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2015 DIGILAW 911 (RAJ)

Champalal v. Firm Ranga Harnath

2015-04-23

VINEET KOTHARI

body2015
JUDGMENT : 1. The plaintiff landlord has filed the present second appeal in this court under Section 100 CPC on 19/7/2003 being aggrieved by the order dated 26/4/2003 passed by learned First Appellate Court of Addl. District Judge, Phalodi allowing the defendant's appeal No.2/93 – Firm Ranga Harnath & sons, Phalodi vs. Champalal & ors. 2. The learned trial court had granted the decree of eviction in a civil suit No.78/74 filed by the appellant landlord – Champalal s/o Ram Gopal Maheshwari & Ors. vs. Firm Ranga Harnath & Sons, Phalodi. The suit was inter alia filed on the ground of default in payment of rent by the defendant tenant. On the date of filing the suit on 5/12/1974, the provisions of the Rajathan Rent Control Act, 1950 were not extended to Phalodi. However, to all the municipal areas of the State of Rajasthan the said Act of 1950 was extended vide Notification dated 10/5/1979, which was published in the Rajasthan Gazette on 18/5/1979 and, therefore, the said Act of 1950 became applicable to Phalodi on 18/5/1979 in terms of the said notification. The said Notification is quoted below for ready reference:- “Home (Gr. V) Department Notification Jaipur, May 10, 1979 S.O.27.-In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-section 92) of Section 2 of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (No. SVII of 1950) and in continuation of the various notifications issued from time to time in this regard the State Government hereby extends provisions of Section 5 to 26 of the said Act to all the Municipal towns in the State of Rajasthan not covered by previous notifications. The State Government further directs that the said provisions shall come into force in the said Municipal Towns with effect from the date of publication of this notification in the Rajasthan Gazette. (No.F1 (6) (3) Home-5/77) By Order of Governor, Commissioner for the Home Affairs & Secretary to the Government.” 3. The State Government further directs that the said provisions shall come into force in the said Municipal Towns with effect from the date of publication of this notification in the Rajasthan Gazette. (No.F1 (6) (3) Home-5/77) By Order of Governor, Commissioner for the Home Affairs & Secretary to the Government.” 3. The learned trial court had decreed the suit by giving the following findings in favour of the appellant-plaintiff :- ^^okn i= la[;k 4 bl okn in dks lkfcr djus dk Hkkj oknh ij gS ih-MCY;w-1 yhyk/kj dk dguk gS fd izfroknh QeZ }kjk tks fdjk;k vnk fd;k x;k mldk bUnzjkt fdjk;k fpÎh bZ,Dl 1 dh iq’r ij fd;k x;k rFkk izfroknh QeZ us vafre ckj tks fdjk;k 100 :i;s vnk fd;sA ftldk Hkh bUnzjkt bZ,Dl 1 fdjk;k fpÎh dh iq’r ij gSA mDr fdjk;k laor~ 2028 ds cS’kk[k oknh vekol rd vnk fd;k x;kA mlds i’pkr~ izfroknh QeZ us fdjk;k vnk djuk can dj fn;k rc mUgsa uksfVl fn;k x;kA Loa; Mh-MCY;w- 1 vkldj.k us viuh eq[; ijh{kk esa gh mDr frfFk;ksa ds ckn dksbZ fdjk;k muds }kjk vnk djuk ugha crk;k gSA bl rjg ls oknh ds c;kuksa ls rFkk bZ,DLk 1 fdjk;k fpÎh dh iq’r ij fd;s x;s bUnzjkt ds Li”V gS fd izfroknh }kjk laor~ 2028 ds Hkknok onh vekol ds i’pkr~ dksbZ fdjk;k vnk ugha fd;kA blfy;s foØe laor~ 2028 ds vklkst lqnh 1 ls foØe laor~ 2031 ds Hkknok lqnh 1 rd fdjk;s ds 800 :i;s oknhx.k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh FkkA bl izdj.k dh vUoh{kk ds nkSjku jktLFkku ifjlj ¼fdjk;k ,oa csn[kyh fu;a=.k½ vf/kfu;e Qyksnh esa ykxw gksus ds ckotwn izfroknh QeZ }kjk mDr vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 13¼,½ ds varxZr dksbZ izkFkZuk i= is’k ugha fd;k x;k vkSj u gh fdjk;k vnk fd;k x;k gS cfYd U;k;ky; }kjk fnukad 29-11-79 dks /kkjk 13¼3½ ds vUrZxr fdjk;k fu/kkZfjr djus ij laor~ 2028 ds vklkst lqnh 1 ls laor~ 2036 ds ekxZ’kh”kZ vekol rd dk fdjk;k izfroknh QeZ dh vksj ls oknhx.k dks vnk fd;k x;k tks oknhx.k ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA vfrfjDr okn in la[;k 8 bl okn in dks lkfcr djus dk Hkkj oknh ij gSA tSlk fd okn in la-4 ds fu/kkZj.k ls Li”V gS fd izfroknh QeZ }kjk] oknhx.k }kjk tc ;g okn is’k fd;k x;k ml le; rd dsoy fo-l- laor~ 2028 ds vklkst lqnh 1 rd dk fdjk;k vnk fd;k x;k FkkA tc fd oknh ;g okn U;k;ky; esa laor~ 2031 esa is’k fd;k x;k FkkA blfy;s izfroknh QeZ }kjk 6 ekg ls T;knk dh vof/k rd oknhx.k dks fdjk;k vnk ugh djus ds dkj.k izfroknh fMQkYVj gks pqdk gSA blds vykok jkTkLFkku ifjlj ¼fdjk;k ,oa csn[kyh fu;a=.k½ vf/kfu;e Qyksnh es lu~ 1979 esa ykxw gks tkus ds ckotwn izfroknh QeZ }kjk /kkjk 13 ¼,½ ds vUrZxr dksbZ izkFkZuk i= is’k ugh fd;k x;kA blfy;s izfroknh QeZ dks mDr izko/kku dk Hkh ykHk ugha fey ik;kA izfroknh QeZ }kjk bl izdj.k dh vUoh{kk ds nkSjku laor~ 2028 ds vlkst lqnh 1 ls laor~ 2036 ds ekxZ’kh”k vekol rd dk fdjk;k tek djok;k x;kA ysfdu mlds i’pkr~ Hkh izfroknh QeZ }kjk bl izdj.k dh vUoh{kk ds nkSjku fdjk;k tek ugha djok;k x;kA tc fd vkjŒ,yŒMCY;wŒ 1975 ist 140 rFkk vkjŒ,yŒMCY;wŒ 1981 ist 487 ds vuqlkj Hkh izfroknh dks fdjk;k fu/kkZfjr djus ds i’pkr gj ekg dh 15 rkjh[k dks fdjk;k tek djokuk pkfg;s Fkk ysfdu mlds }kjk fdjk;k tek ugh djok;k tkus ds dkj.k 6 ekg ls T;knk dh vof/k xqtj tkus ls Hkh izfroknh QeZ fMQkYVj dks pqdh gSA blfy;s oknhx.k izfroknh ls dCtk ikus dk vf/kdkj gSA vuqrks”k %& mijksDr okn inksa ds fu/kkZj.k ls Li”V gS fd oknhx.k izfroknh ls laor~ 2036 ds ekxZ’kh”kZ onh vekol ls fooknxzLr nqdku dk dCtk ikus rd 200 :i;s izfr o”kZ ds fglkc ls fdjk;k ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA rFkk izfroknh ls fooknxzLr dk dCtk ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA AA vkns’k AA oknhx.k dk okn e; [kpkZ bl izdkj fMØh fd;k tkuk gS fd oknh izfroknh QeZ ls laor~ 2036 ds ekXkZ’kh”kZ onh vekol ls fooknxzLr nqdku dk dCtk ikus rd 200 :i;s lkykuk dh nj ls fdjk;k izkIr djus dk vf/kdkjh gS rFkk izfroknh ls fooknxzLr nqdku dk dCtk ikus dk vf/kdkjh gSA izfroknh QeZ 2 ekg i’pkr~ oknhx.k dks fooknxzLr nqdku dk dCtk lkSisa vU;Fkk oknhx.k oknxzLr nqdku dk dCtk izkIr dj ldsxkA Sd/- ¼lR;nso Vkad½ eqflQ ,.M+ U;kf;d eftLVsªV izFke oxZ] Qyksnh^^ 5. Being aggrieved by the said order, the plaintiff appellants have filed the present second appeal. While admitting the present second appeal, a coordinate bench of this Court framed the following substantial questions of law on 16/3/2004:- “Whether the learned lower appellate court has committed an illegality in applying the provisions of Section 13A of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent & Eviction) Act, 1950?” 6. Mr. R.R. Nagori, Sr. Advocate with Mr. Alkesh Agarwal appearing for the plaintiff appellants submitted that Section 13A was brought on the statute book and inserted in the provisions of Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 1950 by the Rajasthan Amendment Act No. 14/76 w.e.f. 29/9/1975 with the object to give relief to the tenants against eviction by giving them an opportunity to deposit arrears of rent within 30 days if the ejectment suit is filed on the ground of default in payment of rent by following the proceedings prescribed under sub-clause (b) of Section 13A of the Act and if the application is not filed within 30 days of the said provision inserted in the Act then the delay cannot be condoned and on the ground of default in payment of rent, as done earlier, the eviction decree could be passed. 7. Mr. R.R. Nagori, Sr. Advocate contended that in the present case the defendant tenant had filed an application under Section 13 (4) read with Section 19A of the Rent Control Act, 1950 on 5/7/1979, after the said Act was extended to the municipal area of Phalodi w.e.f. 18/5/1979 vide aforesaid Notification dated 10/5/1979 in which application he firstly denied the relationship of landlord and tenant and, therefore, denied any default in payment of rent by the defendant, however, the defendant in the alternative also prayed to the court that defendant may be permitted to pay the amount of Rs.1666.67 as rent for 8 years and 3 months, which he was tendering to the court and which may be paid to the landlord. The plaintiff landlord contested the said application and the same was decided by the learned trial court on 29/11/1979 under Section 13(3) and determined the rent and arrears thereof with interest. The plaintiff landlord contested the said application and the same was decided by the learned trial court on 29/11/1979 under Section 13(3) and determined the rent and arrears thereof with interest. The defendant tenant filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act before the learned appellate court on 11/10/1991 for condonation of delay in filing the previous application under Section 13 (4) of the Act on 5/7/1979 in terms of Section 13A of the Act on the ground that in the month of June there was summer vacations and, therefore, the application, which ought to have been filed by him on 1/7/1979 in terms of Section 13A (b) of the Act, the same was filed on 5/7/1979 with a delay of five days and, therefore, the delay of 5 days deserved to be condoned. The said application under Secgion 5 of the Limitation Act was, however, rejected by the learned appellate court of Addl. District Judge, Phalodi vide order dated 8/12/1993 in appeal no. The said application under Secgion 5 of the Limitation Act was, however, rejected by the learned appellate court of Addl. District Judge, Phalodi vide order dated 8/12/1993 in appeal no. 2/93 (99/82) with the following observations:- ^^vihykaV@izfroknh dh vksj ls vUoh{kk U;k;ky; esa Qyksnh esa ,DV 18&5&77 ds ykxw gksus ds i’pkr 5&7&79 dks tks izkFkZuk i= is’k fd;k x;k] ,lesa Li”V :Ik ls izkFkZuk i= dk vUrZxr /kkjk 13 ¼4½ ds rgr dk fy[kk x;k gS izkFkZuk i= esa ftl izdkj dFku fd;k x;k gS ftldk Åij foLrkj ls mYys[k fd;k x;k gS] ds vuqlkj Hkh ;g izkFkZuk i= ,DV dh /kkjk 13¼3½ o ¼4½ ds varxZr gh jgrk gS tks vkns’k bl izkFkZuk i= ij fo)ku fopkj.k U;k;ky; }kjk 29&11&79 dks fd;k x;k gS mlesa Hkh vkns’k dks ,DV dh /kkjk 13 ¼3½ ds vUrZxr crk;k x;k gS vFkkZr~ vkns’k ,DV dh /kkjk 13¼3½ ds varZxr gh fd;k x;k gS] dksbZ izkFkZuk i= vf/kfu;e ;k vf/kfu;e ds fdl izko/kku ds varXkZr is’k fd;k x;k gS] ;g ml izkFkZuk i= esa ds dFku o lacf/kr vf/kfu;e vkSj mlds izko/kku fo’ks”k ds mYys[k ek= ls ;g r; ugha fd;k tk ldrk] tcfd bl ekeys esa izkFkZuk i= esa fd;s dFku o ,DV dh /kkjk 13¼3½ esa ds izko/kku ds lkFk izkFkZuk i= esa izko/kku Lo;a dk Li”V mYys[k fd;k gqvk gSA vf/koDrk ds ‘kiFki= ek= ds vk/kkj ij bl izkFkZuk i= dks /kkjk 13&, ds rgr ugh ekuk tk ldrk gS] blds vykok tSls jsLiksM+UV dh vksj ls cgl dh xbZ gS] vkSj izfroknh ds 5&7&79 ds izkFkZuk i= esa Hkh fy[kk x;k gS fd og jkf’k vnkyr esa tek djk nsxk vkSj oknhx.k dks ys.MyksMZ eku fy;s tkus ij jkf’k oknhx.k dks vnk dj nh tkos blls Hkh ;gh Li”V gksrk gS fd ;g izkFkZuk i= ,DV dh /kkjk 13 ¼3½ ds varZxr is’k fd;k x;k Fkk] u fd /kkjk 13&, ds varZxrA tSlk fo}ku vfHkHkk”kd jsLiksM+s.V }kjk cgl esa dFku fd;k x;k gS fd Qyksnh esa ,DV 18-5-79 dks ykxw gqvk rc ,DV dh /kkjk 13 , esa la’kks/kh v/;kns’k ftlds fy, /kkjk ds Li”Vhdj.k esa v/;kns’k 1975 gksrk vfHkizsRk fd;k x;k gS ykxw Fkk vkSj ,sls esa /kkjk 13, bl ekeys esa ykxw ugh gksrs gkykfd bldk leFkZu ,DV ds izko/kku ls gksrk gS exj ;fn bls uk Hkh ekuk tkos rks Hkh tSlk fo}ku vfHkHkk”kd jsLiksM+.V dh vksj ls cgl dh xbZ gS fd izfroknh }kjk oknh ds nkok esa ds dFkuksa dks tokcnkok esa vLohdkj fd;k x;k vkSj bl ij rudh;kr dk;e dh xbZ ftudk nkok esa fu.kZ; gksuk Fkk ls nkok flQZ fMQkYV ds vk/kkj ij ugh Fkk@gS ,slh fLFkfr esa Hkh vkns’k /kkjk 13¼3½ o ¼4½ ds varxZr gh gksrk gS vkSj izfroknh dks /kkjk 13¼4½ ds rgr vkbZUnk fdjk;k tek djokuk gksrk Fkk fo}ku vfHkHkk”kd jsLiksMs+.V dh bl cgl dk leFkZu i=koyh ij ds fjdkMZ ls gksrk gS D;ksafd oknh dh vksj ls tks nkok is’k fd;k x;k ftldk izfroknh dh vksj ls tks tokcnkok is’k fd;k x;k mlesa nkok esa ds dFkuksa dh vLohdkj fd;k x;k tSlk 5-7-79 dh nj[okLr esa Hkh izfroknh dh vksj ls fy[kk x;k gS fd oknhx.k vkSj izfroknh ds chp yS.M+yksMZ o fVus.V dk fj’rk ugh gS vkSj i{kdkjku~ ds vfHkopuksa ds vk/kkj ij rudh;kr dk;e dh xbZ gS ftuls Hkh Li”V gksrk gS fd nkok esa fu/kkZj.k dk iz’u dsoy fMQkYV dk gh ugha Fkk ,DV ds izko/kkukuqlkj nkok fMQkYV ds o vU; vk/kkjksa ij gks rks vUoh{kk ds nkSjku Hkh ,DV dh /kkjk 13¼4½ ds rgr izfroknh dks vknsf’kr fdjk;k vnk djuk gksrk gSA bl izdkj mijksDr iwjs foospu ds vk/kkj ij vihyk.V@izfroknh dk fnukad 5-7-79 dks izkFkZuk i= ftldh nsjh dh ekQh ds fy; ;g orZeku nj[okLr is’k dh xbZ gS ,DV dh /kkjk 13¼3½ o ¼4½ ds varxZr jgrh gS ,sls esa vihyk.V dh orZeku nj[okLkr fdlh Hkh rjg ls u rks lacf/kr jgrh gS u gh Lohdkj fd, tkus ;ksX; jgrh gS ifj.kkeLo:i vihyk.V dh bl nj[oklr fnukad 11-10-91 dks vLohdkj fd;k tkrk gSA vkns’k vkt fnuakd 8-12-93 dks fy[kk;k tkdj lquk;k x;kA Sd/- ¼vkj-ds-lksuxjk½ vij ftyk U;k;k/kh’k Qyksnh^^ 8. Against the said order the defendant tenant filed revision petition before the High Court, which revision petition No.2/94 was, however, allowed by agreement between the parties on 28/1/2000 by a short order by the coordinate bench of this Court, which is also quoted below for ready reference:- “S.B. Civil Revision Petition No.2/94 28/1/2000 HON'BLE MR. BHAGWATI PRASAD, J. Mr. R.K. Thanvi, for the petitioner. Mr. J.M. Bhandari, for the respondents. This revision petition is decided by agreement of the parties. The parties agree that this revision petition be allowed and the impugned order be set aside and all questions which are germane to the situation and the circumstances of the case be decided by the appellate court as and when the appellate court decided the appeal itself. In this view of the matter, the revision is allowed. The order impugned is set aside and the appellate court is directed to consider all the matters which the parties want to agitate before it as and when the appeal is heard and decided. (Bhagwati Prasad), J.” 9. After the aforesaid order was passed by this Court disposing of the revision petition, the learned first appellate court by the impugned order dated 26/4/2003 itself granted the said prayer of the defendant tenant for condonation of delay and condoning the said delay in the impugned order, the learned first appellate court set aside the eviction decree vide impugned order dated 26/4/2003. 10. Learned counsel Mr. R.R. Nagori, Senior Advocate, therefore, urged that the learned first appellate court has erred in condoning the delay for two reasons, firstly the application under Section 13 A of the Act was never filed by the defendant tenant on 5/7/1979 but was filed under Section 13(4) read with Section 19A of the Act, which was admittedly beyond the period of 30 days of the Rent Control Act, 1950 made applicable to the municipal area of Phalodi and secondly even if the said application was assumed to be one under Section 13A of the Act, the delay could not be condoned by the learned first appellate court in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin vs. Sita Ram – 2003 DNJ (SC) 180. Mr. R.R. Nagori, Sr. Mr. R.R. Nagori, Sr. Advocate further urged that Section 13 A of the Act was a temporary provision for giving one time relief to the tenant if the eviction suit was filed on the ground of default of payment of rent and such suit itself ought to have been filed under the provisions of the Rent Control Act, 1950, which was pending on the date when the provisions of Section 13 A of the Act was inserted in the said Act, which was not the case here since the suit was filed under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act in the year 1974 and during the pendency of the such suit only if filed under the provisions of the Act, 1950 an application is filed within 30 days and arrears of rent are deposited by the defendant tenant then only such a defendant tenant can be given relief under Section 13A of the Act, which has not happened in the present case and on the other hand, after so many years during the proceedings pending before the first appellate court the defendant tenant in the year 1991 sought ex-post facto condonation of delay and after the order passed by the High Court in revision petition on 28/1/2000 only the first appellate court wrongly condoned the delay ex-post facto, which could not have been done and, therefore, the eviction decree deserves to be sustained in the present case as the defendant tenant is not entitled to the benefit under Section 13A of the Act. 11. On the other hand, Mr. R.K. Thanvi, learned Senior Advocate vehemently submitted that the heading of the application filed by the defendant tenant on 5/7/1979 is not important and since the same was filed immediately after the provisions of the Rent Control Act, 1950 were extended to the municipal area of Pholoti on 18/5/1979, the said application was filed on 5/7/1979 and excluding the period of summer vacation of June, 1979, the delay was of only few days, which deserved to be condoned in the present case and has rightly been condoned by the learned first appellate court. He submitted that admittedly after the disposal of the revision petition by the High Court on 29/1/2000 by agreement of the parties, if the delay is condoned by the learned first appellate court, the plaintiff landlord is estopped from challenging the same in the present second appeal and, therefore, the eviction decree cannot be sustained and the substantial questions of law deserve to be decided in favour of the defendant tenant. 12. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties at length and perused the record and orders passed by the courts below. 12. I have heard the learned counsels for the parties at length and perused the record and orders passed by the courts below. Since the facts are not disputed and the limited point which arises for consideration by this Court is with regard to Section 13A of the Act, the provisions of Section13A along with its statement & object for bringing the said provision are quoted below for ready reference:- “13-A. Special provisions relating to pending and other matters: - [Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act as it existed before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance or in any other law.] (a) no court shall, in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the [amending ordinance] pass any decree in favour of landlord for eviction of a tenant on the ground of non-payment of rent, if the tenant applies under clause (b) and pays to the landlord, or deposits in court; within such time such aggregate of the amount or rent in arrears, interest thereon and full costs of the suit as may be directed by the court under and in accordance with that clause; (b) in every such proceeding the court shall, on the application of the tenant made within thirty days from the date of commencement of the [amending ordinance] notwithstanding any order to the contrary, determine the amount of rent in arrears up to the date of the order as also the amount of interest thereon at 6% per annum and costs of the suit allowable to the landlord; and direct the tenant to pay the amount so determined within such time, not exceeding ninety days, as may be fixed by the court; and on such payment being made within the time fixed as aforesaid, the proceeding shall be disposed of as if tenant had not committed any default; (c) the provisions of clauses (a) and (b) shall mutatis mutandis apply to all appeals; or applications for revisions, preferred or made, after the commencement of the [amending ordinance] against decrees for eviction passed before such commencement with the variation that in clause (b), for the expression “from the date of the commencement of the 3 [amending ordinance]”, the expression “from the date of presentation of the memorandum of appeal or application for revision” shall be substituted, (d) no court shall in any proceeding pending on the date of commencement of the Amending Ordinance, pass any decree in favour of a landlord for eviction solely on the ground that due to the death of the tenant as defined in clause (vii) of section 3 as it stood before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance, his surviving spouse, son, daughter and other heirs as referred to in sub-clause (b) of clause (vii) of section 3 were not entitled to the protection against eviction under this Act as it stood before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance. (e) no decree for eviction passed by any court before the commencement of the Amending Ordinance shall, unless the same already stands executed before such commencement be executed against the surviving spouse, son, daughter and other heir as are referred to in sub-clause (b) of clause (vii) of section 3 if such decree was passed solely on the ground as is referred to in clause (d) and such decree shall be deemed to be as against them, and (f) the provisions of clause (d) shall mutatis mutandis apply to all appeals or applications for revisions preferred or made, after the commencement of the Amending Ordinance. Explanation – For the purpose of this section - (a) “Amending Ordinance” - means of Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) (Amendment) Ordinance, 1975] and, (b) “Proceedings” - means suit, appeal or application for revision.” xxx 2. The Object of the Section- It was inserted to provide relief by extra protection to a defaulting tenant against whom a suit is pending and who is still ready and willing to pay the rent due along with costs thereof. In the Statement of Objects and Reasons the object for amending this section are mentioned as follows.- “(6) In relation to pending suits and proceedings for ejectment on ground of defaults, an opportunity had been given to tenants to deposit the arrears of rent within thirty days and upon such deposit no decree for ejectment will be passed on such ground against them.” 13. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin vs. Sita Ram – 2003 DNJ (SC) 180 dealing with the provisions of Section 13(3), 13(4) and 13(5) of the Act has laid down on 28/1/2003 that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not apply to these provisions and the condonation of delay cannot be made. Relevant extract of the said judgment is quoted below for ready reference:- “Coming to the second question, we are of the view that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 is not applicable where there is a default in depositing the rent by the tenant under Section 13(4) of the Act. It is true that Rajasthan Act does not expressly exclude the application of Limitation Act. But Section 5 in its terms is not applicable to wherever there is a default in depositing the rent by the tenant. It is true that Rajasthan Act does not expressly exclude the application of Limitation Act. But Section 5 in its terms is not applicable to wherever there is a default in depositing the rent by the tenant. Section 5 of the Limitation Act reads thus: “5. Extension of prescribed period in certain cases. Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfied the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period." On perusal of the said Section it is evident that the question of application of Section 5 would arise where any appeal or any application may be admitted after the prescribed period, if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not making the appeal or application within such period. Section 13(4) provides that in a suit for eviction on the ground set forth in clause (a) of sub-section (1), the tenant shall on the first date of hearing or on or before such date, the Court may on the application fixed in this behalf or within such time the tenant shall deposit in court or pay to the landlord in court as determined under sub- section (3) from the date of such determination or within such further time not exceeding three months as may be extended by the Court. Thus, sub- section (4) itself provides for limitation of a specific period within which the deposit has to be made, which cannot be exceeding three months as extended by this Court. The matter may be examined from another angle. The deposit by the tenant within 15 days is not an application within the meaning of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Since the deposit does not require any application, therefore, the provisions of Section 5 cannot be extended where the default takes place in complying with an order under sub-section (4) of Section 13 of the Act. The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed having regard to Section 3 thereof. For filing an application after the expiry of the period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any other special statute a cause of action must arise. The provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act must be construed having regard to Section 3 thereof. For filing an application after the expiry of the period prescribed under the Limitation Act or any other special statute a cause of action must arise. Compliance of an order passed by a Court of Law in terms of a statutory provision does not give rise to a cause of action. Failure to comply with an order passed by a Court of Law instant consequences are provided for under the statute. The court can condone the default only when the statute confers such a power on the Court and not otherwise. In that view of the matter we have no other option but to hold that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 has no application in the instant case.” 14. The question which arises for consideration of this Court is as to whether the same ratio in the case of Nasiruddin vs. Sita Ram – 2003 DNJ (SC) 180 will also be applicable to Section 13A of the Act or not. In the considered opinion of this Court, the answer has to be given in affirmative and there is no reason why the provisions of Section 13A of the Act should be construed more liberally and in a different manner. The judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin vs. Sita Ram (supra) clearly lays down that condonation of delay cannot be given since the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act do not apply to these proceedings and admittedly in the present case the defendant tenant had filed the application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act only after 12 years before the first appellate court only and not before the trial court. One wonders how after 12 years the delay in payment of arrears of rent could be condoned under Section 13A of the Act. One wonders how after 12 years the delay in payment of arrears of rent could be condoned under Section 13A of the Act. The limited purpose & scope of Section 13A was to give relief to the tenant in the suit pending at that point of time when the said provision was inserted in the year 1979 and as soon as the provisions of Rent Control Act, 1950 was extended to the municipal area of Phalodi on 18/5/1979, if within 30 days the defendant tenant had applied and deposited the rent itself towards the arrears of rent, he could avoid the eviction, otherwise not. The delay even of a single day could not be condoned, as there is no provision of extension of time under Section 13 A (b) of the Act, as is the case under Section 13(4) of the Act. Section 13 A also requires determination of rent & arrears with interest as under Section 13(3) of the Act & gives period of 30 days for application and 90 days non-extendable period as under Section 13(4) of the Act. The provisions are thus akin & pari materia, therefore, they require similar interpretation. Section 13A(c) merely extends the said provision even if the matter is pending at the appellate forum at that point of time. This Court has consistently followed the Hon'ble Supreme Court judgment in the case of Nasiruddin vs. Sita Ram (supra) in number of judgments and recently in the judgment delivered by this Court in the S.B. CIVIL SECOND APPEAL No.449/2005 - Mani Shanker Vs. Smt. Hukam Kaur decided on 20/4/2015 itself. The relevant extract of which order is quoted below for ready reference:- 9. This Court has also perused the original Challan receipts available in the record of the trial court, which tallies with the dates mentioned in the pleadings filed by the defendant anf finds that the delay in payment of rent as per order u/s 13 (3) of the Act of 1950 was not merely of eight days but was much more. This Court has also perused the original Challan receipts available in the record of the trial court, which tallies with the dates mentioned in the pleadings filed by the defendant anf finds that the delay in payment of rent as per order u/s 13 (3) of the Act of 1950 was not merely of eight days but was much more. In fact, the rent for the month of November, 1999 was paid by the defendant/tenant is one payment for full one year from November-1999 to October 2000, and a sum of Rs.4200/- was paid on 17.02.2000, therefore, qua past three months from November, 1999 to January, 2000, it was paid after expiry of period of said quarter on 17.02.2000, and for the months of February, 2000 to October, 2000, the same was an advance deposit on 17.02.2000. Similarly, for the next year i.e. November, 2000 to October, 2001, the defendant/tenant deposited the monthly rent @ Rs.350/- per month i.e. Rs.4200/- on 23.12.2000. The arrears as determined by the learned trial court under Section 13 (3) of the Act of 1950 on 25.11.1999 to the extent of Rs.16,575/- including 45 months of rent from 01.02.1996 till October 1999 (350 x 45 = 15,575/- + interest @ 8% (Rs.1000/-) = 16,575). The said arrears of Rs.16,575/- was also deposited only on 23.02.2000. The averments made by the defendant/tenant, which is his own admission that he was not available in Pail just after determination of rent under Section 13 (3) of the Act of 1950 on 25.11.1999 and upon his return after suffering a fracture at Ahmedabad, in the second week of February, 2000, upon the advice of his Advocate, he took these steps for depositing the arrears of rent in the month of February, 2000. The relevant para from his reply to the application filed by the plaintiff on 16.02.2001 under Section 13 (5) of the Act of 1950 and his own application u/s 5 of the Limitation Act, are quoted above. 13. The settled legal position is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under Section 13 (3) to 13 (4) and 13 (5) of the Act of 1950. 13. The settled legal position is that Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply to the proceedings under Section 13 (3) to 13 (4) and 13 (5) of the Act of 1950. As the Hon'ble Supreme Court was dealing with Rajasthan Act itself, and it was clearly laid down that the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act does not apply and delay of even a single day cannot be condoned. There is no scope of seeking expost facto condonation or extension of time under Section 13 (4) of the Act of 1950, even if the application was treated as one filed u/s 13 (4) of the Act of 1950. 14. Since at the time of passing of the order under Section 13 (5) of the Act of 1950 by the learned trial court on 04.05.2001, this legal position was not available but the same was available in 2003 at the time of appellate court proceedings, the appellate court taking the present stand in question cannot be faulted. The findings of the first appellate court about eight days' delay appears to be a misreading of facts and dates. On the own admission of the defendant/tenant, he was not available in the town, Pali, during that period and delay was much more eight days. The condonation was not possible as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and, therefore, the eviction decree granted by the first appellate court deserves to be upheld and the questions of law framed above deserve to be answered in favour of plaintiff/ respondent/landlady and against the defendant/appellant/tenant. Therefore, they are answered accordingly. 15. Thus, viewed from any angle, the present second appeal filed by the appellant/defendant/tenant is liable to be dismissed and the eviction decree deserves to be upheld, the appeal is accordingly dismissed with no order as to costs. 15. In view of the above, notwithstanding the order of first appellate court dated 8/12/1993 rejecting the defendant's application in appeal no. 2/93 (99/88) and that order having been set aside by the coordinate bench of this court while disposing of the revision petition no.2/1994 on 28/1/2000 by agreement of the parties, no estoppal can be inferred against the plaintiff and delay cannot be deemed to have been condoned by the first appellate court. 2/93 (99/88) and that order having been set aside by the coordinate bench of this court while disposing of the revision petition no.2/1994 on 28/1/2000 by agreement of the parties, no estoppal can be inferred against the plaintiff and delay cannot be deemed to have been condoned by the first appellate court. The law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Nasiruddin vs. Sita Ram (supra) on 28/1/2003 was not even available & therefore not brought to the notice of the first appellate court when he passed the impugned order dated 26/4/2003 and, therefore, the reference was not made to the said judgment at that point of time, but the said judgment equally binds the facts of the present case even under Section 13A of the Act in which the same legal position will apply. 16. In view of the above, the present second appeal filed by the plaintiff deserves to be allowed and same is accordingly allowed with cost of Rs.10,000/- and the substantial question of law framed above is answered in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendant tenant. 17. The defendant-tenant shall hand over the peaceful & vacant possession of the suit premises to the appellant-plaintiff within a period of eight months from today i.e on or before 31st December, 2015 and shall pay mesne profit @ Rs.5,000/- per month from May, 2015 and will further continue to pay the mesne profit each month by 15th day of the next succeeding month or in advance to the appellant-plaintiff and in case there is any default in payment of mesne profit, the period of eight months for eviction shall stand reduced and the decree of eviction would become executable forthwith. The respondent-defendant-tenant shall also clear all the arrears of rent and mesne profit and pay the same to the plaintiff within three months from today, otherwise the same will bear interest @ 9% per annum. The respondent-tenant or person in possession shall also further not sub-let, assign or part with the possession of the suit premises or any part thereof in favour of any one else and would not create any third party interest in the same during the aforesaid period and the same would be treated as void & such third party will also be bound by this decree. The respondent-defendant- tenant shall furnish a written undertaking incorporating the aforesaid conditions in the trial court within three months and one copy thereof along with affidavit, in this Court. It is made clear that if the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit shop is not handed over to the appellant-landlord within a period of eight months from today or mesne profits are not paid as directed above, besides the expeditious execution of the decree in normal course, the appellant-plaintiff shall also be entitled to invoke the contempt jurisdiction of this Court. A copy of this judgment be sent to both the learned courts below and both the parties forthwith.