JUDGMENT : Ravi V. Malimath, J. 1. The appellant/plaintiff filed a suit for partition and separate possession of her share in the suit schedule property. On contest, the suit was decreed on 12-3-1982 holding that the plaintiff is entitled for half (1/2) share in the suit schedule property. The defendants filed RA No. 18 of 1982 before the I Additional Civil Judge, Mysore. By the order dated 28-2-1990, the share of the plaintiff was modified holding that she is entitled to 2/5th share in the suit property. The plaintiff filed an appeal in RSA No. 932 of 1991 before the Hon'ble High Court of Karnataka, wherein by the judgment dated 16-12-1997, the share of the plaintiff was modified holding that the plaintiff-purchaser is entitled to 7/12th share, while confirming the rest of the order. In the interregnum, before the First Appellate Court, the defendant filed an application under Section 4 of the Partition Act, 1893, holding that he is entitled to purchase the share of the second defendant and therefore, the plaintiff was entitled to receive the value of her share. The application was allowed. The share allotted to the plaintiff was valued by the First Appellate Court in the said order. Subsequent to the judgment and decree passed in RSA No. 932 of 1991, the plaintiff insisted a fresh valuation on the ground that the value made in the year 1993 would not be proper and the value has to be fixed afresh. The order was passed on 21-1-2000. Overruling the said objection of the plaintiff while directing the 4th defendant to deposit the value of the property as fixed by the Hon'ble High Court in RSA No. 932 of 1991, the order dated 21-1-2000 was challenged in Civil Revision Petition No. 1703 of 2000, wherein by the order dated 15-1-2001 a fresh valuation was ordered. Pursuant to the order of the Hon'ble High Court, a memo came to be filed by the plaintiff for appointing a Commissioner for valuation of 7/12th share and a Commissioner was also appointed for valuing the property. The Commissioner submitted his report valuing the said building site as Rs. 9,28,200 and house tiled portion at Rs. 64,600/-, sheet house Rs. 1,40,760/- and held that the value in all is Rs. 11,33,560/-, 7/12th of the share of the plaintiff would be Rs. 6,61,243/-. The Commissioner submitted his report valuing the said building site as Rs. 9,28,200 and house tiled portion at Rs. 64,600/-, sheet house Rs. 1,40,760/- and held that the value in all is Rs. 11,33,560/-, 7/12th of the share of the plaintiff would be Rs. 6,61,243/-. The plaintiff while filing objections to the Commissioner's report contended that the value of the property would have to be increased by 25% since it is a corner property and a major portion is facing towards the road. The objections having been favourably considered, the value was enhanced by 25% and therefore, the valuation of the plaintiff's share would be Rs. 42,542/-, by adding 25% the share of the plaintiff in all comes to Rs. 2,50,361.50 paise. Since the 4th defendant has already deposited an amount of Rs. 20,953/- on 16-3-2000, the balance amount would be payable is Rs. 2,29,408/-. Hence, it was ordered directing the defendant to deposit the said amount of Rs. 2,29,408/- within 15 days. On failure, the plaintiff would be entitled for partition and separate possession of her share by metes and bounds. Aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff has filed the present appeal. 2. Sri Yoganarasimha, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the appellants Counsel submits that the impugned order is bad in law and liable to be set aside. His first contention is that an application under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act is not maintainable before the First Appellate Court. That firstly, such an application can be filed only at the time of drawing up of the final decree. The question of making an application pending adjudication of a preliminary decree would not arise for consideration. The second submission is that the application could be entertained only if the property in question is a dwelling house and that the share has been transferred to a person who is not a member of such a family. The material on record would indicate that the appellant is a member of the family. Therefore, her share cannot be purchased by the defendant. In the absence of the right of the defendant to purchase the share of the plaintiff, he is entitled for possession of the property by metes and bounds. The material on record would indicate that the appellant is a member of the family. Therefore, her share cannot be purchased by the defendant. In the absence of the right of the defendant to purchase the share of the plaintiff, he is entitled for possession of the property by metes and bounds. He further contends that in the order of the learned Single Judge in RSA No. 932 of 1991 there is a categorical reference in para 4 of the judgment that the application filed under Section 4 of the Partition Act ought not to have been entertained by the First Appellate Court. Consequently, it is argued that when the application itself is not maintainable before the Court, all proceedings that have ensued subsequent to the said application are null and void. They cannot be acted upon. They are opposed to the provisions of law. Being opposed to the provisions of law, there cannot be a sustainable order under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act. Resultantly, the properties decreed would have to be divided by metes and bounds. The question of the defendant purchasing the share of the plaintiff would not arise for consideration. 3. On the other hand, Sri T.N. Raghupathy, learned Counsel appearing for the defendant 4 contends that the contentions of the appellant cannot be accepted. He contends that the application filed under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act can be entertained at any stage of the proceedings. It is not necessary that the application could be maintained only during the final decree proceedings. That even if an application is entertained at the preliminary decree stage, the same is liable to be altered based on the shares. Further more, the appellant/plaintiff is not a member of the family. Therefore, her right under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act to purchase the share of a person who does not belong to the family is sustainable. The contention of the appellant's Counsel based on the judgment of the learned Single Judge in RSA No. 932 of 1991 would be of no avail to the appellants. Even though the learned Single Judge has held in para 4 of the order that an application under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act ought not to have been entertained, that is not the resultant order passed by the learned Single Judge. Even though the learned Single Judge has held in para 4 of the order that an application under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act ought not to have been entertained, that is not the resultant order passed by the learned Single Judge. While considering the entire appeal, the learned Single Judge held in para 8 of the judgment that except modifying the share fixed by the First Appellate Court, the other finding rendered by the First Appellate Court was confirmed. Even the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court on the application filed under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act was not disturbed by the Second Appellate Court. It has only modified the share without interfering in any of the other findings. Hence, he pleads that the appeal be dismissed. 4. Heard learned Counsels and examined the records. 5. The points for consideration in this appeal are as follows: "(i) Whether the order passed by the First Appellate Court under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act is erroneous" and whether the subsequent order passed in RSA No. 932 of 1991 is sustainable? (ii) Whether the amounts determined by the Trial Court are appropriate? (iii) Whether any interference is called for?" 6. The first contention urged is that in view of Section 4 of the Partition Act, the order passed by the First Appellate Court is erroneous. That whenever an erroneous order is passed by a Court of law, the same is liable for correction. In the instant case, when the learned Single Judge in RSA No. 932 of 1991 has held that an application under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act ought not to have been entertained, all proceedings thereafter are void. 7. I' am unable to accept such a contention. In the very judgment, the learned Single Judge goes on to hold that except the shares that have been allotted to the plaintiff and as modified by the said Court, all other findings rendered by the Appellate Court are confirmed. One of the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court is on the application filed under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act. The said finding recorded was undisturbed. 8. What is being contended is that once an erroneous order is brought to the notice of the Court, such an order cannot be allowed to remain. One of the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court is on the application filed under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act. The said finding recorded was undisturbed. 8. What is being contended is that once an erroneous order is brought to the notice of the Court, such an order cannot be allowed to remain. The Court has an inherent power as well as a duty to ensure that wrong orders are not perpetuated. Therefore, such an error requires to be corrected and that is exactly what the learned Single Judge has held in para 4 of the judgment passed in RSA No. 932 of 1991. 9. What is of relevance herein is the fact that the First Appellate Court has entertained the application filed under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act and passed orders thereon. The said order was the subject-matter of adjudication in the RSA. The RSA was filed by the plaintiff - herself. The validity of the said order was not disturbed by the learned Single Judge. Even though it was held in para 4 of the order that the application filed under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act ought not to have been entertained, the Court does not grant any relief to the appellant therein based on Section 4 of the Partition Act. On the contrary, the learned Single Judge proceeds to hold that the findings recorded by the Trial Court are confirmed except to the extent of modifying the shares. The order is only to the effect of modifying the order on shares while confirming all other orders. Once the Court has confirmed the findings recorded by the First Appellate Court, the same is not liable for challenge in proceedings of equal jurisdiction. The appellant was well-within her right to challenge the reasons recorded by the learned Single Judge in RSA No. 932 of 1991 before a higher Court, but she has not done so. A Bench of Co-ordinate jurisdiction would not have authority to interfere with the findings recorded by another Bench. Therefore, in these proceedings it would be beyond the scope of this Court to record a finding that the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the corresponding second appeal was erroneous. It is not open for this Court to record such a finding. 10. Therefore, in these proceedings it would be beyond the scope of this Court to record a finding that the order passed by the learned Single Judge in the corresponding second appeal was erroneous. It is not open for this Court to record such a finding. 10. The learned Senior Counsel relies on the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Kiran Singh and Others v Chaman Paswan and Others AIR 1954 SC 340 : (1955)1 SCR 117 with reference to para 6 of the judgment, which reads as follows: "It is a fundamental principle well-established that a decree passed by a Court without jurisdiction is a nullity and that its invalidity could be set up whenever and wherever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon, even at the stage of execution and even in collateral proceedings. A defect of jurisdiction, whether it is pecuniary or territorial or whether, it is in respect of the subject-matter of the action, strikes at the very authority of the Court to pass any decree, and such a defect cannot be cured even by consent of parties." 11. The contention of the appellant could be accepted in the event, if the order passed under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act was not questioned. However, the order passed under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act was questioned by the appellant in RSA. What is sought to be contended herein is that the application itself was not maintainable as the Court has no jurisdiction at all. It is hotly contested by the respondents' Counsel that this was not the objection raised by him at all. On the contrary, the objection raised was only on the question of limitation and therefore, such a plea with regard to the maintainability the application cannot be considered for the first time by this Court. 12. Notwithstanding the objection of the respondent, such a contention cannot be appreciated by this Court, since the same has been answered by the judgment of this Court in RSA No. 932 of 1991. Whether the order passed in the RSA No. 932 of 1991 is just or right is not a question open for determination by this Court? It is not a case where the contention raised by the appellant has not been answered. Whether the order passed in the RSA No. 932 of 1991 is just or right is not a question open for determination by this Court? It is not a case where the contention raised by the appellant has not been answered. The contention of the appellant having been considered, the Second Appellate Court only modified the shares while affirming the findings of the First Appellate Court. Therefore, the question of entertaining the appellant's grievance once again on the second occasion, in a second round of litigation, by a Co-ordinate Bench is beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. Hence, while accepting the principle enunciated by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the same would not be applicable to the facts of this case. 13. Therefore, the finding recorded by the First Appellate Court on the application filed under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act being confirmed by the order in RSA No. 932 of 1991, no interference on the same can be entertained by this Court in these proceedings. Hence, the contentions are rejected. Hence, the first point is answered by holding that there was no error committed by the First Appellate Court in passing the order under Section 4(1) of the Partition Act and further that the order passed in RSA No. 932 of 1991 is sustainable and cannot be interfered with. 14. In the circumstances, the further contentions with regard to the merits of the application whether they are part of the family or outside, whether it involves a dwelling house or not would not be necessary in view of the fact that the contention of the applicants that the application itself should be dismissed, cannot be accepted. 15. So far as the second issue is concerned, the Trial Court considered the memo filed by the Advocate for the appellant and on accepting the Commissioner's report held the valuation at Rs. 9,28,200/-. The objection was that 25% should be increased since the property is a corner site and a major portion is facing the road. Therefore, adding 25% of the same in a sum of Rs. 2,32,050/-, the entire site was valued at Rs. 11,60,250/-. The Commissioner valued the property namely the tiled house as well as sheet house in all at Rs. 11,33,560/-. The contention of adding 25% was accepted. However, the calculation arrived at would appear to be erroneous. Hence, the same is recalculated as follows: 16. 2,32,050/-, the entire site was valued at Rs. 11,60,250/-. The Commissioner valued the property namely the tiled house as well as sheet house in all at Rs. 11,33,560/-. The contention of adding 25% was accepted. However, the calculation arrived at would appear to be erroneous. Hence, the same is recalculated as follows: 16. So far as the quantum mentioned in the impugned order is concerned, there is a mathematical error committed by the Trial Court. In para 9 of its judgment, it is noticed that the Commissioner has valued the site at Rs. 9,28,200/-, the tiled house at Rs. 64,600/- and the sheet house at Rs. 1,40,760/- namely Rs. 11,33,560/- in all. The objection of the plaintiff was that 25% has to be added on, since it is a corner property and a major portion is facing the road. It was accepted by the Trial Court. Therefore, 25% of Rs. 11,33,560/- (Rs. 2,83,390/-) requires to be added on, which comes to Rs. 14,16,950/-. Therefore, the total value will be Rs. 14,16,950/- (Rs. 11,33,560/- + Rs. 2,83,390/-). The share of the plaintiff being 7/12th, the sum payable would be Rs. 8,26,554/- (Rs. 14,16,950 x 7/12). The defendant has already paid a sum of Rs. 2,50,361/- (Rs. 20,953/- and Rs. 2,29,408-50/-). Hence the amount payable would be Rs. 8,26,554 less Rs. 2,50,361/- = Rs. 5,76,193/-. 17. It is also contended that since it is not a commercial transaction, it would be appropriate to impose interest at 6% p.a., on the said amount from the date of the order. In view of the long passage of time and the correction in the impugned order, the appellant would be entitled to an appropriate rate of interest. Since, it is not a commercial transaction; it will be just and equitable to grant interest at 6% p.a., from the date of the impugned order. The impugned order was passed on 3-9-2003. Further, 6% interest) p.a. on Rs. 5,76,193/- from 2003 to 2015 would be Rs. 4,14,858/- (Rs. 5,76,193 x 6% x 12 years). Therefore, the balance payable by the 4th defendant is Rs. 9,41,051/- (Rs. 5,76,193 + Rs. 4,14,858). Therefore, the second point is answered by holding that, the amount determined by the Court below is erroneous and is consequently modified as above. Therefore, interference in the order of the lower Court is to the said extent only. Issues are accordingly answered. Therefore, the balance payable by the 4th defendant is Rs. 9,41,051/- (Rs. 5,76,193 + Rs. 4,14,858). Therefore, the second point is answered by holding that, the amount determined by the Court below is erroneous and is consequently modified as above. Therefore, interference in the order of the lower Court is to the said extent only. Issues are accordingly answered. At this stage, the learned Counsel for the defendant 4 submits that he is willing to pay a sum of Rs. 15,00,000/- in all after deducting the amount already paid. A sum of Rs. 2,50,361/- has been paid. Therefore, excluding this amount from Rs. 15,00,000/-, the defendant is liable to pay a sum of Rs. 12,49,639/- (Rs. 15,00,000 - Rs. 2,50,361). Consequently, the appeal is partly allowed: "(a) The judgment and decree dated 28-2-1990 passed in RA No. 18 of 1982 passed by I Additional District Judge, Mysore, is modified. (b) The amount payable by the legal representatives of respondent 4 is modified to Rs. 12,49,639/-. (c) The rest of the order is undisturbed. No costs."