JUDGMENT : 1. This first appeal under Section 96 CPC is directed against judgment and decree dated 31.10.1984 passed by Additional District Judge, Udaipur, whereby, in a suit for partition filed by plaintiffs Smt. Vidhya Rani and Dinesh Chandra a preliminary decree has been passed and plaintiffs have been held entitled to 5/12th share in suit house situated at 88 Bhopalpura, Udaipur, 14-1/2 Tola of gold articles and 1/4th share in rest of the articles indicated in Schedule-B, 1/4th share in a sum of Rs. 30,000/- deposited with London Store along with interest @ 1% per month w.e.f. 03.08.1969, a sum of Rs. 744/- along with interest @ 1% per month from 28.08.1977 till date of decree and future interest @ 6% per annum and has further decreed the suit regarding the jewellery and other articles indicated in Schedule-A. 2. The facts in brief may be noticed thus : plaintiffs Smt. Vidhya Rani and Dinesh Chandra, who are wife and son of late Shri Satish Chandra filed a suit on 20.09.1977 against Harish Chandra, Smt. Chandra Kunwar and Smt. Sudha Rani - brother-in-law, mother-in-law and sister-in-law respectively of plaintiff Smt. Vidhya Rani with the averments that plaintiff Smt. Vidhya Rani is daughter-in-law of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and plaintiff No. 2 Dinesh Chandra is grand son of said Shivnandan Ji Bhatt, Shivnandan Ji Bhatt was son of Shri Bhawani Shanker Ji; Satish Chandra - husband of Smt. Vidhya Rani and father of Dinesh Chandra died on 07.08.1962 and Shivnandan Ji Bhatt died on 03.08.1969; at the time of death of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt hosue on Plot No.88 was constructed, which was constructed during the life time of Smt. Vidhya Rani's husband, in which, the plaintiffs have 5/16th share as the said house was ancestral property of the plaintiffs and was property of joint family of the parties; besides the said bungalow, at the time of death of Shivnandand Ji Bhatt in the Bank and with London Store a sum of Rs. 30,000/- was in deposit, which also being plaintiffs' ancestral property, the plaintiffs have 5/16th share; at the time of marriage of Vidhya Rani she was given jewellery by Shivnandand Ji Bhatt and her father, which was indicated in Schedule-A and was with defendants Harish Chandra and Chandra Kanwar, which they were entitled to receive; the jewellery, goods and utensils left by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and Satish Chandra at the time of their marriage were with defendant No. 2 Chandra Kanwar, which were indicated in Schedule-B and as the jewellery, utensils and goods were ancestral and joint family property, the plaintiffs have 5/16th share; the plaintiffs gave notice dated 10.10.1973 to the defendants, to which, a wrong reply was given by defendant No. 1 Harish Chandra and the claim about Will executed by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt was incorrect as he had not executed any Will and, even if, any Will is proved by the defendants, still Shivnandand Ji Bhatt had no right to bequeath property of her husband's share and, therefore, the so called Will does not affect the rights of the plaintiffs; Shivnandan Ji Bhatt had ancestral house at Jodiyon Ki Oal, Udaipur, two shops in the market, agricultural land and houses in village Khartana, agricultural lands in villages Ladani and Changedi, which all were ancestral properties, which were sold by Shivnandand Ji Bhatt and the amount was used for purchase of plot and construction of house and was blended with the personal property and in this manner Shivnandan Ji Bhatt made all his property as ancestral property; plaintiff's husband was Government servant with Rajasthan Revenue Board since 01.05.1952 and used to give his salary to Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and Shivnandan Ji Bhatt, plaintiffs and defendants were members of joint family and the properties were never partitioned between them; the cause of action arose on 10.10.1973; ultimately, it was prayed that properties be partitioned by metes and bounds and decree of possession be passed regarding 5/16th share. 3. A written statement was filed by defendant Nos. 3. A written statement was filed by defendant Nos. 1 and 2 - Harish Chandra and Chandra Kanwar denying the averments made in the plaint; it was contended that the house was constructed by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt from his personal income after death of Bhawani Shanker, the property was not ancestral and the house was constructed in 1954 i.e. from 01.09.1954 and the house was not joint family property; no amount was deposited with the Bank as Shivnandan Ji Bhatt had no bank account; a sum of Rs. 30,000/- was deposited with London Store, which was received by him on retirement towards Gratuity and Provident Fund and was his self acquired and not ancestral and, therefore, the plaintiffs have no share in the said sum and the house; it was denied that the jewellery given by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and plaintiff's father were with defendants; plaintiff's husband Satish Chandra was serving at Jaipur at the time of death of his first wife and when he (Satish Chandra) died, he was serving at Ajmer and his entire property was there only and nothing belonging to plaintiffs has been received by the defendants and is not in their possession; the goods indicated in Schedule-B were received by the defendants, however, none of the goods belonged to Satish Chandra; the goods were not ancestral and it was claimed that Shivnandan Ji Bhatt had executed Will regarding his self acquired property before his death and, therefore, his property was with the defendants and under the Will plaintiffs were not given anything; the fact about execution of Will by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt was clearly indicated in reply to the notice from plaintiffs and even before reply to the notice by letter in the year 1970 the status of Will was indicated to plaintiffs and the Will was the last operative Will of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and in view of the Will the plaintiffs have no right in the self acquired property of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt; after the house was constructed in the year 1954-55 for second marriage of Satish Chandra, the house situated at Jadiyon Ki Oal was sold by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt alongwith his brother Harinandan on 07.05.1956 and 50% of the same came to his share; the so called shop had already gone out from the share of Bhawani Shanker to his brother Champa Lal in the year 1938, which was sold by his legal representatives on 12.05.1958; in village Changedi - Bhawani Shanker had no land or house, even at village Ladani they had no property; the agricultural land at village Khartana was personal property and, therefore, the same is owned by him; the land was sold in the year 1956; the allegations regarding blending were denied; the contribution made by Satish Chandra to Shivnandan Ji Bhatt was denied and right to claim partition was also denied; in additional plea, it was stated that the jewellery gifted to plaintiff - Vidhya Rani at the time of her marriage was with her only; ultimately, it was prayed that the suit be dismissed. 4. A replication was filed by the plaintiffs; it was denied that the house was constructed by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt from his personal income; it was claimed that Shivnandan Ji Bhatt sold ancestral property and blended the same with his personal property, which resulted in the entire property becoming ancestral and the house also became ancestral; the properties at Khartana, Ladani and Changedi were ancestral, which were sold by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and the receipts were used for the house and was blended with the personal property and, therefore, the entire property became joint; regarding sum of Rs. 30,000/- with London Store, it was claimed that the same was not personal property, but on account of blending, the same became ancestral property and the plaintiffs have a share in it; it was denied that Shivnandan Ji Bhatt had executed any Will and it was alleged that so called Will was fraudulent. 5. Based on the averments of the parties, the trial court framed the following five issues:- ^^ 1- D;k oknxzLr lEifRr iSr`d lEifRr gS vkSj mlesa Jh lrh'kpUnz dk gd u fgr Fkk\ 2- D;k [ksrh dh tehu ij lrh'kpUnzth dk muds firk dh ekStwnxh esa dksbZ LoRo Fkk\ 3- D;k rFkkdfFkr olh;r Jh f'kouUnuth }kjk fu"ikfnr gS\ 4- D;k [ksrh dh tehu Jh Hkokuh'kadjth ds le; dh gS rFkk bldk bl okn ij D;k vlj gS\ 5- izfrdj D;k gS\ ^^ 6. On behalf of plaintiffs five witnesses were examined; on behalf of defendants also five witnesses were examined.7. After hearing the parties, the trial court came to the conclusion that defendant No. 1 failed to satisfactorily prove that the Will (Exhibit-A/4) was executed by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt; the house at P-8 Bhopalpura was constructed out of joint Hindu family property and as there was blending with ancestral property, coparceners Shivnandan Ji Bhatt, Satish Chandra and Harish Chandra had 1/3rd share each and consequently the plaintiffs were entitled to 5/12th share; in the property Schedule-B the plaintiffs were entitled to 14-1/2 Tola share and in other properties as well; the goods indicated in Schedule-A were with the defendants and plaintiffs were entitled to the same; ultimately, the suit filed by the plaintiffs was decreed as indicated hereinbefore.8. It is submitted by learned counsel for the appellants that the trial court committed serious errors of law and facts while deciding the suit; it was submitted that the Will (Exhibit-A/4) was a holograph Will; there was no allegations made in the plaint regarding the Will being surrounded by suspicious circumstances and no case in this regard was set up; the Will was duly proved in terms of Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 and Section 68 of the Evidence Act; the attesting witnesses were produced and their testimony was not shaken; the trial court was unnecessarily influenced by the fact that plaintiffs were deprived of any bequest by the testator Shivnandan Ji Bhatt, the Will was disclosed in the first instance and mere exclusion by itself cannot be a reason to treat the Will as suspicious; the statement of hand writing expert could not have been relied on by the trial court as the specimen signatures were obtained at the back of the defendants and the opinion by itself is not a substantive piece of evidence; further the genuine prayer made by the defendants-appellants for comparison of signatures by Government FSL was wrongly rejected by the trial court and despite being a holograph Will the opinion only pertained to the signatures, which shows the entire determination by the trial court was baseless and incorrect; it was further submitted that the finding regarding the house being ancestral property and blending is an outcome of total misreading of evidence and the finding is wholly perverse; the trial court has recorded contradictory findings at several places while considering the oral and documentary evidence and has made baseless and unwarranted observations about the defendants and their witnesses, which observations are not borne out from the record and the observations give a indication of the trial court's predilection apparently on account of the plaintiffs having been not granted any bequest under the Will, which has vitiated the entire finding; it was submitted that material documentary evidence has been ignored while coming to the conclusion that the goods Schedule-A were with the defendants, for which, there was absolutely no basis; further the Will having been executed by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt regarding the self acquired property as indicated in Schedule-A as well, the plaintiffs had no share at all; it was prayed that the judgment and decree passed by the trial court deserves to be quashed and set aside.9. Reliance was placed on Pushpavati & Ors. v. Chandraja Kadamba & Ors. AIR 1972 SC 2492 , Surnedra Pal & Ors. v. Dr. (Mrs.) Saraswati Arora & Anr. AIR 1974 SC 1999 , Rabindra Nath Mukharjee & Anr. v. Panchanan Banerjee & Ors. AIR (1995) 4 SCC 459 , S. Sundaresa Pai & Ors. v. Mrs. Sumangala T Pai & Anr. AIR 2002 SC 317 , Ramabai Padmakar Patil & Ors. v. Rukminibai Vishnu Vekhande & Ors. AIR (2003) 98 SCC 537, Uma Devi Nambiar & Ors. v. T.C. Sidhan, AIR (2004) 2 SCC 321 , Sridevi & Ors. v. Jayaraja Shetty & Ors. AIR (2005) 2 SCC 784 , Krishna Kumar Birla v. Rajendra Singh Lodha & Ors. AIR (2008) 4 SCC 300 , Ishwari Prasad Misra v. Mohammad Isa, AIR 1963 SC 1728 , Rani Purnima Debi & Anr. v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb & Anr. AIR 1962 SC 567 , Shashi Kumar Banerjee & Ors. v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee & Ors. AIR 1964 SC 529 , Ram Narain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1973 SC 2200 , Kalyan Singh v. Smt. Chhoti & Ors. AIR 1990 SC 396 , Ramabai Padmakar Patil & Ors. v. Rukminibai Vishnu Vekhande & Ors. AIR 2003 SC 3109 , H. Venkatachala Iyengar v. B.N. Thimmajamma & Ors. AIR 1959 SC 443 , Fakhruddin v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1326 , Ram Sarup Gupta by LRs. v. Bishnu Narain Inter College & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1242 , Kashi Nath through LRs. v. Jaganath, (2003) 8 SCC 740 and Mahesh Kumar by LRs. v. Vinod Kumar & Ors. (2012) 4 SCC 387 . 10. AIR 1959 SC 443 , Fakhruddin v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1967 SC 1326 , Ram Sarup Gupta by LRs. v. Bishnu Narain Inter College & Ors. AIR 1987 SC 1242 , Kashi Nath through LRs. v. Jaganath, (2003) 8 SCC 740 and Mahesh Kumar by LRs. v. Vinod Kumar & Ors. (2012) 4 SCC 387 . 10. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents vehemently supported the judgment and decree passed by the trial court; it was submitted that the Will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances and in fact was never executed by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt, which was clearly proved from the expert witness PW-5 and, therefore, the trial court committed no error in coming to the said conclusion under issue No. 3; it was submitted that defendant No. 1 being propounder of the Will, who had admittedly taken active part in execution of the Will, heavy burden lay on him to prove the due execution of the Will, however, the defendants have utterly failed to prove due execution of the Will as has been elaborately discussed by the trial court which clearly shows that the same is a fraudulent document and, therefore, the same cannot and does not confer any right on the defendants; the plaintiffs though being widow and minor son of testator's son at the time of alleged execution of the Will have been totally deprived of any share in the property and even the jewellery belonging to the plaintiffs has been misappropriated by the defendants; it was further submitted that the trial court after elaborate discussion and based on available material on record has come to the conclusion that the suit property was constructed out of joint family funds after selling ancestral properties and, therefore, the blending was apparent and the plaintiff were, therefore, entitled to share as granted by the trial court; the evidence regarding the movable properties having been left with the defendants at the time of death of plaintiff's husband was sufficient for the trial court to have come to the conclusion and in view of the fact that Smt. Chandra Kanwar did not appear in the witness box was a reason enough for discarding the defence raised by the defendants; once the Will is held to be fraudulent, the plaintiffs are entitled to 1/4th share in the self acquired property and 5/12th share in the ancestral house and the decree passed by the trial court cannot be faulted on the alleged grounds; it was also submitted that the appellate court should be slow to interfere with the appreciation of oral evidence made by the trial court and, therefore, also the judgment impugned does not call for any interference; ultimately, it was prayed that the appeal be dismissed with costs.11. Reliance was placed on Rani Purnima Debi & Anr. v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb & Anr. AIR 1962 SC 567 , Ramchandra Rambux v. Champabai & Ors., AIR 1965 SC 354, B. Venkatamuni v. C.J. Ayodhya Ram Singh & Ors., AIR 2007 SC 311, Smt. Indu Bala Bose & Ors. v. Manindra Chandra Bose & Anr., AIR 1982 SC 133 , Billeswar Kumar v. Smt. Nirupama Debi & Ors., AIR 1973 Cal. 460 , Mrs. Sumangala T. Pai v. S. Sundaresa Pai & Ors., AIR 1991 Ker. 259 , Mythili Nalini v. Kowmari & Ors., AIR 1991 Ker. 266 , Jarnail Singh (D) Through LRs. v. Dhanna Singh & Ors., Chidella Venkateswarlu v. Gurram Pushpa Latha, Madan Lal v. S.L. Maloo & Ors., Ramesh Chandra Agrawal v. Regency Hospital Ltd. & Ors., Shripat Rao & Ors. v. Raghuvirsingh & Ors., AIR 1995 MP 113 , Mallesappa Bandeppa Desai & Anr. v. Desai Mallappa @ Mallesappa & Anr., AIR 1961 SC 1268 and Joyce Primrose Prestor (Mrs.) (Nee Vas) v. Vera Marie Vas (Ms.) & Ors., (1996) 9 SCC 324 . 12. I have considered the rival submissions made by learned counsel for the parties.13. The submissions made by learned counsel for the parties give rise to the following issues for determination in this first appeal:- A. Whether the house situated at Plot No. 88, Bhopalpura, Udaipur was a joint family property or a self acquired property of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt? B. If the property was self acquired whether the same and other properties were blended with the joint family properties? C. Whether the Schedule-A properties belonging to the plaintiffs remained with the defendants? D. Whether the plaintiffs have any share in Schedule-B property? E. Whether the plaintiffs have any share in the sum in depositing with London Store? F. Whether the Will (Exhibit-A/4) was executed by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt? A. Whether the house situated at Plot No. 88, Bhopalpura, Udaipur was a joint family property or a self acquired property of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt? B. If the property was self acquired whether the same and other properties were blended with the joint family properties? 14. F. Whether the Will (Exhibit-A/4) was executed by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt? A. Whether the house situated at Plot No. 88, Bhopalpura, Udaipur was a joint family property or a self acquired property of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt? B. If the property was self acquired whether the same and other properties were blended with the joint family properties? 14. A bare look at the plaint reveals that the plaintiffs claimed that at the time of death of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt, the house of Plot No. 88 was in existence, which was constructed even during the life time of plaintiff No. 1's husband and the house was ancestral property and joint family property of the parties; further allegations were made that Shivnandan Ji Bhatt had ancestral properties at Jodiyon Ki Oal, Udaipur, two shops, agricultural lands at villages Khartana, Ladani and Changedi, which were sold by him and the money was utilised for the purchase of plot and construction of house and was blended with his personal property and, therefore, Shivnandan Ji Bhatt's entire property became ancestral property.15. When the averments made in the plaint were denied by the defendants, in replication it was contended that the house was not constructed from personal income; Shivnandan Ji Bhatt had ancestral properties at Udaipur, which were sold by him and were blended with his personal property, resulting in his entire properties becoming ancestral and the house also became ancestral; the agricultural lands, house at village Khartana, Ladani and Changedi were ancestral property, which were sold by him and same was used in the house and was blended with his personal properties, resulting in the entire property becoming ancestral property.16. The averments made in the plaint and the replication read as under:- Plaint ^^ 3- fd Jh f'kouUnu th dh e`R;q ds le; Hkwikyiqjk mn;iqj esa IykWV uEcj 88 ij caxyk cuk gqvk Fkk tks oknh la[;k 1 ds ifr ds thou dky esa gh cu x;k Fkk ftlesa oknhx.k dk 5@16 fgLlk gS D;ksafd mDr caxyk oknhx.k dh iSf=d lEifRr gS rFkk i{kdkjksa dh la;qDr ifjokj dh lEifRr gSaA 8- fd Jh f'kouUnu th ds ikl tfM;ksa dh vksy] mn;iqj esa edku iwoZtksa dk cuk;k gqvk Fkk rFkk iwoZtksa dh nks nqdkusa Hkh cktkj esa Fkh rFkk xkao [kjrk.kk esa dk'r dh tehu rFkk edukr Fks rFkk xkao ynkuh o paxsMh esa dk'r dh tehu Fkh tks lc iwoZtksa dh iSf=d lEifRr Fkh] ftldks csp dj Jh f'kouUnu th us jde izkIr dh] mlesa ls jde mDr caxys dk IykWV [kjhnus rFkk caxyk cukus ds dke esa yh rFkk viuh O;fDrx.k lEifRr ds lkFk feyk nhA bl izdkj Jh f'kouUnu th dh lEiw.kZ iSf=d lEifRr cuk nhA ^^ Replication ^^ 1- fd izfrys[k i= dh dze la[;k 3 esa oknxzLr caxyk Jh f'kouUnu th dh viuh futh dekbZ dh jde }kjk cuokuk xyr fy[kk gSA Jh f'kouUnu th ds ikl iwoZtksa dh iSf=d lEifRr esa mn;iqj esa edku ,oa nqdkusa vkfn Fkh] ftudks Jh f'kouUnuth us fodz; dj viuh O;fDrxr lEifRr ds lkFk feyk yh] ftlls mudh lEiw.kZ lEifRr iSf=d lEifRr gks xbZ vkSj caxyk Hkh iSf=d lEifRr gks x;kA Jh f'kouUnu th us [kjrk.k dh dk'r dh tehu ,oa edkukr rFkk ynkuh o paxsMh dh dk'r dh tehu tks iwoZtksa dh lEifRr gksus ls iSf=d lEifRr Fkh] mldks Hkh Jh f'kouUnu th us fodz; dj fn;k gS vkSj mldh vkenuh dks Hkh mDr caxys esa yxk;k rFkk viuh O;fDrxr lEifRr ds lkFk feyk fy;k ftlls Hkh lEiw.kZ lEifRr O;fDrxr ,oa iSf=d lEifRr ,d gks xbZ vkSj iSf=d lEifRr gks xbZ gSA ^^ 17. On behalf of the plaintiffs PW-1 Vidhya Devi stated that the house at Bhopalpura was constructed by her father-in-law after selling the ancestral property; the lands at village Khartana, Ladani and Changedi were sold vide Exhibits-3 to 7. 18. On behalf of the plaintiffs PW-1 Vidhya Devi stated that the house at Bhopalpura was constructed by her father-in-law after selling the ancestral property; the lands at village Khartana, Ladani and Changedi were sold vide Exhibits-3 to 7. 18. Further in the cross-examination, she reiterated the sale of ancestral properties by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and purchasing the plot and constructing the house from the said fund, claimed that the plot was purchased in the year 1954 and denied that the same was purchased for a sum of Rs. 2,000/- in the year 1942; the only statement made by the plaintiff in support of her plea as PW-1 reads as under:- ^^ Hkksiky iqjk okyk caxyk esjs llqj Jh f'ko uUnu HkV~B us vius iwoZtksa dh lEifRr dks csp dj ml iSls ls cuok;k FkkA "" gekjs dk'r dh tehu [kjrk.kk rFkk ynk.kh] luokM rFkk pxsaMh esa gS tks nsoh yky th dks rFkk mnk rFkk ykyk xkMjh dks csphA tks/kk xkMjh dks Hkh csph FkhA mu tehuksa dh [kkrs dh udysa ,Xth&3 ls yxkdj ,Xth&7 gSA ^^ 19. It would be noticed that in the entire statement of the plaintiff as PW-1 not a word was uttered regarding the plea pertaining to blending of the ancestral property into self acquired property by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt.20. On behalf of the defendants DW-1 - Harish Chandra deposed that the construction of the disputed house was started in the year 1954 and the plot was purchased in the year 1948-49, the cost of plot was paid in installments; at the time of death of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt in August, 1969, the entire cost of plot had not been paid and on receiving the notice from Urban Improvement Trust, the balance amount was paid by him in 1973 in lump sum; my father did not sell any property of my grand-father and did not utilise any sum belonging to my grand-father; Akbar Mohammed was the contractor; my father and his elder brother Hari Nandan had sold land, which amount was utilised for marriage of my brother (plaintiff's husband).21. DW-5 - Akbar Mohammed stated that Exhibit-A/3 contains his signatures along with date; he had constructed Shivnandan Ji Bhatt's house at Bhopalpura, Udaipur; the house was constructed in the year 1954 and after death of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt probably one room and one toilet were constructed.22. DW-5 - Akbar Mohammed stated that Exhibit-A/3 contains his signatures along with date; he had constructed Shivnandan Ji Bhatt's house at Bhopalpura, Udaipur; the house was constructed in the year 1954 and after death of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt probably one room and one toilet were constructed.22. The trial court while dealing with issue No. 1 dealt with the said aspect and based on the permission for construction Exhibit-A/36 dated 11.10.1960 at one place came to the conclusion that to claim that the construction started in the year 1954 and ended in the year 1954 was false; map (Exhibit- A./12) was discarded as not proved; the receipt (Exhibit-A/33) proved by Akbar Mohammed was rejected on coming to the conclusion that he was telling lies; where after, the learned Judge went on to further discuss the issue by assuming that there was no dispute that the construction started in 1954; the trial court heavily relied on the document Exhibit-21, which is a sale deed executed by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt on 30.06.1954 pertaining to house No. 2/719 in favour of Rodi Lal S/o Nana Lal and Dakhi Bai wife of late Nana Lal Tamboli for a sum of Rs. 9,999/-, wherein, it was indicated that the property was being sold for construction of house at Bhopalpura; the trial court came to the conclusion that the said property, which was sold vide Exhibit-21 by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt, which was purchased by him from Moti Lal vide Exhibit-A/5 on 22.03.1947 and as in the said sale deed (Exhibit-A/5) in favour of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt , it was indicated that the said property was on mortgage with Shivnandan Ji Bhatt since Samvat - 1985 (1928 AD) for a sum of Rs. 2,999/- and as Shivnandan Ji Bhatt started his service in the year 1928, he could not have a sum of Rs. 2,999/- in the year when the property was mortgaged to him and, therefore, it was presumed that the amount was of joint family from the time of his father Bhawani Shanker and the said amount was used for construction of the house and the fact that the said amount was admittedly used for construction of the house, the same amounts to blending; further the trial court came to the conclusion that vide Exhibits- 20, 22 and 23, three houses were sold on 05.05.1956, 04.05.1956 and 04.05.1956 respectively for a sum of Rs. 12,000/- and half of it Rs. 6,000/- were received by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and as the marriage of the plaintiff took place on 24.11.1957, the said amount must have been utilised for construction of the house; the plea raised regarding lump sum payment by the defendant Harish Chandra were not accepted, as Exhibit-A/3 indicated the year 1976 contrary to his claim of making payment in the year 1973; the trial court went on to discard the plea regarding utilisation of funds for construction of the house from Rajasthan Machinery Mart as the documents Exhibits-A/21, A/22, A/23 and A/24 indicated deposit and not withdrawal; the trial court went on to hold that even if a part of the joint family funds were utilized, the same was sufficient to come to the conclusion that the blending was complete.23. The entire basis of the finding recorded by the trial court holding the house at Bhopalpura as joint family property is essentially based on the funds acquired by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt by sale of house on 30.06.1954 vide Exhibit-21 as in the sale deed it was indicated that the money was required for the purpose of construction of house at Bhopalpura and sale of three houses jointly with his elder brother Harinandan vide Exhibits-20, 22 and 23 in May, 1956, in which, he had a share of Rs. 6,000/- and ultimately, went on to accept the theory of blending; the finding recorded by the trial court in the context of Exhibit-21 is ex facie incorrect and the same cannot be sustained; from the bare reading of the averments made in the plaint, it is apparent that the plaintiffs did not make any averment regarding sale of the house vide Exhibit-21 and merely relied on sale of agricultural lands at village Khartana, Ladani and Changedi; further, there was absolutely no assertion in the statements regarding the property sold vide Exhibit-21 being a joint family property and that the mortgage in the year 1928-29 by Moti Lal in favour of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt for a sum of Rs. 2,999/- happened out of joint family funds and, therefore, there was no occasion for the plaintiffs to thereafter seek to make submissions in this regard and trial court making out a case for the plaintiffs regarding the mortgage in the year 1928-29 having been made in favour of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt on account of his lending funds from joint family funds; it was not even the case of the plaintiffs that Shivnandan Ji Bhatt was in possession of joint family funds in the year 1928-29 and the assumption made by the trial court that his father Bhawani Shanker might have lend the money to him as he (Shivnandan Bhatt) had joined the service in the year 1928 itself, has apparently no basis for such assumption; further, not only that the property was mortgage with Shivnandan Ji Bhatt in the year 1928-29 vide Exhibit-A/5, the same was transferred by Moti Lal on 22.03.1947 in favour of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and the document does not indicate the transfer in favour of any joint family, as the transfer is in favour of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt as an individual only; the assumption of a property having purchased by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt in the year 1947 in his individual name and transfer by him by Exhibit-21 in the year 1954 again in his individual capacity as a joint family property based on the fact indicated in the sale deed Exhibit-A/5 regarding mortgage in the year 1928-29 is too far fetched and that also in absence of any specific pleading and/or any oral evidence led by the plaintiffs; in view thereof, the said finding cannot be sustained.24. The trial court has recorded contradictory findings for the purpose of discarding the statement of DW-5 Akabar Mohammed, inasmuch as, for discarding his statement reliance has been placed on the permission Exhibit-A/36 dated 11.10.1960 to indicate that construction did not start in the year 1954 and thereafter at more than one place i.e. at page 26 and page 30 of the judgment indicated that there is no dispute that the construction started in the year 1954; there is no dispute that the Patta pertaining to the plot in question was dated 04.11.1949 (Exhibit-A/7), which was allotted to Shivnandan Ji Bhatt alone and where after the map Exhibit- A/12, which bears an approval dated 04.09.1954, which document has been admitted by the plaintiffs clearly indicates the construction pertaining to the construction relating to the ground floor only and the documents Exhibits-A/36 and A/13, pertained to the first floor issued in the year 1960 and, therefore, the assumption made by the trial court based on the document Exhibit-A/36, which pertained to the first floor, it cannot be said that the construction did not start in the year 1954, though subsequently the trial court itself has taken it as a undisputed fact.25. In view of the fact that the plot in question was allotted in the year 1948-49, property vide Exhibit-21 was sold by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt in the year 1954, which was his individual property and the proceeds were utilised for construction of the house in question in the year 1954, it cannot be said that the same was purchased/constructed out of joint family funds; so far as the receipt of a sum of Rs. 6,000/- as share for by way of sale of the properties along with elder brother Hari Nandan vide Exhibits-20, 22 and 23 is concerned, the assumption of utilisation of the said funds in the construction of the house and/or the same ipso facto resulting in blending, cannot be said to be a correct proposition of law; a bare look at the averments made in the plaint would reveal that the allegations made are that Shivnandan Ji Bhatt blended the ancestral property with his personal property, such kind of blending is impermissible and if the averments are taken on face value, the same amounts to converting the ancestral property into personal property; the doctrine of blending is well settled, which postulates that a coparcener, who is interested in the coparcenary property and, who owns separate property of his own may, by deliberate and intentional conduct, treat the separate property as forming part of the coparcenary property; such conduct represents his clear intention of abandoning his claim on the said property, the object being to get it assimilated into the joint family property. The resulting position is that the separate property of the coparcener looses its separate character.26. In the present case, as already noticed hereinbefore while averments have been made in the plaint and the replication regarding blending, not a word has been uttered by the plaintiffs as PW-1 regarding the blending, from the material on record also while the trial court has rejected the theory that the amount deposited with Rajasthan Machinery Mart was utilised for construction of the house, the trial court has not taken into account the fact that the amount remained in deposit and the fact as to the amount obtained from the transfers in the year 1956 also remained in deposit with the Rajasthan Machinery Mart.27. Further, it is not in dispute that the second marriage of son Satish Chandra with appellant Smt. Vidhya Rani took place on 24.11.1957 i.e. after the joint properties were sold; the trial court has rejected the plea that the amount obtained from the sale of joint properties was spent on the marriage of Satish Chandra on assumption that the construction continued during the period 1956 onwards as well and that no one would keep the funds idle for one and a half year so as to spent the same at the time of marriage; as already noticed hereinbefore, the fact that the construction activity qua the house at Bohpalpura was over during the period before the joint properties were sold, the utilisation of funds obtained from sale of joint properties for the marriage cannot be ruled out in the circumstances which have come on record.28. the above discussion, it is established that the house situated at Plot No. 88, Bhopalpura was self acquired property of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and the plaintiffs have failed to prove that the said property was blended with the joint family properties as claimed; the trial court despite absence of specific pleadings and any evidence whatsoever, either oral or documentary, has merely on assumptions, conjectures and surmises held the said properties as joint family properties, which finding cannot be sustained. (iii) Whether the Schedule-A properties belonging to the plaintiffs remained with the defendants? 29. The Schedule-A properties comprised of the jewellery, which was given to plaintiff No. 1 at the time of her marriage and jewellery and other goods, which were given by her father at the time of her marriage, it is claimed in the plaint that the said goods were with defendant Nos. 29. The Schedule-A properties comprised of the jewellery, which was given to plaintiff No. 1 at the time of her marriage and jewellery and other goods, which were given by her father at the time of her marriage, it is claimed in the plaint that the said goods were with defendant Nos. 1 and 2 i.e. mother-in-law and brother-in-law; in the written statement the fact has been specifically denied; the trial court based on the statements of plaintiff No. 1 - Smt. Vidhya Rani and PW-4 father of the plaintiff, came to the conclusion that at the time of death of Satish Chandra, his father Shivnandan Ji Bhatt came to Ajmer, where the death took place and took Smt. Vidhya Rani, her son Dinesh Chandra along with all the goods including the jewellery to Udaipur and thereafter Smt. Vidhya Rani left the matrimonial house and went with her father, however, the jewellery and goods remained with Shivnandan Ji Bhatt; the trial court while coming to the said conclusion, inter alia, opined as under:- ^^ tsoj lksus dk okfn;k ds firk us ugha fn;k Fkk cfYd llqj us fn;k Fkk] ;g okfn;k dk dFku gSA okfn;k dh 'kknh gq, fnukad 7-8-62 dks flQZ 4 lky 9 ekg gq, Fks] ,d NksVk nw/kewagk iq= FkkA ,slh ifjfLFkfr esa Hkkjrh; ifjokj esa llqjky dk fn;k gqvk lkeku ,slh efgykvksa ds lkFk ugha Hkstk tkrkA ^^ 30. From the evidence available on record it is not in dispute that the marriage of Satish Chandra with plaintiff No. 1 - Smt. Vidhya Rani took place on 24.11.1957, Satish Chandra died on 07.08.1962, father-in-law Shivnandan Ji Bhatt died on 03.08.1969, the notice seeking partition by the counsel was issued on 10.10.1973 and ultimately the suit seeking partition was filed on 22.09.1977; the claim regarding the goods/jewellery indicated in Schedule-A is that the said goods were brought to Udaipur on death of Satish Chandra, however, when she left Udaipur for Kota with her father after about ten days of death of her husband, the goods/jewellery remained with the father-in-law, not a word in this regard has been stated in the plaint; the averment relevant reads as under:- ^^ 5- fd oknh la[;k 1 dh 'kknh ds le; oknh la[;k 1 dks Jh f'kouUnu th dh vksj ls tsoj rFkk oknh la[;k 1 ds firk dh vksj ls tsoj rFkk lkeku fn;k x;k Fkk] mldh lwph ifjf'k"V ( d ) esa vafdr gS tks izfroknh la[;k 1 o 2 ds ikl gS og oknhx.k izkIr djus ds vf/kdkjh gSA ^^ 31. PW-1 - Smt. Vidhya Rani stated that the said goods were brought to Udaipur and under compelling circumstances she left Udaipur for Kota under her father's guardianship; PW-4 - Jagannath further went on to say that behaviour with plaintiff No. 1 was not good and, therefore, she left the matrimonial house and went with him and the goods given to her at the time of her marriage and belonging to her remained with the in-laws; however, both the witnesses admitted that Jagannath and plaintiff No. 1's father reached Ajmer on the night before and Shivnandan Ji Bhatt reached Ajmer on the next morning of death.32. From the above statements while the plea appears to be that on account of compelling circumstances i.e. non-conducive atmosphere at the matrimonial home/misbehaviour, the plaintiff No. 1 left the matrimonial home, however, despite leaving the matrimonial home under the alleged circumstances and having left all her jewellery and goods with the in-laws, the plaintiff No. 1 chose not to make any claim, till her father-inlaw died after seven years of her leaving the matrimonial home in the year 1969 and till the year 1973 when the notice was issued by the counsel, inter alia, claiming the said goods/jewellery as well i.e. after 11 years from the said incident and where after also the suit was filed almost after four years of giving of the notice and therein also as quoted hereinbefore there was no averment as to how the goods/jewellery remained with the defendants except for a bald averment regarding the goods remaining with the defendants; the said conduct on part of the plaintiff No. 1, cannot be said to be natural in not claiming her jewellery/goods for over 15 years till she filed a suit in the year 1977 from the year 1962 when her husband died and she left Udaipur for Kota along with her father.33. The only relevant document which has come on record pertaining to the said aspect is a letter dated 29.05.1966 Exhibit-A/38 written by plaintiff No. 1 - Smt. Vidhya Rani to her mother-in-law, wherein, she has indicated that on account of misplaced assumptions she assumed that their (in-laws') behaviour with her would not be good, therefore, she left with her father, in fact she should have kept patience as the (in-laws) were also under mourning and sought to return back to the matrimonial home; in the said letter as well there is no reference of the goods/jewellery remaining with the defendants.34. Even in the letter dated 19.03.1971 (Exhibit-A/15) written by Smt. Vidhya Rani seeking the Will etc. there is no reference to the said jewellery/goods.35. Even in the letter dated 19.03.1971 (Exhibit-A/15) written by Smt. Vidhya Rani seeking the Will etc. there is no reference to the said jewellery/goods.35. The presumption/assumption made by the trial court as noticed hereinbefore for coming to the conclusion that the goods/jewellery remained with the respondents on account of alleged circumstances in Indian families that the goods are not allowed to be taken by the lady, has no legal sanction and/or is not a fact regarding which a judicial notice can be taken and/or assumption could be made by the trial court; the plaintiffs have failed to place on record any material whatsoever and/or any overt act between the period 1962 till the notice by the counsel was given in the year 1973 claiming possession of the goods with the defendants including not a word in the letter dated 29.05.1966 and letter dated 19.03.1971 Exhibit-A/15.36. In view of the above discussion, the finding recorded by the trial court regarding the goods/jewellery Schedule-A cannot be sustained and the same is, therefore, set aside. (iv) Whether the plaintiffs have any share in Schedule-B property?37. So far as the properties included in Schedule-B with the plaint is concerned, the plaintiffs have made the following averments in the plaint:- ^^ 6- fd Jh f'kouUnu th rFkk lrh'kpUnz th dh e`R;q ds le; mUgksaus tks tsoj ,oa lkeku] crZu vkfn NksM+k gS] og izfroknh la[;k 2 ds ikl gS] mldh lwph ifjf'k"B [k esa vafdr gS rFkk ;g tsoj] crZu] lkeku vkfn iSf=d lEifRr gksus rFkk l;qaDr ifjokj dh lEifRr gksus ls oknhx.k dk mlesa 5@16 fgLlk gSA ^^ The averments have been replied as under:- ^^ okn dh dafMdk N% esa ntZ lkeku f'kouUnuth dh e`R;q i'pkr~ ge izfroknhx.k dks feyk exj ;g Lohdkj ugha fd lwph [k esa ntZ lkeku esa ls dksbZ Hkh lkeku Jh lrh'kpUnz dk gks ;g Hkh Lohdkj ugha fd lwph esa ntZ lkeku iSr`d lEifRr gks fofnr jgs fd Jh f'kouUnuth us viuh e`R;q ds iwoZ viuh LomikftZr lEifRr dk olh;rukek dj fn;k Fkk vkSj blh otg ls mudh lEifRr gd izfroknhx.k ds ikl gS ol;hr }kjk dksbZ pht oknhx.k dks ugha nh xbZ gSA ^^ 38. From the bare reading of the plaint averments and the written statement, it is apparent that while the existence of the goods as contained in Schedule-B has not been denied, it is claimed that deceased Shivnandan Ji Bhatt had executed a Will and, therefore, the disposition of the properties indicated in Schedule-B would be governed by the said Will; as such, the disposition of the said goods contained in Schedule-B would be governed by either testate succession in terms of the Will (Exhibit-A/4) and/or intestate succession, in case, the Will (Exhibit-A/4) is not found to be proved. (v) Whether the plaintiffs have any share in the sum in depositing with London Store? 39. The issue pertaining to the deposits with the London Store would also be governed by the decision as to whether the succession would be testate or intestate based on the fact as to whether the Will (Exhibit-A/4) is found proved or not. (vi) Whether the Will (Exhibit-A/4) was executed by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt? 40. The issue regarding the validity of the Will assumes significance in view of the finding recorded hereinbefore regarding the status of the properties situated at Bhopalpura and the fact that property contained in Schedule-B and the amount deposited with London Store are found to be self acquired property of late Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and as the plea raised by the plaintiffs regarding blending has already been negated hereinbefore.41. The defendants claimed that deceased Shivnandan Ji Bhatt executed a Will (Exhibit-A/4); though the Will does not contain any date, it is claimed that the same was executed on 25.12.1962 and the testator died on 03.08.1969; it is claimed that the Will (Exhibit-A/4) is a holograph Will, the same contains signatures of DW-2 - Udai Lal and DW-3 - Govardan Singh, the attesting witnesses; the Will (Exhibit-A/4) essentially provides for vesting of the properties owned by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt with his wife Smt. Chandra Kanwar, however, it provides for appropriating the income from the said properties by her, the beneficiary (wife) has been prohibited from mortgaging or gifting the property; it further provides that after death of wife, the property would vest in Harish Chandra; the plaintiff - Smt. Vidhya Rani and her son were not bequeathed anything under the said Will; in support of the Will DW-1 - Harish Chandra, the ultimate beneficiary, both the attesting witnesses DW-2 - Udai Lal and DW-3 - Govardhan Singh were examined; DW-4 - Heera Lal Kothari was also examined, who is said to be friend of deceased Shivnandan Ji Bhatt; on behalf of the plaintiffs PW-5 - H.L. Badhwar, a hand writing expert was produced in rebuttal, who produced his report Exhibit-1/PW-5 and stated his conclusion that the signatures on the Will Exhibit-A/4 were not that of person, who had executed Exhibit-A/19A and Exhibit-34; based on the expert evidence and the fact that the plaintiffs had been deprived of any bequeath, the trial court found that the Will was surrounded by suspicious circumstances.42. It would be noticed that after the evidence of the defendants was over, on 09.12.1982 an application was filed by the plaintiff seeking photographs of the disputed signatures for expert opinion, which permission was granted by the Court on the application itself and no order-sheet was drawn; another application was filed on 13.01.1983, wherein, again permission was sought for taking photographs as the photographs taken earlier were stolen, which was also granted on the same day and where after the hand writing expert H.L. Bhadwar was examined on 04.04.1983 along with his opinion; on 04.04.1983 an application was filed by the defendants under Order 18, Rule 17 CPC seeking recall of the plaintiff, which application was rejected on 09.05.1983; another application was filed on 18.09.1984 under Section 151 CPC seeking examination of the Will by Forensic Science Laboratory, which application was also rejected.43. Learned counsel for the appellants as well as respondents have cited large number of judgments regarding the validity of the Will. The latest judgment of Mukesh Kumar v. Vinod Kumar & Ors. (2012) 4 SCC 387 on the aspect, which encompasses almost all the earlier judgments reads as under:- "27. We shall now consider whether the appellant had succeeded in discharging the onus of proving that the Will dated 10-2-1992 was validly executed. For deciding this question it will be useful to notice some of the precedents in which this Court had considered the mode and manner of proving a Will. 28. In one of the earliest judgments in u the three - Judge Bench noticed the provisions of Sections 45, 47, 67 and 68 of the Evidence Act, 1872 and Sections 59 and 63 of the 1925 Act and observed: "18. ... Section 63 requires that the testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and that the signature or mark shall be so made that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a will. This section also requires that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses as prescribed. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. This section also requires that the will shall be attested by two or more witnesses as prescribed. Thus the question as to whether the will set up by the propounder is proved to be the last will of the testator has to be decided in the light of these provisions. Has the testator signed the will? Did he understand the nature and effect of the dispositions in the will? Did he put his signature to the will knowing what it contained? Stated broadly it is the decision of these questions which determines the nature of the finding on the question of the proof of wills. It would prima facie be true to say that the will has to be proved like any other document except as to the special requirements of attestation prescribed by Section 63 of the Succession Act, 1925. As in the case of proof of other documents so in the case of proof of wills it would be idle to expect proof with mathematical certainty. The test to be applied would be the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters." 19. However, there is one important feature which distinguishes wills from other documents. Unlike other documents the will speaks from the death of the testator, and so, when it is propounded or produced before a court, the testator who has already departed the world cannot say whether it is his will or not; and this aspect naturally introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question as to whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the departed testator. Even so, in dealing with the proof of wills the court will start on the same enquiry as in the case of the proof of documents. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. The propounder would be called upon to show by satisfactory evidence that the will was signed by the testator, that the testator at the relevant time was in a sound and disposing state of mind, that he understood the nature and effect of the dispositions and put his signature to the document of his own free will. Ordinarily when the evidence adduced in support of the will is disinterested, satisfactory and sufficient to prove the sound and disposing state of the testator's mind and his signature as required by law, courts would be justified in making a finding in favour of the propounder. In other words, the onus on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts just indicated. 20. There may, however, be cases in which the execution of the will may be surrounded by suspicious circumstances. The alleged signature of the testator may be very shaky and doubtful and evidence in support of the propounder's case that the signature, in question is the signature of the testator may not remove the doubt created by the appearance of the signature; the condition of the testator's mind may appear to be very feeble and debilitated; and evidence adduced may not succeed in removing the legitimate doubt as to the mental capacity of the testator; the dispositions made in the will may appear to be unnatural, improbable or unfair in the light of relevant circumstances; or, the will may otherwise indicate that the said dispositions may not be the result of the testator's free will and mind. In such cases the court would naturally expect that all legitimate suspicions should be completely removed before the document is accepted as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. The presence of such suspicious circumstances naturally tends to make the initial onus very heavy; and, unless it is satisfactorily discharged, courts would be reluctant to treat the document as the last will of the testator. It is true that, if a caveat is filed alleging the exercise of undue influence, fraud or coercion in respect of the execution of the will propounded, such pleas may have to be proved by the caveators; but, even without such pleas circumstances may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will in executing the will, and in such circumstances, it would be a part of the initial onus to remove any such legitimate doubts in the matter. 21. Apart from the suspicious circumstances to which we have just referred, in some cases the wills propounded disclose another infirmity. Propounders themselves take a prominent part in the execution of the wills which confer on them substantial benefits. If it is shown that the propounder has taken a prominent part in the execution of the will and has received substantial benefit under it, that itself is generally treated as a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and the propounder is required to remove the said suspicion by clear and satisfactory evidence. It is in connection with wills that present such suspicious circumstances that decisions of English courts often mention the test of the satisfaction of judicial conscience. It may be that the reference to judicial conscience in this connection is a heritage from similar observations made by ecclesiastical courts in England when they exercised jurisdiction with reference to wills; but any objection to the use of the word "conscience" in this context would, in our opinion, be purely technical and academic, if not pedantic. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive. (emphasis supplied)" 29. The test merely emphasizes that, in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is deciding a solemn question and it must be fully satisfied that it had been validly executed by the testator who is no longer alive. (emphasis supplied)" 29. The ratio of H. Venkatachala Iyengar case was relied upon or referred to in Rani Purnima Debi v. Kumar Khagendra Narayan Deb, Shashi Kumar Banerjee v. Subodh Kumar Banerjee, Surendra Pal v. Saraswati Arora, Seth Beni Chand v. Kamla Kunwar , Sridevi v. Jayaraja Shetty, Niranjan Umeshchandra Joshi v. Mrudula Jyoti Rao and S.R. Srinivasa v. S. Padmavathamma . 30. In Jaswant Kaur v. Amrit Kaur, the Court analysed the ratio in H. Venkatachala Iyengar case and culled out the following propositions:- "(1). Stated generally, a will has to be proved like any other document, the test to be applied being the usual test of the satisfaction of the prudent mind in such matters. As in the case of proof of other documents, so in the case of proof of wills, one cannot insist on proof with mathematical certainty. 2. Since Section 63 of the Succession Act requires a will to be attested, it cannot be used as evidence until, as required by Section 68 of the Evidence Act, one attesting witness at least has been called for the purpose of proving its execution, if there be an attesting witness alive, and subject to the process of the court and capable of giving evidence. 3. Unlike other documents, the will speaks from the death of the testator and therefore the maker of the will is never available for deposing as to the circumstances in which the will came to be executed. This aspect introduces an element of solemnity in the decision of the question whether the document propounded is proved to be the last will and testament of the testator. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. Normally, the onus which lies on the propounder can be taken to be discharged on proof of the essential facts which go into the making of the will. 4. Cases in which the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances stand on a different footing. A shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit and such other circumstances raise suspicion about the execution of the will. That suspicion cannot be removed by the mere assertion of the propounder that the will bears the signature of the testator or that the testator was in a sound and disposing state of mind and memory at the time when the will was made, or that those like the wife and children of the testator who would normally receive their due share in his estate were disinherited because the testator might have had his own reasons for excluding them. The presence of suspicious circumstances makes the initial onus heavier and therefore, in cases where the circumstances attendant upon the execution of the will excite the suspicion of the court, the propounder must remove all legitimate suspicions before the document can be accepted as the last will of the testator. 5. It is in connection with wills, the execution of which is surrounded by suspicious circumstances that the test of satisfaction of the judicial conscience has been evolved. That test emphasises that in determining the question as to whether an instrument produced before the court is the last will of the testator, the court is called upon to decide a solemn question and by reason of suspicious circumstances the court has to be satisfied fully that the will has been validly executed by the testator. 6. If a caveator alleges fraud, undue influence, coercion etc. in regard to the execution of the will, such pleas have to be proved by him, but even in the absence of such pleas, the very circumstances surrounding the execution of the will may raise a doubt as to whether the testator was acting of his own free will. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter." 31. And then it is a part of the initial onus of the propounder to remove all reasonable doubts in the matter." 31. In Uma Devi Nambiar v. T.C. Sidhan the Court held that active participation of the propounder / beneficiary in the execution of the will or exclusion of the natural heirs cannot lead to an inference that the will was not genuine. Some of the observations made in that case are extracted below: "16. A will is executed to alter the ordinary mode of succession and by the very nature of things, it is bound to result in either reducing or depriving the share of natural heirs. If a person intends his property to pass to his natural heirs, there is no necessity at all of executing a will. I t is true that a propounder of the will has to remove all suspicious circumstances. Suspicion means doubt, conjecture or mistrust. But the fact that natural heirs have either been excluded or a lesser share has been given to them, by itself without anything more, cannot be held to be a suspicious circumstance especially in a case where the bequest has been made in favour of an offspring. As held in P.P.K. Gopalan Nambiar v. P.P.K. Balakrishnan Nambiar it is the duty of the propounder of the will to remove all the suspected features, but there must be real, germane and valid suspicious features and not fantasy of the doubting mind. It has been held that if the propounder succeeds in removing the suspicious circumstance, the court has to give effect to the will, even if the will might be unnatural in the sense that it has cut off wholly or in part near relations. (See Pushpavathi v. Chandraraja Kadamba.) In Rabindra Nath Mukherjee v. Panchanan Banerjee it was observed that the circumstance of deprivation of natural heirs should not raise any suspicion because the whole idea behind execution of the Will is to interfere with the normal line of succession and so, natural heirs would be debarred in every case of Will. of course, it may be that in some cases they are fully debarred and in some cases partly. (emphasis supplied)"The same view was reiterated in Pentakota Satyanarayana v. Pentakota Seetharatnam." 44. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joyce Primrose Prestor v. Vera Marie Vas & Ors. of course, it may be that in some cases they are fully debarred and in some cases partly. (emphasis supplied)"The same view was reiterated in Pentakota Satyanarayana v. Pentakota Seetharatnam." 44. Hon'ble Supreme Court in Joyce Primrose Prestor v. Vera Marie Vas & Ors. (1996) 9 SCC 324 while dealing with a holograph Will observed that "the case of a holograph Will, which is admittedly in the hand writing of the testator, is a special case, which will require a different approach in considering the evidence in the case to find whether the Will has been duly executed and attested."45. (1996) 9 SCC 324 while dealing with a holograph Will observed that "the case of a holograph Will, which is admittedly in the hand writing of the testator, is a special case, which will require a different approach in considering the evidence in the case to find whether the Will has been duly executed and attested."45. It has to be noticed that in the present case the Will (Exhibit-A/4) propounded by the defendants is a holograph Will and besides the signatures on the Will, it is claimed that the entire Will is in the hand writing of the testator Shivnandan Ji Bhatt; besides the document Exhibit-A/4, the parties have placed on record several admitted letters in the hand writing of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt, which are Exhibits-3A, 5A, 7A to 10A, 11 to 17, the letters pertained to the period 14.10.1956 to 19.07.1962; from the report of the hand writing expert produced by the plaintiffs as PW-5, it is apparent that the entire emphasis of the hand writing expert has been regarding the signatures on the Will and on account of his finding that the signatures on Exhibit-A/4 are not of the person who has executed the sale deeds Exhibit-19A and Exhibit-34; however, as to why despite the fact that the Will was a holograph Will, the expert confined his opinion to the signatures only has not at all been explained; besides the document Exhibit-A/4, which is of course disputed by the plaintiffs, the documents Exhibits-3A, 5A, 7A to 10A, 11 to 17 are letters written by deceased Shivnandan Ji Bhatt and are in his hand writing, which documents were very much available on record for the purpose of comparing the hand writing and/or for reaching a definite conclusion; the confining of the report by the hand writing expert only to the signatures has apparently led to an incomplete conclusion, when sufficient other admitted material in the form of writings by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt was available on record, in absence of any cogent reasons for not comparing the contents of the Will with the other admitted writings of Shivnandan Ji Bhatt, the opinion of the hand writing expert looses its significance.46. Though the trial court has recorded reasons and has reached to a conclusion that the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances primarily on account of the fact that the plaintiffs, who are widowed daughter-in-law and grand son of the testator have been deprived of any bequeath under the Will, as noticed hereinbefore in the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court, the said aspect by itself was not sufficient for the trial court to come to a conclusion that the Will was surrounded by suspicious circumstances; in support of the validity of the Will the defendants produced two attesting witnesses; both the attesting witnesses supported the version of the defendants and the plaintiffs failed to point out any contradiction whatsoever in the statements of the attesting witnesses; the trial court's emphasise regarding the so called interest of the attesting witnesses is apparently baseless.47. It would be understood that a document like a Will has to be get attested by persons, who are known to the testator and, therefore, merely because the testator had deposits with the London Store, where one of the attesting witnesses Govardhan Singh worked, cannot be a reason to discard his evidence; further, the trial court also was not justified in rejecting the application filed by the defendants for getting a opinion regarding the hand writing on the Will from the Forensic Science Laboratory.48. As noticed hereinbefore, the Will was a holograph Will and there was sufficient admitted documents on record for the trial court for seeking opinion from the Forensic Science Laboratory so as to reach to a conclusion with some certainty regarding the validity of the Will as the entire case hinged on the validity of the said document.49. The few other reasons recorded by the trial court about non-mentioning of so called joint properties in the Will cannot by itself be a sufficient reason for discarding the Will; further, the trial court has emphasised on certain aspect, which apparently does not have any implication on the validity of the Will and the Court was swayed in view of its coming to the conclusion that the plaintiffs, who are widowed daughter-in-law and grand son of the testator have been deprived of any bequeath under the Will.50. In view of the above discussion, the finding recorded by the trial court regarding the validity of the Will also cannot be sustained. In view of the above discussion, the finding recorded by the trial court regarding the validity of the Will also cannot be sustained. However, in the circumstances of the case, wherein the hand writing expert PW-5 has opined about difference in signatures on Exhibit-A/4 and Exhibits-19A and 34, the interest of justice would require that the Will Exhibit-A/4 along with the admitted documents Exhibits-3A, 5A, 7A to 10A, 11 to 17, which are hand written letters by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt, be examined by the Forensic Science Laboratory for comparison of the writing in the Will Exhibit-A/4 with the hand writing on Exhibits-3A, 5A, 7A to 10A, 11 to 17 and for that limited purpose, the matter deserves to be remanded back to the trial court, who would seek the opinion of the Forensic Science Laboratory on the said documents and based on the finding, after giving opportunity to both the sides to lead evidence, if any, to re-decide the issue No. 3 pertaining to the execution of the Will by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt. Based on the finding on issue No. 3, the fate of the properties i.e. immovable property situated at 88, Bhopalpura, Udaipur, properties indicated in Schedule-B etc. shall be determined by the trial court and a fresh decree would be passed accordingly.51. So far as the submission of learned counsel for the respondents that the appellate court should be slow in interfering with the appreciation of oral evidence made by the trial court and the reliance placed on Shripat Rao (supra) is concerned, as discussed hereinbefore, the trial court has by misconstruing the documentary evidence, discarding and ignoring material evidence and based on its preconceived notion about falsity of defendants' witnesses, which aspect has been found to be incorrect, has arrived at findings, which findings cannot be sustained merely on the principle that the appellate court should be slow in interfering with the appreciation of oral evidence made by the trial court.52. In view of the above discussion, the appeal is partly allowed. The findings recorded by the trial court regarding the nature of property situated at 88, Bhopalpura, Udaipur is set aside and it is held that the property was self acquired property of late Shivnandan Bhatt; the finding on Schedule-A is set aside, the finding on Schedule-B and deposits with London Store shall follow the finding on the validity of the Will. The finding recorded by the trial court on issue No. 3 regarding execution of Will by Shivnandan Ji Bhatt is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the trial court to get the document Exhibit-A/4 (Will) compared with documents Exhibits-3A, 5A, 7A to 10A, 11 to 17 appropriately from State Forensic Science Laboratory and re-decide the said issue after giving opportunity to the parties to lead further evidence, if any, on the issue and based on its finding on issue No. 3 and findings recorded hereinbefore decide the issue pertaining to the relief. The finding regarding the Khartana land is upheld.53. As the suit pertains to the year 1977, it is expected of the trial court to seek the opinion from the State Forensic Science Laboratory within a period of three months and decide the issue within two months thereafter. The record be sent back to the trial court immediately in proper custody as the documents are in precarious position. No order as to costs.Appeal partly Allowed.