JUDGMENT R.K. Deshpande, J. 1. Rule, made returnable forthwith. Heard finally by consent of the learned counsel appearing for the parties. Amongst all other questions, two questions involved before the School Tribunal are -- (i) whether the resignation dated 11-7-2003, which was obtained by the petitioner-Management from the respondent No. 1 employee, was forced resignation?, and (ii) whether the respondent No. 1 employee was gainfully employed during the pendency of the appeal? The serious factual controversy involved in the appeal needs to be decided by permitting the parties to lead oral and documentary evidence in support of their rival claims. For that purpose, if the parties choose to file an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief, that has to be accepted, subject to the right of the other side to cross-examine. 2. By the impugned order, the School Tribunal has held that the jurisdiction invoked by the respondent No. 1 employee is an appellate jurisdiction, as provided under Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 and there is no provision to conduct the proceedings, in which the parties can be permitted to produce evidence. It is not possible to accept such a view in the light of the provisions of the Maharashtra Employees of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (M.E.P.S. Act), the Code of Civil Procedure, the decision of the learned Single Judge of this Court (Shri D.K. Deshmukh, J., as he then was) in the case of Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque v. Shri S.A. Azmi and ors., reported in 2001 (1) Mh.LJ. 249 : 2000 (3) ALL MR 762, and the recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Tajender Singh Ghambhir and another v. Gurpreet Singh and others, reported in (2014) 10 SCC 702. 3. Section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act provides a right of appeal to Tribunal to employees of a private school against the order of dismissal, removal, otherwise termination, reduction in rank or supersession in the matter of promotion. Section 10 of the M.E.P.S. Act deals with the general powers and procedure of Tribunal Sub-section (1) therein states that for the purpose of admission, hearing and final disposal of appeals, the Tribunal shall have the same powers as are vested in an Appellate Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, and shall have the power to stay the operation of any order against which an appeal is made. Section 107(1) read with Order XLI, Rules 27 to 29 deal with the powers of the Appellate Court to take additional evidence or to require such evidence to be taken. Section 107(2) states that the Appellate Court shall have the same powers and shall perform as nearly as may be the duties as are conferred and imposed by the Code on the Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of the suits. Under Order XVIII, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the trial Court has power to record the evidence. Under section 3 of the Oaths Act, 1969, all the Courts having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, have power to administer oaths. 4. In the decision of this Court in the case of Mohammad Salam Anamul Haque, cited supra, the question was whether the order passed by the School Tribunal in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction under section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act can be executed in terms of the Code of Civil Procedure so as to have an alternate remedy available instead of filing the contempt proceedings. After considering all the provisions of the M.E.P.S. Act, this Court has held in para 11 of its decision as under: "11. Perusal of the above quoted provisions shows that the Appellate Court has been conferred with the same powers and same duties as are conferred and imposed by the Code on Courts of original jurisdiction in respect of the suits instituted therein. It is, thus, clear that the Appellate Court under the Civil Procedure Code has the same powers as the trial Court under the Civil Procedure Code and therefore, the tribunal constituted under the Act will also possesses all the powers of the Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code. Thus, as the tribunal possesses all the powers that are conferred by the Code on Courts of original jurisdiction, it can definitely be termed as "Civil Court" and therefore the order made by the tribunal would be an order within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Civil Procedure Code. It may be pointed out here that this Court by its judgment in the case of Janata Janardan Shikshan Sanstha v. Dr. Vasant P. Satpute, 1986 Mh.LJ. 260 and also in its judgment in Rasta Peth Education Society, Pune v. Pethkar Udhao Bhimashankar, 1994 Mh.LJ. It may be pointed out here that this Court by its judgment in the case of Janata Janardan Shikshan Sanstha v. Dr. Vasant P. Satpute, 1986 Mh.LJ. 260 and also in its judgment in Rasta Peth Education Society, Pune v. Pethkar Udhao Bhimashankar, 1994 Mh.LJ. 725, has held that a Civil Court can entertain a civil suit relating to the subject-matter on which the appeal under section 9 of the Act can be filed before the School Tribunal. Thus, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court and the Tribunal has been held to be concurrent. Under section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code the Courts under the Civil Procedure Code have jurisdiction to entertain all suits of civil nature. It is, thus, clear that the dispute that is raised before the tribunal under the Act is a dispute of a civil nature and therefore it can be safely said that the tribunal for the purpose of deciding appeals filed before it can be said to be Civil Court for the purpose of Civil Procedure Code and therefore, an order made by the Tribunal is an order within the meaning of the Civil Procedure Code. I have already pointed out above that under section 36 of the Civil Procedure Code, provisions in the Code relating to execution of decree are applicable to the execution of the order. Therefore, if the order made by the School Tribunal is an order within the meaning of Civil Procedure Code, then the provisions in the Code relating to execution of a decree are available for enforcing or executing an order made by the School Tribunal. Therefore, when the School Tribunal makes an order for reinstatement and for payment of back-wages, the Appellant in whose favour such an order is made can definitely approach the School Tribunal, which made the order for execution of that order in the same manner in which the decree under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code is to be executed. In such situation, either the tribunal may itself execute the decree or it may transfer the decree for execution to another Court in accordance with the provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code. In such situation, either the tribunal may itself execute the decree or it may transfer the decree for execution to another Court in accordance with the provisions contained in the Civil Procedure Code. It is thus clear to my mind that an order made by the School Tribunal is an order which is executable under the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code." It is thus the ratio of the decision of this Court in the aforesaid judgment that the Tribunal possesses all the powers that are conferred by the Code on the Courts of original jurisdiction and it can definitely be termed as "Civil Court" and, therefore, the order made by the Tribunal would be an "order" within the meaning of section 2(14) of the Civil Procedure Code, which can be executed in terms of section 36 therein. 5. In the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Tajender Singh Ghambhir, cited supra, it has been held in para 11 therein as under: "11. The High Court was also in error in holding that the deficiency in Court fee in respect of the plaint cannot be made good during the appellate stage. In this regard, the High Court, overlooked the well-known legal position that an appeal is continuation of the suit and the power of the appellate Court is coextensive with that of the trial Court. It failed to bear in mind that what could be done by the trial Court in proceeding of the suit, can always be done by the appellate Court in the interest of justice." It is thus clear that it is well-known legal position that an appeal is continuation of the suit and the power of the Appellate Court is co-extensive with that of the trial Court, and what could be done by the trial Court in the proceedings of the suit, can always be done by the Appellate Court in the interest of justice. 6. In view of above, it has to be held that the School Tribunal exercising jurisdiction under section 9 of the M.E.P.S. Act possesses all the powers that are conferred by the Code on the Courts of original jurisdiction and the Tribunal can be termed as a "Civil Court", which possesses power under Order XVIII, Rule 4 of the Code to record the oral evidence of witnesses. Even if the provision is titled as "Right of appeal to Tribunal to employees of a private school", it can be termed as continuation of suit and the power of the School Tribunal becomes coextensive with that of the trial Court and what could be done by the trial Court in the proceedings of the suit can always be done by the School Tribunal in its appellate jurisdiction in the interest of justice. The School Tribunal can, therefore, conduct the proceedings of an appeal as the Court of original jurisdiction to administer oath, record the evidence as contemplated by Order XVIII, Rule 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure by permitting the parties to examine and cross-examine the witnesses, etc. In view of this, the School Tribunal has committed an error in holding that in exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, as provided under Order XLI of the Code of Civil Procedure, the parties cannot be permitted to produce evidence. 7. It would, however, be the discretion of the School Tribunal whether the parties are to be permitted to lead oral evidence in the interest of justice, keeping in view the facts and circumstances of each case. While doing this, the School Tribunal may have regard to the nature of factual dispute, the burden of proof, the presumptions in law, the choice of the party to discharge such burden or rebut presumptions in law by leading oral evidence. In order to cut short the controversy and concentrate upon the material controversy, it shall always be desirable for the School Tribunal to frame an appropriate issue or the issues of facts so that the party desiring to discharge the burden or rebut the presumptions in law, is not deprived of such opportunity to lead evidence to prove facts in support of its stand. It will not be a hard and fast rule to permit the parties in each case to lead oral evidence. The School Tribunal may decide cases on the basis of pleadings and the documents on record and/or on the basis of affidavits if it is possible, depending upon the facts and circumstances of such cases. 8. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 21-11-2014 passed by the School Tribunal, Amravati, in Appeal No. 65 of 2003 is hereby quashed and set aside. 8. In the result, the petition is allowed. The impugned order dated 21-11-2014 passed by the School Tribunal, Amravati, in Appeal No. 65 of 2003 is hereby quashed and set aside. The School Tribunal shall permit the parties to lead evidence in support of their rival claims either by examination-in-chief or by filing an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief, and the party filing an affidavit in lieu of examination-in-chief shall be subject to cross-examination by the other side. The parties to appear before the School Tribunal on 7-4-2015. The School Tribunal shall decide the appeal expeditiously. Rule is made absolute in above terms. No order as to costs.