JUDGMENT : This is an application filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India for a direction upon the West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal to fix up an early date for hearing of the original application of the writ petitioner in the matter of Ananda Koley v. State of West Bengal & Others bearing O.A. 3598 of 2015. 2. At the very outset a preliminary objection is raised on behalf of the State respondents. It is submitted by Mr. Pranab Kumar Dutt, learned senior standing Counsel, West Bengal that the learned Tribunal has not been made a party to this proceedings. Therefore, it is not maintainable on the ground of non-joinder of the necessary party. 3. It is submitted by Mr. Dutt that according to the settled proposition of law, Writ of certiorari lies only in respect of a judicial and quasi judicial act as distinguished from administrative act. According to him, the question where in a Writ in the nature of certiorari under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, a party or parties in whose favour a Tribunal or authority had made an order, which is sought to be quashed, is/are necessary party or parties. 4. The second limb of argument of Mr. Dutt is that an allegation is raised against the learned Tribunal by rejecting the prayer for fixing an early date. Therefore, in view of the fact involved herein the Tribunal is necessary party to this writ petition. 5. Mr. Dutt relies upon the case of Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia v. Additional Member Board of Revenue, Bihar & Another reported, in AIR 1963 SC 786 . 6. Mr. Saptansu Basu, learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioner submits that it is the settled principles of law that the learned Tribunal is not a proper and necessary party unless allegations are made against the learned Tribunal, which need a reply from them. It is not usual for the Tribunal to be represented by a lawyer. 7. Drawing our attention towards the facts and circumstances of this case, he submits that the presence of learned Tribunal through a lawyer is not necessary in view of the facts and circumstances of the case involved in this writ petition. It is also submitted by Mr. It is not usual for the Tribunal to be represented by a lawyer. 7. Drawing our attention towards the facts and circumstances of this case, he submits that the presence of learned Tribunal through a lawyer is not necessary in view of the facts and circumstances of the case involved in this writ petition. It is also submitted by Mr. Basu that in the instant case the Tribunal under reference is created under the provisions of West Bengal Land Reforms and Tenancy Tribunal, Act, 1997. 8. He relies on a decision of Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 and Sabitri Devi v. District Judge, Gorakhpur& Others, reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 . 9. He further relies on AIR 1999 SC 976 (Savitri Devi v. District Judge, Gorakhpur & Others) and 2003 (2) CLT 73 in support of his above submissions. The legislature enacted the above act deriving its power from the provisions of Article 323B of the Constitution of India. 10. We have heard the learned Counsel appearing for the respective parties in respect of the above preliminary objection and we have considered the facts and circumstances of this case. The question of adding a Tribunal as a party respondent to a proceeding initiated under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India praying for Writ of certiorari was not taken into consideration in the matter of Udit Narain Singh Malpaharia (supra) by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Rather, there was no scope to consider the question of making a Tribunal a party, which has been created in exercise of the provisions of Article 323A of the Constitution of India or by virtue of legislation of the State in exercise of power conferred under Article 323B the Constitution of India. 11. It was decided in the above matter that in a Writ of certiorari no only the Tribunal or authority whose order is sought to be quashed but also, the parties in whose favour the said order is issued are necessary parties. 12. 11. It was decided in the above matter that in a Writ of certiorari no only the Tribunal or authority whose order is sought to be quashed but also, the parties in whose favour the said order is issued are necessary parties. 12. In the decision of Syed Yakoob v. Radhakrishnan reported in AIR 1964 SC 477 , a Constitution Bench consisting of Five Hon'ble Judges of the Supreme Court held that unless allegations are made against a learned Tribunal created under the provisions of any statute which need a reply from the Tribunal, it is not necessary to add the Tribunal as a party to a Writ of certiorari. It is further observed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the above decision that in ordinary cases, their position is like that of Courts or other Tribunals against whose decision Writ proceedings are initiated, they are not interested in the merits of the dispute in any sense, and so, its representation by a lawyer in such proceeding is wholly unnecessary and inappropriate. At the cost of repetition let it be recorded that while deciding the above issue in the above matter there was no scope to consider the question of adding Tribunal a party in a Writ of certiorari, which has been framed under the provisions of Article 323A of the Constitution of India or by virtue of an Act legislated by the State Legislature in exercise of power conferred on it under the provisions of Article 323B of the Constitution of India. 13. In our view in case of those Tribunals specific allegation against a Tribunal was necessary for adding the Tribunal a party in a Writ of certiorari because in that case the learned Tribunal is required to be represented by a lawyer and in other matters such representation is wholly unnecessary and even in appropriate. 14. But the point which has fallen for consideration before us is the necessity of adding the Tribunal as a party which has been created by virtue of the West Bengal Land Reforms & Tenancy Tribunal Act, 1997 in exercise of power conferred under the provisions of Article 323B of the Constitution of India. 15. For proper adjudication of the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents in this writ petition, let us take into consideration the aforesaid provisions of Article 323B of the Constitution of India. 15. For proper adjudication of the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the respondents in this writ petition, let us take into consideration the aforesaid provisions of Article 323B of the Constitution of India. By virtue of the above provision, the appropriate legislature of a State may, by law, provide for adjudication or trial by Tribunals of any disputes, complain or offences too by or any matters specified in Clause 2 with respect to which such legislature has power to make the law. The above provision has already been interpreted by the Constitution Bench of the Hon'ble Supreme Court consisting of Seven Hon'ble Judges in case of L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India & Others reported in AIR 1997 SC 1125 . So for the purpose of applying our mind with regard to the preliminary objection consideration of the relevant portions of the above decision is necessary I and those portions of the above decision are quoted below:- "78. The legitimacy of the power of Courts within constitutional democracies to review legislative action has been questioned since the time it was first conceived. The Constitution of India, being alive to such criticism, has, while conferring such power upon the higher judiciary, incorporated important safeguards. An analysis of the manner in which the Framers of our Constitution incorporated provisions relating to the judiciary would indicate that they were very greatly concerned with securing the independence of the judiciary. (#) These attempts were directed at ensuring that the judiciary would be capable of effectively discharging its wide powers of judicial review. While the Constitution confers the power to strike down laws upon the High Courts and the Supreme Court, it also contains elaborate provisions dealing with the tenure, salaries, allowances, retirement age of Judges to the superior Courts. The inclusion of such elaborate provisions appears to have been occasioned by the belief that, armed by such provisions, the superior Courts would be insulated from any executive or legislative attempts to interfere with the marking of their decisions. The Judges of the superior Courts have been entrusted with the task of upholding the Constitution and to this end, have been conferred the power to interpret it. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations. It is they who have to ensure that the balance of power envisaged by the Constitution is maintained and that the legislature and the executive do not, in the discharge of their functions, transgress constitutional limitations. It is equally their duty to oversee that the judicial decisions rendered by those who man the subordinate Courts and tribunals do not fall foul of strict standards of legal correctness and judicial independence. The constitutional safeguards which ensure the independence of the Judges of the superior judiciary are not available to the Judges of the subordinate judiciary or to those who man Tribunals created by ordinary legislations. Consequently Judges of the latter category can never be considered full and effective substitutes for the superior judiciary in discharging the function of constitutional interpretation. We, therefore, hold that the power of judicial review over legislative action vested in the High Courts under Article 226 and in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is an integral and essential feature of the Constitution, constituting part of its basic structure. Ordinarily, therefore, the power of High Courts and the Supreme Court to test the constitutional validity of legislations can never be ousted or excluded. 79. We also hold that the power vested in the High Courts to exercise judicial superintendence over the decisions of all Courts and Tribunals within their respective jurisdictions is also part of the basic structure of the Constitution. This is because a situation where the High Courts are divested of all other judicial functions apart from that of constitutional interpretation, is equally to be avoided. 93. Before moving on to other aspects, we may summarise our conclusions of the jurisdictional powers of these Tribunals. The Tribunals are competent to hear matters where the vires of statutory provisions are questions. However, in discharging this duty, they cannot act as substitutes for the High Courts and the Supreme Court which have, under our constitutional setup, been specifically entrusted with such an obligation. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. Their function in this respect is only supplementary and all such decisions of the Tribunals will be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the respective High Courts. The Tribunals will consequently also have the power to test the vires of subordinate legislations and rules. However, this power of the Tribunals will be subject to one important exception. The Tribunals shall not entertain any question regarding the vires of their parent statutes following the settled principle that a Tribunal which is a creature of an Act cannot declare that very Act to be unconstitutional. In such cases alone, the concerned High Court may be approached directly. All other decisions of these Tribunals, rendered in cases that they are specifically empowered to adjudicate upon by virtue of their parent statutes, will also be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of their respective High Court. We may add that the only Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. By this, we mean that it will not be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except, as mentioned, where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of he concerned Tribunal. 99. In view of the reasoning adopted by us, we hold that Clause 2(d) of Article 323A and Clause 3(d) of Article 323B, to the extent they exclude the jurisdiction of the High Courts and the Supreme Court under Articles 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution, are unconstitutional. Section 28 of the Act and the "exclusion of jurisdiction" clauses in all other legislations enacted under the aegis of Articles 323A and 323B would, to the same extent, be unconstitutional. The jurisdiction conferred upon the High Courts under Articles 226/227 and upon the Supreme Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is part of the inviolable basic structure of our Constitution. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Article 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence of test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. While this jurisdiction cannot be ousted, other Courts and Tribunals may perform a supplemental role in discharging the powers conferred by Article 226/227 and 32 of the Constitution. The Tribunals created under Article 323A and Article 323B of the Constitution are possessed of the competence of test the constitutional validity of statutory provisions and rules. All decisions of these Tribunals will, however, be subject to scrutiny before a Division Bench of the High Court within whose jurisdiction the concerned Tribunal falls. The Tribunals will, nevertheless, continue to act like Courts of first instance in respect of the areas of law for which they have been constituted. It will not, therefore, be open for litigants to directly approach the High Courts even in cases where they question the vires of statutory legislations (except where the legislation which creates the particular Tribunal is challenged) by overlooking the jurisdiction of the concerned Tribunal, Section 5(6) of the Act is valid and constitutional and is to be interpreted in the manner we have indicated." 16. After considering the provisions of Article 323B of the Constitution of India together with the interpretation of the same in the matter of L. Chandra Kumar (supra), we find that a Tribunal created under the aforesaid provision is a Court of first instance and in a case coming within the jurisdiction of West Bengal Land Reforms & Tenancy Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the Tribunal') the Court sitting under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India cannot act as a Court of first instance. Therefore, there are two distinguishable features so, far as the Tribunals created by virtue of any statute where the power flows from the provisions of Article 323A or Article 323B of the Constitution of India as follows:- i. The Tribunal is a Court of first instance and under the provisions of Section 8 of the said Act 1997 the jurisdiction of a Court sitting under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India has been ousted to act as the Court of first instance. Necessary to point out that judicial review is a basic structure of the Constitution of India. ii. Necessary to point out that judicial review is a basic structure of the Constitution of India. ii. A Tribunal created under the provisions of Article 223A of the Constitution of India or by virtue of the provisions of an Act which is legislated by the State Legislature in exercise of power conferred on it by the provisions of Article 223B of the Constitution of India, is competent to examine the vires of any provision of an Act save and except any provision of an Act which creates that Tribunal. 17. Reference may be made to the decision of Rajiv Kumar & Another v. Hemraj Singh Chauhan & Others reported in (2010) 4 SCC 554 and relevant portion of the above decision is quoted below:- "9. The Constitution Bench in L. Chandra Kumar held that the power of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and of this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution is a part of the basic structure of our Constitution (see paras 78 and 79, pp. 301 and 302 of the Report). The Constitution Bench also held that various tribunals created under Articles 323-A and 323-B of the Constitution, will function as Court of first instance and are subject to the power of judicial review of the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The Constitution Bench also held that these tribunals are empowered even to deal with constitutional questions and can also examine the vires of statutory legislation, except the vires of the legislation which creates the particular tribunal. 10. ............................................................................................ 11. .......................................................................................... 13. In view of such repeated and authoritative pronouncement by the Constitution Bench of this Court, the approach made to the High Court for the first time by these appellants in respect of their service disputes over which CAT has jurisdiction, is not legally sustainable the Division Bench of the High Court, with great respect, fell into an error by allowing the appellants to treat the High Court as a Court of first instance in respect of their service disputes for adjudication of which CAT has been constituted." 18. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that a Tribunal, which is created under the provisions of Article 323A of the Constitution of India or under the provisions of an Act legislated by State Legislature in exercise of power conferred by the provisions of Article 323B of the Constitution of India, need not be made a party for initiating a proceeding under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. But in a case where there is a specific allegation against the learned Tribunal it should be made a party to give him an opportunity to be represented by a lawyer in such a proceeding initiated under Article 226 or 227 of the Constitution of India. 19. It is necessary to point out that after considering the facts and circumstances of this case, we find that though the prayer made by the petitioner based on a ground, amongst others, for hearing of this matter at an early date was rejected, that cannot be considered as an allegation against the learned Tribunal considering the pleadings made in this writ petition. In view of the above, the preliminary objection raised on behalf of the State respondents is rejected. 20. Considering the facts and circumstances of this case we find that the petitioner has been asked by the respondent No.3 by a notice (at page 45 of this writ petition) to restore its original condition within four weeks from the date of receipt of the above communication. 21. We are prima facie of the opinion that unless the scope of giving interim protection to the petitioner is considered by the learned Tribunal at an early date, the issue involved in the application pending before the learned Tribunal may become academic issue at the time of final hearing of the original application but we cannot grant such interim order considering the urgency involved in the matter ignoring the proposition of law that the learned Tribunal is the Court of first instance to consider such prayer. 22. In view of the above, this writ petition stands disposed of with a direction upon the learned Tribunal to take up the original applica1ion of the petitioner at an early date taking into consideration the urgency involved in this matter and the scope of superseding other important matters. 22. In view of the above, this writ petition stands disposed of with a direction upon the learned Tribunal to take up the original applica1ion of the petitioner at an early date taking into consideration the urgency involved in this matter and the scope of superseding other important matters. Till the above application of the applicant/writ petitioner is taken up by the learned Tribunal, the parties are directed to maintain status quo as of today in respect of the land in question. 23. There will be no order as to costs. 24. Urgent certified copy of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties on priority basis.