Naresh Yadav, who was charged alone. During his trial, when six witnesses were already examined, accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav were summoned under section 319 of the Code. 24. After appearance, the accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav were charged together in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999. The accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav were never charged in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999. Their case got separated even before framing of charge against accused Naresh Yadav as they were absconding since the date of institution of the FIR. 25. When these two appeals were heard analogous by the Division Bench, Brother Jha, J. was of the opinion that after summoning of additional accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav the trial of all the accused persons ought to have been held afresh by examining the witnesses. In his opinion, because trial in respect of two of the appellants, namely, Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav had not been brought to conclusion and further on account of the fact that the additional accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav had been summoned on the basis of some evidence, it would have been in fitness of things and as per provisions of law to hold the entire trial de novo. According to him, the trial of newly added accused summoned under section 319 of the Code separately was gross violation of the principles of section 319 of the Code and settled principles of law. 26. As stated above, two Sessions trials were held separately. According to him, the trial of newly added accused summoned under section 319 of the Code separately was gross violation of the principles of section 319 of the Code and settled principles of law. 26. As stated above, two Sessions trials were held separately. Though the common witnesses were examined and documents exhibited in the two Sessions trials, the two cases were disposed of by two separate judgments delivered by the trial court on 18th August, 2007. 27. Let it be noted that admittedly P.W.1 to P.W.6 were examined before summoning of accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 and after summoning of the accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav those witnesses were tendered by the prosecution only for the purpose of cross-examination. 28. I have heard Mr. Prem Chand Yadav, learned counsel for the appellants in Cr.Appeal No. 1083 of 2007, Mr. Sanjiva Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellants in Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1134 of 2007, Ms Shashi Bala Verma, learned Additional Public Prosecutor for the State in both these appeals and Mr. Ashhar Mustafa, learned amicus curiae, and with their assistance, gone through the records of these two cases. 29. Mr. Prem Chand Yadav, learned counsel for the appellants Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav of Cr.Appeal (DB) No.1083 of 2007, has submitted that the examination-in-chief of P.W.1 to P.W.6 was held in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 even before the appellants were summoned. Though the appellants could get opportunity to cross-examine them but their examination-in-chief was held behind the back of the appellants. He has submitted that in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 319 of the Code, after summoning of the appellants the entire proceedings ought to have been held afresh against the appellants. Since that has not been done, entire trial as against appellants Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav got vitiated. He has submitted that in terms of sub-section (4) of Section 319 of the Code, after summoning of the appellants the entire proceedings ought to have been held afresh against the appellants. Since that has not been done, entire trial as against appellants Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav got vitiated. He has further contended that both the learned Judges of the Division Bench have set aside the judgment of conviction recorded in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 by the trial court and directed for retrial of the appellants by taking evidence of all the witnesses afresh and hence their appeal does not require any further hearing as there is no dissenting or divergent view of the two learned Judges of the Division Bench. 30. Mr. Sanjiv Kumar Singh, learned counsel for the appellants Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav of Cr. Appeal No.1134 of 2007, has submitted that in view of sub-sections (1) and (4) of section 319 of the Code, the trial of the appellants ought to have been held together with the additional accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav and since that has not been done, the trial of the appellants Hiray Yadav and Dasrath Yadav also got vitiated. He has submitted that for separation of trial of the appellants under section 299 of the Code, a prima facie finding ought to have been given by the trial court, which is missing in the impugned order. Apart from this technical ground, he has also addressed the Court on merits of the case. He submitted that in view of the provisions prescribed under section 392 of the Code, it would be open to this Court to decide the appeal on merits. He has contended that the prosecution has failed to prove its case by leading cogent evidence during trial to bring home the charges. According to him, out of the eight witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, P.W.2 Krishna Yadav, P.W.3 Diwakar Kumar Yadav, P.W.4 Mukesh Yadav and P.W.8 Neelam Devi have not supported the case of the prosecution and hence, their evidence is of no help to the case of the prosecution. According to him, out of the eight witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution, P.W.2 Krishna Yadav, P.W.3 Diwakar Kumar Yadav, P.W.4 Mukesh Yadav and P.W.8 Neelam Devi have not supported the case of the prosecution and hence, their evidence is of no help to the case of the prosecution. According to him, P.W.1 Pinki Devi, wife of the deceased Sanjiva Yadav and P.W.5 Anpi Devi, mother of the deceased have claimed themselves to be eye witnesses but the evidences led by them do not appear to be reliable. They are not only close relatives of the deceased but also chance witnesses. He has contended that P.W.6 Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey, who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased, has contradicted the eye witnesses in material particulars. His further contention is that the investigation of the case was not only defective but an effort has been made by the investigating agency to conceal the truth. Further, the material exhibits like clothes worn by the deceased, the bullets recovered by the doctor during autopsy and the blood-stained earth were never produced before the court. According to him, the conduct of the investigating agency creates serious doubt about the veracity of the prosecution case and in the light of the evidence adduced during trial, the court below ought to have given the benefit of doubt to the appellants Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav. 31. Mr. Ashhar Mustafa, learned amicus curiae has submitted that in view of the safeguard provided under sub-section (4) of section 319 of the Code the proceedings in respect of newly added accused ought to have been commenced afresh and the witnesses already examined ought to have been re-examined. Tendering of witnesses for cross-examination only has vitiated their trial and hence their case needs to be remanded for fresh trial. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in Michael Machado & Anr. Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. [ (2000) 3 SCC 262 ] and Shashikant Singh Vs. Tarkeshwar Singh & Anr. [ (2002) 5 SCC 738 ]. 32. Mr. In support of his submissions, he has relied upon decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in Michael Machado & Anr. Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. [ (2000) 3 SCC 262 ] and Shashikant Singh Vs. Tarkeshwar Singh & Anr. [ (2002) 5 SCC 738 ]. 32. Mr. Mustafa has further contended that in case of the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1134 of 2007 (Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav), a separate trial was held in which all the witnesses were examined in presence of the accused, and thus there is no illegality in their trial and the said appeal may be decided on merits. He has contended that section 392 of the Code empowers the 3rd Judge to whom the matter is referred to decide on what points he shall hear the arguments and the 3rd Judge would be completely free to resolve the difference as he thinks fit. In support of his contention, he has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court in Babu & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. [ AIR 1965 SC 1647 ] and Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia Vs. State of Gujarat [ (1997) 7 SCC 156 ]. 33. Ms Shashi Bala Verma, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing in both the appeals has submitted that the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1083 of 2007 (Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav) have not suffered any prejudice due to non-holding of de novo trial. They have been given opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses examined earlier. She has contended that it would appear from the record that the lawyer appearing on their behalf had filed an application before the court to summon P.W.1 to P.W.6 of Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 for the purposes of cross-examination alone. The prayer made on behalf of the newly added accused was acceded to by the trial court and hence at this belated stage they cannot take the plea that their trial was vitiated as the examination-in-chief of P.W.1 to P.W.6 was not held in their presence. She has further contended that even if there is some error or irregularity in the trial of appellants Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav, the same has not occasioned a failure of justice warranting fresh trial. She has further contended that even if there is some error or irregularity in the trial of appellants Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav, the same has not occasioned a failure of justice warranting fresh trial. She concedes that it is true that in view of the statutory provisions prescribed under section 319(4) of the Code, a de novo trial ought to have been held in case of newly added accused but as the same has not caused any prejudice to the accused and the objection has not been raised at the earlier stage, their appeal needs to be decided on merits. She has contended that in case of the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No.1134 of 2007 there is no illegality in trial. The appellants Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav were made accused in the FIR itself. After completion of investigation, charge sheet was submitted by the police showing them as absconders. Their case was committed to the court of Sessions along with co-accused Naresh Yadav. As accused Naresh Yadav was in custody since long and the appellants Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav were absconding, the court below separated their trial even before framing of charge in case of accused Naresh Yadav. The witnesses were examined in Sessions Case No.230A of 1999 in presence of the accused and hence the judgment of the court below so far as Sessions Case No.230A of 1999 is concerned does not suffer from any illegality. Though the learned Additional Public Prosecutor has defended the judgments and orders passed by the trial court in the two Sessions cases, no objection has, however, been raised by her in respect of the jurisdiction of this Bench to hear the appeals on merits. Her contention is that the witnesses examined during trial have proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. They have fully corroborated the prosecution case. The medical report also corroborates the ocular testimony of the witnesses and the investigation of the case was free from any defect. She has contended that on merits both the appeals deserve to be dismissed. 34. Her contention is that the witnesses examined during trial have proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. They have fully corroborated the prosecution case. The medical report also corroborates the ocular testimony of the witnesses and the investigation of the case was free from any defect. She has contended that on merits both the appeals deserve to be dismissed. 34. In view of the submissions made at the bar by the respective counsel for the parties and in view of the conflicting opinion of the two learned Judges of this Court on the scope and ambit of section 319(4) of the Code, it is to be seen whether the two trials arising out of Muffasil P.S.Case No.244 of 1997 were vitiated in any manner. 35. Section 319 of the Code reads as under :- “319. Power to proceed against other persons appearing to be guilty of offence. - (1) Where, in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence which he appears to have committed. (2) Where such person is not attending the Court he may be arrested or summoned, as the circumstances of the case may require, for the purpose aforesaid. (3) Any person attending the Court although not under arrest or upon a summons, may be detained by such Court for the purpose of the inquiry into, or trial of, the offence which he appears to have committed. (4) Where the Court proceeds against any person under sub-section (1) then— (a) The proceedings in respect of such person shall be commenced afresh, and witnesses re-heard; (b) Subject to the provisions of clause (a), the case may proceed as if such person had been an accused person when the Court took cognizance of the offence upon which the inquiry or trial was commenced. 36. The ambit and scope of the power of the court under section 319 of the Code has been explained and interpreted by the Supreme Court and various High Courts on more than one occasion. 37. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi & ors. 36. The ambit and scope of the power of the court under section 319 of the Code has been explained and interpreted by the Supreme Court and various High Courts on more than one occasion. 37. In Municipal Corporation of Delhi Vs. Ram Kishan Rohtagi & ors. [ (1983)1 SCC 1 ], which is one of the earlier cases where scope of section 319 of the Code has been dealt by the Supreme Court, it has been observed in paragraph 19 as under :- “19. In these circumstances, therefore, if the prosecution can at any stage produce evidence which satisfies the court that the other accused or those who have not been arrayed as accused against whom proceedings have been quashed have also committed the offence the Court can take cognizance against them and try them along with the other accused. But, we would hasten to add that this is really an extraordinary power which is conferred on the Court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other person against whom action has not been taken. More than this we would not like to say anything further at this stage. We leave the entire matter to the discretion of the court concerned so that it may act according to law. We would, however, make it plain that the mere fact that the proceedings have been quashed against respondent Nos. 2 to 5 will not prevent the court from exercising its discretion if it is fully satisfied that a case for taking cognizance against them has been made out on the additional evidence led before it. 38. In Michael Machado & Anr. Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. [ (2000) 3 SCC 262 ], on extensive consideration of the provisions contained in section 319 of the Code, the Supreme Court observed as under in paragraphs 11 and 12 :- “11. The basic requirements for invoking the above section is that it should appear to the court from the evidence collected during trial or in the inquiry that some other person, who is not arraigned as an accused in that case, has committed an offence for which that person could be tried together with the accused already arraigned. It is not enough that the court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. It is not enough that the court entertained some doubt, from the evidence, about the involvement of another person in the offence. In other words, the court must have reasonable satisfaction from the evidence already collected regarding two aspects. First is that the other person has committed an offence. Second is that for such offence that other person could as well be tried along with the already arraigned accused. 12. But even then, what is conferred on the court is only a discretion as could be discerned from the words the court may proceed against such person. The discretionary power so conferred should be exercised only to achieve criminal justice. It is not that the court should turn against another person whenever it comes across evidence connecting that another person also with the offence. A judicial exercise is called for, keeping a conspectus of the case, including the stage at which the trial has proceeded already and the quantum of evidence collected till then, and also the amount of time which the court had spent for collecting such evidence. It must be remembered that there is no compelling duty on the court to proceed against other persons. 39. In Krishnappa Vs. State of Karnataka [ (2004) 7 SCC 792 ], the Supreme Court reiterated that the power to summon an accused is an extra-ordinary power conferred on the court and should be used very sparingly and only if compelling reasons exist for taking cognizance against the other persons against whom action has not been taken. In the said case, their Lordships, while observing that a person can be summoned even though the proceedings had earlier been quashed as far as he was concerned and held that the exercise of power under section 319 of the Code should not have been resorted to, since the chances of conviction on the basis of the evidence on record was remote. 40. In Palanisamy Gounder & Anr. Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police [ (2005) 12 SCC 327 ], the Supreme Court observed that the power under section 319 cannot be exercised so as to conduct a fishing inquiry. Unless the court is hopeful that there is a reasonable prospect of the case against the newly added accused ending in their conviction for the offence concerned, the court shall refrain from adding them as accused. 41. In Brindaban Das & Ors. Vs. Unless the court is hopeful that there is a reasonable prospect of the case against the newly added accused ending in their conviction for the offence concerned, the court shall refrain from adding them as accused. 41. In Brindaban Das & Ors. Vs. State of West Bengal [ (2009) 3 SCC 329 ], the Supreme Court observed that the object of the provisions of section 319 of the Code is that the whole case against all the accused should be tried and disposed of not only expeditiously but also simultaneously. It further observed that the fulcrum on which the invocation of Section 319 of the Code rests is whether the summoning of persons other than the named accused would make such a difference to the prosecution as would enable it not only to prove its case but also to secure the conviction of the persons summoned. 42. In Sarabjit Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. [( AIR 2009 SC 2792 ], the Supreme Court observed that the power under section 319 of the Code can be exercised only on the basis of sufficient evidence brought before it and not on the basis of materials which have been collected during investigation particularly when final form was submitted and the same had been accepted by the Magistrate concerned. 43. In Michael Machado (Supra), while considering the constraints imposed by sub-section (4) of section 319 of the Code, the Supreme Court held as under in paragraph 14 : “14. The court while deciding whether to invoke the power under Section 319 of the Code, must address itself about the other constraints imposed by the first limb of sub- section (4), that proceedings in respect of newly added persons shall be commenced afresh and the witnesses re- examined. The whole proceedings must be re-commenced from the beginning of the trial, summon the witnesses once again and examine them and cross-examine them in order to reach the stage where it had reached earlier. If the witnesses already examined are quite a large in number the court must seriously consider whether the objects sought to be achieved by such exercise is worth wasting the whole labour already undertaken. If the witnesses already examined are quite a large in number the court must seriously consider whether the objects sought to be achieved by such exercise is worth wasting the whole labour already undertaken. Unless the court is hopeful that there is reasonable prospect of the case as against the newly brought accused ending in conviction of the offence concerned we would say that the court should refrain from adopting such a course of action. 44. In Shashikant Singh Vs. Tarkeshwar Singh & Anr. [ (2002) 5 SCC 738 ], the question, as to whether the order passed under section 319 of the Code would cease to be operated if trial of the co-accused has been concluded, has been considered by the Supreme Court and it was held as under in paragraph 9 :- “9. The intention of the provision here is that where in the course of any enquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears to the court from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence, the court may proceed against him for the offence which he appears to have committed. At that stage, the court would consider that such a person could be tried together with the accused who is already before the court facing the trial. The safeguard provided in respect of such person is that, the proceedings right from the beginning have mandatorily to be commenced afresh and the witnesses reheard. In short, there has to be a de novo trial against him. The provision of de novo trial is mandatory. It vitally affects the rights of a person so brought before the court. It would not be sufficient to only tender the witnesses for the cross-examination of such a person. They have to be examined afresh. Fresh examination-in-chief and not only their presentation for the purpose of the cross-examination of the newly added accused is the mandate of Section 319(4). The words “could be tried together with the accused” in Section 319(1), appear to be only directory. “Could be” cannot under these circumstances be held to be “must be”. They have to be examined afresh. Fresh examination-in-chief and not only their presentation for the purpose of the cross-examination of the newly added accused is the mandate of Section 319(4). The words “could be tried together with the accused” in Section 319(1), appear to be only directory. “Could be” cannot under these circumstances be held to be “must be”. The provision cannot be interpreted to mean that since the trial in respect of a person who was before the court has concluded with the result that the newly added person cannot be tried together with the accused who was before the court when order under Section 319(1) was passed, the order would become ineffective and inoperative, nullifying the opinion earlier formed by the court on the basis of the evidence before it that the newly added person appears to have committed the offence resulting in an order for his being brought before the court.” 45. In Babubhai Bhimabhai Bokhiria Vs. State of Gujarat & Ors. [ (2013) 9 SCC 500 ], the Supreme Court observed that the words could be tried together appearing in section 319 of the Code are not mandatory but only directory. 46. In Mohd. Shafi Vs. Mohd. Rafiq & Anr. [(2007) 14 SCC 544], it was held by the Supreme Court that pre-requisite for exercise of power under section 319 of the Code is the satisfaction of the court to proceed against a person who is not an accused but against whom the evidence occurs for which the court can even wait till the cross-examination is over and there should be no illegality in doing so. 47. In Harbhajan Singh & Anr. Vs. State of Punjab & Anr. [ (2009) 13 SCC 608 ], the Supreme Court held that in all cases the court may not wait till the cross-examination is over for the purpose of exercising its jurisdiction under section 319 of the Code. 48. In Rakesh & Anr. Vs. State of Haryana [(2001) 6 SCC 348], the Supreme Court held as under in paragraph 8 :- “8. Sub-section (4) envisages that once a person is added as an accused, then the proceedings against him are required to be commenced afresh. At that stage, he would have full opportunity of testing the evidence of witness by cross-examination. Vs. State of Haryana [(2001) 6 SCC 348], the Supreme Court held as under in paragraph 8 :- “8. Sub-section (4) envisages that once a person is added as an accused, then the proceedings against him are required to be commenced afresh. At that stage, he would have full opportunity of testing the evidence of witness by cross-examination. Prior to summoning such person to face trial, there would not be any question of calling him to cross-examine the witness. Section also does not contemplate that type of additional stage in the trial.” 49. It further held as under in paragraph 10 :- “10. Hence, once the Sessions Court records a statement of the witness it would be part of the evidence. It is true that finally at the time of trial the accused is to be given an opportunity to cross- examine the witness to test its truthfulness. But that stage would not arise while exercising court's power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. Once the deposition is recorded, no doubt there being no cross-examination, it would be a prima facie material which would enable the sessions court to decide whether powers under Section 319 should be exercised or not. Sub-section (1) of Section 319 itself provides that in the course of any inquiry into, or trial of, an offence, it appears from the evidence that any persons not being the accused has committed any offence for which such person could be tried together with the accused, the Court may proceed against such person for the offence for which he appears to have committed. Further in case of inquiry there may not be any question of cross-examining the witness. In State of H.P. v. Surinder Mohan and Others [ (2000) 2 SCC 396 ], this Court dealt with the contention that before granting pardon under Section 306 of the Cr.P.C., accused should be permitted to cross examine such person whose evidence is recorded by the Magistrate. The Court negatived the said contention by holding that at the time of investigation or inquiry into an offence, the accused cannot claim any right under law to cross-examine the witness. The right to cross- examine would arise only at the time of trial. During the course of investigation by the police, the question of cross-examination by the accused does not arise. The right to cross- examine would arise only at the time of trial. During the course of investigation by the police, the question of cross-examination by the accused does not arise. Similarly, under Section 200 Cr.P.C. when the Magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence, that is, before issuing process holds the inquiry, the accused has no right to be heard, and, therefore, the question of cross-examination does not arise. Further, the person to whom pardon is granted, is examined but is not offered for cross-examination and thereafter during trial if he is examined and cross-examined then there is no question of any prejudice caused to the accused. In such cases, at the most the accused may lose the chance to cross-examine the approver twice, that is to say, once before committal and the other at the time of trial. Similar would be the position under Section 319 Cr.P.C.” 50. In Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [ (2009) 16 SCC 785 ], a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court noticing the conflict between the Judges in Rakesh (Supra) and Mohd. Shafi (Supra), referred the matter to a three-Judge Bench. The issues to be resolved by a three-Judge Bench were as under :- “(1) When the power under sub-section (1) of Section 319 of the Code of addition of accused can be exercised by a Court? Whether application under Section 319 is not maintainable unless the cross-examination of the witness is complete? (2) What is the test and what are the guidelines of exercising power under sub-section (1) of Section 319 of the Code? Whether such power can be exercised only if the Court is satisfied that the accused summoned in all likelihood would be convicted?” 51. Later on, vide order dated 08.12.2011 passed in Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [ (2013) 4 SCC 277 ], a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court referred the matter to a Constitution Bench. 52. Ultimately, in Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [ (2014) 3 SCC 92 ], the matter came to be decided by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on 10.01.2014. State of Punjab & Ors. [ (2013) 4 SCC 277 ], a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court referred the matter to a Constitution Bench. 52. Ultimately, in Hardeep Singh Vs. State of Punjab & Ors. [ (2014) 3 SCC 92 ], the matter came to be decided by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court on 10.01.2014. While deciding the issues involved in the case, the Constitution Bench took into account the variety of views having been expressed by the Supreme Court and several High Courts of the country on the scope and extent of powers of the courts under the criminal justice system to arraign any person as an accused during the course of enquiry or trial as contemplated under section 319 of the Code. After considering various interpretations given by various Courts and Benches for section 319 of the Code, the Constitution Bench summed up the issues and answered as under in paragraph 117 as under :- “117. We accordingly sum up our conclusions as follows: Questions (i) & (iii) - What is the stage at which power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. can be exercised? AND - Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. has been used in a comprehensive sense and includes the evidence collected during investigation or the word "evidence" is limited to the evidence recorded during trial? Answer 117.1. In Dharam Pal's case, the Constitution Bench has already held that after committal, cognizance of an offence can be taken against a person not named as an accused but against whom materials are available from the papers filed by the police after completion of investigation. Such cognizance can be taken under Section 193 Cr.P.C. and the Sessions Judge need not wait till 'evidence' under Section 319 Cr.P.C. becomes available for summoning an additional accused. 117.2. Section 319 Cr.P.C., significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) Inquiry (2) Trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. 117.2. Section 319 Cr.P.C., significantly, uses two expressions that have to be taken note of i.e. (1) Inquiry (2) Trial. As a trial commences after framing of charge, an inquiry can only be understood to be a pre-trial inquiry. Inquiries under Sections 200, 201, 202 Cr.P.C., and under Section 398 Cr.P.C. are species of the inquiry contemplated by Section 319 Cr.P.C. Materials coming before the Court in course of such enquiries can be used for corroboration of the evidence recorded in the court after the trial commences, for the exercise of power under Section 319 Cr.P.C., and also to add an accused whose name has been shown in Column 2 of the charge-sheet. 117.3. In view of the above position the word 'evidence' in Section 319 Cr.P.C. has to be broadly understood and not literally i.e. as evidence brought during a trial. Question (ii) - Whether the word "evidence" used in Section 319(1) Cr.P.C. could only mean evidence tested by cross-examination or the court can exercise the power under the said provision even on the basis of the statement made in the examination-in-chief of the witness concerned? Answer 117.4 Considering the fact that under Section 319 Cr.P.C. a person against whom material is disclosed is only summoned to face the trial and in such an event under Section 319(4) Cr.P.C. the proceeding against such person is to commence from the stage of taking of cognizance, the Court need not wait for the evidence against the accused proposed to be summoned to be tested by cross-examination. Question (iv) - What is the nature of the satisfaction required to invoke the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to arraign an accused? Whether the power under Section 319 (1) Cr.P.C. can be exercised only if the court is satisfied that the accused summoned will in all likelihood be convicted? Answer 117.5 Though under Section 319(4)(b) Cr.P.C. the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the Court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 Cr.P.C. would be the same as for ?framing a charge. Answer 117.5 Though under Section 319(4)(b) Cr.P.C. the accused subsequently impleaded is to be treated as if he had been an accused when the Court initially took cognizance of the offence, the degree of satisfaction that will be required for summoning a person under Section 319 Cr.P.C. would be the same as for ?framing a charge. The difference in the degree of satisfaction for summoning the original accused and a subsequent accused is on account of the fact that the trial may have already commenced against the original accused and it is in the course of such trial that materials are disclosed against the newly summoned accused. Fresh summoning of an accused will result in delay of the trial - therefore the degree of satisfaction for summoning the accused (original and subsequent) has to be different. Question (v) Does the power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. extend to persons not named in the FIR or named in the FIR but not chargesheeted or who have been discharged? Answer 117.6. A person not named in the FIR or a person though named in the FIR but has not been charge-sheeted or a person who has been discharged can be summoned under Section 319 Cr.P.C. provided from the evidence it appears that such person can be tried along with the accused already facing trial. However, in so far as an accused who has been discharged is concerned the requirement of Sections 300 and 398 Cr.P.C. has to be complied with before he can be summoned afresh.” 53. The Constitution Bench in Hardeep Singh (Supra), placing reliance on the decision in Palanisamy Gounder (Supra) in which the practice of invoking the power under section 319 of the Code just to conduct a fishing inquiry was deprecated, held as under in paragraphs 105 and 106 : “105. Power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. is a discretionary and an extra- ordinary power. It is to be exercised sparingly and only in those cases where the circumstances of the case so warrant. It is not to be exercised because the Magistrate or the Sessions Judge is of the opinion that some other person may also be guilty of committing that offence. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. 106. Only where strong and cogent evidence occurs against a person from the evidence led before the court that such power should be exercised and not in a casual and cavalier manner. 106. Thus, we hold that though only a prima facie case is to be established from the evidence led before the court not necessarily tested on the anvil of Cross-Examination, it requires much stronger evidence than mere probability of his complicity. The test that has to be applied is one which is more than prima facie case as exercised at the time of framing of charge, but short of satisfaction to an extent that the evidence, if goes unrebutted, would lead to conviction. In the absence of such satisfaction, the court should refrain from exercising power under Section 319 Cr.P.C. In Section 319 Cr.P.C. the purpose of providing if it appears from the evidence that any person not being the accused has committed any offence is clear from the words “for which such person could be tried together with the accused.” The words used are not for which such person could be convicted‘. There is, therefore, no scope for the Court acting under Section 319 Cr.P.C. to form any opinion as to the guilt of the accused. 54. In view of the statutory provisions of sub-section (4) of Section 319 of the Code and the decisions of the Supreme Court cited hereinabove, the legal position that can be culled out is that in respect of the newly added accused the provision of de novo trial is mandatory. It vitally affects the right of a person so brought before the court. It would not be sufficient to only tender the witnesses for cross-examination. The witnesses already examined in the trial have to be examined afresh failing which the trial would get vitiated. In that view of the matter, since P.W.1 to P.W.6 were tendered only for the purpose of cross-examination in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999, the trial of the accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav, who are appellants in Cr.Appeal (DB) No.1083 of 2007, got vitiated, and thus, the impugned judgment and order passed by the trial court in Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 cannot be sustained and accordingly they are set aside. 55. 55. Now, the next question which would immediately arise is whether the trial of the appellants Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav should be remanded to the trial court for fresh trial. This question shall be dealt with presently. 56. Before that, I would like to take up the case of accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav, who are appellants in Cr.Appeal (DB) No.1143 of 2007 arising out of Sessions Case No.230A of 1999. The first question for consideration before this Court in respect of the aforesaid two appellants would be whether their trial held by the court below was also vitiated in law or they ought to have been tried together with other accused persons at one trial. 57. At the cost of repetition, I would like to record once again that the trial of the appellants Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav was never held together with the additional accused summoned under section 319 of the Code, namely, Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav. These two appellants were sent up for trial together with co-accused Naresh Yadav. Their trial got separated even before framing of charge in case of Naresh Yadav. In their case, each and every witness was examined separately. The co-accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav, who were summoned under section 319 of the Code in separate trial, had no concern with the case of the appellants Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav. In that view of the matter, in my opinion, there is no illegality in their trial. Moreover, in Shashikant Singh (Supra), the Supreme Court has categorically observed that the words could be tried together with the accused in section 319(4) of the Code appeared to be only directory and could be cannot under these circumstances be held to be must be. 58. The next question which would emerge for consideration is whether or not the order of splitting up of the case of the two appellants of Sessions Case No. 230A of 1999 from the original Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 was bad in law. 59. In this regard, it would be relevant to note that while filing the charge sheet before the court, the investigating agency had come to the conclusion that accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav were absconding and they were not available for trial. 59. In this regard, it would be relevant to note that while filing the charge sheet before the court, the investigating agency had come to the conclusion that accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav were absconding and they were not available for trial. The record shows that one of the accused Naresh Yadav, who was sent up for trial along with the two absconders was languishing in custody since 20.04.1998. The charge sheet in the case was submitted on 17.07.1998 in the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Munger. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate took cognizance of the offence on 17.07.1998 itself. Since the accused Naresh Yadav was in custody and the other two sent-up accused were absconding, the case was committed to the court of Sessions on 11th March, 1999. The absconding accused failed to appear even before the Sessions court and ultimately, being left with no option, on 19th November, 1999, the case of the accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav was ordered to be split up from the original Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 by the trial court so that there may not be any delay in trial of the accused, who was languishing in custody. 60. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that for separation of trial under section 299 of the Code, a prima facie finding ought to have been given by the trial court, which is missing in the impugned order, is totally misconceived. There is no provision in the Code which requires any such finding. It is the duty of the court to try the case expeditiously and take all measures which are required for expeditious disposal thereof. In case the presence of the co-accused cannot be procured without undue delay, the trial Judge has discretion to split up the trial. It would appear from the record that the court had taken all steps available in law to procure the attendance of these two appellants, namely, Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav and since their attendance could not be secured, it was left with no option but to split up their trial from the main case. The question of joint trial or several trials is always in the discretion of the trial court. 61. The question of joint trial or several trials is always in the discretion of the trial court. 61. Sections 219 to 222 of the Code deal with the joinder of charges against accused persons in the same trial while section 223 of the Code deals with the persons who may be charged and tried together in the same trial. 62. Section 218 of the Code lays down the general principle that every distinct offence must be charged and tried separately. Though the cases falling under clauses (a) to (g) of Section 223 of the Code permit trial of two or more persons accused of the same offence or of the different offences committed in course of the same transaction, it is more in the nature of an enabling provision for the conduct of joint trial but cannot by any stretch of imagination be read a provision prohibiting trial of a single accused when the other accused persons are absconding. Section 223 of the Code does not in any way bar trial of one accused in the absence of others. 63. While dealing with a similar issue, a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in Pandiyan and others Vs. The Inspector of Police, Sathangadu Police Station, Chengalpattu District [2005 (1) Crime 268] observed as under in paragraph 24 :- "24. It is also made clear that though Section 223 enables that all persons could be tried together for the commission of the offence committed in the course of the same transaction, it is needless to say that it is only an enabling provision so as to prevent multiplicity of proceedings and there is no provision, which prevents the Court from trying the case as against other accused separately if the facts and circumstances of the particular case so warrant." 64. In the facts of the present case, having regard to the statutory provisions of the Code, I am of the opinion that the trial court has committed no illegality in splitting up the trial of the accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav from the original Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 and holding their trial separately. Their trial in separated Sessions Case No.230A of 1999 is neither bad nor illegal. 65. Their trial in separated Sessions Case No.230A of 1999 is neither bad nor illegal. 65. As I have expressed my opinion that the trial of accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav was not vitiated, the next question which would arise is whether the appeal preferred by them before this Court vide Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1134 of 2007 has to be referred to the Division Bench for hearing on merits or this Bench itself would be competent to decide the case in terms of the reference made under section 392 of the Code. 66. At the very outset, it is necessary here to advert to the jurisdiction or the authority of this Bench under section 392 of the Code to hear the appeals on merits regardless of the fact that there is no dissenting or divergent views expressed by the two learned Judges of this Court in respect of the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1083 of 2007 as also the fact that though the two learned Judges expressed their conflicting views in respect of the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No.1134 of 2007, they formed their opinion merely on technical grounds and no hearing was made on merits. 67. Section 392 of the Code reads as under :- “392. Procedure where Judges of Court of appeal are equally divided. When an appeal under this Chapter is heard by a High Court before a Bench of Judges and they are divided in opinion, the appeal, with their opinions, shall be laid before another Judge of that Court, and that Judge, after such hearing as he thinks fit, shall deliver his opinion, and the judgment or order shall follow that opinion: Provided that if one of the Judges constituting the Bench, or, where the appeal is laid before another Judge under this section, that Judge, so requires, the appeal shall be re-heard and decided by a larger Bench of Judges.” 68. A similar provision was contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (for short Code of 1898‘) under section 429, which reads as under :- “429. When the Judges composing the Court of Appeal are equally divided in opinion, the case, with their opinions thereon, shall be laid before another Judge of the same Court, and such Judge, after such hearing (if any) as he thinks fit, shall deliver his opinion, and the judgment or order shall follow such opinion.” 69. When the Judges composing the Court of Appeal are equally divided in opinion, the case, with their opinions thereon, shall be laid before another Judge of the same Court, and such Judge, after such hearing (if any) as he thinks fit, shall deliver his opinion, and the judgment or order shall follow such opinion.” 69. A comparison of section 392 of the Code with Section 429 of the Code of 1898 would make it clear that save and except the proviso which has been added to section 392 of the Code, there is no difference between section 392 of the Code and section 429 of the Code of 1898. The ambit and scope of the power of the Court under section 392 of the Code and section 429 of the Code of 1898 has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in various judgments. 70. In Babu & Ors. Vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh [ AIR 1965 SC 1467 ], it has been held by the Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court that section 429 of the Code of 1898 contemplates that it is for the third Judge to decide on what points he shall hear arguments, if any, and that postulates that he is completely free in resolving the difference as he thinks fit. 71. In Hethubha alias Jithuba Madhuba & Ors. Vs. The State of Gujarat [ (1970) 1 SCC 720 ], the Supreme Court has held that the whole case is to be dealt with by the third Judge and not merely the difference between the two Judges comprising the court of appeal and the third Judge was free to resolve the difference as he thinks fit. 72. In State of Andhra Pradesh Vs. P.T.Appaiah & Anr. [ (1980) 4 SCC 316 ], it has been held by the Supreme Court that even in a case when both the learned Judges had held that the accused was guilty but there was difference of opinion as to the nature of offence committed by the accused, it was open to the third Judge to decide the appeal by holding that the accused was not guilty by considering the case on merits. 73. In Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia Vs. 73. In Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia Vs. State of Gujarat [ (1997) 7 SCC 156 ], the Supreme Court has held that where a case is referred to a third Judge under section 392 of the Code, such Judge is not only entitled to decide on what point he shall hear the arguments, if any, but his decision will be final and the judgment in the appeal will follow his decision. 74. In Radha Mohan Singh alias Lal Saheb & Ors. Vs. State of U.P. [ (2006) 2 SCC 450 ], a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court has held that it is a settled legal position that the third Judge is under no obligation to accept the view of one of the Judges either as a rule of prudence or on score of judicial etiquette. 75. In the light of the statutory provision of law prescribed under section 392 of the Code and the interpretation and meaning given to the said provision by the authoritative pronouncements of the Supreme Court noticed hereinabove, it is as plain as day that it is for the third Judge to decide on what point he shall hear the arguments, if any, and after hearing the arguments, he is completely free to resolve the differences as he thinks fit and he is under no obligation to accept the view of one of the learned Judges either as a rule of prudence or on the score of judicial etiquette. In that view of the matter, I have no scintilla of doubt that this Bench has the jurisdiction to decide these appeals even on merits in resolving the difference. 76. Coming back to the facts of the prosecution case, as noted above, the FIR was registered on 22.09.1997 on the fardbeyan of Pinki Devi, who has been examined as P.W.1 in Sessions Trial No.230A of 1999. She has proved her signature on the fardbeyan, which has been marked as Ext.-1. She has stated in her examination-in-chief that the occurrence took place at about 5.30 a.m. on 22.9.1997. In addition to what has been stated in the fardbeyan, in her examination-in-chief, she has given a vivid description of the manner of occurrence. She has proved her signature on the fardbeyan, which has been marked as Ext.-1. She has stated in her examination-in-chief that the occurrence took place at about 5.30 a.m. on 22.9.1997. In addition to what has been stated in the fardbeyan, in her examination-in-chief, she has given a vivid description of the manner of occurrence. She has stated that firstly Hirday Yadav shot at the deceased and immediately thereafter the other four accused persons also fired shots at him, as a result of which, her husband sustained one gunshot injury on his face, two gunshot injuries on his spleen and one gunshot injury on his waist. She has stated that the occurrence was witnessed by her mother-in-law, sister-in-law and others. She has stated that the motive for committing the crime was non-payment of extortion amount demanded by the accused Hirday Yadav. In cross-examination, she has admitted that when she was accompanied by her husband carrying a lota, to attend the call of nature, her mother-in-law was returning after attending the call of nature, also carrying a lota in her hand. When the shots were fired by the accused persons, the lotas being carried by her husband and mother-in-law fell to the ground. She has admitted that due to the injuries sustained by her husband, his clothes were drenched with blood. At that time, he was wearing ganji and lungi and the gunshots had caused holes on the clothes worn by him. She further admitted that when she went near her husband, her clothes also became drenched with blood. She has stated that when firing was made, she was at a distance of only 1 foot from her husband and the accused persons, who had surrounded her husband from all sides, were also at a distance of only 1 foot from her husband. She has stated that at the time of occurrence, her husband was in a standing position and the accused Hirday Yadav, who had fired the first shot, stood facing him. After sustaining the injury, her husband had fallen down with his back on the ground. He was profusely bleeding and a large quantity of blood had spread on the ground. The blood-stained clothes were taken by the Investigating Officer. She has stated that her husband was shot at near the Sita Kund metal road. At that time there was none except her near the place of occurrence. He was profusely bleeding and a large quantity of blood had spread on the ground. The blood-stained clothes were taken by the Investigating Officer. She has stated that her husband was shot at near the Sita Kund metal road. At that time there was none except her near the place of occurrence. She has denied the defence suggestion that her husband was accused in Sessions Case No.194 of 1992 and one another case registered in the Kotwali police Station. She stated that she does not remember as to whether all the accused had fired when her husband was in standing position or they fired after he had fallen. She has stated that though she was at a distance of only one foot away from the deceased who himself was equally near the accused when the occurrence took place but no harm was caused to her by the accused persons. 77. P.W.2 Krishna Yadav, P.W.3 Diwakar Kumar Yadav and P.W.4 Mukesh Yadav did not support the prosecution case and have been declared hostile by the prosecution. They were cross-examined with leave of the court. In cross-examination, they have completely denied having any knowledge about the prosecution case. Surprisingly, the prosecution did not make any effort to draw their attention towards their previous statements made before the police. 78. P.W.5 Anpi Devi, mother of the deceased, has corroborated the prosecution case. She has stated that at the relevant time of occurrence, she was returning from the ground near ITI building after answering the call of nature and when she arrived near the house of Akhilesh Gupta, she saw that the accused Hirday Yadav, Dasrath Yadav, Rama Yadav, Shyama Yadav and Naresh Yadav armed with pistols had surrounded her son. They fired shots at him and he sustained two gunshot injuries on his back, one gunshot injury on his waist and one gunshot injury on the back of his head, as a result of which, he fell down and died. In cross-examination, her attention was drawn towards her previous statement made before the police in which she had stated that she came running on hearing the sound of firing and when she reached, she saw her son lying dead in a pool of blood, but she has denied having made such statement before the police. In cross-examination, her attention was drawn towards her previous statement made before the police in which she had stated that she came running on hearing the sound of firing and when she reached, she saw her son lying dead in a pool of blood, but she has denied having made such statement before the police. She has further stated that when the firing took place, she was at a distance of 10 feet from her son. She admits that she made no effort to save her son. She has stated that at the time of occurrence, she was carrying a lota in her hand and her son was also carrying a lota in his hand. Their respective lotas had fallen down near the place of occurrence. According to her, at the time of occurrence, the deceased was wearing ganji, lungi and janghia. In cross-examination, she has categorically stated that each of the five shots fired at her son by the accused persons had caused wounds of entry and wounds of exit and the bullets fired at him had passed right through. She also denied the defence suggestion that her son was accused in some criminal cases and was facing trial. 79. P.W.6 Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey, who was posted as Civil Assistant Surgeon at Sadar Hospital, Munger had conducted autopsy on 22.09.1997 on the body of the deceased Sanjiva Yadav. He has stated that the post-mortem examination was conducted at 10.00 a.m. on 22.09.1997. The body was identified by Constables Ramdeo Ram and Krishna Yadav. According to P.W. 6, the following ante-mortem injuries were found on the body of Sanjiva Yadav :- (1) Wound of entry – one lacerated circular wound ½” in diameter x brain cavity deep on occipital parietal region (middle portion). Singeing of hairs present. (2) Wound of entry – one lacerated circular would ½” diameter x soft tissue deep of right back of chest wall lower portion 1” lateral to vertebra. One bullet found lodged in the soft tissue which was recovered. Tattooing around the wound was present. (3) Wound of entry – one lacerated circular wound ½” in diameter x deep vertebra back of abdomen. (4) Wound of entry – one lacerated circular wound ½” in diameter x abdominal cavity deep on left side of back just above iliac crest. Tattooing around the wound was present. Tattooing around the wound was present. (3) Wound of entry – one lacerated circular wound ½” in diameter x deep vertebra back of abdomen. (4) Wound of entry – one lacerated circular wound ½” in diameter x abdominal cavity deep on left side of back just above iliac crest. Tattooing around the wound was present. On dissection :- There was fracture of occipital, parietal bones with laceration of brain matter, blood and blood clot was present in cranial cavity. One bullet found lodged in the brain cavity. Fracture of lumber vertebra II and torn of its spinal cord was seen. One bullet was found in muscles. Abdominal cavity contained blood and blood clot. Small gut perforated at two places and large gut at one place. One bullet found lodged in the right side of peritoneal cavity. Four bullets recovered, sealed, signed and handed over to police. 80. P.W.6 has opined that the death of Sanjiva Yadav was caused by shock and hemorrhage due to abovesaid injuries caused by firearm and the time elapsed since death was about 6-12 hours. He has proved the post-mortem report, which has been marked as Ext.-2. In cross-examination, he has stated that he had not left out anything which might have helped the defence. He has also stated that he had returned the clothes etc. of the deceased which he received from the police. He has admitted that when he conducted the post-mortem examination, the stomach of the deceased was empty and neither any food nor stool was found in the small intestine. Even in the large gut no material was found. He has stated that had he found anything in the guts or stomach, he would have written about that in the post-mortem report. He has stated that though tattooing was found around two wounds, no blackening, charring or smoking around the wound has been mentioned in the post-mortem report. He has admitted that had firing been made on the deceased from a distance of 1-2 feet, there would have been blackening and smoking around the wounds. He also admitted that he did not find any exit wound and only four wounds of entry were found by him. He admitted that the nature of injuries found on the person of the deceased was not possible in case of face to face firing. He also admitted that he did not find any exit wound and only four wounds of entry were found by him. He admitted that the nature of injuries found on the person of the deceased was not possible in case of face to face firing. According to him, if the injured had fallen with back on the ground, the types of injuries found on the person of the deceased could not have been occurred. He has stated that he had handed over the recovered bullets to the police and the same were not in his possession. 81. P.W.7 Nand Bihari Singh, the Investigating Officer of the case has proved his signature on the fardbeyan, formal FIR, inquest report and seizure memo, which have been marked as Exts.-3, 4, 5 and 6 respectively. He has stated that the inquest report and the seizure memo were signed by him though they had been prepared by Sub-Inspector Manoj Kumar. He took up investigation of the case after institution of the FIR. In course of investigation, he recorded the statements of Krishna Yadav (P.W.2), Anpi Devi (P.W.5), Neelam Devi (P.W.8), Nawal Kishore Yadav (not examined), Pankaj Kumar Gupta (not examined), Muneshwar Mandal (not examined), Ganeshi Yadav (not examined), Lalit Prasad Sah (not examined), Mukesh Yadav (P.W.4), Sunil Yadav (not examined) and Diwakar Kumar Yadav (P.W.3). He inspected the place of occurrence and seized the blood stained earth. He has stated that P.W.2 Krishna Yadav had stated before him that the latter had seen Hirday Yadav, Dasrath Yadav, Rama Yadav, Shyama Yadav and Naresh Yadav running away and further P.W.1 Pinki Devi had said that Sanjiva Yadav had sustained gunshot injury. According to him, P.W.3 Diwakar Kumar Yadav had stated before him that he had heard that the accused persons had killed Sanjiva Yadav. P.W.4 Mukesh Yadav had stated that on 22.09.1997 at about 5.00 a.m. accused persons had shot at the deceased Sanjiva Yadav as a result of which he died. On completion of investigation, he submitted charge sheet before the court. In cross-examination, he admitted that he had not witnessed the occurrence. He further admitted that neither the informant nor any of her family members had come to the police station to inform regarding the alleged occurrence. On completion of investigation, he submitted charge sheet before the court. In cross-examination, he admitted that he had not witnessed the occurrence. He further admitted that neither the informant nor any of her family members had come to the police station to inform regarding the alleged occurrence. He admits that he had received information about the alleged occurrence over the phone pursuant to which he made a station diary entry and proceeded towards the place of occurrence. He has stated that the person who made the call had neither disclosed his identity nor the identity of the assailants. He could not disclose the number of the station diary entry. He admitted that neither the station diary entry is before him nor the contents of the same have been noted down in the case diary. He further admitted that when he inspected the place of occurrence, he could not find any lota. He admitted that the blood stained earth seized from the place of occurrence was not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical examination. He also admitted that he had not prepared any sketch map of the place of occurrence. He has stated that the inquest report was correctly prepared and had there been any mark of blood on the clothes of the deceased, the same would have been noted down in the inquest report. He admitted that the inquest report does not mention that the clothes worn by the deceased were stained with blood. He has admitted that Sub-Inspector of Police Manoj Kumar, who had scribed the inquest report and the seizure memo had not put his signature on those two documents. He admitted that neither the seizure memo nor the inquest report prepared in the writing of Manoj Kumar contained any assertion that these were prepared pursuant to his direction. He admitted that the blood stained earth seized by him and the clothes worn by the deceased at the time of occurrence are not in his possession and the same were never produced before the court. When the defence put a question regarding the previous statement of P.W.1 Pinki Devi, he has admitted that she had not stated before him that her husband was shot at twice in the spleen and once at kanpatti. When the defence put a question regarding the previous statement of P.W.1 Pinki Devi, he has admitted that she had not stated before him that her husband was shot at twice in the spleen and once at kanpatti. He stated that she had not stated that at the time of occurrence she was going to ITI ground to answer the call of nature. When he was asked about the previous statement of P.W.5 Anpi Devi, he has stated that she had not stated that the FIR named accused persons had killed her son. She had stated that all the accused persons were armed with pistols and made indiscriminate firing. He has admitted that during inspection of the place of occurrence, he could not recover any empty or live cartridge. 82. P.W.8 Neelam Devi, sister of the deceased Sanjiva Yadav, has stated that when the alleged occurrence took place, she was at her sasural and on coming to know about the murder of her brother, she came to her parental home and saw the body of her brother. She stated that she does not know who killed her brother. She further said that her statement was also not recorded by the police during investigation. At this stage, the prosecution declared her hostile and with leave of the court, cross-examined her. In cross-examination, she has denied the fact that during investigation she had made statement to the police that on hulla when she went near the place of occurrence, she found her brother dead and came to know through P.W.1 Pinki Devi and P.W.5 Anpi Devi that the accused persons had killed her brother. She denied that she has made a false statement before the court. 83. In view of the aforesaid evidence, the trial court came to the conclusion that P.W.1 Pinki Devi and P.W.5 Anpi Devi fully corroborated the prosecution case and the ocular testimony of the two eye witnesses has duly been corroborated by P.W.6 Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey, who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased. The trial court has held that P.W.7 Nand Bihari Singh, the Investigating Officer of the case, has also corroborated the ocular testimony and medical evidence led before the court. 84. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to see whether the evidences collected during trial were sufficient to hold that the charges stood proved. The trial court has held that P.W.7 Nand Bihari Singh, the Investigating Officer of the case, has also corroborated the ocular testimony and medical evidence led before the court. 84. Before proceeding further, it would be appropriate to see whether the evidences collected during trial were sufficient to hold that the charges stood proved. I find from the evidence that the alleged occurrence took place at 5.30 a.m. on 22.09.1997 and the fardbeyan of P.W.1 Pinki Devi was promptly recorded by the Investigating Officer (P.W.7) at 6.00 a.m. on that very day. P.W.7 is the police officer, who not only recorded the fardbeyan but also took up the investigation of the case. He deposed that he was posted as Incharge S.H.O. of the Police Station concerned at the relevant time. He received vague information on the phone regarding the occurrence pursuant thereto he left the Police Station after making entry of the said information in the station diary. Admittedly, the station diary entry was not produced in the court. He failed to give its number and admitted that the same was not incorporated in the case diary. There is no dispute that the earliest report to the police regarding the occurrence was received over the phone in respect of which the station diary entry was made. The said entry, however, has been withheld from the court. Had it been produced, the court would have examined whether or not the information received by the police over phone was vague or cryptic. The Investigating Officer has proved the inquest report and the seizure memo prepared in respect of the blood-stained earth. On perusal of the inquest report (Ext.- 5), it would appear that the same was prepared at 6.30 a.m. on 22.09.1997 at the place of occurrence itself but the seizure memo (Ext.-6) does not contain the time when it was prepared. In his deposition, P.W.7 has stated that the inquest report and the seizure memo were prepared by Sub-Inspector of Police Manoj Kumar. He has admitted that the signature of Manoj Kumar is not present either on the inquest report or on the seizure memo. True it is that both the documents contain the signature of the Investigating Officer of the case but there is no explanation why the police officer who authored those documents did not put his signature. He has admitted that the signature of Manoj Kumar is not present either on the inquest report or on the seizure memo. True it is that both the documents contain the signature of the Investigating Officer of the case but there is no explanation why the police officer who authored those documents did not put his signature. The discrepancy could have been clarified by none else than the author of the documents himself. The prosecution has failed to explain as to why Sub-Inspector of Police Manoj Kumar was not examined during trial. He was definitely an important witness. His non-examination during trial creates considerable suspicion. Another relevant aspect of this case is that even though the information received over phone was immediately recorded and the police reached the place of occurrence within a short span of a mere half an hour, the fardbeyan of the informant was recorded at 6.00 a.m., the FIR was drawn after an inordinate and unexplained delay of seven hours at 1.00 p.m. As noted above, the inquest report was prepared at 6.30 a.m., but the same does not contain the name of any of the accused persons. It would be important to notice here that the post-mortem examination on the body of the deceased was conducted by the doctor on the date of occurrence itself at 10.00 a.m., but the formal FIR was drawn three hours after the post-mortem examination. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, though there is delay of only 7 hours in drawing the FIR, the same gives an impression that there was deliberate delay in drawing the formal FIR. When the names of the accused had already been disclosed by the informant at 6.00 a.m., they ought to have been mentioned in the inquest report which was prepared at the place of occurrence itself at 6.30 a.m. There may be some justification for preparing the inquest report at the place of occurrence itself but there can be no justification for sending the body for post-mortem examination and obtaining a post-mortem report first and then instituting an FIR. I am of the view that holding of a post-mortem examination is certainly an integral part of investigation which ought to have been done only after institution of the FIR. I am of the view that holding of a post-mortem examination is certainly an integral part of investigation which ought to have been done only after institution of the FIR. The manner in which the investigating agency has proceeded in the matter gives a clear impression that the accusations are an afterthought or have been made by giving a coloured version of the events. 85. I find that the Investigating Officer has admitted in the cross-examination that the sample of blood-stained earth seized from the place of occurrence was not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical test. Failure on the part of the investigating agency to send the blood stained earth to Forensic Science Laboratory or to produce the same before the court creates serious doubt about the seizure of the same from the place of occurrence. I further find that the two police constables, namely, Ramdeo Ram and Krishna Yadav, who identified the body and carried it to the hospital for post-mortem examination, have not been examined during trial. 86. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellants that the investigation of the case was tainted finds support from the fact that P.W.6 Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey has stated that he recovered four bullets from the body of the deceased during autopsy, which were handed over to the constable Ramdeo Ram in sealed condition. The said bullets were neither produced in the court nor were the same sent to the ballistic expert. During investigation the investigating agency has failed to seize any weapon said to have been used in the crime. Whether the recovered bullets were used in a particular weapon could have been ascertained by scientific test. The prosecution case is that all the accused persons were armed with pistols. Under such circumstances, the investigating agency ought to have endeavoured to find out and establish which weapon the bullets were fired from. Surprisingly, the investigating agency made no effort in this regard. 87. Further, P.W.1 Pinki Devi and P.W.5 Anpi Devi respectively stated that there were holes in the clothes worn by the deceased. P.W.6 Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey has deposed that he handed over the clothes worn by the deceased to the constables who had brought the body. As noted above, the constables have not been examined during trial. There is no explanation for their non-examination. P.W.6 Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey has deposed that he handed over the clothes worn by the deceased to the constables who had brought the body. As noted above, the constables have not been examined during trial. There is no explanation for their non-examination. The clothes worn by the deceased which, according to the prosecution case, were stained with blood, were not produced during trial. To top it all, the Investigating Officer has admitted in his cross-examination that when the inquest report was prepared, he did not notice any hole in the ganji or lungi worn by the deceased. 88. The eye witnesses examined during trial have stated that each of the accused shot at the husband of the informant when they were at a distance of only 1 foot from him. If the prosecution case is to be believed, carbonaceous material as well as gunshot residue should have been deposited on the deceased‘s clothes. The said clothes would have yielded valuable information about the range of firing. The ganji and lungi worn by the deceased at the time of occurrence were valuable pieces of evidence. Admittedly, neither the clothes worn by the deceased were produced before the court nor the same were sent for any scientific test. The defects pointed out hereinabove on the part of the investigating agency create serious doubt as to the time, place and manner of occurrence. 89. However, it is well settled that in case of a defective investigation, the court has to be circumspect in evaluating the evidence, but it would not be right in acquitting the accused solely on account of defect in investigation, otherwise it would tantamount to playing into the hands of the Investigating Officer if the investigation is designedly defective. If the court is convinced that the testimony of witnesses to the occurrence is true, it would be free to act on it even though the Investigating Officer‘s role in the case gives it an impression that the investigation of the case is tainted. 90. Keeping the above well-settled law in mind, it is to be seen whether or not the witnesses to the occurrence in the instant case are reliable. The two eye-witnesses of the case are P.W.1 Pinki Devi and P.W.5 Anpi Devi, being closely related to the deceased as his wife and mother respectively. 91. 90. Keeping the above well-settled law in mind, it is to be seen whether or not the witnesses to the occurrence in the instant case are reliable. The two eye-witnesses of the case are P.W.1 Pinki Devi and P.W.5 Anpi Devi, being closely related to the deceased as his wife and mother respectively. 91. Learned counsel for the appellants has contended that the conviction solely based on the evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.5, who are wife and mother of the deceased respectively, cannot be sustained in absence of corroboration from other witnesses. On the other hand, learned Additional Public Prosecutor has submitted that merely because the eye witnesses in the case at hand are related to the deceased, their evidence cannot be discarded. According to her, the role of the court in such circumstances would be to scrutinize their evidence carefully. Her contention is that in addition to the evidence of the said eye witnesses, medical evidence through P.W.6 Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey also supports the prosecution case. 92. As regards the admissibility of evidence of P.W.1 and P.W.5 being closely related to each other and the deceased, I am of the view that there is no bar in considering the evidence of relatives. However, in view of the well-settled legal position, their evidence has to be carefully scrutinized. 93. Now, let us consider the evidence of the informant first. In the FIR she has not given the vivid description of the injuries sustained by the deceased but while deposing in court, she has stated the exact parts of the body over which the injuries were caused. In the FIR she has stated that while she was going to attend the call of nature accompanied by her husband, all the five accused persons named in the fardbeyan armed with pistols surrounded her husband and one after the other fired shots at him, as a result of which he fell down and died. She has stated that the accused Hirday Yadav was the person who first shot at her husband. According to her all the accused fired from a close range of about 1 foot. In the FIR it has not been mentioned how many shots were fired by the accused persons but during trial it has clearly been stated that each of the accused fired one shot at her husband. According to her all the accused fired from a close range of about 1 foot. In the FIR it has not been mentioned how many shots were fired by the accused persons but during trial it has clearly been stated that each of the accused fired one shot at her husband. If the contention of the informant is to be believed, there ought to have been five gunshot injuries on the body the deceased. Further, in the FIR, it has been stated that when the informant raised hulla, Anpi Devi (P.W.5) and others arrived at the place of occurrence. In cross-examination, the informant has admitted that when the accused persons opened fire, there was none except her near the place of occurrence. The contention of the informant (P.W.1) clearly rules out the presence of P.W.5 at the place of occurrence when the alleged murder took place. I further find that in the cross-examination, P.W.1 has stated that when Hirday Yadav fired first shot, he was standing facing the deceased who also was in a standing position. 94. P.W.5 Anpi Devi has deposed that when the firing took place, she was at a distance of only 10 feet from her deceased son. At that time she was returning back to home after answering the call of nature. She has stated that she was carrying a lota in her hand which fell to the ground when the firing took place. She has given a vivid description of the injuries sustained by the deceased in her deposition. She has stated that there were wounds of entry and wounds of exit on the body of the deceased and the bullets fired at him had passed right through. 95. In their deposition, both P.W.1 and P.W.5 have stated that after sustaining gunshot injuries, the deceased fell having back with the ground. Both the eye witnesses have stated that the clothes worn by the deceased were drenched with blood. P.W.1 has stated that even her clothes were drenched with blood. 96. When the evidences of P.W.1 and P.W.5 are carefully scrutinized vis-à-vis medical evidence collected during trial, the prosecution case becomes highly suspect. Since beginning, it is the case of the prosecution that at the time of occurrence the deceased was going to clear his bowels. Dr. P.W.1 has stated that even her clothes were drenched with blood. 96. When the evidences of P.W.1 and P.W.5 are carefully scrutinized vis-à-vis medical evidence collected during trial, the prosecution case becomes highly suspect. Since beginning, it is the case of the prosecution that at the time of occurrence the deceased was going to clear his bowels. Dr. Krishna Mohan Purvey, who conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased, has clearly admitted in his cross-examination that the stomach of the deceased was found empty at the time of post-mortem examination. Neither any food nor any stool was found in the small intestine. He also admitted that nothing was found even in the large gut. 97. As noticed above, P.W.5 Anpi Devi has contended that the gun shot passed right through the body of the deceased but Dr. K. M. Purvey (P.W.6) has categorically admitted in cross-examination that he did not find any exit wound. He has stated that he could find only four wounds of entry. Further, the informant has stated that Hirday Yadav fired when the victim was standing face to face but the doctor has admitted in cross-examination that the kind of injuries found on the person of the deceased could not have been caused in face to face firing. I further find that as per eye witnesses when the victim sustained gunshot injuries, he fell down with his back to the ground but the doctor has admitted that if the injured had so fallen, the type of injuries found on the person of the deceased would not have been possible. 98. It has been stated in the deposition of the two eye witnesses that firing was made by putting the pistol almost on the body of the victim as the accused persons were at a distance of only 1 foot from him. In that case, there ought to have been at least five gunshot injuries on the body of the deceased but the doctor could find only four wound of entry. That apart, the doctor has admitted that had there been firing on the deceased from the distance of 1-2 feet, charring, blackening and smoking around the wound would have occurred, but no charring, blackening or smoking was found on the body of the deceased. He has stated that he could notice tattooing around only two wounds while conducting autopsy. 99. That apart, the doctor has admitted that had there been firing on the deceased from the distance of 1-2 feet, charring, blackening and smoking around the wound would have occurred, but no charring, blackening or smoking was found on the body of the deceased. He has stated that he could notice tattooing around only two wounds while conducting autopsy. 99. Thus, it is seen that the medical evidence altogether rules out the possibility that the injuries could have occurred in the manner alleged. It is well settled that if the evidence of eye witnesses is corroborated by medical evidence, it cannot be disbelieved merely because the eye witnesses happen to be close relatives. However, if the medical evidence altogether rules out the possibility that the injuries could have taken place in the manner alleged, it may prove fatal to the prosecution case. The physical evidence/medical evidence is important because unlike the witnesses testimony it does not lie and cannot be accused of bias. In the present case, the physical evidence/medical evidence does not align at all with the testimony of the eye witnesses. 100. Regard being had to the tainted investigation, non-examination of independent witnesses, withholding of important witnesses and non-alignment of ocular testimony of the eye witnesses with the medical evidence, I am of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove the charges beyond reasonable doubt. In that view of the matter, the impugned judgment and order passed by the court below cannot be sustained. Accordingly, the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 18.08.2007 passed in Sessions Case No.230A of 1999 is set aside. The appellant no.1 in Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1134 of 2007 Hirday Yadav, who is in custody, is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. The appellant no.2 Dasrath Yadav, who is on bail is discharged from the liability of his bail bonds. The appeal stands allowed. Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 101. The appellant no.1 in Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1134 of 2007 Hirday Yadav, who is in custody, is directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. The appellant no.2 Dasrath Yadav, who is on bail is discharged from the liability of his bail bonds. The appeal stands allowed. Sessions Trial No.230 of 1999 101. When I have come to the finding that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt in case of charge sheeted accused Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav, it is to be seen whether the case of accused Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav of Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1038 of 2007, whose trial has been held to be vitiated, should be sent back to the trial court for retrial. 102. In this regard, it is important to enunciate the scope and ambit of Section 386 of the Code which sets out the powers of the appellate court in criminal cases. To the extent it is relevant, it reads as under : ? “386. Powers of the Appellate Court – xxxx xxxx xxxx (b) in an appeal from a conviction— (i) reverse the finding and sentence and acquit or discharge the accused, or order him to be re-tried by a Court of competent jurisdiction subordinate to such Appellate Court or committed for trial, or (ii) alter the finding, maintaining the sentence, or (iii) with or without altering the finding, alter the nature or the extent, or the nature and extent, of the sentence, but not so as to enhance the same? 103. Thus, it is apparent that section 386 of the Code gives power to the appellate court to send back a case to the trial court for retrial. 104. In such circumstances, the next question would be whether or not an order for retrial ought to be made in the present case. The issue in question has been dealt with by the Supreme Court in several cases. 105. In Abinash Chandra Bose vs Bimal Chandra Bose [ AIR 1963 SC 316 ], the Supreme Court refused retrial because it was of the opinion that the retrial in the circumstances of the case would have been not only further harassment of the defendant but also additional chance to the prosecution to adduce evidence which it could not produce in the first trial. This reasoning of the Supreme Court has been reiterated in many cases. 106. In Mohd. Hussain v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi), [ (2012) 2 SCC 584 ], the appellant was convicted under section 302 and 307 IPC as also section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act by the trial court. He was awarded death sentence under section 302 IPC and imprisonment for life under section 307 UPC and section 3 of the Explosive Substances Act. The prosecution case was that the appellant Md. Hussain @ Julfikar Ali was guilty of placing a bomb in a Blueline bus, which exploded at Ram Pura Bus Stand on 30th December, 1997 in which four persons died and 24 sustained injuries. In appeal, a two-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court gave split verdict by setting aside the sentence awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the Delhi High Court. While one of the learned Judges ordered a fresh trial, holding that the trial was vitiated as the appellant was not provided with a counsel to defend himself properly, another learned Judge held that the trial was illegal and directed that the appellant be set at liberty and ordered his deportation as the appellant was a Pakistani citizen. 107. In view of the split verdict of the two-Judge Bench, the matter was referred to a three-Judge Bench of the Supreme Court to examine whether the matter requires to be remanded for a de novo trial. Though in the case, considering the gravity of the offence, the three-Judge Bench in its judgment reported in 2012(9) SCC 408 , remanded the matter to the trial court for de novo trial of the appellant from the stage of production of witnesses and directed the trial court to conclude the trial as expeditiously as possible and in no case later than three months from the date of communication of the order but while saying so, the Bench held as under in paragraph 41 :- “41. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code. That is clear from the bare language of Section 386(b). Though such power exists, it should not be exercised in a routine manner. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code. That is clear from the bare language of Section 386(b). Though such power exists, it should not be exercised in a routine manner. A de novo trial or retrial of the accused should be ordered by the appellate court in exceptional and rare cases and only when in the opinion of the appellate court such course becomes indispensable to avert failure of justice. Surely this power cannot be used to allow the prosecution to improve upon its case or fill up the lacuna. A retrial is not the second trial; it is continuation of the same trial and same prosecution. The guiding factor for retrial must always be demand of justice. Obviously, the exercise of power of retrial under Section 386(b) of the Code, will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case for which no straitjacket formula can be formulated but the appeal court must closely keep in view that while protecting the right of an accused to fair trial and due process, the people who seek protection of law do not lose hope in legal system and the interests of the society are not altogether overlooked. 108. In view of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court, it can be culled out that though the appellate court has the power to order retrial of the accused under section 386(b) of the Code, it should not be exercised in a routine manner. It should be ordered in exceptional and rare cases only when in the opinion of the appellate court such course becomes indispensable to avert failure of justice and the guiding factor for retrial must always be demand of justice and exercise of power of retrial will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case for which no straitjacket formula can be formulated. Even where a conviction is vitiated by mistake of the trial court for which the prosecution is not to be blamed, it does not necessarily follow that retrial should be ordered. 109. Thus, it is to be seen whether the case of the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1083 of 2007 is fit to be ordered for re-trial from the stage of production of witnesses. 109. Thus, it is to be seen whether the case of the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1083 of 2007 is fit to be ordered for re-trial from the stage of production of witnesses. Keeping the ambit and scope of the power of the appellate court under section 386(b) of the Code explained and interpreted by the Supreme Court on more than one occasion when I look to the facts and circumstances of the present case, I find that the appellants were named in the FIR along with three others, namely, Naresh Yadav, Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav, but on completion of investigation the police found them to be innocent. When the charge sheet was submitted against the accused Naresh Yadav, Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav, the appellants were not sent up for trial. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate before whom the police report was filed accepted the police report and discharged the appellants while taking cognizance against the other three accused named in the FIR. When the charge sheet was filed the accused Naresh Yadav was in judicial custody and the two other accused persons Hirday Yadav and Dasrath Yadav were absconding. In due course of time trial of absconding accused was separated from the under trial prisoner Naresh Yadav. In course of trial of Naresh Yadav after examination of six witnesses, the appellants Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav were summoned by the trial court under section 319 of the Code vide order dated 09.04.2002. By the said order the trial court has held that on the basis of evidence of P.W.4 and P.W.5 a prima facie case is made out against the appellants. It is well-settled that a prima facie evidence may be sufficient for taking cognizance of an offence against the accused but for summoning an accused under section 319 of the Code, there must be compelling reasons. It is to be noted that the accused Naresh Yadav in whose trial the appellants were summoned died during trial and the case against him got abated. The two accused persons, who were charge sheeted and whose case was split up initially even before framing of charge in case of the accused Naresh Yadav were subsequently put on trial in Sessions Case No.230A of 1999. The trial court held them guilty under section 302/34 IPC and section 27 of the Arms Act. The two accused persons, who were charge sheeted and whose case was split up initially even before framing of charge in case of the accused Naresh Yadav were subsequently put on trial in Sessions Case No.230A of 1999. The trial court held them guilty under section 302/34 IPC and section 27 of the Arms Act. In the appeal preferred by them the judgment of conviction passed by the trial court has already hereby been set aside on merits, regard being had to the tainted investigation, withholding of important witnesses and non-alignment of ocular testimony of the eye witnesses with the medical evidence, as also in view of the unreliable testimony of P.W.4 Anpi Devi and P.W.5 Pinki Devi (examined as P.W.5 and P.W.1 respectively in split up trial bearing Sessions Case No.230A of 1999) on whose testimony alone the appellants were summoned under section 319 of the Code. 110. In the circumstances mentioned hereinabove, having found the conviction and sentence of the appellants to be bad in law, not on merits but on the ground that the trial was vitiated, in my opinion, it would not be just and proper for this Court to order for retrial of the appellants after a lapse of almost 18 years from the date of institution of FIR, which in the circumstances of the case would serve no useful purpose. 111. Accordingly, the appellants of Cr.Appeal (DB) No. 1083 of 2007, namely, Shyam Kumar @ Shyama Yadav and Ram Kumar @ Rama Yadav, who are on bail, are discharged from the liability of their bail-bonds. 112. The appeal stands allowed.