JUDGMENT : G. S. SOLANKI, J. 1. Learned Second Additional Sessions Judge, Mandla (Link Court Niwas) has awarded death sentence to the respondents/accused and has made reference of proceedings to this Court for confirmation of death sentence passed vide impugned judgment dated 27-1-2015 passed in Sessions Trial No. 146/2014. 2. The accused have been convicted by the trial Court for the offences punishable under sections 148, 302/149, 201/149 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to R.I. for 3 years with fine of Rs. 500/-, death sentence and R.I. for 3 years with fine of Rs. 200/- respectively with default stipulations. They have filed the aforesaid appeal against the aforesaid conviction and sentence. Since the reference and the appeal have arisen out of a common judgment, therefore, they are being disposed of by the common judgment. 3. The prosecution’s case, in short, is that on 25-8-2014 complainant Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) had gone to village Taurdara along with her husband Brijlal (since deceased) to the house of her cousin Holkar Maravi (PW-2) for treatment of their son Sachin by way of exorcism because she had come to know that in that village accused Parvati Bai and Suratia Bai make treatment through some Godly powers. It is alleged that complainant along with the deceased and her son had gone to the house of accused Mukesh and Suratia Bai where so many other villagers were also present and they were performing Bhajan-Kirtan on Harmonium and Dholak. It is further alleged that during the aforesaid process, some Godly powers were transmitted to accused Gend Singh, Dumari, Parvati Bai, Pusiya Bai, Suratia Bai, they started dancing, who were having Trishul, Farsa and Bana in their hands. It is further alleged that suddenly Suratia Bai came to Brijlal, dragged him and then accused Parvati Bai and Suratia Bai told that Brijlal knows and performs witchcraft, therefore, kill him. On such exhortation accused Parvati, Pusia, Bhagwati Bai, Mukesh, Dumari and Gend Singh assaulted Brijlal. They felled him down and accused Parvati inflicted a Trishul blow on his neck. At the same time Gend Singh was dancing on the body of Brijlal. Complainant Sukhmat Bai and her cousin Holkar made hue and cry to save Brijlal but none of the villagers came to save him. They felled him down and accused Parvati inflicted a Trishul blow on his neck. At the same time Gend Singh was dancing on the body of Brijlal. Complainant Sukhmat Bai and her cousin Holkar made hue and cry to save Brijlal but none of the villagers came to save him. Holkar went out of the house of Mukesh to seek some assistance from Levan Singh and other villagers, thereafter he came back along with Dayaram and Levan Singh and tried to save Brijlal but the accused persons did not spare him and accused Mukesh, Dumari and Gend Singh poured kerosene oil upon Brijlal and accused Gend Singh set ablaze Brijlal by a match-stick and accused Parvati Bai, Pusia Bai, Bhagwati Bai and Suratia Bai threw wooden pieces on the burning body of Brijlal and thereby all the accused committed the murder of Brijlal by assaulting and burning him. It is further alleged that complainant Sukhmat Bai ran away from the place of the incident and hid in the house of Levan Singh. 4. Levan Singh informed about the incident telephonically at P.S. Niwas, thereafter the Police came to village Taurdara in the night and found that Brijlal has died. On 26-8-2014, Varsha Patel (PW-7) prepared inquest report (Ex.P-3) and recorded dehati nalishi (Ex.P-25), marg intimation (Ex.P-17) at the behest of complainant Sukhmat Bai. Burnt dead body of Brijlal was sent for the post-mortem examination. Manoj Kumar Chouhan (PW-4), Assistant Surgeon, conducted the post-mortem and opined that the death was homicidal in nature. 5. During investigation, accused Parvati Bai was arrested and Trishul was seized at her instance along with blood stained clothes vide seizure memo (Ex.P-13). A can of Kerosene oil was seized at the instance of accused Mukesh along with blood stained clothes vide seizure memo (Ex.P-14). One jerrycan of Kerosene oil and match-sticks were seized at the instance of Gend Singh vide seizure memo (Ex.P-16) and another jerrycan of Kerosene oil and Farsa were seized at the instance of Dumari Bai vide seizure memo (Ex.P-15). 6. After due investigation, the accused persons were charge-sheeted before JMFC, Niwas, District Mandla, who committed the case to the Sessions Court, Mandla. Learned Sessions Judge, Mandla made over the case to Second Additional Sessions Judge, Mandla (Link Court Niwas). Learned Second Additional Sessions Judge framed the charges against the accused persons. 7. The accused persons abjured the guilt and pleaded false implication. Learned Sessions Judge, Mandla made over the case to Second Additional Sessions Judge, Mandla (Link Court Niwas). Learned Second Additional Sessions Judge framed the charges against the accused persons. 7. The accused persons abjured the guilt and pleaded false implication. They did not adduce any evidence in their defence. 8. On completion of trial and upon appreciation of evidence on record, the trial Court held the accused persons guilty for committing the murder of Brijlal and convicted and sentenced them as mentioned hereinabove, hence this reference by Second Additional Sessions Judge and the appeal by the accused persons. 9. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellants/accused persons has submitted that the trial Court has committed illegality in not appreciating the evidence on record in its proper perspective and further submitted that the trial Court has failed to appreciate that all the accused were not having common object to commit the murder of Brijlal. He has further submitted that there is a discrepancy in the medical and ocular evidence. The prosecution has deliberately withheld the independent witness Levan Singh and only produced related witnesses namely Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) and Holkar Maravi (PW-2), therefore, the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court is liable to be set aside and the accused persons are liable to acquitted. 10. On the other hand, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State has justified and supported the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial Court. 11. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and gone through the impugned judgment, evidence and other material on record. It is not disputed that deceased Brijlal died due to homicidal injuries. 12. Dr. Manoj Kumar Chouhan (PW-4), Assistant Surgeon, Primary Health Center, Pipariya conducted post-mortem examination of the dead body of the deceased and found that the dead body of the deceased was mutilated and disfigured. Fragments remained of head, trunk, abdomen, both forearms and arms, fragments remains of both thigh, both hands. Both hands and foots are absent from the body. Skeleton is incomplete. Both forearms and both legs are flexed due to heat stiffening. Sharp cut injury present below knee joint and wrist joint, upper portion skull is not present. Both eye balls are burnt. Deep wound present over right side of neck. Burn injury present over whole body. Deep burn present over whole body and is completely charred. Skeleton is incomplete. Both forearms and both legs are flexed due to heat stiffening. Sharp cut injury present below knee joint and wrist joint, upper portion skull is not present. Both eye balls are burnt. Deep wound present over right side of neck. Burn injury present over whole body. Deep burn present over whole body and is completely charred. Body gives a strong smell of burning and smell of kerosene oil is present on body. On the basis of aforesaid injuries, the Doctor has opined that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. Considering the nature of injuries found on the body of the deceased, we are also of the view that the death of the deceased was homicidal in nature. 13. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that the prosecution has not produced any independent witness. Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) and Holkar Maravi (PW-2) are related and interested witnesses, therefore, the trial Court has committed illegality in placing the reliance on the aforesaid witnesses. Counsel has further submitted that Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) herself admitted in her cross-examination that she along with her cousins Holkar, Amar Singh, husband Brijlal and son Sachin went to the house of Mohan. He has placed reliance on the decisions of the Apex Court in Raju @ Balachandran and others vs. State of Tamilnadu, AIR 2013 SC 983 and Bhajan Singh @ Harbhajan Singh and others vs. State of Haryana, (2011) 7 SCC 421 . 14. On the contrary, learned Government Advocate appearing on behalf of the State has submitted that the testimony of related witnesses cannot be thrown out only on the basis of the fact that they are related and interested witnesses. 15. It is true that Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) is the wife of the deceased and Holkar Maravi (PW-2) is cousin of Sukhmat Bai, however, as per prosecution’s case, Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) and Holkar Maravi (PW-2) both went to the house of appellant Mukesh, who happened to be the son of Mohan. In these circumstances, if Sukhmat Bai admitted in her cross-examination Para-17 that she went to the house of Mohan along with her husband Brijlal, son Sachin, cousins Holkar Maravi and Amar Singh, who has not been examined, it does not make any difference because the house of appellant Mukesh and his father Mohan is the same place. 16. In these circumstances, if Sukhmat Bai admitted in her cross-examination Para-17 that she went to the house of Mohan along with her husband Brijlal, son Sachin, cousins Holkar Maravi and Amar Singh, who has not been examined, it does not make any difference because the house of appellant Mukesh and his father Mohan is the same place. 16. As far as appreciation of testimony of related and interested witnesses is concerned, in our opinion, if the wife of the deceased was present on the spot at the time of the incident, she cannot be said to be an interested witness due to her relationship with the deceased. This point has been elaborately considered by the Apex Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Smt. Kalki and another, AIR 1981 SC 1390 wherein the Apex Court has observed that true it is, she is the wife of the deceased but she cannot be called an interest witness. ‘Related’ is not equivalent to ‘interested’. A witness may be called ‘interested’ only when he or she derives some benefit from the result of a litigation; in the decree in a civil case, or in seeing an accused person punished. A witness who is a natural one and is the only possible eye witness in the circumstances of a case cannot be said to be ‘interested’. In the instant case, both the eye witnesses namely Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) the wife of the deceased and Holkar Maravi (PW-2), her cousin, had gone to the house of appellant Mukesh for the purpose of treatment of the son of Sukhmat Bai and Brijlal through exorcism and there is nothing on record to show that there was any previous enmity or litigation between the appellants and Sukhmat Bai, in these circumstances, both the witnesses Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) and Holkar Maravi (PW-2) cannot be said to be interested witnesses. 17. So far as non-production of other witnesses like child witness Sachin (the son of deceased Brijlal and Sukhmat Bai) and Amar Singh, another cousin of Sukhmat Bai, is concerned, it is true that they could have been examined before the trial Court and they would have further unfolded the story. It appears to be a fault on the part of the prosecution as well as the trial Court to leave two material witnesses without assigning any reason. It appears to be a fault on the part of the prosecution as well as the trial Court to leave two material witnesses without assigning any reason. However, it is well established principle of law that the evidence must be weighed and not to be counted. 18. Now we have to scrutinize the testimony of Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) and Holkar Maravi (PW-2) keeping in mind that both of them are the related witnesses. 19. Learned counsel for the appellants has further contended that the prosecution has failed to prove the very fact that at the time of the incident, an unlawful assembly was made by the appellants and there was a common object of the said unlawful assembly. In support of the aforesaid contention, learned counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Shivjee Singh and others vs. State of Bihar, AIR 2009 SC 417 . 20. In Shivjee Singh (supra), at the time of the incident main accused Ambika Singh opened the fire on the urge of his father Satya Naraian Singh and shot dead Meghnad Singh but the other co-accused persons were pelting stones from the roof of the house on complainant party. In such circumstances, the Apex Court has held that the co-accused persons were not having common object to commit the murder of Meghnad Singh. In the instant case Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) and Holkar Maravi (PW-2) have specifically stated that they both had gone to the house of appellant Mukesh along with deceased, minor Sachin and another witness Amar Singh. Despite extensive cross-examination of these two witnesses, the defence could not succeed to bring any material discrepancy in their cross-examination regarding presence of two witnesses at the beginning, except some discrepancies in regard to time and the fact that they went one by one at the house of appellant Mukesh. We are conscious that these two witnesses are rustic villagers/tribes, they do not have watches in their hands, in such circumstances, the defence of time does not have any material impact on the facts of the case. 21. Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) has categorically stated in her statement before the trial Court that when she reached to the house of Mukesh, all the accused persons were present there. Some other persons were also present there, who had come for treatment of their kids through exorcism. 21. Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) has categorically stated in her statement before the trial Court that when she reached to the house of Mukesh, all the accused persons were present there. Some other persons were also present there, who had come for treatment of their kids through exorcism. This fact has been duly corroborated by Holkar Maravi (PW-2). Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) further stated that initially the accused persons were reciting Kirtan and during Kirtan, some Godly powers were transmitted to them, thereafter appellant Suratia Bai exhorted to other co-accused persons/appellants to catch Brijlal, thereafter appellant Parvati Bai inflicted a Trishul blow on the neck of Brijlal, as a result of which, Brijlal became unconscious, thereafter the accused persons felled him down and committed his murder. Upto the aforesaid extent, Holkar Maravi (PW-2) has corroborated the testimony of Sukhmat Bai (PW-1). Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) has further stated that she herself and her brother Holkar asked the villagers to save Brijlal but non one had come to save him and said that they are not able to save Brijlal. She has further stated that at that time appellant Gendlal was dancing on the chest of Brijlal and was playing Tamura. She further stated that thereafter all the accused persons brought a jerrycan of Kerosne oil and poured on the body of the deceased, thereafter Gend Singh and Mukesh set him ablaze and threw wooden pieces on the burning body of Brijlal. She further stated that when the body of Brijlal was burning, due to fear she ran away from the spot and hid in the house of Levan Singh. 22. Holkar Maravi (PW-2) has also stated that during Kirtan some Godly powers were transmitted to appellant Suratia Bai and she said that Brijlal performs witchcraft , therefore, kill him, thereafter all the accused persons caught hold of Brijlal and started beating him by fists. He further stated that he asked the accused persons to leave Brijlal then they told that they will punish him by death and thereafter started beating Brijlal, thereafter he went to the house of Levan Singh but at that time Levan Singh was not present at his house, thereafter he went to the field of Levan Singh and told him that the accused persons were brutally beating Brijlal. He has further stated that when he and Levan Singh were returning from the field of Levan Singh, on the way, Dayaram met them and all of them reached in the courtyard of the house of appellant Mukesh and saw that Brijlal was set to ablaze and all the accused persons were dancing, thereafter they made a telephonic call to the Police from the house of Levan Singh. 23. Learned counsel for the appellants has vehemently argued that none of the witnesses has stated that any sharp edged weapon was used by any of the appellants. Though as per the version of Sukhmat Bai (PW-1), Parvati Bai inflicted a Trishul blow on the neck of the deceased but no such corresponding injury was found in the post-mortem examination, therefore, there is a major discrepancy in the medical and ocular evidence. In such circumstances, the trial Court has committed illegality in seeking the medical corroboration from the statement of Dr. Manoj Kumar Chouhan (PW-4) and the post-mortem report. The counsel has placed reliance on the decision of the Apex Court in Abdul Sayeed vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, 2010 (Vol. 7) AIR SCW 5701 and State of Haryana vs. Ram Singh, AIR 2002 SC 620 . 24. In State of Haryana vs. Ram Singh (supra) the nature of injuries found by the Doctor ran counter to the statement of the eye witnesses. In Abdul Sayeed vs. State of Madhya Pradesh (supra), there was no discrepancy in ocular and medical evidence. On the contrary it was held that where a large number of assailants attacked one person, in such circumstances, eye witnesses are unable to state how many injuries and in what manner caused by accused. Thus, in fact situation discrepancy in medical evidence and ocular evidence is bound to occur. In the instant case also more than 5 accused persons made assault on the deceased. It has also come on record that despite request, none of the villagers had dared to save the life of Brijlal, in such circumstances, it cannot be expected from Sukhmat Bai, the wife of the deceased, who was present on the spot through out the incident, to state which injury was caused by which of the appellant and in what manner they caused such injuries to the deceased. It is true that Holkar Maravi (PW-2) was present only till the appellants caught hold the deceased and started beating him brutally, thereafter he went out to seek some assistance from Levan Singh and other villagers, therefore, he was also not in a position to state which of the appellant had made assault on the deceased and in which manner. So far as the injury caused by Trishul is concerned, which is alleged to have been caused by Parvati Bai, Dr. Manoj Kumar Chouhan (PW-4) has specifically stated that there was a deep incised wound on the right side of the neck of the deceased and same was charred. This fact is very well supported by the evidence of Dr. Manoj Kumar Chouhan (PW-4) vide post-mortem report (Ex.P- 21), thus it cannot be said that there was no injury of Trishul on the neck of the deceased. On the contrary, the statement of complainant Sukhmat Bai is corroborated by the medical evidence. 25. So far as identity of the accused/appellants is concerned, as mentioned hereinabove, Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) is the sister of Holkar Maravi (PW-2), who was the resident of same village where the appellants were residing and he must be well known to all the appellants. Sukhmat Bai initially came to the house of Holkar Maravi along with her husband and son thereafter they went to the house of the appellants along with Holkar Maravi and they were present at the time of the incident at the house of appellant Mukesh. 26. On a careful scrutiny of the statement of Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) and Holkar (PW-2), it reveals that there was sufficient light on the place of the incident because it has come on record that at the time of the incident an electric bulb as well as a Diya (lamp) were lighted. It is true that there is no specific statement of Sukhmat Bai and Holkar that who had cut the hands and legs of the deceased, however, it has come on record that one broken Farsa was found on the spot and as per FSL report, human blood was found on the same, which shows that said broken Farsa was used during the incident. As discussed hereinabove, at the time of the incident, Sukhmat Bai, being the wife of Brijlal was not in a position to see that who had used the Farsa, however, she has stated that all the appellants unanimously committed the murder of her husband and the blow of Trishul given by Parvati Bai has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. In such circumstances, when human blood was found on Farsa, certainly it must have been used by one of the appellants for cutting the limbs of the deceased. In such circumstances, the principles laid down in Shivjee Singh (supra) are not applicable to the fact situation of this case. 27. The principles in regard to common object have been elaborately considered by the Apex Court in Gangadhar Behera and others vs. State of Orissa, (2002) 8 SCC 381 wherein it has been held by the Apex Court that as far as common object is concerned, direct evidence generally is not available, the same has to be gathered from the act committed and result therefrom. It has been further held that where an assembly which is initially lawful may subsequently become unlawful. The purpose for which the member of assembly set out or desired to achieve, is the object. If the object desired by all the members is the same, the knowledge that is the object which is being pursued is shared by all the members and they are in general agreement as to how it is to be achieved and that is how the common object of the assembly. An object is entertained in the human mind, and it being merely a mental attitude, no direct evidence can be available and, like intention, has generally to be gathered from the act which the person commits and the result therefrom. Though no hard-and-fast rule can be laid down under the circumstances from which the common object can be culled out, it may reasonably be collected from the nature of the assembly, arms it carried and behaviour at or before or after the scene of incident. The word “knew” used in the second branch of the section implies something more than a possibility and it cannot be made to bear the sense of “might have been known”. Positive knowledge is necessary. The word “knew” used in the second branch of the section implies something more than a possibility and it cannot be made to bear the sense of “might have been known”. Positive knowledge is necessary. When an offence is committed in prosecution of the common object, it would generally be an offence which the members of the unlawful assembly knew was likely to be committed in prosecution of the common object. In the instant case, all the appellants were present at the time of the incident and they were dancing together and appellant Suratia Bai exhorted the other appellants to catch Brijlal as he seems performing witchcraft. This fact was suggested during cross-examination of Sukhmat Bai that one of the appellants stated that some witchcraft activity being performed by Brijlal, therefore, he stood because he perceived that the said exhortation was for him, thereafter all the appellants caught hold of him. It has been further explained by Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) in her cross-examination Para-22 that the appellants besieged Brijlal and brutally beat him, she asked the other villagers to save her husband but no one had come forward to save him. Holkar had gone to seek some assistance from Levan Singh and other villagers. Upto that extent, Holkar has also duly corroborated the statement of Sukhmat Bai. It appears that when the appellants started beating Brijlal, Holkar went outside the place of incident to seek some assistance and when he returned back, Brijlal was already set to ablaze by the appellants. It has also come on record that after setting ablaze Brijlal, the appellants were dancing together. Thus, looking to the previous and post conduct of the appellants, it is apparent that the appellants were having common object to commit the murder of Brijlal. 28. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the conduct of Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) does not appear to be natural, when she was present during the entire incident, she could have tried to save the deceased but she also ran away from the spot. We are not convinced with the aforesaid argument. 28. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that the conduct of Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) does not appear to be natural, when she was present during the entire incident, she could have tried to save the deceased but she also ran away from the spot. We are not convinced with the aforesaid argument. As already discussed hereinabove, at the time of the incident all the appellants became violent and they suddenly started beating Brijlal brutally, thereafter, Sukhmat Bai and Holkar asked the other villagers to save Brijlal but no one came forward to help them, theafter, Holkar went away from the spot to seek some assistance from Levan Singh and other villagers, this conduct of Holkar cannot be said to be unnatural. So far as conduct of Sukhmat Bai is concerned, being a lady, it cannot be expected from her to fight alone against the accused persons, who had become violent, because it has come on record that at the time of the incident no one had come forward to help her as well as Holkar also went to seek help. Further she was having a minor son with her, if she would have tried to save her husband from violent accused persons, they might have killed both of them also, in these circumstances, if she had not tried to save her husband, her conduct cannot be said to be unnatural because at that time it was more important for her to save the life of herself as well as her minor son. 29. Learned counsel for the appellants has further submitted that Investigation Officer Varsha Patel (PW-7) has admitted in her cross-examination that when she reached to the spot, all the appellants were found together at the place of the incident. She took all the appellants in a vehicle and came back to the police station, which shows that all the appellants were caught together and a false case has been made against them. Looking to the post conduct of the appellants wherein the appellants, after committing the murder of Brijlal, were dancing together and celebrating incidence, in these circumstances, if all the appellants were caught together, it cannot be said to be unnatural. Looking to the post conduct of the appellants wherein the appellants, after committing the murder of Brijlal, were dancing together and celebrating incidence, in these circumstances, if all the appellants were caught together, it cannot be said to be unnatural. Some minor discrepancies have been brought in the cross-examination of Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) and Holkar (PW-2) but that does not goes to the root of the case because the defence has not dared to confront the aforesaid witnesses with Dehati Nalishi and their statements recorded under section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 30. The testimony of Sukhmat Bai (PW-1) and Holkar (PW-2) further finds support from medical evidence and other circumstantial evidence like FSL report wherein the human blood was found on Kurti and Salwar of Parvati Bai and Shirt of Mukesh and the Kerosene oil was found in the residue of jerrycan and Dr. Manoj Kumar Chouhan (PW-4) has specifically stated that smell of Kerosene oil was found on the dead body of the deceased. In such circumstances, it is proved on record that initially the assembly of the appellants were lawful and at the time of the incident it was converted into an unlawful assembly and all the appellants knew that Brijlal is going to be killed. They assaulted him brutally, thereafter poured Kerosene oil upon him and thereafter set him ablaze. Thus, in our considered opinion, the trial Court has not committed any illegality in arriving at the conclusion that the appellants have committed the murder of Brijlal in furtherance of common object of their unlawful assembly. 31. So far as conviction of the appellants recorded under sections 148, 201/149 of the Indian Penal Code is concerned, it is proved on record that Brijlal was set to ablaze during the incident and thereafter all the appellants unanimously threw the wooden pieces on Brijlal for causing disappearance of evidence of the offence committed by them. It has also come on record that at the time of the incident, the appellants were having deadly weapon and they used such weapons in furtherance of their common object, in such circumstances, in our considered opinion, the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants under sections 148, 201/149 of the Indian Penal Code and we affirm the same. 32. It has also come on record that at the time of the incident, the appellants were having deadly weapon and they used such weapons in furtherance of their common object, in such circumstances, in our considered opinion, the trial Court has rightly convicted the appellants under sections 148, 201/149 of the Indian Penal Code and we affirm the same. 32. On the question of sentence, learned counsel for the appellants has submitted that it is not a case, which comes under the category of rarest of rare cases. He has placed reliance on the decision of Apex Court in Bachan Singh vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1980 SC 989, Santosh Kumar Satishbhushan Bariyar vs. State of Maharashtra, 2010 (Vol. 2) AIR SCW 1130. 33. We have cautiously gone through the facts of the case. The appellants are the rustic and illiterate villagers, who believe in superstitious methods of treatment (Godly powers) and their motive to commit the murder of Brijlal was the fear that due to witchcraft (which said to be performed by Brijlal) their Godly powers will be vanished, therefore, they committed the murder of Brijlal. One of the accused persons is less than 20 years of age and three accused persons are ladies, who are less than 50 years of age. Nothing has come on record to show that the appellants are habitual criminals or they have any criminal antecedents or they are grave danger to the society. It is true that their act is heinous and required to be condemned but at the same time it cannot be said that it is a rarest of the rare cases where accused persons are required to be eliminated from the society. In such circumstances, we find no justifiable reason to impose the death sentence on the appellants. 34. Accordingly, we affirm the conviction of the appellants recorded by the trial Court under sections 148, 302/149, 201/149 of the Indian Penal Code, however, we modify the death sentence awarded to the appellants under section 302/149 of the Indian Penal Code to life imprisonment with fine of Rs. 1000/- to each of the appellants. The sentence awarded to the appellants under sections 148, 201/149 of the Indian Penal Code is hereby affirmed. All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 35. In the result, the reference made by the trial Court is answered accordingly. 1000/- to each of the appellants. The sentence awarded to the appellants under sections 148, 201/149 of the Indian Penal Code is hereby affirmed. All the sentences are directed to run concurrently. 35. In the result, the reference made by the trial Court is answered accordingly. Subject to above modification, for the aforesaid reasons, Criminal Appeal No. 458/2015 is partly allowed.