JUDGMENT V.M. Pancholi, J. 1. The State has preferred this petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India wherein the petitioner has challenged the order dated 24.1.2014 passed by respondent No. 2- Controlling Authority under the Payment of Gratuity Act as well as the order dated 12.6.2014 passed by respondent No. 1-Appellate Authority (Payment of Gratuity Act). Heard learned AGP Mr. Bharat Vyas for the petitioners. Learned AGP submitted that respondent No. 3-workman was appointed as daily wager from 2.8.1986. He was remaining absent and, therefore, his services were terminated. Respondent No. 3, therefore, challenged the said action by raising dispute which was referred to the concerned Labour Court. The matter was settled between the petitioners and respondent No. 3-workman on 29.9.1999 and the said terms of settlement were produced before the Labour Court. The Labour Court, therefore, passed an order on 29.9.1999 wherein it was observed that the said reference is disposed off in view of the terms of settlement produced on record. Learned AGP thereafter submitted that the respondent No. 3 was reinstated in service and order to that effect came to be passed on 30.11.1999. 2. Learned AGP thereafter submitted that respondent No. 3 was superannuated on 30.6.2011. The respondent No. 3, thereafter, lodged his claim of gratuity. The said claim was ascertained by the petitioner and the amount was paid to the respondent No. 3. However, the respondent No. 3 disputed the calculation of the amount and, therefore, approached the respondent No. 2-Controlling authority by filing an application No. 29 of 2013. Respondent No. 3, in the said application, claimed the amount of gratuity from the date of his first appointment. Respondent No. 2-Controlling Authority granted the said application and directed the petitioners to make the payment by considering his first date of appointment i.e. 2.8.1986 till the date of his superannuation i.e. 30.6.2011. 3. Learned AGP Mr. Vyas thereafter contended that the petitioners preferred Statutory Appeal before the Appellate Authority i.e. respondent No. 1 under section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act of 1972. Learned AGP has made the grievance that the Appellate Authority dismissed the said appeal on the ground of delay in filing the appeal and on the ground that the petitioners have not deposited the amount as per the provisions contained in section 7 of the Gratuity Act. The petitioners have, therefore, no option but to file the present petition. Learned AGP has made the grievance that the Appellate Authority dismissed the said appeal on the ground of delay in filing the appeal and on the ground that the petitioners have not deposited the amount as per the provisions contained in section 7 of the Gratuity Act. The petitioners have, therefore, no option but to file the present petition. 4. Learned AGP Mr. Vyas would contend that the respondent No. 2-Controlling Authority has wrongly considered the date of appointment i.e. 2.1.1986 for calculating the amount of gratuity. He has contended that the respondent No. 3 was terminated from the service in 1987 and thereafter the dispute was settled between the parties in the year 1999. It is the case of the petitioners that the respondent No. 3 has partly waived his backwages and he was not granted continuity of service at the time of reinstatement in view of the terms of the settlement placed before the Labour Court. Therefore, respondent No. 2-Controlling Authority ought to have considered that the respondent No. 3 was appointed from 1.11.1999 in view of the settlement and, therefore, respondent No. 2 has wrongly considered the services of the respondent No. 3 during the period between 1987 to 1999 for calculating the amount of gratuity. 5. Learned AGP Mr. Vyas thereafter contended that the respondent No. 1 has dismissed the appeal only on the ground of delay in filing the said appeal. Respondent No. 1 had not given opportunity of hearing to the petitioners before dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay and, therefore, the order passed by the respondent No. 1 is in violation of the principles of natural justice and hence the said order be quashed and set aside. 6. I have considered the submissions canvassed on behalf of learned AGP. I have also gone through the material produced on record as well as the impugned orders. From the record, it has emerged that respondent No. 3 was appointed in the year 1986 and thereafter his services came to be terminated in the year 1987. He raised the dispute which was referred to the concerned Labour Court in the year 1989. During the pendency of the said reference before the concerned Labour Court, the petitioners and respondent No. 3 entered into settlement and the said settlement was placed before the Labour Court. He raised the dispute which was referred to the concerned Labour Court in the year 1989. During the pendency of the said reference before the concerned Labour Court, the petitioners and respondent No. 3 entered into settlement and the said settlement was placed before the Labour Court. The said document is produced by the petitioners at Annexure 'B' with the compilation. Condition No. 1 of the said settlement clearly stipulated that the petitioners-employer will reinstate respondent No. 3 workman from 1.11.1999 with continuity of service. It is further revealed that respondent No. 3-workman will not claim any backwages and he has waived the same. Thus, from the terms of the settlement, it is clear that the petitioners have agreed to reinstate the respondent No. 3-workman with continuity of service. The Labour Court passed the order in view of the said terms of settlement. Thus, in the opinion of this Court, when the petitioners-employers have accepted in the said settlement that they will reinstate the workman with continuity of service at this stage, it is not open for them to contend that his services prior to 1999 are not required to be counted for the, purpose of calculating the amount of gratuity under the Payment of Gratuity Act. Thus, the said contention is required to be rejected in view of the terms of the settlement. Thus, I am of the opinion that no error is committed by the respondent No. 2-Controlling Authority while calculating the services of the workman prior to 1999 and from the date of his first appointment in the year 1986. 7. With regard to the second contention taken by the learned AGP that the order passed by respondent No. 1-Appellate Authority is in violation of the principles of natural justice is also required to be rejected. It is an admitted fact that the petitioners preferred the appeal after a period of limitation prescribed under section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. It is an admitted fact that the petitioners preferred the appeal after a period of limitation prescribed under section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972. Under section 7(7) of the said Act, it is specifically provided that any person aggrieved by an order passed by the Controlling Authority shall prefer an appeal within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of the order and the Appellate Authority, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within said period of 60 days, extend the said period by further 60 days. Section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act, 1972 reads as under: "7(7) Any person aggrieved by an order under sub-section (4) may, within sixty days from the date of the receipt of the order, prefer an appeal to the appropriate Government or such other authority as may be specified by the appropriate Government in this behalf: Provided that the appropriate Government or the Appellate Authority, as the case may be, may, if it is satisfied that the appellant was prevented by sufficient cause from preferring the appeal within the said period of sixty days, extend the said period by a further period of sixty days: [Provided further that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the Controlling Authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4), or deposits with the appellate authority such amount.]" 8. In view of the aforesaid statutory provision, the Appellate Authority is not empowered to condone the delay if the appeal is preferred after a period of 120 days. This Court has considered the provisions contained in section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. In the case of Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation v. Sunderben Chhanabhai Baraiya, 2011 (131) FLR 870 (Guj.) has considered the provisions contained in sub-section (7) of section 7 of the Payment of Gratuity Act. This Court held that the Appellate Authority had rightly dismissed the appeal which was filed after eleven months, and the Appellate Authority had no power to condone the delay. This Court held that the Appellate Authority had rightly dismissed the appeal which was filed after eleven months, and the Appellate Authority had no power to condone the delay. It was further held that if the extraordinary power conferred to this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is invoked and exercised, in such type of cases, it will be nothing but amounting to miscarriage of justice, and therefore, the petition was dismissed by this Court. 9. Even thereafter, Full Bench of this Court has considered the provision contained in section 35 of the Central Excise Act of 1944. The provision contained in section 35 of the Central Excise Act are pari-materia with the provision contained in section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. The Full Bench of this Court in the case of Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India and others AIR 2015 Guj. 97 , has held in paragraph 31 as under: "31. We may now proceed to answer the question. (1) Question No. 1 is answered in negative by observing that the limitation provided under section 35 of the Act cannot be condoned in filing the appeal beyond the period of 30 days as provided by the proviso nor the appeal can be filed beyond the period of 90 days. (2) The second question is answered in negative to the extent that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution would not lie for the purpose of condonation of delay in filing the appeal. (3) On the third question, the answer is in affirmative, but with the clarification that- (A) The petition under Article 226 of the Constitution can be preferred for challenging the order passed by the original adjudicating authority in following circumstances that: (A.1) The authority has passed the order without jurisdiction and by assuming jurisdiction which there exist none, or (A.2) Has exercised the power in excess of the jurisdiction and by overstepping or crossing the limits of jurisdiction, or (A.3) Has acted in flagrant disregard to law or rules or procedure or acted in violation of principles of natural justice where no procedure is specified. (B) Resultantly, there is a failure of justice or it has resulted into gross injustice. (B) Resultantly, there is a failure of justice or it has resulted into gross injustice. We may also sum up by saying that the power is there even in aforesaid circumstances, but the exercise is discretionary which will be governed solely by the dictates of the judicial conscience enriched by judicial experience and practical wisdom of the Judge." 10. In view of the aforesaid Full Bench decision, it is clear that the Appellate Authority is not empowered to condone the delay if the appeal is filed after a period of 120 days from the date of receipt of the order by the aggrieved party. In the present case, it is admitted that the petitioners preferred the appeal after a period of limitation and, therefore, the said appeal was rightly rejected by the Appellate Authority. 11. It is also observed by the Appellate Authority that the petitioners had not deposited the amount as per the order passed by the Controlling Authority and, therefore, the said appeal is not maintainable. Further, proviso of section 7(7) provides that no appeal by an employer shall be admitted unless at the time of preferring the appeal, the appellant either produces a certificate of the Controlling Authority to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him an amount equal to the amount of gratuity required to be deposited under sub-section (4) or deposits with the Appellate Authority such amount. Thus, it is mandatory that the employer has to deposit the amount as per the further proviso of section 7(7) of the Payment of Gratuity Act. If such amount is not deposited, the appeal is liable to be dismissed which is rightly dismissed by the authority. 12. Even otherwise, the order passed by the respondent No. 2-Controlling Authority is in accordance with law. The authority has not exceeded its jurisdiction nor violated the principles of natural justice and, therefore, also no interference is required by this Court while exercising the powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the present petition is dismissed.