Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 912 (GUJ)

State of Gujarat v. Maheshbhai Gagjibhai Patel

2015-09-14

K.J.THAKER, M.R.SHAH

body2015
Judgment M.R. Shah, J. 1. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied by the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by learned Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad Rural, dated 9.4.1992 in Sessions Case No. 150 of 1990 acquitting all the accused for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B, 306, 498-A read with Section 114 of the Indian Penal Code (for short "IPC"), both State as well as the original complainant (brother of the deceased) have preferred present Criminal Appeals. 2. That the brother of the deceased filed a complaint on 29.6.1990 with Paschim Railway Vadodara Police Station against the accused persons alleging, inter alia, that because of the constant harassment and the dowry demand by the accused, his sister, deceased Ranjanben had committed suicide. It was alleged that as the incident had taken place within seven years from the date of marriage of the deceased with original accused No. 1 and there was constant dowry demand from 1985-86 till 1989-90, due to which the deceased committed the suicide by jumping on the railway track, the accused persons have committed offence under Sections 304-B, 306 and 498-Aof IPC. That the investigating officer thereafter initiated the investigation. He recorded the statement of the concerned witnesses and also recovered the documentary evidences including the inquest panchnama; panchnama of the place; recovery panchnama of the diary produced by one Laljibhai Patel; Certificate of State Bank of India, postmortem report etc. Thereafter, upon conclusion of the investigation, the investigating officer filed the charge-sheet against all the accused persons for the offences under Sections 304-B, 306, 498-A of IPC. As the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Sessions, the learned Magistrate committed the case to the Sessions Court, Ahmedabad Rural. The learned Sessions Judge framed the charges against all the accused vide Exh. 7, for the offences punishable under Sections 304-B, 306, 498-A read with Section 114 of IPC. All the accused pleaded not guilty and, therefore, they came to be tried by the learned Sessions Court for the aforesaid offences. 3. To prove the case against the accused, the prosecution examined following witnesses:- PW No. Name of witness Exh. No. 1 Shri Natvarbhai Thakarshibhai Patel, Panch. 17 2 Shri Ashik Balubhai Thaker, Panch 19 3 Shri Chanduji Visaji Thakor, Panch 21 4 Shri Jaswantbhai Dhanjibhai Patel, Complainant 23 5 Shri Kanaiyalal Ambumani, Officer of State Bank of India. 3. To prove the case against the accused, the prosecution examined following witnesses:- PW No. Name of witness Exh. No. 1 Shri Natvarbhai Thakarshibhai Patel, Panch. 17 2 Shri Ashik Balubhai Thaker, Panch 19 3 Shri Chanduji Visaji Thakor, Panch 21 4 Shri Jaswantbhai Dhanjibhai Patel, Complainant 23 5 Shri Kanaiyalal Ambumani, Officer of State Bank of India. 24 6 Shri Govindbhai Khemchand Chaudhry 26 7 Shri Bherusing Navalsing Chauhan 27 8 Shri Laljibhai Pitamberdas Patel 28 9 Shri Kiritkumar Jivanlal Bharuchi, Station Master 30 10 Dr. Bimal Amthagiri Goswami 33 11 Shri Prabhatsinh Siddhraj, First Garde Jamadar 37 12 Shri Bhathji Mahijibhai, Head Constable 38 13 Shri Rameshchandra Mohanlal Solanki, PSI 41 14 Shri Chimanlal Kashidas Patel, Teacher 47 15 Shri Chunilal Mohanlal Gajjar, Teacher 48 16 Shri Akhileshchandra Jagdishchandra Bhargav, Investigating Officer 49 17 Chandubhai Poslabhai Chaudhari, Police Inspector 51 4. Through the aforesaid witnesses, the prosecution also produced on record relevant documentary evidences including the Certificate of State of India to prove that the complainant gave Rs. 20,000/- to original accused No. 1 which was demanded by him as dowry; the diary produced by one Laljibhai Patel to prove that the complainant paid Rs. 25,000/- to original accused No. 1, which was demanded by him as dowry in the year 1989, which was collected from the staff members of the school where the complainant was serving etc. 5. On closure of evidence by the prosecution, further statements of the accused came to be recorded under Section 313 of the Criminal Procedure Code in which all the accused denied having committed any offence. Original accused No. 1 in his further statement stated that the deceased Ranjanben was suffering from some mental problem and she was given medical treatment by Dr. Mrugesh Vaishnav. He also stated a false case has been filed against him. That on appreciation of evidence by impugned judgment and order, learned trial Court has acquitted all the accused of the offences for which they were tried, more particularly, for offences under Sections 304-B, 306,498-A read with Section 114 of IPC. 6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad Rural, the State as well as the original complainant (brother of the deceased) have preferred present Criminal Appeals. 7. 6. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad Rural, the State as well as the original complainant (brother of the deceased) have preferred present Criminal Appeals. 7. Shri Himanshu Patel, learned APP has appeared on behalf of the State and Shri Ashish Desai, learned advocate has appeared on behalf of the original complainant and Shri Vipul Sundesha, learned advocate appearing on behalf of the original accused. 7.1 Shri Himanshu Patel, learned APP and Shri Desai learned advocate appearing for the original complainant have vehemently submitted that the learned trial Court has materially erred in acquitting the accused persons. It is further submitted by the learned advocates appearing for the respective appellants that while acquitting the accused persons learned trial Court has not properly appreciated the entire evidence on record and/or has not appreciated the entire evidence on record in its true perspective. It is submitted that the prosecution through witnesses, more particularly, the brother of the deceased-original complainant as well as other witnesses such as Laljibhai Patel and even independent witnesses-neighbours had proved that right from the very beginning the accused persons were demanding dowry and were harassing the deceased. It is submitted by Shri Patel, learned APP and Shri Desai learned advocate appearing for the original complainant that the marriage took place in the year 1984-85 and that in the year 1985-86 itself original accused No. 1 demanded a huge sum of Rs. 20,000/- and was harassing the deceased. It is submitted that, therefore, a sum of Rs. 20,000/- was paid to original accused No. 1 by two cheques of Rs. 10,000/- each. It is submitted that payment of Rs. 20,000/- by cheques in favour of original accused No. 1 has been proved by the prosecution by producing certificate issued by the State Bank of India that two cheques of Rs. 10,000/- each were deposited in the account of original accused No. 1. It is further submitted by Shri Patel, learned APP appearing on behalf of the State and Shri Desai, learned advocate appearing for the original complainant that even thereafter also the demand of dowry and harassment by the original accused continued even in the year 1989. It is submitted that in the year 1989, the accused, more particularly, accused No. 1, demanded a huge sum of Rs. It is submitted that in the year 1989, the accused, more particularly, accused No. 1, demanded a huge sum of Rs. 25,000/- and because of that they were harassing the deceased. It is submitted that the payment of Rs. 25,000/- to original accused No. 1 in the year 1989 came to be proved by the prosecution by leading the evidences oral as well as documentary. It is submitted that the concerned staff members, who contributed the amount which was paid to original accused No. 1 have been examined. It is submitted that the contribution by the staff members has also been established and proved by the deposition of original complainant as well as one Laljibhai Patel (a staff member). It is submitted that even the same has been proved by the documentary evidence in the form of diary maintained by Laljibhai Patel, which was produced at Exh. 29. It is further submitted that even the cruelty and/or harassment by the accused to the deceased have been proved by the prosecution by examining two independent witnesses i.e. neighbours, viz. PW-6, Govindbhai Khemchandbhai Chaudhary, and PW-7, Bherusing Navalsing Chauhan. It is submitted that despite the above overwhelming evidences on record, both oral as well as documentary, learned trial Court has committed a grave error in acquitting the accused persons, more particularly, when the incident had taken place within a period of seven years from the date of marriage between the deceased and original accused No. 1. Making above submissions, it is requested to allow the respective appeals. 8. Present appeals are opposed by Mr. Sundesha, learned advocate appearing on behalf of original accused Nos. 2 to 5. It is vehemently submitted by him that, in the facts and circumstances of the case and on appreciation of evidence, learned trial Court has not committed any error in acquitting the accused persons for the offences under Sections 304-B, 306, 498-A read with Section 114 of IPC. It is submitted that the finding recorded by the learned trial Court is on appreciation of evidence and the same is neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence on record and, therefore, this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. It is submitted that the finding recorded by the learned trial Court is on appreciation of evidence and the same is neither perverse nor contrary to the evidence on record and, therefore, this Court may not interfere with the impugned judgment and order of acquittal. It is submitted that on appreciation of evidence learned trial Court has rightly disbelieved the story put forward by the prosecution, more particularly, the original complainant that there was demand of dowry by the accused and/or the payment of Rs. 20,000/- to original accused No. 1 alleged to have been made in the year 1985-86 and Rs. 25,000/- alleged to have been paid to original accused No. 1 by the complainant in the year 1989 by collecting the contribution from the staff members. It is submitted that as such the prosecution has miserably failed to prove payment of any amount to original accused No. 1, more particularly Rs. 20,000/- alleged to have been paid to original accused No. 1 in the year 1985-86 and Rs. 25,000/- to original accused No. 1 in the year 1989. It is submitted that, therefore, as such learned trial Court has not committed any error in acquitting the accused persons. 8.1 Relying upon the following decisions of Honourable Supreme Court, it is requested to dismiss the appeals and confirm the order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court. "(i) Chandrappa and Others v. State of Karnataka reported in 2007 4 SCC 415 (ii) Atmaram S/o Raysingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra reported in JT 2013 (2) SC 505 (iii) Mangat Ram v. State of Haryana reported in AIR 2014 SC 1782 (iv) Indrajit Sureshprasad Bind and Others v. State of Gujarat reported in 2013 (2) GLH 604 ." 8.2 Making aforesaid submissions and relying upon the aforesaid decisions, it is requested to dismiss the present appeals. 9. Heard learned advocates appearing for the respective parties at length. We have re-appreciated, reviewed and reconsidered the entire evidence on record. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the present appeals are the appeals against the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court by which the accused persons are acquitted for the offences under Sections 304-B, 306, 498-A read with Section 114 of IPC. At the outset, it is required to be noted that the present appeals are the appeals against the impugned judgment and order of acquittal passed by the learned trial Court by which the accused persons are acquitted for the offences under Sections 304-B, 306, 498-A read with Section 114 of IPC. It is required to be noted that the principles which would govern and regulate the hearing of appeal by this Court, against an order of acquittal passed by the trial Court, have been very succinctly explained by the Apex Court in a catena of decisions. In the case of M.S. Narayana Menon @ Mani v. State of Kerala & Anr., (2006) 6 S.C.C. 39 , the Apex Court has narrated the powers of High Court in appeal against the order of acquittal. In para 54 of the decision, the Apex Court has observed as under:-- "54. In any event the High Court entertained an appeal treating to be an appeal against acquittal, it was in fact exercising the revisional jurisdiction. Even while exercising an appellate power against a judgment of acquittal, the High Court should have borne in mind the well-settled principles of law that where two view are possible, the appellate Court should not interfere with the finding of acquittal recorded by the Court below." 9.1 Further, in the case of Chandrappa v. State of Karnataka, (2007) 4 S.C.C. 415 , the Apex Court laid down the following principles:-- "42. From the above decisions, in our considered view, the following general principles regarding powers of the appellate Court while dealing with an appeal against an order of acquittal emerge: [1] An appellate Court has full power to review, re-appreciate and reconsider the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. [2] The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of such power and an appellate Court on the evidence before it may reach its own conclusion, both on questions of fact and of law. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. [3] Various expressions, such as, substantial and compelling reasons, good and sufficient grounds, very strong circumstances, distorted conclusions, glaring mistakes, etc. are not intended to curtain extensive powers of an appellate Court in an appeal against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in the nature of flourishes of language to emphasis the reluctance of an appellate Court to interfere with acquittal than to curtail the power of the Court to review the evidence and to come to its own conclusion. [4] An appellate Court, however, must bear in mind that in case of acquittal there is double presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the presumption of innocence is available to him under the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence that every person shall be presumed to be innocent unless he is proved guilty by a competent Court of law. Secondly, the accused having secured his acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by the trial Court. [5] If two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court." 9.2 Thus, it is a settled principle that while exercising appellate power, even if two reasonable conclusions are possible on the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate Court should not disturb the finding of acquittal recorded by the trial Court. 9.3 Even in the case of State of Goa V. Sanjay Thakran & Another, 2007 3 S.C.C. 75, the Apex Court has reiterated the powers of the High Court in such cases. In para 16 of the said decision, the Court has observed as under:-- "16. From the aforesaid decisions, it is apparent that while exercising the powers in appeal against the order of acquittal the Court of appeal would not ordinarily interfere with the order of acquittal unless the approach of the lower Court is vitiated by some manifest illegality and the conclusion arrived at would not be arrived at by any reasonable person and, therefore, the decision is to be characterized as perverse. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. Merely because two views are possible, the Court of appeal would not take the view which would upset the judgment delivered by the Court below. However, the appellate Court has a power to review the evidence if it is of the view that the conclusion arrived at by the Court below is perverse and the Court has committed a manifest error of law and ignored the material evidence on record. A duty is cast upon the appellate Court, in such circumstances, to re-appreciate the evidence to arrive to a just decision on the basis of material placed on record to find out whether any of the accused is connected with the commission of the crime he is charged with." 9.4 Similar principle has been laid down by the Apex Court in the cases of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Ram Veer Singh & Ors, 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5553 and in Girja Prasad (Dead) by LRs v. State of MP reported in 2007 A.I.R. S.C.W. 5589. Thus, the powers, which this Court may exercise against an order of acquittal are well settled. 9.5 In the case of Luna Ram v. Bhupat Singh and Ors, (2009) SCC 749, the Apex Court in paras-10 and 11 has held as under: "10. The High Court has noted that the prosecution version was not clearly believable. Some of the so called eye witnesses stated that the deceased died because his ankle was twisted by an accused. Others said that he was strangulated. It was the case of the prosecution that the injured witnesses were thrown out of the bus. The doctor who conducted the postmortem and examined the witnesses had categorically stated that it was not possible that somebody would throw a person out of the bus when it was in running condition. 11. Considering the parameters of appeal against the judgment of acquittal, we are not inclined to interfere in this appeal. The view of the High Court cannot be termed to be perverse and is a possible view on the evidence." 9.6 Even in a recent decision of the Apex Court in the case of Mookkiah and Anr. v. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. v. State, rep. by the Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu, AIR 2013 SC 321 , the Apex Court in para 4 has held as under: "4. It is not in dispute that the trial Court, on appreciation of oral and documentary evidence led in by the prosecution and defence, acquitted the accused in respect of the charges leveled against them. On appeal by the State, the High Court, by impugned order, reversed the said decision and convicted the accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC and awarded RI for life. Since counsel for the appellants very much emphasized that the High Court has exceeded its jurisdiction in upsetting the order of acquittal into conviction, let us analyze the scope and power of the High Court in an appeal filed against the order of acquittal. This Court in a series of decisions has repeatedly laid down that as the first appellate court the High Court, even while dealing with an appeal against acquittal, was also entitled, and obliged as well, to scan through and if need be re-appreciate the entire evidence, though while choosing to interfere only the court should find an absolute assurance of the guilt on the basis of the evidence on record and not merely because the High Court could take one more possible or a different view only. Except the above, where the matter of the extent and depth of consideration of the appeal is concerned, no distinctions or differences in approach are envisaged in dealing with an appeal as such merely because one was against conviction or the other against an acquittal. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 9.7 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. [Vide State of Rajasthan v. Sohan Lal and Others, (2004) 5 SCC 573 ]" 9.7 It is also a settled legal position that in acquittal appeal, the appellate Court is not required to rewrite the judgment or to give fresh reasonings, when the reasons assigned by the Court below are found to be just and proper. Such principle is laid down by the Apex Court in the case of State of Karnataka v. Hemareddy, AIR 1981 SC 1417 , wherein it is held as under: "...This Court has observed in Girija Nandini Devi V. Bigendra Nandini Choudhary (1967) 1 SCR 93 :( AIR 1967 SC 1124 ) that it is not the duty of the Appellate Court on the evidence to repeat the narration of the evidence or to reiterate the reasons given by the trial Court expression of general agreement with the reasons given by the Court the decision of which is under appeal, will ordinarily suffice." 9.8 Thus, in case the appellate Court agrees with the reasons and the opinion given by the lower Court, then the discussion of evidence is not necessary. Considering the aforesaid principles of law, present appeals against acquittal are required to be considered. 10. On considering the entire evidence on record, it appears that the marriage between the deceased and original accused No. 1 was solemnized in the year 1984. Out of the wedlock the deceased and original accused No. 1 had two children. That the unfortunate incident took place on 28.6.1990 after approximately six years and two months, but within seven years from the date of marriage. In the night of 28.6.1990, dead body of the deceased was found on the railway track. It was alleged by the complainant in his complaint, which was given on the very next date that although out right from 1984 there was harassment to the deceased due to dowry demand. To prove the dowry demand and payment, it was alleged by the original complainant-brother of the deceased that in the year 1985-86, Rs. 20,000/- were paid to original accused No. 1 by two cheques, each of Rs. 10,000/-. It was further alleged by the original complainant and the prosecution that a similar demand was made in the year 1989 and at that time original accused No. 1 demanded Rs. 25,000/-. 20,000/- were paid to original accused No. 1 by two cheques, each of Rs. 10,000/-. It was further alleged by the original complainant and the prosecution that a similar demand was made in the year 1989 and at that time original accused No. 1 demanded Rs. 25,000/-. According to the complainant, who at the relevant time was serving as a PT teacher, for some time he was also plying the rickshaw, and it was not possible for him to pay such a huge amount and, therefore, the staff members of the school in which the complainant was serving contributed the amount and, thereafter, Rs. 25,000/- was paid to the original complainant which in turn was paid to original accused No. 1. To prove the payment of Rs. 20,000/- by two cheques each of Rs. 10,000/-, the prosecution had examined the officer of the State Bank of India for proving the Certificate of State Bank of India (Exh. 25), which would go to show that the cheque amounts were deposited in the account of original accused No. 1. However, it is required to be noted that in the income tax return of original accused No. 1, there is an entry that Rs. 20,000/- was paid to the complainant towards loan. Therefore, the explanation given by original accused No. 1 that the said amount was returned to original complainant is plausible. 10.1 To prove that an amount of Rs. 25,000/- was paid to original accused No. 1 in the year 1989, which was demanded by original accused No. 1 as dowry, the prosecution has examined Jaswantbhai Dhanjibhai Patel, PW-4, Exh. 23; Laljibhai P. Patel, PW-8, Exh. 28; Chimanlal Patel, PW-14, Exh. 47; and one Chunilal Mohanlal Gajjar, PW-15, Exh. 48. However, it is required to be noted that in cross-examination the aforesaid witnesses have admitted that when their initial statements were recorded by the police there was no such mention by them that they have paid the amount to the original complainant which, in turn, was paid to original accused No. 1. To prove that the amount of Rs. 25,000/- was paid to original accused No. 1 in the year 1989 by collecting the contribution from the staff members, the prosecution has heavily relied upon the diary alleged to have been maintained by Laljibhai, which was produced at Exh. 29. To prove that the amount of Rs. 25,000/- was paid to original accused No. 1 in the year 1989 by collecting the contribution from the staff members, the prosecution has heavily relied upon the diary alleged to have been maintained by Laljibhai, which was produced at Exh. 29. However, it is required to be noted that in cross-examination said witness has specifically admitted that he does not maintain the diary regularly and except said entry there are no other entries except the entries with respect to the marriage expenses of his daughter. The aforesaid has been appreciated by the learned trial Court in extenso. In the facts and circumstances of the case, it is also required to be noted that the said witness has specifically admitted in his cross-examination that the said diary was produced by him subsequently and there was no such mention of maintaining the diary when his first statement was recorded by the police. There are other material contradictions in the deposition of the original complainant as well as said Laljibhai and other staff members. Under the circumstances and on appreciation of evidence, the learned trial Court has dis-believed the case on behalf of the prosecution that there was any dowry demand by the original accused, more particularly, with respect to the amount of Rs. 20,000/- alleged to have been paid in the year 1985-86 and Rs. 25,000/- alleged to have been paid to original accused No. 1 in the year 1989 and thereby has not accepted the case on behalf of the prosecution with respect to dowry demand and consequently, when on appreciation of evidence learned trial Court acquitted all the accused for the offences for which they were tried, it cannot be said that learned trial Court has committed any error which calls for interference of this Court in exercise of the appellate jurisdiction against the order of acquittal. 11. At this stage, it is required to be noted that though the prosecution tried to prove the harassment or ill-treatment by examining the neighbours, who were examined as PW-6, Govindbhai Khemchandbhai Chaudhary, and PW-7, Bherusing Navalsing Chauhan, however, nothing fruitful comes against the accused. Nothing has been mentioned by any of the witnesses for what there were quarrels between the deceased and original accused No. 1. Nothing has been mentioned by any of the witnesses for what there were quarrels between the deceased and original accused No. 1. On the basis of the depositions of the aforesaid two witnesses it cannot be said that the prosecution has been successful in proving the case of harassment and/or ill-treatment by the accused. Therefore, even on appreciation of evidence it cannot be said that the prosecution has been successful in proving the offence under Section 306 of IPC. Looking to the charge framed against the respondents-accused for the offence under Sections 306 and 498-Aof the IPC, the prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. It is found by the trial Court after taking into account the evidence produced by the complainant that no ingredients of such offence are involved in the case which proves offence against the accused respondents under Section 498-A or 306 of IPC. It is found by the trial Court after appreciating the evidence that there is no proof against the accused persons which reflects that the accused have given physical or mental harassment to the deceased. We are convinced that the submissions made by learned APP and learned advocate for the original complainant do not dent the impugned judgment. It cannot be said that the accused had perpetrated the death of the deceased. It is rightly found that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt against the accused persons. Therefore, in our view, learned trial Judge has rightly acquitted the accused persons of the charges under Section 498-A, 306 and 114 of IPC and it cannot be said that due to respondents' provocation, instigation or abetment, the deceased has committed suicide. Therefore, these appeals sans merit and are required to be dismissed. 12. In view of above discussion and in the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that the prosecution has not succeeded in establishing the offence under Sections 498-A and Section 306 of IPC against the accused. In view of this, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court, more particularly, considering the parameters laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court referred to herein above while considering the appeals against acquittal. 13. Under the circumstances, both these appeals fail, they deserve to be dismissed and accordingly they are dismissed. In view of this, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment passed by the learned trial Court, more particularly, considering the parameters laid down by the Honourable Supreme Court referred to herein above while considering the appeals against acquittal. 13. Under the circumstances, both these appeals fail, they deserve to be dismissed and accordingly they are dismissed. We confirm the impugned judgment and order of acquittal dated 9.4.1992 passed by learned Sessions Judge, Ahmedabad Rural in Sessions Case No. 150 of 1990. Record and Proceedings, if any, be sent back to the trial Court concerned forthwith. Bail and bail bonds, if any, stand cancelled. Appeal Dismissed.