JUDGMENT : S. Abdul Nazeer, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment and decree in R.A. No. 125/2010 dated 13.6.2011 on the file of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumkur. 2. Respondent No. 1 herein was the plaintiff in the suit O.S. No. 122/2005 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge at Sira. The appellants and respondent Nos. 2 to 4 were the defendants. For the sake of convenience, the parties are referred to by their respective ranking before the trial Court. 3. The plaintiff filed the above suit for declaration that it is the owner of the suit schedule properties by cancelling the sale deeds executed by the 5th defendant in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 dated 14.1.2000 and 22.5.2000 and for permanent injunction restraining the defendants, their agents, servants or workmen and all others claiming through them from interfering with its peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties and for certain other reliefs. 4. According to the plaintiff, it has purchased two bits of land measuring 225 x 217 ft. and 250 x 370 ft. under a deed of sale dated 24.2.1992. It has constructed certain buildings to house the hostel and school for the children and the remaining portion is a vacant land and is used as a play ground for the school children. The suit schedule properties are part and parcel of the aforesaid two bits of lands. The defendants have no right, title or interest over the suit schedule properties. It is a revenue land. The sixth defendant executed three different sale deeds in favour of defendants Nos. 1 to 5 in respect of the suit schedule properties. The title of the plaintiffs vendor in respect of the suit schedule properties has been confirmed in O.S. No. 5/1984 dated 31.1.1990. 5. Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have filed their written statement denying the plaintiffs title to the suit schedule properties. It is contended that they are in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties. Their father was in possession of the suit schedule properties and that they had put up construction over the same about 35 years back and after his death, defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have reconstructed the building. It is contended that they are in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties. Their father was in possession of the suit schedule properties and that they had put up construction over the same about 35 years back and after his death, defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have reconstructed the building. They are in continuous lawful possession uninterruptedly, openly and that they have perfected their title by adverse possession in respect of the said properties. Defendant No. 8 has also filed the written statement denying the plaintiffs title to the suit schedule properties. 6. On the basis of the pleadings of the parties, the trial Court has framed the following issues: "1. Whether the plaintiff- Institution proves that the suit schedule property belongs to it by virtue of registered sale deed dated 24.2.1992? 2. Whether plaintiff-Institution further proves that the defendant Nos. 6 to 8 have no right, whatsoever over the suit schedule property? 3. Whether plaintiff-Institution further proves that the alleged sale deeds dated 14.1.2000 and 25.2.2000 executed in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 5 by T.M.C., Sira, are not valid and not binding on the plaintiff? 4. Whether plaintiff- Institution proves that the said institution is entitled for relief of declaration and consequential reliefs of mandatory injunction and permanent injunction, as sought for? 5. Whether the defendants prove that the suit is barred by limitation? 6. Whether defendant further proves that defendants No. 1 to 5 have perfected their title over the suit schedule property by way of adverse possession? 7. What order or decree?" 7. On behalf of the plaintiff, three witnesses were examined as PW.1 to PW.3. DW.1 to DW.12 were examined as witnesses of the defendants. Several documents have been marked in the evidence of both the parties. On appreciation of the materials on record, the trial Court has held issue Nos. 1 to 3 in the affirmative and in favour of the plaintiff On issue No. 5, the trial Court held that the suit is not barred by time. However, issue Nos. 4 and 6 have been answered against the plaintiff Consequently, suit was decreed in part by declaring that plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule properties. The sale deeds executed by defendant No. 7 in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 5 dated 14.1.2000 and 22.5.2000 respectively have been cancelled. 8. However, issue Nos. 4 and 6 have been answered against the plaintiff Consequently, suit was decreed in part by declaring that plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule properties. The sale deeds executed by defendant No. 7 in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 5 dated 14.1.2000 and 22.5.2000 respectively have been cancelled. 8. Feeling aggrieved by this judgment on issue Nos. 4, 6 and 7, the plaintiff filed an appeal in R.A. No. 125/2010 on the file of the II Additional District and Sessions Judge, Tumkur. The first appellate Court has re-appreciated the entire materials on record and has allowed the appeal. Defendant Nos. 1 to 5 were directed to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the suit schedule properties to the plaintiff The defendants were restrained from interfering with the plaintiffs possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties. The first appellate Court has directed an enquiry for determining the mesne profits under Order 20 Rule 12 of the CPC. 9. In this appeal filed under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the decree of the First Appellate Court has been challenged by defendant Nos. 1, 3 and 4 and legal representatives of defendant Nos. 2 and 5. 10. The appeal was admitted to consider the following substantial questions of law: "1. Whether the Lower Appellate Court was justified in granting the relief of declaration and possession against defendant Nos. 1 to 5 when Ex. D-16, refers to possession of defendant Nos. 1 to 3's father, Sri. Dasappa way back in 1970-71? 2. Whether both the Courts below were justified in relying upon the Judgment and decree passed in O.S. No. 5/1984 seeking declaration against Government when Ex. D-16 discloses that much prior to filing of suit, Sri. Dasappa, father of defendant Nos. 1 to 3 was also in possession of some portion of land as per the proceedings before the Assistant Commissioner vide Ex. D16?" 11. Sri Padmanabha Mahale, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants would contend that the defendants are in lawful possession and enjoyment of the suit schedule properties. They have been in possession of the properties for the past over 35 years as on the date of the suit. They have constructed buildings in the suit schedule properties. They have perfected their title by adverse possession. They have been in possession of the properties for the past over 35 years as on the date of the suit. They have constructed buildings in the suit schedule properties. They have perfected their title by adverse possession. In the circumstances, the first appellate Court was not justified in rejecting the claim of the defendants that they have perfected their title by adverse possession. 12. On the other hand, Sri M. Shivappa, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the first respondent submits that the plaintiff has filed the suit on the basis of its title to the properties. The plaintiff has purchased properties measuring 225 x 217 ft. and 250 x 370 ft. in two bits from its previous owner Nidumamidi Mutt. The plaintiff has put up construction in some portions of the properties and the remaining property was kept vacant for use of their school children as a playground. The defendants have no right, title or interest over the suit schedule properties. Defendants attempted to put up constructions in the suit schedule properties, which are part and parcel of the properties purchased by them under the sale deed dated 24.2.1992. The trial Court while answering issue No. 1 has clearly held that plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule properties. The defendants have not challenged the order of the trial Court on issue Nos. 1 to 3 and 5. The court below has also held that the sale deeds executed by the TMC, Sira, dated 14.1.2000 and 25.2.2000 in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 5 is not valid. At one breath, the defendants have stated that they have purchased the properties under the sale deeds executed by the TMC, Sira, dated 14.1.2000 and 25.2.2000. They have also taken up an inconsistent plea that they have perfected their title by adverse possession, which is not permissible in law. There is no plea as to from what date they have been in hostile possession of the properties. Having set up title in themselves, they could not have raised a plea of adverse possession. Since the plaintiff has established title, it is entitled for possession of the suit schedule properties. He prays for dismissal of the appeal. 13. I have carefully considered the arguments made by the learned Counsel at the Bar and perused the materials placed on record. 14. Since the plaintiff has established title, it is entitled for possession of the suit schedule properties. He prays for dismissal of the appeal. 13. I have carefully considered the arguments made by the learned Counsel at the Bar and perused the materials placed on record. 14. As noticed above, the contention of the plaintiff is that it has purchased 2 bits of land measuring 225 x 217 ft. and 250 x 370 ft. from Nidumamidi Mutt. Nidumamidi Mutt was the owner of the said properties. According to the plaintiff, the defendants have encroached certain portions of the land, which are morefully described in the schedule to the plaint. The defendants have denied the purchase of the properties by the plaintiff under a registered sale deed dated 24.2.1992. According to the defendants, they are in possession of the properties from 1970-1971 onwards. The TMC, Sira, passed a resolution confirming the sale and executed the sale deeds in their favour. They have also taken a plea that they have perfected their title by adverse possession. 15. The trial Court has held that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule properties by virtue of the sale deed Ex. P1 dated 24.2.1992. The trial Court while answering issue No. 3 has further held that TMC, Sira, had no right to execute the sale deeds dated 14.1.2000 and 25.2.2000 in respect of the properties in question in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 5. The resolution passed by the TMC, Sira, at Ex. P24 has been cancelled by the Deputy Commissioner. The order of the trial Court declaring that the plaintiff is the owner of the properties has become final as it has not been challenged by defendant Nos. 1 to 5. However, the trial Court has held that defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have perfected their tide by adverse possession. This portion of the decree has been set aside by the first appellate Court. 16. It is clear from the materials on record that plaintiff has established tide to the suit schedule properties. The alternative plea of the defendants is that they have perfected their tide by adverse possession. It is well established that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a mixed question of fact and law. 16. It is clear from the materials on record that plaintiff has established tide to the suit schedule properties. The alternative plea of the defendants is that they have perfected their tide by adverse possession. It is well established that plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a mixed question of fact and law. Therefore, a person, who claims adverse possession should plead and establish on what date he came into possession, what was the nature of his possession, whether factum possession was known to the other party, how long his possession has continued and his possession was open and undisturbed. 17. In DR. MAHESH CHAND SHARMA v. RAJ KUMARI SHARMA (SMT) AND OTHERS, (1996) 8 SCC 128 , the Supreme Court has held that the plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a mixed question of fact and law. The party pleading adverse possession must state with sufficient clarity as to when his adverse possession commenced and the nature of his possession. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all the facts necessary to establish his adverse possession. 18. In KARNATAKA BOARD OF WAKF v. GOVERNMENT OF INDIA AND OTHERS, (2004) 10 SCC 779 , the Apex Court has again held that a person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour and since such a person is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish necessary facts to establish his adverse possession. It has been held thus: "In the eye of the law, an owner would be deemed to be in possession of a property so long as there is no intrusion. Non use of the property by the owner even for a long time won't affect his title. But the position will be altered when another person takes possession of the property and asserts a right over it. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is 'nec vi, nec clam, nec precario', that is, peaceful, open and continuous. Adverse possession is a hostile possession by clearly asserting hostile title in denial of the title of the true owner. It is a well settled principle that a party claiming adverse possession must prove that his possession is 'nec vi, nec clam, nec precario', that is, peaceful, open and continuous. The possession must be adequate in continuity, in publicity and in extent to show that their possession is adverse to the true owner. It must start with a wrongful disposition of the rightful owner and be actual, visible, exclusive, hostile and continued over the statutory period. Physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases of this nature. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show: (a) on what date he came into possession, (b) what was the nature of his possession, (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party, (d) how long his possession has continued, and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish his adverse possession." It has been further held as under: "A plaintiff, filing a title suit, should be very clear about the origin of title over the property. He must specifically plead it. The pleas on title and adverse possession are mutually inconsistent and the latter does not begin to operate until the former is renounced............. In this case, the respondent obtained title under the provisions of the Ancient Monuments Act. But, the alternative plea of adverse possession by the respondent is unsustainable. The element of the respondent's possession of the suit property to the exclusion of the appellant with the animus to possess it is not specifically pleaded and proved. So are the aspects of earlier title of the appellant or the point of time of disposition." 19. In CHATTI KONATI RAO v. PALLE VENKATA SUBBA RAO, (2010) 14 SCC 316 , it has been held that in a claim of adverse possession, there are no equities in favour of claimant. So are the aspects of earlier title of the appellant or the point of time of disposition." 19. In CHATTI KONATI RAO v. PALLE VENKATA SUBBA RAO, (2010) 14 SCC 316 , it has been held that in a claim of adverse possession, there are no equities in favour of claimant. Therefore, the claimant must clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. It has been held as under: "15. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. Mere possession does not ripen into possessory title until the possessor holds the property adverse to the title of the true owner for the said purpose. The person who claims adverse possession is required to establish the date on which he came in possession, nature of possession, the factum of possession, knowledge to the true owner, duration of possession and that possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour as he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner and, hence, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to establish adverse possession. The courts always take unkind view towards statutes of limitation overriding property rights. The plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blended one of fact and law." (emphasis supplied by me) 20. It is also well established that in a suit falling under Section 65 of the Limitation Act, plaintiff must establish his title to the property. He need not prove that he was in possession within 12 years. When the plaintiff has established his title to a land, the burden of proving that he has lost that title by reason of the adverse possession of the defendant lies upon the defendant. If the defendant fails to prove that he has been in adverse possession for more than 12 years, the plaintiff is entitled to succeed on the strength of his title. A person alleging that he has become owner of immovable property by adverse possession must establish that he was in possession of the property peaceably, openly and in assertion of a title hostile to the real owner. Stricter proof is required to establish acquisition of title by adverse possession for the statutory period. 21. A person alleging that he has become owner of immovable property by adverse possession must establish that he was in possession of the property peaceably, openly and in assertion of a title hostile to the real owner. Stricter proof is required to establish acquisition of title by adverse possession for the statutory period. 21. In M. DURAI v. MUTHU AND OTHERS, (2007) 3 SCC 114 , the Apex Court has again reiterated the aforesaid legal position as under: "7. The change in the position in law as regards the burden of proof as was obtaining in the Limitation Act, 1908 vis-à-vis the Limitation Act, 1963 is evident. Whereas in terms of Articles 142 and 144 of the old Limitation Act, the plaintiff was bound to prove his title as also possession within twelve years preceding the date of institution of the suit under the Limitation Act, 1963, once the plaintiff proves his title, the burden shifts to the defendant to establish that he has perfected his title by adverse possession." 22. In ANNAKILI v. A. VEDANAYAGAM AND OTHERS, (2007) 14 SCC 308 , the Apex Court has held that when a suit is for possession based on title and the defendant resisting the suit on the basis of hostile title, burden of proof lies on the defendant to show that he/she was in possession of the said property on the basis of hostile title since past 12 years which has resulted in extinguishing the title of plaintiff It has been held thus: "It was not obligatory on the part of the respondent-plaintiffs seeking possession to file a suit for declaration of their title also. As the title of the respondents in the suit property had already been adjudicated upon, a suit for recovery of possession on the basis of the said title attracted Article 65 of the Schedule appended to the Limitation Act, 1963. In terms of the said provision, it was for the appellant-defendant to show that she and her predecessor had been in possession of the suit property on the basis of the hostile title and as a result whereof the title of the respondent-plaintiffs stood extinguished." It has been further held as under: "24. In terms of the said provision, it was for the appellant-defendant to show that she and her predecessor had been in possession of the suit property on the basis of the hostile title and as a result whereof the title of the respondent-plaintiffs stood extinguished." It has been further held as under: "24. Claim by adverse possession has two elements: (1) the possession of the defendant should become adverse to the plaintiff; and (2) the defendant must continue to remain in possession for a period of 12 years thereafter. Animus possidendi as is well known is a requisite ingredient of adverse possession. It is now a well-settled principle of law that mere possession of the land would not ripen into possessory title for the said purpose. Possessor must have animus possidendi and hold the land adverse to the title of the true owner. For the said purpose, not only animus possidendi must be shown to exist, but the same must be shown to exist at the commencement of the possession. He must continue in the said capacity for the period prescribed under the Limitation Act. Mere long possession, it is trite, for a period of more than 12 years without anything more does not ripen into a title." 23. In the written statement, defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have not pleaded in clear terms on what date they came into possession of the property, whether the factum of possession was known to the plaintiff or its predecessor in title, the nature of their possession, etc. Be that as it may. 24. Defendant Nos. 6 to 8 have executed sale deeds Ex. P33 to Ex. P37 in respect of the suit schedule properties in favour of defendant Nos. 1 to 5 on the basis of the resolution of the TMC, Sira. This resolution was set aside by the Deputy Commissioner in appeal No. 8/2000-01. The trial Court has therefore set aside the sale deeds at Ex. P33 to Ex. P37 and declared the plaintiff as the owner of the properties. The title of the vendor of the plaintiff has been confirmed in the decree in O.S. No. 5/1984. When the trial Court has concluded that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule properties and defendant Nos. 6 to 8 had no right over the same, the question of other defendants having any right over the said properties cannot arise. When the trial Court has concluded that the plaintiff is the owner of the suit schedule properties and defendant Nos. 6 to 8 had no right over the same, the question of other defendants having any right over the said properties cannot arise. The very defence raised by the defendants before the Deputy Commissioner, Tumkur in appeal No. 8/2000-01 cuts the plea of adverse possession because defendant Nos. 1 to 3 had set up a plea of permissive possession, which is totally analogous or inconsistent with the plea of adverse possession. They being diametrically opposite to each other cannot go hand in hand. The defendants have right to take up inconsistent pleas in any suit. But, it does not mean that they are at liberty to take up any inconsistent pleas which are capable of eliminating or demolishing one another. 25. The defendants have not admitted the title or ownership of the plaintiff to the suit schedule properties. They have not pleaded hostile claim to the knowledge of the plaintiff The defence that defendant Nos. 6 to 8 allotted the schedule properties to defendant Nos. 1 to 5 would also demolish the very base of the defence of adverse possession raised. When the Deputy Commissioner has cancelled the resolution made by defendant Nos. 6 to 8 to allot the schedule properties to defendant Nos. 1 to 5 as reflected in Ex. P24, the very source of acquisition of schedule properties by defendant Nos. 1 to 5 is done away with. It has also come in the evidence that the properties sold under Ex. P33 to 35 are vacant sites. The licences issued for putting up construction at Ex. P25 to Ex. P27 are dated 16.3.2000. Thus, they were permitted to put up construction in the vacant sites sold to them. This would demolish their plea that since 30 to 35 years, they have been in possession of the properties by putting up dwelling houses. The RTC extracts at Ex. D1 to Ex. D4 produced by the defendants relate to the period between 1984-1985 and 1993-1994. They relate to 31.16 acres in Sy. No. 47. The first appellate Court has considered the matter in detail while coming to the conclusion that defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have not perfected their title by adverse possession. 26. The RTC extracts at Ex. D1 to Ex. D4 produced by the defendants relate to the period between 1984-1985 and 1993-1994. They relate to 31.16 acres in Sy. No. 47. The first appellate Court has considered the matter in detail while coming to the conclusion that defendant Nos. 1 to 5 have not perfected their title by adverse possession. 26. As stated above, the title of the plaintiffs vendor in relation to the properties in question has been confirmed by the Civil Court in O.S. No. 5/1984 (Ex. P40 and Ex. P41). The title deeds of defendant Nos. 1 to 5 at Ex. P33 to Ex. P37 executed by TMC, Sira has been set aside by the trial Court. These title deeds have been executed by TMC, Sira, on the premise that it is the owner of the suit schedule properties. It is not the case of the defendants that TMC, Sira was not the owner of the properties. They have not disclaimed their title under Ex. P33 to Ex. P37 and pleaded hostile claim against the plaintiff or its predecessor in title. Therefore, reliance on Ex. D16 will not assist defendant Nos. 1 to 5 in any manner. The appellate Court has rejected this plea by observing as under: "The defendants have also rather heavily relied upon Ex. D16 which is the certified copy of the order dated 16.7.1979 passed by the Assistant Commissioner, Madhugiri Sub-Division dismissing the petition filed against the father of defendants-1 to 3 and 6 by M.N. Eshwarappa. But, I find it difficult to say that it would nourish and nurture the plea of adverse possession. Because, even if it is assumed for a moment that the father of the defendants 1 to 3 was in possession of any extent of land in Sy. No. 47, certainly it cannot be designated or styled as adverse possession. Furthermore, Ex. P40 to P.42 have also demolished the theory of adverse possession set up by the defendants. They are certified copy of judgment and decree rendered in O.S. 5/1984 filed against Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka and others by the plaintiffs vendor for a declaration of its title to the schedule property and permanent injunction. Furthermore, Ex. P40 to P.42 have also demolished the theory of adverse possession set up by the defendants. They are certified copy of judgment and decree rendered in O.S. 5/1984 filed against Chief Secretary, Government of Karnataka and others by the plaintiffs vendor for a declaration of its title to the schedule property and permanent injunction. As could be seen from them, the schedule property was mutt, hostel and residential quarters and lying in an extent of land measuring 860 x 860', lying within the boundaries mentioned in the schedule and situate in Sy. No. 47. Thus, it shows that the schedule property in the suit under appeal is only a part of it. The very fact that the said suit had been decreed has furnished much more proof to the claim projected. Even the appeal preferred against it came to be dismissed attaching finality to the judgment and decree rendered as per Ex. P40 and P41. Ex. P42 is only a certified copy of the order sheet maintained in R.A.15/1990. On the face of this evidence, it is indeed impossible to believe and accept the defence of adverse possession raised." 27. The appellate Court has rejected the plea of adverse possession on proper appreciation of the materials on record. I do not find any error in the said reasoning of the court below. The substantial questions of law are answered accordingly. The appeal is devoid of merit. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.