JUDGMENT : Manjula Chellur, J. MAT 1520 of 2013 is initiated at the instance of the State and the other two FMAs are at the instance of private parties. The facts relating to the above three appeals have history of long legal battle, therefore, it is just and proper to narrate the background in which the present appeals arise for consideration. The West Bengal Co-operative Societies Bill, 2006 was passed by West Bengal Legislative Assembly on 10.3.2006. 2. State of West Bengal sent a report for the purpose of obtaining assent of the President of India under Article 200 read with Article 254(2) of the Constitution in respect of the aforesaid Bill. On 12.4.2006, Report, inter-alia provided, the State perceived new law may be inconsistent to certain central legislations which were enumerated therein. 3. On 12.8.2009 President of India returned the Bill with a note that the same may be amended so as to exclude the co-operatives covered under the Employee's Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 1952. 4. On 15.1.2010 the Bill was accordingly amended and again sent for assent of the President of India. 5. On 13.5.2010, the Bill received the assent of the President of India. 6. On 25.5.2010 the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act of 2006 (hereinafter referred to as the Act of 2006) was notified in the Official Gazette after having received the assent of the President. The Act of 2006, however, was not notified to come into effect at once. The Act of 2006 repealed the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act of 1983. Section 6 of the new act provided that any action done under the repealed act, namely, West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 shall be deemed to have been done under the new act as if the provisions of the new act were in force at all material times. Sections 29(5) read with Section 32(5) and Section 36 of the new act provided that the term of the Board of Directors of the Cooperative Societies shall be for a period of 60 months from the date of election. 7. On 18.1.2011 the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 2006 was brought into force by notification in Official Gazette. 8. On 30.1.2001 State legislature passed the West Bengal Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act of 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the amending Act of 2011) which received the assent of the Governor. 7. On 18.1.2011 the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 2006 was brought into force by notification in Official Gazette. 8. On 30.1.2001 State legislature passed the West Bengal Co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act of 2011 (hereinafter referred to as the amending Act of 2011) which received the assent of the Governor. By the amending Act of 2011, Section 36 of the Act of 2006 was amended and the tenure of the Board of Directors of Co-operative Societies who had been elected prior to coming into force in the Act of 2006 was fixed at 36 months. It is relevant to note that the tenure of the said Co-operative Societies were for a period of 36 months under Section 27 (8) of the repealed Act. 9. With effect from 6.2.2012 amending Act of 2011 came into force. 10. On 15.2.2012 Constitution 97th Amendment Act, 2011 was assented by the President and the Constitution stood amended by incorporation of Part IX B therein. Article 243 ZJ (2), inter-alia, provided that the tenure of the Board of a Co-operative Society shall be for 5 years from the date of its election. 11. On 27.2.2012, petitioners filed writ petition challenging the vires of the Amending Act of 2011, particularly, Section 12 (a)(ii) thereof amending Section 36 of the Act of 2006, as afore stated. 12. On 17.10.2012 a learned Single Judge of this Court declared Section 12 (a)(ii) of the Amending Act of 2011 ultra-vires on the ground: (i) that the aforesaid amending provision was ultra-vires Section 6 of the Act of 2006 which inter-alia, provided that acts done under the repealed Act will be deemed to have been done under the Act of 2006 as if the provisions of the said Act were in force at all material points of time; (ii) that the impugned amending provision was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it created an arbitrary and discriminatory classification between Co-operative Societies elected under the Act of 2006 and those elected under the repealed Act of 1983 in view of the aforesaid legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006. 13. On 3.4.2012 the State Government preferred an appeal being AST No. 339 of 2012 challenging the aforesaid judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 17.10.2012. 14. Said appeal came to be withdrawn on 17.1.2013. 15. 13. On 3.4.2012 the State Government preferred an appeal being AST No. 339 of 2012 challenging the aforesaid judgment and order of the learned Single Judge dated 17.10.2012. 14. Said appeal came to be withdrawn on 17.1.2013. 15. On 4.2.2013 the West Bengal Co-operative Societies (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance 2013 was promulgated. In the report submitted to the Governor for promulgation of the said ordinance, a reference was made to the defect in legislative draftsmanship of the amending Act of 2011 as pointed out in the aforesaid judgment and order dated 17.10.2012. Reference was also made to the anomalous situation created in various cooperative societies due to disputes cropping up between new Boards elected after expiry of three years pursuant to various orders passed by this Court in different writ petitions and the previous Boards who claimed to have been revived upon the declaration of the amending Act of 2011 as ultra-vires. 16. On 6.2.2013 W.P. No. 3829 of 2013 was filed challenging the aforesaid ordinance. On 26.4.2013 during the midst of hearing of the aforesaid writ petition West Bengal Co-operative Societies (Amendment and Validation) Act 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the Validation Act of 2013) was passed by the State legislative and published in the Official Gazette. It came into force from 4.2.2013, i.e. the date of promulgation of the ordinance. 17. On 26.4.2013 it was assailed in the present writ petition. On 13.9.2013 a learned Judge of this Court declared the Validating Act of 2013, ultra-vires as it sought to nullify the earlier judgment and order dated 17.10.2012 passed by this Court, as stated above. 18. On 20.9.2013 an appeal came to be preferred by the State Government assailing the judgment and order dated 13.9.2013. 19. On 24.11.2014 the tenure of the Boards of the Co-operative Societies came to an end even under the unamended provisions of 2006. With the above factual situation the present appeals arise for our consideration. 20. We are referring to the facts and parties as referred in MAT 1520/13 only since the decision in this appeal would bind the decision in other appeals. 21. Learned Advocate General Sri Jayanta Kumar Mitra arguing for the State submits that the Validating Act was promulgated only with a view to cure the legislative deficits pointed out by the learned Single Judge in judgment and order dated 17.10.2012 passed in W.P. No. 4009(w) of 2012. 21. Learned Advocate General Sri Jayanta Kumar Mitra arguing for the State submits that the Validating Act was promulgated only with a view to cure the legislative deficits pointed out by the learned Single Judge in judgment and order dated 17.10.2012 passed in W.P. No. 4009(w) of 2012. To substantiate this, he places reliance on the report filed by the State at the time of promulgation of the ordinance 2013 as reflected in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State in the writ proceedings being W.P. No. 3829 of 2013 challenging the promulgation of the said ordinance. Purpose of promulgating the Validating Act according to him was not to nullify the effect of the earlier judgment but was to correct a legislative error pointed out in the judgment. Mere absence of reference to the earlier judgment in the statement of objects and reasons to the Bill of 2006 cannot override the clear intendment of the provisions of the validating Act of 2013 is the stand of the State. He further submitted that the validating Act sought to rectify the anomaly created by the legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006 by treating the Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 and the Boards elected under the Act of 2006 as a homogenous group although the elections were conducted under the two statutes were substantially different, one being conducted under the auspices of the State Government while the other is conducted under the Superintendence of an independent Election Commission. Hence, according to him the validating act did not suffer from any legislative arbitrariness or was in violation of constitutional mandate as laid down in part IXB of the constitution, particularly, Article 243 ZJ(2) thereof. According to his stand, Article 243 ZJ (2) relates to the tenure of a Board elected in terms of the constitutional scheme as envisaged in part IXB of the constitution after its promulgation and it does not refer to an earlier Board elected under the repealed Act of 1983. He concludes his argument by submitting that the validating Act did not require presidential assent in view of the fact that the presidential assent sought and was granted to the parent act, namely Act of 2006 and the same was not in general terms but in respect of specified central legislations only. He concludes his argument by submitting that the validating Act did not require presidential assent in view of the fact that the presidential assent sought and was granted to the parent act, namely Act of 2006 and the same was not in general terms but in respect of specified central legislations only. Admittedly Validating Act does not impinge on any provisions of the said central legislations. 22. Per contra, Mr. Bikash Ranjan Bhattacharyya, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent/writ petitioners contend that the State in order to nullify the effect of the judgment and order, the State only with that purpose hastily promulgated the ordinance 2013 which was challenged in W.P. No. 3829 of 2013. According to him there was no other reason or purpose for enacting the Validating Act and its pre-cursor ordinance 2013. The State having withdrawn the appeal against the aforesaid judgment and order dated 17.12.2012 in W.P. No. 4009(w) of 2012, the same had become final and binding between the parties. Therefore, the enactment of Validating Act to revert the tenure of the Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 to three years, in fact amounted to taking away a right conferred in the said Boards to continue for five years by virtue of aforesaid judgment and order. The impugned legislation hence according to him also suffered from legislative arbitrariness in as much as it sought to create two distinct classes, namely, Boards elected under the repealed Act on one hand, and the Boards elected under the Act of 2006. On the other hand, such classification having been held arbitrary and without rational basis by judgment dated 17.10.2012 and accordingly creation of such distinction by impugned legislative exercise was nothing but a product of legislative arbitrariness. 23. He further argues that the Validating Act was enacted after incorporation of part IXB of the Constitution, particularly, Article 243 ZJ (2) which specifically provided that the tenure of an elected Board of a Co-operative Society shall be for five years. Hence, according to him the impugned legislation apart from being violative of Article 14 is also in breach of the provisions of part IXB, particularly, Article 243 ZJ (2) thereof. 24. Hence, according to him the impugned legislation apart from being violative of Article 14 is also in breach of the provisions of part IXB, particularly, Article 243 ZJ (2) thereof. 24. He also argued that the Validating Act also suffers from procedural ultravires as no presidential assent for its enactment was obtained though such assent had been given by the President of India to the parent Act. He finally concludes his arguments submitting that although the tenure of five years as prescribed by the unamended Act of 2006 is already over, the respondent Boards have to be permitted to operate for an additional period of the remainder tenure for which it had been wrongfully prevented to work by the State during the pendency of the present appeal. 25. With these arguments at our command we proceed to see the reasoning in the impugned judgment which is assailed before us. Learned Single Judge declared the Validating Act 2013 as ultra-vires, inter-alia, the ground that it was sought to nullify the effect of the judgment rendered by this Court on 17.10.2012 in W.P. No. 4009(w) of 2012 and thereby took away a right accrued in favour of Co-operative Societies by artificially reverting to an anterior situation which had been declared invalid by the Court. Learned Judge refused the contentions of the State that the validating Act was a piece of curative legislation to rectify the legislative deficits indicated in the earlier judgment by holding that if such clarification or removal of confusion and defects in drafting were the foundation of the Validating Act, at least this Court's judgment in W.P. No. 4009(w) of 2012 ought to have been referred to in the statement of Objects and Reasons or at least in the recital of the Bill but such was not the factual situation. 26. Learned Single Judge also held that the aforesaid piece of legislation was ultra-vires Article 243 ZJ (2) and Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Article 243 ZJ (2) was incorporated by the 97th constitutional amendment on 15th February 2012, and inter-alia provided that the term of office of elected members of the Board and its office bearers shall be for a term of five years from the date of election and the term of office bearer shall be co-terminus with the term of the Board. The Validating Act by reverting the term of office of members of elected Board under the repealed Act of 1983 from five years to three years, according to the learned Judge, violated the letter and spirit of the aforesaid Constitutional Amendment and was, therefore, ultra-vires. Learned Single Judge, however, clarified that the Co-operative Societies who have willingly proceeded for election to constitute the respective Boards in the mean time prior to the expiration of the five years term shall not be affected by the said judgment. 27. In order to understand the import of the Validating Act it is necessary the relevant amendments brought to the Act of 2006 are understood. The Validating Act of 2013 introduces several amendments to Sections 6(2), 29(5), 32(5)(a) and 36(a) of the Act of 2006. The amendments to the aforesaid provisions by the Validating Act are set out in bold herein below: Sub section (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act, read as follows: "(2) Notwithstanding such repeal anything done or suffered or any action taken including any rule made, and transaction entered into, any notification or notice issued with prospective or retrospective effect, any order passed, any appointment or registration made, any suit or proceeding commenced, any dispute decided or referred to arbitration, any right or title accrued, or any liability or obligation or penalty incurred under the Co-operative Societies Act, 1912 (2 of 1912) or the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940 (Ben.Act XXVI of 1940) or the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973 (West Bengal Act XXXVIII of 1973) or the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983 (West Ben. Act XLV of 1983) shall be deemed to have been done or suffered or taken under this Act, as if the provisions of this Act were in force at all material times when such thing was done or suffered or such action was taken, unless otherwise specifically provided in this Act: Provided that such thing done or suffered or action taken shall not be deemed to have conferred any right which had not vested or accrued before the date of commencement of this Act or have extended any right which had vested or accrued before the date of commencement of this Act, to the Board of a Co-operative Society registered or deemed to have been registered under the Cooperative Societies Act, 1912, or the Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1940, or the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1973, or the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Act, 1983, with the effect of such repeal." 28. Clause (a) of sub-section (5) of section 29 of the Principal Act, upon its amendment, reads as follows: "The agenda of the annual general meeting shall be as follows: Election of directors of the Board, if any: Provided that such election shall be held- (a) in case the election of directors of the Board held before the date of commencement of this Act, within three years from the date of such election; (b) in any other case, within five years from the date of last election. Provided further that after constitution of the Co-operative Election Commission, such election shall be held in an annual general meeting or a special general meeting under the provision of sections 29 and 31." 29. Provided further that after constitution of the Co-operative Election Commission, such election shall be held in an annual general meeting or a special general meeting under the provision of sections 29 and 31." 29. Clause (a) of sub-section (5) of section 32 of the Principal Act, upon its amendment, reads as follows: "32(5)(a) A director elected or nominated under sub-section (1) except the chief executive shall hold office throughout a term of five years of the Board or till the Board is dissolved under sections 34 or 35 or 36 whichever is earlier: Provided that a director under clauses (d) and (e) of sub-section(1) shall not be eligible for re-election or nomination, as the case may be, within a period of five years from the date of expiry of his term of office: Provided further that a director under clause (c) of sub-section (1) shall be entitled to attend any meeting of the Board, if he is suspended or punished in a departmental proceeding or a departmental proceeding against him is pending. Provided also that a director elected or nominated in any Board prior to the date of commencement of this Act, shall hold office throughout a term of three years of the Board or till the Board is dissolved under sections 34 or 35 of 36, whichever is earlier." 30. Clause (a) of Section 36 of the Principal Act, upon its present amendment, reads as follows: "the Board of directors of any of the Co-operative societies shall, if the election of its directors has been held with a period of 60 months from the date of their election under sub-section (1) of section 29, or within a period of thirty six months from the date of their election where such election has been held before the date of commencement of this Act stand dissolved on and from the date immediately following the date of expiry of the said period." 31. From the arguments across the bar, the following gist of the challenge to the Validating Act be summarised as under: (i) Act of 2006 received assent by the President of India prior to its promulgation. Therefore, the Validating Act of 2013 which sought to amend the Act of 2006 also required presidential assent. Absence of presidential assent renders the aforesaid legislation ultra-vires the Constitution. Therefore, the Validating Act of 2013 which sought to amend the Act of 2006 also required presidential assent. Absence of presidential assent renders the aforesaid legislation ultra-vires the Constitution. (ii) The Validating Act of 2013 seeks to nullify the effect of the earlier judgment asked by this Court in W.P. No. 4009 of 2012 and takes away a right accrued to the Co-operative Societies elected under the repealed Act in terms of the legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006. Validating or curative legislation may cure or change the substratum of law but cannot nullify the effect of an earlier judgment conferring rights in favour of an individual. Moreover, a Validating Act is a product of legislative arbitrariness and is violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it seeks to differentiate between Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 and the new Board under the Act of 2006 without any rational basis whatsoever. (iii) The Validating Act is violative of Part IXB of the Constitution of India particularly Article 243 ZJ (2) thereof, in as much as it reverts the tenure of the Boards of the Co-operatives elected under the repealed Act of 1983 from five years to three years. 32. We proceed to analyse the material before us with reference to each of the aforesaid challenges as follows: Point No. 1: 33. It is true that the Act of 2006 had been reserved for presidential assent under Article 200 read with Article 254(2) of the Constitution of India. Prayer for grant of such assent was made on the perceived inconsistency of the Bill with provisions of specified Central legislations which were enumerated in the report submitted on the said Bill by the law department of the State which reads as under: Report on the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Bill, 2006: The subject matter of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies Bill, 2006 is included within entries 32, 64 and 66 of the State List and within entries 1, 2, 6, 7, 9, 10, 13 and 46 of the Concurrent List in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution of India and is within the competence of the State Legislature. The West Bengal Co-operative Societies Bill, 2006 was passed by the West Bengal Legislative Assembly and was reserved by the Governor for the consideration of President under article 200, read with clause (2) of article 254 of the Constitution of India since certain provisions of the Bill were repugnant to the provisions of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the Land Improvement Loans Act, 1883, the Agriculturists' Loans Act, 1884, the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, the Registration Act, 1908, the Presidency Town Insolvency Act, 1909 and the Provisional Insolvency Act, 1920, which are existing laws and the Employees Provident Funds and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952, the Companies Act, 1956, the Limitation Act, 1963 and the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which are earlier laws made by Parliament with respect to certain matters enumerated in the Concurrent List and which attracted clause (2) of article 254 of the Constitution of India. 34. The President was pleased to return to the State legislature for reconsideration and amendment of the Bill with the following note: I, Pratibha Devisingh Patil, President of India, having considered the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Bill, 2006, which was reserved for my consideration under the provisions of article 200 of the Constitution, do hereby direct, in pursuance of the proviso to article 201 of the Constitution, that the Bill be returned to the Legislature of the State of West Bengal to re-consider it and to amend the Bill, as follows: "the provisions under clause 83 of the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Bill, 2006 may be modified to restrict it to the cooperative societies which are not coverable under the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act, 1952 (19 of 1952) (the said Act) to avoid conflict between the said Act and the West Bengal Cooperative Societies Bill, 2006." 35. Thereafter the Bill was accordingly amended so as to restrict applicability to Co-operative Societies which are not covered under the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 1952 and such amended Bill received the assent of the President and was duly enacted as the Act of 2006. 36. Thereafter the Bill was accordingly amended so as to restrict applicability to Co-operative Societies which are not covered under the Employees' Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 1952 and such amended Bill received the assent of the President and was duly enacted as the Act of 2006. 36. The aforesaid legislative exercise relating to presidential assent to the parent Act, namely, Act of 2006 indicates that the State legislature had not sought assent to the aforesaid Act in general terms but it was only in respect of perceived inconsistencies vis-a-vis specified central legislations alone and such assent was accordingly granted after amendment of the relevant clause of the proposed Bill which was inconsistent with the provisions of the Employees Provident Fund and Miscellaneous Provisions Act of 1952. 37. It is trite law that a presidential assent may be sought for and granted either in general terms or may be specific to certain Central legislations only which are referred to in the report and considered by the President at the time of grant. 38. It is relevant to refer to (i) Gram Panchayat v. Malwinder Singh reported in 1985 (3) SCC 661 wherein it was held: "The assent of the President under Article 254 (2) of the Constitution is not a matter of idle formality. The President has, at least, to be apprised of the reason why his assent is sought if, there is any special reason for doing so. If the assent is sought and given in general terms so as to be effective for all purposes, different considerations may legitimately arise. But if, as in the instant case, the assent of the President is sought to the Law for a specific purpose, the efficacy of the assent would be limited to that purpose and cannot be extended beyond it." 39. Similar view was expressed in Kaiser-I-Hind v. National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Limited and others reported in 2002 (8) SCC 182 (referred to para 74). 40. Similar view was expressed in Kaiser-I-Hind v. National Textile Corporation (Maharashtra North) Limited and others reported in 2002 (8) SCC 182 (referred to para 74). 40. When presidential assent under Article 200 read with Article 254 (2) of the Constitution was granted to a State legislature in respect of perceived inconsistencies with the provisions of specified Central Legislations, subsequent amendments to the parent legislation so assented by the President does not require further assent until and unless the amendments proposed to the parent legislation relate to any perceived inconsistencies with the said Central Legislations for which the assent had been sought for and was granted. 41. In the present case, the Validating Act of 2013 amends the legislative fiction contained in Section 6 of the Act of 2006 whereby elections to the Boards of Co-operative Societies under the repealed Act of 1983 was deemed to have been held under the Act of 2006 as if the provisions of the new Act were in force at all material points of time. This deeming clause was sought to be amended by the Validating Act of 2013 and was subjected to exceptions specifically provided otherwise in the Act. 42. Consequent thereto, Section Sections 29(5) read with Section 32(5) and Section 36 of the Act of 2006 were also amended whereby it was, inter-alia, provided that the tenure of office of the Board of Directors of a Co-operative Society which had been elected prior to the commencement of the Act of 2006 shall be for a period of three years from the date of the said elections. Perusal of aforesaid amendments makes it crystal clear that its scope and ambit does not impinge upon the provisions of the special Central Legislations for which assent had been granted by the President of India to the parent Act. Hence, we are of the opinion that no further assent was required for promulgation of the Validating Act, 2013 amending the Act of 2006. Point No. 2:- 43. A validating or Curative statute is promulgated to cure a legislative defect and is ordinarily retrospective in nature. 44. In Ninth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, " Validating statute", "Curative statute" and "Declaratory statute" are defined as follows:- Validating Statute. (182) A law that is amended either to remove errors or to add provisions to confirm to constitutional requirements. (page- 1545). 44. In Ninth edition of Black's Law Dictionary, " Validating statute", "Curative statute" and "Declaratory statute" are defined as follows:- Validating Statute. (182) A law that is amended either to remove errors or to add provisions to confirm to constitutional requirements. (page- 1545). Curative Statute.(1.) An Act that corrects an error in a statute's original enactment, usually, an error that interferes with interpreting or applying the statute. Cf. validating statute. (cases: Statutes 236,278.11)(page 1543). Declaratory Statute. (17C) A law enacted to clarify prior law by reconciling conflicting judicial decisions or by explaining the meaning of a prior statute - Also terms expository statute.(cases: statutes 236, 278.11)(page-1543). 45. Permanent edition volume 44 page 8 in words and phrases, Validating statute; is defined as:- "Statute whose purpose is to cure past errors and omissions and thus make valid what was invalid. Himrich v. Carpenter, 569, N-W. Section 568, 1997 SD 116-statute 236." 46. In P. Ramanath Aiyar's, the Law Lexicon (Encyclopedic Law Dictionary) 1997 edition, page 452, curative statute, is defined as follows. "Curative statutes are those which attempt to cure or correct errors and irregularities in judicial or administrative proceedings and would seek to give effect to contracts and other transactions between private persons which otherwise would fail to produce their intended consequences an account of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical requirement. Madras Maintenance and Public Order (Removal of Doubts and Amendment) Act 1 of 1949." In Re:- AIR 1950 Madras 324. A Law, retrospective in effect which is designed to the remedy some legal defect in previous transactions. A form of retrospective legislation which reaches back into the past to operate up on past events, acts or transactions in order to correct errors and irregularities and to render valid and effective many attempted acts which would otherwise be ineffective for the purpose intended. As applied to conveyances they supply one or more ingredients of a legal act which the parties intended to perform but which they fail to accomplish completely or which they executed only imperfectly." (Black's Law Dictionary) 47. However, a validating/curative statute cannot nullify the effect of a judgment which has become final and binding between the parties. 48. In Indian Aluminum Co. & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. reported in (1996)7SCC 637, the relevant portion reads as under:- 56. However, a validating/curative statute cannot nullify the effect of a judgment which has become final and binding between the parties. 48. In Indian Aluminum Co. & Ors. v. State of Kerala & Ors. reported in (1996)7SCC 637, the relevant portion reads as under:- 56. "From a resume of the above decisions the following principles would emerge: (1) The adjudication of the rights of the parties is the essential judicial function. Legislature has to lay down the norms of conduct or rules which will govern the parties and the transactions and require the court to give effect to them; (2) The Constitution delineated delicate balance in the exercise of the sovereign power by the legislature, executive and judiciary; (3) In a democracy governed by rule of law, the legislature exercises the power under Articles 245 and 246 and other companion articles read with the entries in the respective lists in the Seventh Schedule to make the law which includes power to amend the law. (4) Courts in their concern and endeavour to preserve judicial power equally must be guarded to maintain the delicate balance devised by the Constitution between the three sovereign functionaries. In order that rule of law permeates to fulfil constitutional objectives of establishing an egalitarian social order, the respective sovereign functionaries need free play in their joints so that the march of social progress and order remains unimpeded. The smooth balance built with delicacy must always be maintained; (5) In its anxiety to safeguard judicial power, it is unnecessary to be overzealous and conjure up incursion into the judicial preserve invalidating the valid law competently made; (6) The court, therefore, needs to carefully scan the law to find out: (a) whether the vice pointed out by the court and invalidity suffered by previous law is cured complying with the legal and constitutional requirements; (b) whether the legislature has competence to validate the law; (c) whether such validation is consistent with the rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution. (7) The court does not have the power to validate an invalid law or to legalise impost of tax illegally made and collected or to remove the norm of invalidation or provide a remedy. These are not judicial functions but the exclusive province of the legislature. Therefore, they are not encroachment on judicial power. (7) The court does not have the power to validate an invalid law or to legalise impost of tax illegally made and collected or to remove the norm of invalidation or provide a remedy. These are not judicial functions but the exclusive province of the legislature. Therefore, they are not encroachment on judicial power. (8) In exercising legislative power, the legislature by mere declaration, without anything more, cannot directly overrule, revise or override a judicial decision. It can render judicial decision ineffective by enacting valid law on the topic within its legislative field fundamentally altering or changing its character retrospectively. The changed or altered conditions are such that the previous decision would not have been rendered by the court, if those conditions had existed at the time of declaring the law as invalid. It is also empowered to give effect to retrospective legislation with a deeming date or with effect from a particular date. The legislature can change the character of the tax or duty from impermissible to permissible tax but the tax or levy should answer such character and the legislature is competent to recover the invalid tax validating such a tax on removing the invalid base for recovery from the subject or render the recovery from the State ineffectual. It is competent for the legislature to enact the law with retrospective effect and authorise its agencies to levy and collect the tax on that basis, make the imposition of levy collected and recovery of the tax made valid, notwithstanding the declaration by the court or the direction given for recovery thereof. (9) The consistent thread that runs through all the decisions of this Court is that the legislature cannot directly overrule the decision or make a direction as not binding on it but has power to make the decision ineffective by removing the base on which the decision was rendered, consistent with the law of the Constitution and the legislature must have competence to do the same." 49. In National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2003) 5 SCC 23 , Hon'ble Apex Court interpreted what amounts to "overruling" a judicial decision; ".. overruling assumes that a contrary decision is given on the same facts of law. In National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India v. Union of India & Ors. reported in (2003) 5 SCC 23 , Hon'ble Apex Court interpreted what amounts to "overruling" a judicial decision; ".. overruling assumes that a contrary decision is given on the same facts of law. Where the law, as in this case, has been changed and is no longer the same, there is no question of the legislature overruling this Court." "Once the circumstances are altered by legislation, it may neutralise the effect of the earlier decision of the Court which becomes ineffective after the change of law." 50. In State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala reported in AIR (2014) 12 SCC 696 , a Constitution Bench of the Apex Court highlighted the principle of separation of power in the context of Indian Constitution laying down the parameters of legislative exercise in the face of a binding judgment inter parties. 126. "On deep reflection of the above discussion, in our opinion, the constitutional principles in the context of Indian Constitution relegating to separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary may, in brief, be summarised thus: 126.1. Even without express provision of the separation of powers, the doctrine of separation of powers is an entrenched principle in the Constitution of India. The doctrine of separation of powers informs the Indian constitutional structure and it is an essential constituent of rule of law. In other words, the doctrine of separation of power though not expressly engrafted in the Constitution, its sweep, operation and visibility are apparent from the scheme of Indian Constitution. Constitution has made demarcation, without drawing formal lines between the three organs legislature, executive and judiciary. In that sense, even in the absence of express provision for separation of powers, the separation of powers between the legislature, executive and judiciary is not different from the Constitutions of the countries which contain express provision for separation of powers. 126.2. Independence of courts from the executive and legislature is fundamental to the rule of law and one of the basic tenets of Indian Constitution. Separation of judicial power is a significant constitutional principle under the Constitution of India. 126.3 Separation of powers between three organs-the legislature, executive and judiciary-is also nothing but a consequence of principles of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Separation of judicial power is a significant constitutional principle under the Constitution of India. 126.3 Separation of powers between three organs-the legislature, executive and judiciary-is also nothing but a consequence of principles of equality enshrined in Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, breach of separation of judicial power may amount to negation of equality under Article 14. Stated thus, a legislation can be invalidated on the basis of breach of separation of powers since such breach is negation of equality under Article 14 of the Constitution. 126.4 The superior judiciary (High Courts and Supreme Court) is empowered by the Constitution to declare a law made by the legislature (Parliament and State Legislature) void if it is found to have transgressed the constitutional limitations or if it infringed the rights enshrined in Part III of the Constitution. 126.5. The doctrine of separation of powers applies to the final judgments of the courts. The legislature cannot declare any decision of a court of law to be void or of no effect. It can, however, pass an amending Act to remedy the defects pointed out by a court of law or on coming to know of it aliunde. In other words, a court's decision must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that the decision could not have been given in the altered circumstances. 126.6. If the legislature has the power over the subject-matter and competence to make a validating law, it can at any time make such a validating law and made it retrospective. The validity of a validating law, therefore, depends upon whether the legislature possessed the competence which it claims over the subject-matter and whether in making the validation law it removes the defect which the courts had found in the existing law. 126.7. The law enacted by the legislature may apparently seem to be within its competence but yet in substance if it is shown as an attempt to interfere with the judicial process, such law may be invalidated being in breach of doctrine of separation of powers. In such situation, the legal effect of the law on a judgment or a judicial proceeding must be examined closely, having regard to legislative prescription or direction. The questions to be asked are: (i) Does the legislative prescription or legislative direction interfere with the judicial functions? In such situation, the legal effect of the law on a judgment or a judicial proceeding must be examined closely, having regard to legislative prescription or direction. The questions to be asked are: (i) Does the legislative prescription or legislative direction interfere with the judicial functions? (ii) Is the legislation targeted at the decided case or whether impugned law requires its application to a case already finally decided? (iii) What are the terms of law; the issues with which it deals and the nature of the judgment that has attained finality? If the answer to Questions (i) and (ii) is in the affirmative and the consideration of aspects noted in Question (iii) sufficiently establishes that the impugned law interferes with the judicial functions, the Court may declare the law unconstitutional." 51. However, at paragraph 157 of the said decision the Bench held as under:- "The question whether or not the legislature has usurped the judicial power or enacted a law in breach of separation of powers principle would depend on facts of each case after considering the real effect or law on a judgment or a judicial proceeding." 52. In the light of such enunciation of law, one has to examine whether the Validating Act of 2013 seeks to nullify the judgment dated 17th October, 2012 delivered by this Court in W.P. No. 4009(w) of 2012 or not. 53. In W.P. No. 4009(w) of 2012 vires of Amending Act of 2011 fell for consideration. The learned Single Judge after a detailed discussion of the facts and the law applicable thereto declared Section 12(a)(ii) of the Amending Act 2011 which amended Section 36(a) of the Act of 2006 and prescribed that the tenure of office of Board of Directors of Co-operative Societies elected under the Repealed Act, 1983 shall be for three years from the date of its election to be ultra vires. 54. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court declared that the said Amendment was ultra vires Section 6 of 2006 which created a legal fiction that anything done under the repealed Act, 1983 was deemed to have been done under the provisions of the Act of 2006 as if those provisions were in force at all material points of time. 54. In the aforesaid judgment, this Court declared that the said Amendment was ultra vires Section 6 of 2006 which created a legal fiction that anything done under the repealed Act, 1983 was deemed to have been done under the provisions of the Act of 2006 as if those provisions were in force at all material points of time. Hence, by operation of such legal fiction, election under Section 27(8) of the repealed Act 1983 electing Directors to the Board of a Co-operative Society was deemed to be done under the new Act of 2006 and the tenure of office of such Board was accordingly deemed to be for five years from the date of its election by operation of Section 36(a) read with Section 6 of the new Act. As Section 6 of the Act of 2006 was prefaced with a non-obstante clause, learned Single Judge held that the said legal fiction overruled the other provisions of the Act of 2006 and, therefore, the legislative exercise to amend Section 36(a) of the Act of 2006 simpliciter without amending the legal fiction incorporated in Section 6 thereof was a product of defective legislative draftsmanship and Section 12(a)(ii) of the Amending Act of 2011 was declared ultra vires Section 6 of the Act of 2006. Learned Single Judge proceeded to hold that the provisions of the Amending Act of 2006 was also violative of Article 14 of the Constitution as it created a distinction between the Co-operatives elected under the repealed law and those elected under the new law notwithstanding the legal fiction created under Section 6 of the Act of 2006. 55. The aforesaid judgment was initially challenged by the State of West Bengal but subsequently appeal was withdrawn and after withdrawal of the appeal, the State initially promulgated the Ordinance of 2013 which was in similar terms as the Validating Act of 2013. Constitutional validity of such ordinance was assailed in W.P. No. 3829(w) of 2013 (Joytirmoy Chakraborty and Anr. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.). In the said proceeding the State filed an affidavit duly sworn on 18th February, 2013 explaining the circumstances which resulted in the promulgation of the said Ordinance. 56. It is just and proper to refer to certain paragraphs from the said affidavit clarifying circumstances leading to the promulgation of the said ordinance. v. State of West Bengal and Ors.). In the said proceeding the State filed an affidavit duly sworn on 18th February, 2013 explaining the circumstances which resulted in the promulgation of the said Ordinance. 56. It is just and proper to refer to certain paragraphs from the said affidavit clarifying circumstances leading to the promulgation of the said ordinance. The relevant portions read as under: (xii) "In the meantime, the West Bengal State Co-operative Bank challenged the vires of the West Bengal Co-operative societies (Amendment) Act, 2011 before the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta in W.P. No. 4009 of 2012 relying upon, inter alia, Section 6 (Repeal and Savings clause) of the West Bengal Co-operative societies Act, 2006 and the Constitution (97th Amendment) Act, 2011. On 17th October, 2012, His Lordship Hon'ble Justice Biswanath Somadder was pleased to dispose of the said Writ Petition, inter alia, with the following observation:- " The State, without making necessary amendment to the Repeal and Savings clause of the Principal Act, sought to bring about a retrograde change in the tenure of the Boards of directors of Co-operative societies elected under the Repealed Act of 1983, by whittling down its tenure from five years to three years, thereby rendering nugatory the conscious and deliberate change that was brought about by the State earlier, upon bringing into force the Principal Act, which was in consonance with the proposed constitutional amendment. For reasons stated above, sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of section 12 of the Amendment Act is held to be repugnant to the provision of sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act, to the extent it seeks to reduce the tenure of the Boards of Co-operative societies to thirty six months from sixty months, as originally provided under clause(a) of section 36 of the Principal Act and is further held to be ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Sub clause (ii) of clause (a) of section 12 of the Amendment Act is, therefore, liable to be struck down and is accordingly struck down. Sub clause (ii) of clause (a) of section 12 of the Amendment Act is, therefore, liable to be struck down and is accordingly struck down. Consequently, the Board of writ petitioner No. 1, which came into effect from 24th November, 2009, shall continue in office for a period of sixty months to be computed from that date, subject of course, to all other provisions of law, as applicable for its continuance." (xiii) Be it mentioned here that during the pendency of the W.P. No. 4009(w) of 2012, in number of cases, his Lordship the Hon'ble Justice Biswanath Somadder was pleased to pass orders directing the special officers appointed in respective Co-operative Societies to conduct elections under the supervision of the Co-operative Election Commission, West Bengal after the expiry of the term of the Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983. Relevant parts of some of those Judgments of His Lordship the Hon'ble Justice Biswanath Somadder are reproduced herein below:- (a) In W.P. No. 12145(W) of 2012 (In Re.- The Gun & shell Factory Cooperative Society Limited and Another v. The Co-operative election Commission and Others.): " It is expected that the special officer shall make all endeavour to ensure that the election process is completed as expeditiously as possible within the statutory time frame, so that a properly constituted Board of Directors is able to take charge of Gun & Shell Co-operative society Limited.." (b) In W.P. No. 2083(W) of 2012 (In Re.- Anil Kumar Ghosh v. the State of West Bengal and others): ".. the Special Officer shall proceed to prepare the voters' list on the basis of available records with the bank and in accordance with the scheme of the statute to ensure that by a free, fair and transparent democratic process, the election for delegates and consequently, the Board of Directors, is completed within the shortest possible time, which, in any event, shall not exceed the time frame as stipulated in the notification dated 2nd March, 2012.." (c) In W.P. No. 19849(W) of 2012 ( In Re.- Sunirmal Chakraborty v. The State of West Bengal and others): " this Court directs the special officer of the Government of West Bengal appointed in respect of Electro Urban Co-operative Credit Limited to ensure that the election of delegates of Electro urban Co-operative Credit Society limited are held as per the schedule published earlier" (d) In W.P. No. 5473(W) of 2012 (In Re.- Dulal Chandra Basu and others v. The State of West Bengal and Others): ".. Since the object of a co-operative society is likely to be frustrated unless one ensures its autonomous functioning by a democratically elected body from amongst the general members of the society, it is expected that the special officer shall take all endeavour to ensure that the election is completed as expeditiously as possible and well within the statutory time frame, so that a properly constituted Board of directors is able to take charge of the concerned housing society." (e) In W.P. No. 19229 (W) of 2012 (In Re.- Tapan Guha Roy v. that State of West Bengal and Others): ".. to take appropriate steps on the basis of the observations made herein above and ensure that the election process is conducted at an early date so that a democratically elected body is able to take charges of Jalpaiguri Central Co-operative Bank Ltd. without any undue delay" (xiv) After pronouncement of the Judgment on 17th October, 2012 in W.P. No. 4009 (W) of 2012, the State Government at first decided to prefer appeal before the Hon'ble division Bench of the High Court, Calcutta against the said Judgment and Order. Appeal petition being A.S.T. No. 399 of 2012 was filed before the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta on 4th December, 2012. An application being A.S.T.A. No. 226 of 2012 for stay of operation of the Judgment and Order dated 17th October, 2012 was also filed along with the said appeal. Appeal petition being A.S.T. No. 399 of 2012 was filed before the Hon'ble High Court, Calcutta on 4th December, 2012. An application being A.S.T.A. No. 226 of 2012 for stay of operation of the Judgment and Order dated 17th October, 2012 was also filed along with the said appeal. (xv) With the pronouncement of the Judgment on 17th October, 2012, a question was referred to the State Government regarding authority of the Special Officers vis-a-vis the erstwhile Boards. The validity and authority of the newly constituted Boards also became doubtful to the respective Cooperative Societies inasmuch as the validity of the elections itself became doubtful. This gave rise to chaos on a large scale. The Special officers stopped functioning owing to the order passed by the Hon'ble high Court, Calcutta. Reportedly, in a number of Co-operative societies, severe disputes and dissensions took place between the respective previous Boadrs and the newly constituted Board. Election process came to a halt in around 800 cooperative societies in different stages. (xvi) There were some societies where neither there was a Board, nor the special officer was functioning causing a total vacuum in the management of those Co-operative societies. (xvii) As a result, lending and recovery of agricultural loans were being hampered seriously. Reportedly, depositors were not getting their money back which might result in law and order problem any moment. All development works in such Co-operative societies were also being seriously hampered. In the absence of management in office, various important issues like inclusion of new members in Co-operative societies, payment of salaries to the employees of co-operative societies was disrupted or stopped. From the aforementioned, it is quite apparent that there was anarchy and mismanagement in the co-operative Sector. (xviii) During pendency of the appeal, during pendency of the appeal, the Government received numbers of reports from different corners regarding the stalemate situations in the co-operative sector as stated in the foregoing paragraphs. It was also necessary to validate elections already held. These compelled the Government to go back to the solemn Judgment and order dated 17th October, 2012. The ratio emerging from the valued observation of his Lordship the Hon'ble Justice Biswanath Somaddar in the said Judgment which led the Government to realise the shortcoming in the drafting of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies (amendment) Act, 2011. These compelled the Government to go back to the solemn Judgment and order dated 17th October, 2012. The ratio emerging from the valued observation of his Lordship the Hon'ble Justice Biswanath Somaddar in the said Judgment which led the Government to realise the shortcoming in the drafting of the West Bengal Co-operative Societies (amendment) Act, 2011. (xix) In the interest of furtherance of co-operative movement in democratic manner in West Bengal as well as to put an end to the prevailing stalemate and chaotic situation as stated in the foregoing paragraphs, the Government felt it necessary to immediately validate the provisions of the West Bengal co-operative Societies (Amendment) Act, 2011 by amending the West Bengal Co-operative societies Act, 2006 in the light of the ratio of the said judgment of His Lordship the Hon'ble Justice Biswanath Somaddar as contained in the said Judgment and Order dated 17th October, 2012 and also to amend certain other provisions of the West Bengal co-operative societies Act, 2006. (xx) In view of the aforesaid, the Government decided to remove the defect and the reason for invalidating pointed out in the Solemn Judgment and Order dated 17th October, 2012 and with this intent and objective, the State Government first decided to withdraw the appeal being A.S.T. No. 399 of 2012 and the application for stay of operation of the Judgment and order dated 17th October, 2012 being A.S.T. A. No. - 226 of 2012. The decision of the State Government to withdraw the said appeal petition was communicated to the Learned State Advocate vide letter No. 19-Co-op./H/20C- 21/2012 (Pt.-II) dated 2nd January, 2013. On 17th January, 2013, the said appeal petition and the connected application were duly withdrawn. Since the West Bengal Legislative Assembly was not in session and it might take even two more months before the commencement of the next assembly session, it became necessary to introduce the amendments to be made in the West Bengal Co-operative societies Act, 2006 by way of promulgation of the West Bengal Co-operative societies (Amendment and Validation) Ordinance, 2013 to put an end to the prevailing chaos and anarchy and for fostering developmental activities in the Co-operative Sector and for facilitating loan disbursement to the indigent and farmers." 57. Reports submitted to the Governor leading to the promulgation of the ordinance by the Governor were also produced before us by the Advocate General. Reports submitted to the Governor leading to the promulgation of the ordinance by the Governor were also produced before us by the Advocate General. Such reports endorse the averments in the affidavit filed on behalf of the State in the earlier ligation, as stated above. 58. From reading of the above said facts it appears that at the time of delivery of judgment by this Court in W.P. No. 4009 of 2012 the State was fully conscious of the judgment and had sought to rectify the legislative deficits indicated in the judgment by promulgating the aforesaid Ordinance. It was not with an intention to erase effect of such judgment such promulgation was brought, but to resolve a confusion which arose on account of rival claims between newly constituted Boards who had been elected under the auspices of special officers appointed pursuant to orders of this Court in various writ petitions on one hand and the previous Boards on the other hand who claimed they were entitled to run respective Co-operative Societies as per the aforesaid judgment in W.P. No. 4009 of 2012. That apart, special officers appointed under the orders of this Court in various writ petitions were also confused resulting in vacuum created with regard to the management of large number of Co-operatives resulting in a severe blow to the Co-operative movement in the State Of West Bengal. 59. In the above circumstances, in due regard to the judgment of the learned Single Judge dated 17.10.2012 in W.P. No. 4009 of 2012, the State Government had chosen to promulgate the Ordinance of 2013 which happens to be the basis for the impugned Validating Act. 60. Such Validating Act being subsequently promulgated, challenge to the Ordinance was dropped and the instant writ petition was preferred challenging the Validating Act itself. 61. 60. Such Validating Act being subsequently promulgated, challenge to the Ordinance was dropped and the instant writ petition was preferred challenging the Validating Act itself. 61. In the earlier paragraphs we have already referred to the pleadings filed by the State in the earlier proceeding challenging the aforesaid Ordinance of 2013 and we have perused the records produced before us leading to the promulgation of the Ordinance, 2013 in order to test the reasoning and observations made in the impugned judgment by the learned Single Judge that the Validating Act cannot be said to be an exercise in pursuance of the observations made by this Court in its judgment dated 17.10.2012 since there is no whisper of the said judgment and order of this Court in the statement of Objects and Reasons in the Bill introduced in the State Legislature resulting in the enactment of the Validating Act of 2013. The averments made in the pleadings filed by the State in the writ petition 3829 of 2013 and the records placed before us leading to the promulgation of the Ordinance, 2013 clearly indicate that the State was inspired to promulgate the aforesaid Ordinance and subsequently the Validating Act to cure the legislative defects pointed in the said judgment and not to override the same. 62. The object and purpose of a legislative exercise simply cannot be judged by referring to the statement of Objects and Reasons in the Bill introduced to the State Legislature. It has to be appreciated primarily from the clear meaning of the provisions of the legislation itself and the mischief it seeks to cure or remove. Only in cases of confusion or ambiguity, the statement of Objects and Reasons to such legislation may be referred to. (Reference made to State Bank Staff Union v. Union of India (2005)7 SCC 584 Para 12). 63. Judging from that angle, the clear and unequivocal provisions of the Validating Act of 2013 show, it is a legislative exercise undertaken pursuant to the judgment and order dated 17.10.2012 in W.P. No. 4009 of 2012 and not one which seek to invalidate the impact of such judgment. It is a legislative exercise coming into existence inspired by observations in the said judgment rather than to nullify its effect, as has been strenuously submitted before us. 64. In Madan Mohan Pathak and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. It is a legislative exercise coming into existence inspired by observations in the said judgment rather than to nullify its effect, as has been strenuously submitted before us. 64. In Madan Mohan Pathak and Anr. v. Union of India and Anr. (1978)2 SCC 50 , the Apex Court held that Life Insurance Corporation Modification of Settlement Act 1976 was ultra vires inasmuch as the Amending Act sought to declare a particular settlement for payment of bonus to class III and class IV employees of Life Insurance Corporation inoperative after the Court had issued a writ of mandamus for implementation of the same. The Bench was unanimous in its opinion that the amending Act was violative of Article 31 and Article 19(1)(f) of the Constitution of India as bonus is the property of the employees which was sought to be taken away from them without compensation. In addition thereto, a majority of the judges in the Bench held that the Amending Act was unconstitutional inasmuch as it sought to nullify rights arising from a judgment which already became final. In the words of the Bench it is stated at para 31 as under:- "The object of the Act was, in effect, to take away the force of the judgment of the Calcutta High Court recognising the settlements in favour of Class III and Class IV employees of the corporation. Rights under that judgment could be said to arise independently of Article 19 of the constitution. I find myself in complete agreement with my learned brother Bhagwati that to give effect to the judgment of the Calcutta high Court is not the same thing as enforcing a right under Article 19 of the Constitution. It may be that a right under Article 19 of the constitution becomes linked up with the enforceability of the judgment. Nevertheless, the two could be viewed as separable sets of rights. If the right conferred by the judgment independently is sought to be set aside, Section 3 of the Act, would, in my opinion, be invalid for trenching upon the judicial power." 65. Nevertheless, the two could be viewed as separable sets of rights. If the right conferred by the judgment independently is sought to be set aside, Section 3 of the Act, would, in my opinion, be invalid for trenching upon the judicial power." 65. However, at para 27 of the said judgment the Bench observed as follows:- "The statement of objects and reasons discloses that the purpose of the impugned Act was to undo settlements which had been arrived at between the Corporation and Class III and Class IV employees on January 24 and February 6, 1974 and actually recognised by the order of the Calcutta High Court. The question could well arise whether this was really the exercise of a legislative power or of a power comparable to that of an appellate authority considering the merits of what had passed into a right to property recognised by the courts. This Court has decided in Shrimati Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain that even a constitutional amendment cannot authorise the assumption of a judicial power by Parliament. One of the tests paid down there was whether the decision is of a kind which requires hearing to be given to the parties, or, in other words, involves at least a quasi-judicial procedure, which the Parliament does not, in exercise of its legislative power, follow. A decision reached by the Central Government, under Section 11(2) of the Act, is the result of a satisfaction on matters stated there and would imply quasi-judicial procedure where the terms of a settlement had to be reviewed or revised. But, the legislative procedure, followed here, does not require that to be done. It would in any event, be unfair to adopt legislative procedure to undo such a settlement which had become the basis of a decision of a high Court. Even if legislation can remove the basis of a decision it has to so it by an alternation of general rights of a class but not by simply excluding two specific settlements between the Corporation and its employees from the purview of Section 18 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, which had been held to be valid and enforceable by a High Court. Such selective exclusion could also offend Article 14." (Emphasis supplied) 66. Such selective exclusion could also offend Article 14." (Emphasis supplied) 66. In the present case, the operation of the legislative fiction has been restricted in respect of all Boards elected under the repealed Act by altering the legal substratum applicable to the said Boards and not in respect of a selected few. Therefore, the Validating Act had altered general rights of a class instead of affecting specific individuals as in the case of Madan Mohan Pathak (supra). 67. In Re:- Cauvery Dispute Tribunal (1993) Supplementary 1 SCC (1996) (II), the Court held that Karnataka Cauvery Basin Irrigation Protection Ordinance, 1991 was unconstitutional which ultra vires inasmuch as it sought to override an interim order passed by the Tribunal constituted under Inter State Water Dispute Act 1956. 68. In the present case, the Validating Act has been promulgated only to cure legislative defects disclosed in the judgment passed by this Court, therefore, the ratio of the judgment In Re:- Cauvery Water Dispute Tribunal cannot be said to apply to the facts of this case. 69. Similarly, in S.R. Bhagwat and Ors. v. State of Mysore (1995) 6 SCC 16 , Karnataka State Civil Services(Regulation of Promotion, pay and Pension) Act 1973 was declared ultra vires as it sought to nullify the judgment and order passed by a Court of Law which had become final and was binding on the parties. The case related to the creation of the State of Mysore by reorganisation of the States of Hyderabad and Bombay under the State Re-Organization Act, 1956. The service of employees who were working under the earlier state were initially integrated in the service of the Central Government prior to their absorption in the cadre of New State under the provisions of Section 115(5) of the Re-Organization Act and the dispute arose between the inter se promotion of such employees and judicial orders were passed thereon. During the pendency of the contempt proceedings, the impugned legislation was promulgated wherein the legislature reserved right to review judicial orders which had been passed relating to promotion of Civil Service and payment of salaries and allowances in consequence thereto. In this backdrop, the Apex Court held that conferment of power to review and reopen a finally settled judicial position was impermissible in law and accordingly quashed the said legislation. 70. In the present case the facts are entirely different. In this backdrop, the Apex Court held that conferment of power to review and reopen a finally settled judicial position was impermissible in law and accordingly quashed the said legislation. 70. In the present case the facts are entirely different. The State Legislature came forward to rectify an error created by a legal fiction to treat elected Boards under the Repealed Act and the new Boards as a homogeneous group (a legislative error indicated in the earlier judgment). 71. In the case of D. Cawasji and Co. Mysore v. State of Mysore and another reported in 1984 (supplementary) SCC 490 the Validating Act issue came up for consideration. Their Lordships opined that the Validating Act was unconstitutional as the vice of illegal collection had not been rectified in the absence of removal of the illegality due to which the earlier levy had been declared illegal. The Court in the said judgment at paragraph 17 clarified that a Validating Act may retrospectively rectify a defect or lacuna leading to the invalidation of the law. It was observed, as follows: "A Validating Act seeks to validate the earlier Acts declared illegal and unconstitutional by Courts by removing the defect or lacuna which led to invalidation of the law. With the removal of the defect or lacuna resulting in the validation of any Act held invalid by a competent court, the Act may become valid, if the Validating Act is lawfully enacted. But the question may still arise as to what will be the fate of acts done before the Validating act curing the defect has been passed. To meet such a situation and to provide that no liability may be imposed on the state in respect of such acts done before the passing of the Validating Act making such act valid, a Validating Act is usually passed with retrospective effect. The retrospective operation relieves the state of the consequences of acts done prior to the passing of the Validating act. The retrospective operation of a Validating act properly passed curing the defects and lacuna which might have led to the invalidity of any act done may be upheld, if considered reasonable and legitimate." 72. The retrospective operation relieves the state of the consequences of acts done prior to the passing of the Validating act. The retrospective operation of a Validating act properly passed curing the defects and lacuna which might have led to the invalidity of any act done may be upheld, if considered reasonable and legitimate." 72. If we judge the same from that perspective, the impugned Validating Act in the instant case cannot be said to be illegal in as much as it seeks to rectify the defect in the legal substratum which was the foundation of the invalidation in the earlier law. 73. In State of Tamil Nadu v. State of Kerala and Another reported in AIR 2014 SC 2407 the legislation was held invalid as it sought to alter factual findings given by the Tribunal. This kind of legislative exercise was opined to be an unconstitutional exercise because it encroaches on judicial powers of the Court. No such effort has been made in the impugned Validating Act. On the other hand, it seeks to rectify legislative anomaly expressed or pointed out in the earlier judgment of the Court and nothing more. 74. By placing reliance on Nar Bahadur Bhandari and Another v. State of Sikkim and Others reported in (1998) 5 SCC 39 para 10 and so also Aneeta Hada v. M/s. Godfather Travels and Tours Private Limited reported in (2012) SC 2795, para 32, it was strenuously argued that a legal right was created in the Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 by way of legal fiction by virtue of Section 6 of the Act of 2006 and such vested right could not be taken away by retrospective operation of the Validating Act. The aforesaid authorities merely lay down the proposition that a legal fiction has to be interpreted in the light of the object and purpose for which it was enacted and nothing more. 75. In National Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Federation of India v. Union of India reported in (2003) 5 SCC 23 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court dealt with the issue of retrospective amendment of Section 80-P(2)(iii) of the Act. The legislature had sought to give retrospective effect to the said amendment for the last thirty years. Repelling the argument of the arbitrariness, the Apex Court held as follows: "28. The legislature had sought to give retrospective effect to the said amendment for the last thirty years. Repelling the argument of the arbitrariness, the Apex Court held as follows: "28. The test of the length of time covered by the retrospective operation cannot by itself, necessarily be a decisive test. Account must be taken of the surrounding facts and circumstances relating to the taxation and the legislative background of the provision. To recapitulate the legislative background of the particular statutory provision in question before us-the first authoritative interpretation of Section 80-P(2)(a)(iii) was made in 1994 in Assam Coop. when it was held that the word "of" must be construed as "produced by". Therefore, the law as it stood from 1968 was, by this decision, required to be read in precisely this manner and presumably assessments of apex societies were commenced and concluded on this basis. The situation continued till 1998 till this Court reversed Assam Coop. in Kerala State Coop. Marketing Federation Limited. Before the assessment year was over, by the 1998 Amendment the word "of" was substituted by "grown by". In real terms therefore there was hardly any retrospectivity, but a continuation of the status quo ante. The degree and extent of the unforeseen and unforeseeable financial burden was, in the circumstances, minimal and cannot be said to be unreasonable or unconstitutional." 76. In State Bank's Staff Union v. Union of India reported in (2005) 7 SCC 584 with reference to issue of curative statutes it was held as under: "26. Curative statutes are by their very nature intended to operate upon and affect past transactions. Curative and validating statutes operate on conditions already existing and are therefore wholly retrospective and can have no prospective operation." 77. However, at para 24 while referring to the report, the Apex Court observed, as under: "24. Craies on Statute Law (7th Edition) at p. 396 observes that: "If a statute is passed for the purpose of protecting the public against some evil or abuse, it may be allowed to operate retrospectively, although by such operation it will deprive some person or persons of a vested right." Thus public interest at large is one of the relevant considerations in determining the constitutional validity of a retrospective legislation." 78. In Commissioner of Income Tax (Central)-1, New Delhi v. Vatika Township Private Limited reported in (2015) SCC 1, the Apex Court held that imposition of surcharge on the tax of undisclosed income was a new imposition or impost and could not be given a retrospective effect. In the said judgment, however, the Court noted a very relevant and obvious exception to declaratory or curative statutes by observing as follows: "32. Let us sharpen the discussion a little more. We may note that under certain circumstances, a particular amendment can be treated as clarificatory or declaratory in nature. Such statutory provisions are labelled as "declaratory statutes". The circumstances under which provisions can be termed as "declaratory statutes" are explained by Justice G.P. Singh in the following manner: "Declaratory statutes The presumption against retrospective operation is not applicable to declaratory statutes. As stated in CRAIES and approved by the Supreme Court: 'For modern purposes a declaratory Act may be defined as an Act to remove doubts existing as to the common law, or the meaning or effect of any statute. Such Acts are usually held to be retrospective. The usual reason for passing a declaratory Act is to set aside what Parliament deems to have been a judicial error, whether in the statement of the common law or in the interpretation of statutes. Usually, if not invariably, such an Act contains a Preamble, and also the word "declared" as well as the word "enacted". But the use of the words 'it is declared' is not conclusive that the Act is declaratory for these words may, at times, be used to introduced new rules of law and the Act in the latter case will only be amending the law and will not necessarily be retrospective. in determining, therefore, the nature of the Act, regard must be had to the substance rather than to the form. If a new Act is 'to explain' an earlier Act, it would be without object unless construed retrospective. An explanatory Act is generally passed to supply an obvious omission or to clear up doubts as to the meaning of the previous Act. It is well-settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended. The language 'shall be deemed always to have meant' is declaratory, and is in plain terms retrospective. It is well-settled that if a statute is curative or merely declaratory of the previous law retrospective operation is generally intended. The language 'shall be deemed always to have meant' is declaratory, and is in plain terms retrospective. In the absence of clear words indicating that the amending Act is declaratory, it would not be so construed when the pre-amended provision was clear and unambiguous. An amending Act may be purely clarificatory to clear a meaning of a provision of the principal Act which was already implicit. A clarificatory amendment of this nature will have retrospective effect and, therefore, if the principal Act was existing law which the Constitution came into force, the amending Act also will be part of the existing law." 79. The Validating Act is in the nature of a curative statute whose endeavour is to cure legislative defect pointed out in the earlier judgment. Hence, its retrospective effect or operation cannot be held to be unconstitutional. Such retrospectivity was to correct anomaly created by the legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006 and in no way causes undue hardship or arbitrariness in the instant case. 80. At the time of their elections under the repealed Act of 1983, members of the Boards were very well aware that they had a tenure of three years. Later, only by a legal fiction they were treated on par with the Boards elected under Act of 2006 and their tenure was deemed to be extended to five years. Considering such legal fiction as unjust, the tenure of the old Boards were reverted back to three years by virtue of amending Act of 2011 without amending the legal fiction under Section 6 of the parent Act. Pointing out such error in the legislative exercise, this Court in earlier writ petition 4009 (w) of 2012 declared the amending Act as ultra-vires. In view of the said judgment, the legal fiction was sought to be amended so as not to treat the old Boards elected under the repealed Act at par with the new Boards elected under the Act of 2006 vis-a-vis their tenure in office. But for such legal fiction, the elected members of the Board at the time of their election as a matter of fact did not have any statutory right or mandate to continue in office for more than three years. But for such legal fiction, the elected members of the Board at the time of their election as a matter of fact did not have any statutory right or mandate to continue in office for more than three years. Therefore, no one can claim a vested right in continuation of a legal fiction. The Validating Act had a limited retrospective operation as it was brought into force with effect from 04.02.2013, that is the date of the promulgation of the Ordinance. Hence, repeal of the legal fiction from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance can never be said to be either arbitrary or unreasonable or operated to the undue hardship of the members of the said Board, particularly, in view of the fact that any act done or suffered by the said Boards prior to the promulgation of the said Ordinance by virtue of the legal fiction remained unaffected. Hence, retrospective operation of the curative amendment, as aforesaid, at any stretch of imagination cannot in the facts of the case be held either to be contrary to the public interest or, arbitrary or unjust or caused undue hardship to the elected members of the Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 so as to be held to be violative of article 14 of the Constitution. 81. It is relevant to refer to the judgment reported in 1997 8 SCC 522 in S.S. Bola and Others v. B.D. Sardana and Others. In this case the Apex Court while upholding the validating of the Amending Act altering the legal basis of interse seniority and promotion to higher posts held that the same shall operate retrospectively to the extent that the seniority list published shall stand annulled and fresh seniority list would be drawn up in accordance with the provisions of the amending Act, however, promotions which have been already made on the basis of seniority list so drawn up shall remain unaffected. 82. 82. In the case of State of Gujarat and Another v. Raman Lal Keshav Lal Soni and Others reported in (1983) 2 SCC 33 , the Apex Court had an occasion to deal with the third amendment to Gujarat Panchayats 1978, Apex Court declared Gujarat Panchayats (third Amendment Act of 1978) unconstitutional as it sought to retrospectively nullify the effect of a judgment passed by the High Court holding that the panchayat service was a civil service of the State and the members of the said service are Government servants. The Act sought to make artificial distinction between Municipality Employees in the Panchayat service and the Government servants in the self-same service. 83. In the instant case, the Validating Act merely altered the legal substratum on the basis of which judgment in W.P. 4009 of 2012 was passed by this Court. It did not nullify the said judgment but was enacted bearing in mind the observations made in the judgment. The Validating Act was brought into force from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance of 2013 and did not affect the Acts done or suffered by the respective Co-operative Societies during the subsistence of the unamended legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006. Whenever a new legislation is enacted, it always affects existing rights or creates new rights. Merely giving retrospective operation to a legislation would not render a law as unfair or unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. Such proposition of law was illustrated by the Apex Court in the case of State of Tamilnadu v. Arooran Sugars Limited reported in 1997 (1) SCC 326 , the Apex Court at paras 13 and 16 held as follows: "13. The power of the legislature to amend, delete or obliterate a statute or to enact a statute prospectively or retrospectively cannot be questioned and challenged unless the court is of the view that such exercise is in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. Whenever any Act or amendment is brought in force retrospectively or any provision of the Act is deleted retrospectively, in this process rights of some are bound to be affected one way or the other. In every case, it cannot be urged that the exercise by the legislature while introducing a new provision or deleting an existing provision with retrospective effect per se shall be violative of Article 14. In every case, it cannot be urged that the exercise by the legislature while introducing a new provision or deleting an existing provision with retrospective effect per se shall be violative of Article 14. If that stand is accepted, then the necessary corollary shall be that legislature has no power to legislate retrospectively, because in that event a vested right is effected; of course, in special situation the Supreme Court has held that such exercise was violative of Article 14 of the Constitution.." 16. It is open to the legislature to remove the defect pointed out by the court or to amend the definition or any other provision of the Act in question retrospectively. In this process it cannot be said that there has been an encroachment by the legislature over the power of the judiciary. A court's directive must always bind unless the conditions on which it is based are so fundamentally altered that under altered circumstances such decisions could not have been given. This will include removal of the defect in a statute pointed out in the judgment in question, as well as alteration of substitution of provisions of the enactment on which such judgment is based, with retrospective effect." 84. In the above said case the Apex Court held that it is permissible for the legislature to make amendments to the existing law in order to remove anomaly pointed out in the earlier judgment of the Court. Hence, the Validating Act is not seeking to nullify the earlier judgment of the Court. It only cures the anomaly which was pointed out by the Court in the said judgment and has been given retrospective effect from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance 2013 so as to remove such legal anomaly without causing undue hardship to the members of the old Boards elected under the repealed Act. 85. The members of the earlier Boards under the repealed Act of 1983 were aware at the time of their election with regard to their tenure. Such tenure was different from the tenure envisaged under the Act of 2006. By way of legal fiction the earlier Boards were deemed to be elected under the Act of 2006 entitling them to have a tenure of five years under the new Act. 86. This legal fiction has created an imaginary State of affairs which but for the fiction factually does not exist. By way of legal fiction the earlier Boards were deemed to be elected under the Act of 2006 entitling them to have a tenure of five years under the new Act. 86. This legal fiction has created an imaginary State of affairs which but for the fiction factually does not exist. Hence, the Boards which are naturally unequal at the time of their creation were deemed to be equal by the aforesaid legal fiction so as to enjoy similarity in so far as their tenures. This is nothing but an outcome of an artificially created situation. Hence, this would subsist so long as the legal fiction remains in the statute book. It is relevant to mention that legal fiction by itself did not create any vested right in a party to its continuance as it is subject to repeal or amendment, as the case may be, like any other provision of law. 87. In the present case, the Validating Act has merely amended the legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006 in order to cure a legal anomaly and nothing more. Such amendment has led to retrospective effect from the date of promulgation of the Ordinance of 2013 and not earlier. By doing so, the Validating Act does not affect the acts done or suffered by the Boards during the subsistence of the legal fiction till its amendment by the aforesaid Ordinance. Such nature of retrospectivity cannot by any stretch of imagination be said to be contrary to public interest or cause hardship to the respondent/writ petitioner or the Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983, in any manner whatsoever so as to suffer vice of unconstitutionality. 88. The next question is whether the Validating Act of 2013 is discriminatory in nature and thereby violative of the Article 14 of the Constitution. Ongoing through the impugned judgment, no doubt one would definitely notice such reasoning ventilated by the learned Single Judge while declaring Amending Act of 2011 as invalid. From judgment in Writ Petition 4009(w) of 2012 relevant portions are quoted below: "It is quite evident that the Amendment Act is a hasty piece of legislation. However, proceeding in haste by itself cannot be a ground of challenge to the validity of a statute, though proceeding in haste amounts to arbitrariness (see State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. K. Shyam Sunder & Ors. However, proceeding in haste by itself cannot be a ground of challenge to the validity of a statute, though proceeding in haste amounts to arbitrariness (see State of Tamil Nadu & Ors. v. K. Shyam Sunder & Ors. reported in (2011) 8 SCC 737 ).The resultant action of proceeding in haste has tantamounted to a palpable demonstration of legislative arbitrariness by the State legislature. The Amendment Act came into effect from 18th January, 2011. Insertion of the provision contained under sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of section 12 of the Amendment Act into section 36 of the Principal Act after the word and figure "section 29", has the effect of reduction of tenure of only those Boards of Co-operative Societies which were elected prior to the Principal Act coming into force and whose initial tenure of thirty six months stood extended up to sixty months by virtue of the legal fiction introduced under the non obstante provision in the Repeal and Savings clause contained under section 6 of the Principal Act. On the other hand, all Boards of Cooperative societies elected between 18th January, 2011 and 6th February, 2012 or even thereafter, notwithstanding such amendment introduced by the Amendment Act, would have an automatic tenure of sixty months. In other words, the effect of the Amendment Act does not at all touch the tenure of the Boards of Co-operative Societies, which have been elected after 18th January, 2011. Such legislative action clearly illustrates the concept of negation of equality and squarely hits Article 14 of the Constitution; the ipsissima verba being, arbitrary." 59. The Court further held: "As observed earlier, once the legal fiction under a non obstante clause was introduced by the Principal Act, the three years tenure of the Boards of all State Co-operative Societies, including the writ petitioner No. 1, who were elected under the provision of sub-section (8) of section 27 of the Repealed Act of 1983, was deemed to be extended for a further period of two years, immediately upon the Principal Act coming into force with effect from 18th January, 2011, in consonance with the proposed Constitutional Amendment. The State, without making necessary amendment to the Repeal and Savings clause of the Principal Act, sought to bring about a retrograde change in the tenure of the Boards of Directors of Co-operative Societies elected under the Repealed Act of 1983, by whittling down its tenure from five years to three years, thereby rendering nugatory the conscious and deliberate change that was brought about by the State earlier, upon bringing into force the Principal Act, which was in consonance with the proposed Constitutional Amendment. For reasons stated above, sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of section 12 of the Amendment Act is held to be repugnant to the provision of sub-section (2) of section 6 of the Principal Act, to the extent it seeks to reduce the tenure of the Boards of Co-operative Societies to thirty six months from sixty months, as originally provided under clause (a) of section 36 of the Principal Act and is further held to be ultra vires Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of section 12 of the Amendment Act is, therefore, liable to be struck down and is accordingly struck down. Consequently, the Board of writ petitioner No. 1, which came into effect from 24th November, 2009, shall continue in office for a period of sixty months to be computed from that date, subject of course, to all other provisions of law, as applicable for its continuance." 90. In the above circumstances, it was held that amendment to Section 36 (a) of the Act of 2006 altering the tenure of the Board elected under the Repealed Act of 1983 without amending the legal fiction of equality under Section 6 of the Act of 2006, rendered such classification, arbitrary, unreasonable, resulting in violation of Article 14 of the Constitution. However, such observation of discriminatory classification made in the said judgment does not hold good once the substratum of the law, namely, Section 6 of the Act of 2006 stood amended as per the observations made by the learned Judge in the said judgment. In the changed scenario under the statutory scheme, legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006 was made subject to other provisions of the Act which provided for different tenures for Boards elected under the repealed Law and Boards elected under the New Law. In the changed scenario under the statutory scheme, legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006 was made subject to other provisions of the Act which provided for different tenures for Boards elected under the repealed Law and Boards elected under the New Law. Such Amendment virtually restored the natural distinction between the two types of Boards, as stated above, which were always in existence but for the legal fiction. Therefore, one cannot say such classification was without rational basis, unjustified, unreasonable, arbitrary or violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 91. It must be remembered that the Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 were to enjoy a tenure of three years under the law that was inforce at the relevant time of election. Hence, no right, far less a vested right had been created in the Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 at the time of their elections to continue beyond the tenure of three years from the date of such election. Their tenure was deemed to be extended on account of the legal fiction created under Section 6 of the Act of 2006. It is nobody's case that State legislature was not competent to amend the legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006. As a matter of fact, failure to effect such amendment had faced the criticism at the hands of this Court in the earlier judgment as learned Judge observed that it was an Act of "Poor Draftsmanship". Distinction or difference in the tenure of the Board of directors under the repealed Act and the New Act cannot be said to be an artificial one or a case of hostile or arbitrary discrimination. It is an outcome of the legislative mandate under the respective laws. Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 and those elected under the Act of 2006 are significant and independent classes in themselves having separate tenure of office as per the respective legislations under which they were elected. Such separate groups were sought to be amalgamated by a legal fiction by virtue of Section 6 of the Act of 2006. This Court in the earlier judgment held that desegregating the said Boards would be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 unless the legal fiction under Section 6 was amended. Such separate groups were sought to be amalgamated by a legal fiction by virtue of Section 6 of the Act of 2006. This Court in the earlier judgment held that desegregating the said Boards would be discriminatory and violative of Article 14 unless the legal fiction under Section 6 was amended. State legislature as a matter of fact undertook such legislative exercise in bringing the Validating Act of 2013 to amend the legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act and thereby desegregate the two independent and individual groups, i.e. Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 and the new act of 2006. 92. The election of the Board under the auspices of an independent Co-operative Election Commission by virtue of Section 96 of the Act of 2006 cannot be treated at par with the State controlled election of a Board by virtue of statutory scheme of the repealed Act of 1983. Save and except, the legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006, the Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 and those elected under the new Act of 2006 cannot be treated as a homogeneous group. Hence, the Validating Act of 2013 which sought to rectify an anomalous homogeneity created by an overriding legal fiction cannot be understood as discriminatory or arbitrary in nature. 93. On the other hand, a legislative fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006 if permitted to continue, it would create an artificial distinction between the tenure of Boards inter se elected under the repealed Act of 1983, while the Boards elected under the repealed Act prior to 18th January, 2008 would have a tenure of three years as per repealed Act, the Boards which were elected on/after 18th January, 2008 and were in existence on the date of coming into force of Act 2006, that is, 18th January, 2006 would enjoy an additional tenure of two years by virtue of Section 6 of the Act of 2006. This in fact created an artificial distinction between the Boards constituted under the Repealed Act without any rational basis. The Validating Act by correcting legal substratum, namely, overriding effect of the legal fiction reasserted the reasonable classification between the Boards elected under the repealed Act on one hand and those elected under the new Act on the other hand who would have had different tenures. The Validating Act by correcting legal substratum, namely, overriding effect of the legal fiction reasserted the reasonable classification between the Boards elected under the repealed Act on one hand and those elected under the new Act on the other hand who would have had different tenures. Such legislative exercise, at any cost cannot be said to create a hostile discrimination between the Boards elected under the respective legislations. On the contrary it seeks to cure an anomaly created by legal fiction under the Act of 2006, as stated above. 94. In Andhra Pradesh Dairy Development corporation Federation v. B. Narashima Reddy and others reported in (2011)9 SCC 286 , Apex Court was of the opinion that Amendment Act of 2006 amending the 1995 Act and declaring that the Milk co-operatives shall be governed by 1964 Act instead of 1995 Act was a retrograde step prompted by a change of Government and, therefore, unconstitutional. The Apex Court further held that the classification of Milk co-operatives, vis-a-vis, other Co-operatives were unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. 95. In the case on hand, facts are the just opposite. The Validating Act of 2006 seeks to reestablish natural classification between the Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 and those elected under the Act of 2006 which was sought to be effaced by the legal fiction under Section 6 of the Act of 2006 unlike the artificial distinction between the Milk co-operative and other Cooperatives created by the Amending Act which were declared ultra vires in the aforesaid judgment. 96. That apart, while in the aforesaid judgment, the Amending Act was held to be a retrograde step in increasing Government control on co-operatives by reverting Milk co-operative to the 1964 Act, in our case the eclipse of the old Boards elected through a State controlled mechanism under the scheme of 1983 Act would usher in new Boards in the Co-operatives elected under an independent Election commission in terms of the Act of 2006 as envisaged in part IXB of the Constitution and cannot be said to be a retrograde step. 97. It was strenuously argued that creation of such classification between the Boards by Validating Act is an example of legislative arbitrariness and, therefore, unconstitutional. 97. It was strenuously argued that creation of such classification between the Boards by Validating Act is an example of legislative arbitrariness and, therefore, unconstitutional. One must make a clear distinction between the Sovereign Act of the State in making laws on one hand and an administrative action of the State on the other. If the legislative power is exercised within constitutional parameters it cannot be held unconstitutional by attributing motives to the legislature, while an administrative action may, however, be tested on the grounds of malice both in law and in fact. 98. In the case of State of Tamil Nadu v. K. Shyam Sunder reported in (2011)8 SCC 737 paragraph 50 is relevant which reads as under:- "In Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, this Court held that Article 14 strikes at arbitrariness because an action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of equality. Whenever therefore, there is arbitrariness in State action, whether it be of the legislature or of the executive, Article 14 immediately springs into action and strikes down such State action." [See also E.P. Royappa v. State of T.N. (1974)4 SCC 3 and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978)1 SCC 248 .] 99. Relying on the expression "legislature" in the above said paragraph it was strenuously argued that legislative arbitrariness is a species of ultra vires evolved by the constitutional Courts to check whimsical legislation prompted by the change in the political executive of the State. 100. It would be appropriate to refer to paragraphs 36 and 37 of the report referred to above in order to appreciate the ratio in the above decision. The relevant portion reads as under:- "36. In State of Punjab v. Gurdial Singh, this Court held that when power is exercised in bad faith to attain ends beyond the sanctioned purposes of power by simulation or pretension of gaining a legitimate goal, it is called colourable exercise of power. The action becomes bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, guided by an extraneous consideration, whether good or bad but irrelevant to the entrustment. The action becomes bad where the true object is to reach an end different from the one for which the power is entrusted, guided by an extraneous consideration, whether good or bad but irrelevant to the entrustment. When the custodian of power is influenced in exercise of its power by considerations outside those for promotion of which the power is vested, the action becomes bad for the reason that power has not been exercised bona fide for the end design. 37. It has consistently been held by this Court that the doctrine of mala fides does not involve any question of bona fide or mala fide on the part of legislature as in such a case, the Court is concerned to a limited issue of competence of the particular legislature to enact a particular law. If the legislature is competent to pass a particular enactment, the motives which impelled it to an act are really irrelevant. On the other hand, if the legislature lacks competence, the question of motive does not arrive at all. Therefore, whether a statute is constitutional or not is, thus, always a question of power of the legislature to enact that statute. Motive of the legislature while enacting a statute is inconsequential: "Malice or motive is beside the point, and it is not permissible to suggest parliamentary incompetence on the score of mala fides." The legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having passed a law for an extraneous purpose. This kind of "transferred malice" is unknown in the field of legislation." [See K.C. Gajapati Narayan Deo v. State of Orissa AIR 1953 SC 375 , STO v. Ajit Mills Ltd. SCC p. 108 (1977)4 SCC 98 para 16, K. Nagaraj v. State of A.P., (1985) 1 SCC 523 , Welfare Assn., A.R.P. v. Ranjit P. Gohil, (2003) 9 SCC 358 and State of Kerala v. Peoples Union for civil Liberties, (2009) 8 SCC 46 .]. 101. From the above reading, it is clear that a judgment has to be read as a whole. It is erroneous to pick up a line or two from the decisions ignoring other portions thereof to cull out its ratio. In the said report the Apex Court annulled 2011 Tamil Nadu Amending Act which sought to suspend the operation of 2010 State Act which had been upheld by the Court and had already come into operation. It is erroneous to pick up a line or two from the decisions ignoring other portions thereof to cull out its ratio. In the said report the Apex Court annulled 2011 Tamil Nadu Amending Act which sought to suspend the operation of 2010 State Act which had been upheld by the Court and had already come into operation. The Court held that the factual basis for enacting Amending Act was unfounded and the issues canvased therein could be addressed by resorting to notifications under Section 18 of the 2010 Act. It further held that the purpose of Amending Act was nothing but to nullify the effect of the judgment upholding the 2010 Act and such Amending Act caused undue hardship to the students who were already following the curricula and books prescribed under the 2010 Parent Act. The ratio of the said decision, therefore, is to the effect that the 2011 Amending Act was unconstitutional as it sought to suspend operation of the 2010 Act although the same had been upheld by the Court and such suspension was not in public interest as it caused undue hardship to innumerable students who had already commenced their education under curricula prescribed in the parent Act. 102. In the present case, the Validating Act of 2013 sought to remove an anomaly arising out of legal fiction under Section 6 of the 2006 Act as pointed out in the earlier judgment of this Court. That apart, there was confusion in the administration and management of the Co-operatives in the State as disputes were breaking out between the Boards which were elected in terms of various orders passed by the Court and the previous Boards who placed claim to manage the said Co-operatives in terms of the judgment in W.P. No. 4009(w) of 2012. Thus, the Validating Act was enacted to resolve confusion in management of Co-operatives which had cropped up in the meantime. Hence, the validating Act cannot be said to be ultra vires the constitutional parameters of legislative competence of the State so as to declare it as invalid. 103. It is pertinent to note that neither in Ajay Hassia and others nor Aneeta Hada cases relied upon by the respondents, the court was dealing with the issue of invalidating of a primary legislation. In both the cited cases the challenge was to the arbitrariness of administrative actions. 103. It is pertinent to note that neither in Ajay Hassia and others nor Aneeta Hada cases relied upon by the respondents, the court was dealing with the issue of invalidating of a primary legislation. In both the cited cases the challenge was to the arbitrariness of administrative actions. Hence, the said authorities cannot be pressed into service to propound a proposition that primary legislation can be declared ultra-vires on the ground of legal malice of the legislature. 104. As a matter of fact, the above controversy seems to have been put to rest by the Apex Court in the following decisions in G.C. Kanungo v. State of Orissa reported in 1995 (5) SCC 96 , the Apex Court has held as under: "11. "The legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having passed a law for an extraneous purpose. If no reasons are so stated as appears from the provisions enacted by it. Its reasons for passing a law or those that are stated in the Objects and Reasons. Even assuming that the executive, in a given case, has an ulterior motive in moving a legislation, that motive cannot render the passing of the law mala fide. This kind of 'transferred malice' is unknown in the field of legislation." 12. Hence, we have no hesitation in finding that the 1991 Amendment Act cannot be held to be unconstitutional because of the ulterior motive and the mala fides attributed to the Orissa State Legislature." 105. Similarly, in State of Himachal Pradesh v. Narain Singh reported in 2009 13 SCC 165 , the Apex Court succinctly held as follows: "19. An argument was, however, made before the High Court that the aforesaid amendment is actuated by a mala fide motive and is a piece of colourable legislation. The aforesaid contention was, however, not accepted by the High Court in the impugned judgment. In fact such contention is not tenable on principle. 20. Reference in this connection be made to a decision of this Court in K. Nagaraj v. State of A.P. wherein Chandrachud, C.J., speaking for a three-Judge Bench said that the legislature, as a body, cannot be accused of having passed a law for an extraneous purpose. Learned Chief Justice held that the concept of "transferred malice" is unknown in the field of legislation provided the legislature enacts the law within its powers. Learned Chief Justice held that the concept of "transferred malice" is unknown in the field of legislation provided the legislature enacts the law within its powers. The aforesaid principle in K. Nagaraj has been accepted by this Court in many cases and a reference in this connection may be made to a decision of this Court in G.C. Kanungo v. State of Orissa." 106. Relying on the aforesaid authorities, we hold that a primary legislation which is otherwise constitutionally valid cannot be declared ultra-vires by attributing mala fides to the legislature. We further, hasten to observe that in the factual matrix of the present case where sufficient and compelling reasons of public interest have been demonstrated for promulgation of the Ordinance 2013 and the subsequent Validating Act as evident from the records produced before us leading to the promulgation of the said Ordinance as well as the pleadings on behalf of the State in W.P.3829 of 2013 wherein Ordinance 2013 was challenged, we do not find any malice in law or in fact in the promulgation of the impugned legislation. 107. It has been strenuously argued that the directions given in the earlier judgment dated 17.10.2012 operates as res judicata and therefore binds the State, therefore, the same cannot be set aside by the Validating Act. Reliance is placed on 1985 (1) AllER 211 (Clark and Others v. Chat Burn and others) and AIR 1967 SCC 1390 ( Man Gru Mahato and others v. Takur Taraknathji Tarekeshwar and others). Firstly, the Validating Act changes the legal substratum on which the earlier judgment was based and does not alter the directions given in the said judgment as contended by the writ petitioners. Secondly, principles of res judicata precludes a subsequent adjudication of a cause by a judicial authority but has no application to the sovereign right of the legislature to alter the legal foundation upon which the previous judgment was rendered. Hence, the aforesaid argument suffers from total fallacy and the authorities relied upon in support thereof have no manner of application in the facts of the present case. Point No. 3: 108. Finally we come to the arguments that the Validating Act is violative of the letter and spirit of Article 243ZJ(2) of the Constitution of India. Part IXB was incorporated in the Constitution of India with effect from 15.02.2012. Point No. 3: 108. Finally we come to the arguments that the Validating Act is violative of the letter and spirit of Article 243ZJ(2) of the Constitution of India. Part IXB was incorporated in the Constitution of India with effect from 15.02.2012. Article 243ZJ(2) contained in the said part reads as follows: "Article 243ZJ: Number and term of members of Boards and its office bearers: .................................................................. (2) The term of office of elected members of the Board and its office bearers shall be five years from the date of election and the term of office bearers shall be conterminous with the term of the Board; Provided that the Board may fill a casual vacancy on the Board by nomination out of the same class of members in respect of which the casual vacancy has arisen, if the term of office of the Board is less than half of its original term." 109. It has been submitted that the Validating Act of 2013 which came into force on 26th April, 2013 is violative of the aforesaid constitutional provision which, inter-alia, provides that the term of office of the elected members of the Board and its office bearers shall be five years from the date of election. It has been argued that when the Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983 were given an extended tenure of five years by operation of legal fiction engrafted in Section 6 of the Act of 2006, amendment of such legal fiction and thereby reverting to three year tenure for the said Boards by the Validating Act of 2013 was a retrograde step which is in violation of the constitutional mandate under the above said Article of the Constitution of India. 110. It is well-settled law that a constitutional amendment is always prospective in nature. (reference is made to Ranjit Singh v. Commissioner of Income Tax, U.P. and others reported in AIR 1962 SC 93 para-9) The constitutional mandate of five year tenure for the elected members of the Board of a co-operative as engrafted in Article 243ZJ(2), as aforesaid, would apply to a Board whose members were elected after incorporation of the said part and not in respect of a Board which had been elected prior to its incorporation. Prospective operation of Part IXB of the constitution is further evident by reading Article 243ZT of the Constitution of India which reads as under: "Article 243ZT: Continuance of existing laws:- Notwithstanding anything in this Part, any provision of any law relating to co-operative societies in force in a State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (Ninety-seventh Amendment) Act, 2011, which is inconsistent with the provisions of this Part, shall continue to be in force until amended or repealed by a competent Legislature or other competent authority or until the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is less." 111. Article 243ZT saves the operation of law which was in force at the time of incorporation of Part IXB of the Constitution in so far as they are in consistent with the provisions of the said part till its amendment or for a maximum period of one year from its commencement, whichever is earlier. 112. Upon reading the saving clause in Article 243ZT, it leaves no doubt in anyone's mind that the constitutional imperative of a five year tenure for a Board is prospective in nature and by no stretch of imagination it shall apply to a Board already in existence elected under an earlier law made by the State legislature. Therefore, the Validating Act cannot be said to be violative of the provisions contained in Part IXB of the Constitution of India on such score. 113. It has been further argued, when the State legislature had, even prior to the enactment of the Part IXB of the Constitution amended its law and enacted Act of 2006 relating to co-operatives and thereby provided a tenure of five year for all Boards, including those Boards elected under the repealed Act of 1983, the enactment of the Validating Act reverting the tenure of such Boards elected under the repealed law to three years was violative of the spirit of the constitutional mandate. 114. Part IXB of the Constitution was incorporated to give constitutional recognition to the systematic and orderly development of the Co-operative movement in a democratic manner in the country. Let us go through the relevant provisions of the said constitutional amendment. 115. 114. Part IXB of the Constitution was incorporated to give constitutional recognition to the systematic and orderly development of the Co-operative movement in a democratic manner in the country. Let us go through the relevant provisions of the said constitutional amendment. 115. Article 243ZH (Clause b) defines the Board as under: "(b) "Board" means the board of directors or the governing body of a cooperative society, by whatever name called, to which the direction and control of the management of the affairs of a society is entrusted to;" 116. Article 243ZJ of the Constitution lays down the Constitution and tenure of such Boards. It provides for reservation of seats for Schedule Castes and Schedule Tribes, so also women and co-option of members having experience in the fields of Banking, management and other related fields. Clause 2 of the said Article provides that the tenure of such a Board shall be for a term of five years from the date of its election. Article 243ZK provides for regular and timely election of a Board to the Cooperative Societies under the auspices of an independent Election Commission. Said Article 243ZK reads as follows: "Article 243ZK: Election of members of Board:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law made by the Legislature of a State, the election of a Board shall be conducted before the expiry of the term of the Board so as to ensure that the newly elected members of the Board assume office immediately on the expiry of the term of the office of members of the outgoing Board. (2) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, all elections to a co-operative society shall vest in such an authority or body, as may be provided by the Legislature of a State, by law: Provided that the Legislature of a State may, by law, provide for the procedure and guidelines for the conduct of such elections." 117. The said Article provides that election of the members of a Board of a Cooperative Society shall be conducted before the expiry of a prior Board and the newly elected members shall assume office immediately on the expiry of the term of the outgoing Board. Superintendence, direction and control of the election to the Boards of a Co-operative Society shall vest in an authority or institution provided by the legislature of a State. 118. Superintendence, direction and control of the election to the Boards of a Co-operative Society shall vest in an authority or institution provided by the legislature of a State. 118. Therefore, from reading of the scheme under Part IXB in the Constitution makes it clear that its provisions shall apply to a Board of a Co-operative Society elected in consonance with the provisions of the said part. Section 96 of the Act of 2006 provides for the establishment of an independent cooperative Election Commission as envisaged under Article 243ZK(2) of the Constitution for the above said superintendence, direction and control of elections to a Co-operative Society under the said Act. Although the repealed Act of 1983 provided for a co-operative election authority under Section 35, the said authority did not enjoy independent power and under Section 36 of the said Act, the State Government was empowered to make rules for preparation of electoral rolls, fixing of date, place and manner of election including publication of results thereof. On the other hand, by virtue of Section 96(8) Act of 2006 all such powers are vested in an independent Election Commission constituted under Section 96 of the said Act. Therefore, the election of a Board to a Co-operative Society under the repealed Act of 1983 cannot be said to be in terms of the constitutional scheme as envisaged under Part IXB of the Constitution of India or the statutory scheme under the Act of 2006. 119. The Boards elected under the Act of 2006 ought to be elected under the superintendence, direction and control of an independent Election Commission constituted under the provisions of Section 96 of the said Act. This definitely indicate a rational nexus for classifying the Boards constituted under the repealed Act of 1983 as a separate class from those elected under the auspices of an independent Election Commission under the Act of 2006. It is also evident that a Board elected under the provisions of repealed Act of 1983 cannot be construed as a Board elected pursuant to the provisions of Part IXB of the Constitution especially in the light of Article 243ZK(2) thereof so as to enjoy a tenure of five years as envisaged therein. It is also evident that a Board elected under the provisions of repealed Act of 1983 cannot be construed as a Board elected pursuant to the provisions of Part IXB of the Constitution especially in the light of Article 243ZK(2) thereof so as to enjoy a tenure of five years as envisaged therein. Present Validating Act seeks to cure an anomaly of equating the Boards constituted through an election process under the repealed Act of 1983 with those Boards elected under the election process contemplated in the Act of 2006 which requires superintendence, direction and control of an independent co-operative Election Commission as provided under Article 243ZK(2) of the Constitution of India. Accordingly, a Board under the repealed Act of 1983 which was not elected under the umbrella of an independent Election Commission as envisaged in Article 243ZK(2) of the Constitution of India cannot be said to be one which would enjoy a tenure of five years under Article 243ZJ(2) of the said Part. Hence, Validating Act of 2013 cannot be invalidated on the anvil of falling foul of the letter and spirit of the aforesaid constitutional amendment. 120. In the Hassan Co-operative Milk Producers Societies Union Limited and others v. State of Karnataka and others (W.A. 734 of 2014) on 30.04.2014 a special bench of Karnataka High Court held that amending Act of 2013 prescribing tenure of a Board of the committees shall be for five years from the date of their election instead of five co-operative years with retrospective operation as valid, inter-alia, on the ground that the amending Act of 2013 gives effect to part IXB of the Constitution. As already opined by us, extending the tenure of a Board elected under the earlier procedure, that is repealed Act of 1983 which is not in consonance with Article 243ZK(2) of the Constitution of India would virtually defeat the purpose of the said constitutional amendment, therefore, we are of the view that the ratio of the said decision is of no assistance so far as the facts of the present case. 121. In the light of above discussion and reasoning, above appeal is allowed setting aside the impugned judgment. We direct the Co-operative Election Commission to hold elections to all the Co-operatives forthwith since the term of all the Boards has come to an end parties to bear their own costs. 122. 121. In the light of above discussion and reasoning, above appeal is allowed setting aside the impugned judgment. We direct the Co-operative Election Commission to hold elections to all the Co-operatives forthwith since the term of all the Boards has come to an end parties to bear their own costs. 122. The appeals F.M.A. No. 2351 of 2014 and F.M.A. No. 3681 of 2014 are disposed of in terms of above reasoning. Other applications does not survive for consideration, accordingly are dismissed. I agree. Appeal allowed.