JUDGMENT : The Central Bureau of Investigation (for short 'CBI') has filed the present application for cancellation of the bail granted by the Sessions Judge, Alipore, sitting as the Vacation Judge. 2. The present case arises in view of the alleged involvement of the Opposite Party along with several other accused in cheating the investors of their hard-earned money, most of whom are from the poorer sections of society, of an enormous amount of money running into several thousands of crores of rupees. The alleged involvement of the Opposite Party was revealed while investigating what is popularly known as the "Sarada Chit Fund Scam" case. 3. The Opposite Party had applied for bail on three previous occasions before the Sessions Court. These applications were rejected on 20th May, 25th June and 2nd July, 2015. He had also moved an application for bail before this Court but chose not to press. Later he moved CRM No.6575 of 2015 which was decided by a Division Bench of this Court, to which one of us (Mhatre, J.) was a party, on 6th August, 2015. The prayer for bail was rejected. 4. It appears from the record before us that the Opposite party moved an application for bail before the Sessions Court, Alipore, on 9th October, 2015. The Sessions Judge, Alipore, directed the Opposite Party to intimate the learned Public Prosecutor the next date of hearing and called for the case diary. The hearing was fixed on 31st October, 2015. It appears that the CBI was given a notice on 14th October, 2015 by the Advocate for the Opposite Party informing it that the bail application would be heard on 31st October, 2015. There is no dispute that this notice was received by the CBI on 14th October, 2015. 5. On 31st October, 2015 when the matter was taken up for hearing before the Vacation Judge, an application was submitted by the CBI through its Counsel for an adjournment. The reason for the adjournment was that the Investigating Officer of the case had been summoned to testify before the Special court, CBI at Raipur, Madhya Pradesh, and therefore was not available in the Court on that day to assist the Counsel for the CBI. The reason for the adjournment was that the Investigating Officer of the case had been summoned to testify before the Special court, CBI at Raipur, Madhya Pradesh, and therefore was not available in the Court on that day to assist the Counsel for the CBI. The adjournment application was disallowed by the learned Vacation Judge, and he directed that the parties should appear before him at 3 p.m. It appears that the matter was then heard at 3.30 p.m. on 31st October, 2015, as reflected from the impugned order. However, the Special Public Prosecutor of the CBI was not present. A memo was filed on behalf of the CBI which was signed by the Special P.P. indicating that the learned Judge had erred in directing that the matter would be heard on that date and had not conceded to the reasonable request made by the CBI for an adjournment of the matter to any other date because of the absence of the Investigating Officer and the case diary. 6. The learned Judge has recorded in the impugned order that an adjournment was sought by the Special Public Prosecutor on the ground that the Investigating Officer was at Raipur and the case diary was not available with him. The case was taken up for hearing by the Vacation Judge in the absence of the Counsel for the CBI and the case diary. The Vacation Judge was conscious of the fact that the Sessions Court on three previous occasions and the High Court on another occasion had rejected the bail applications of the Opposite Party. However, he observed that since he had concurrent jurisdiction in view of provisions of Section 439(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, there was no need to wait for either the case diary or the presence of the Counsel for the CBI, as reflected from the impugned order. The learned Judge was perturbed by the fact that the Counsel for the CBI had contended in the memo filed by him that the bail application was being taken up for hearing with undue haste and that he had pre-determined the issue. On considering the submissions of the Counsel for the Opposite Party the learned Vacation Judge granted bail on furnishing a bond of Rs. 2 lac with two sureties of Rs. 1 lac each. 7. On considering the submissions of the Counsel for the Opposite Party the learned Vacation Judge granted bail on furnishing a bond of Rs. 2 lac with two sureties of Rs. 1 lac each. 7. The present application for cancellation of the bail has been argued by the learned Counsel for the CBI on the following points: (i) No notice was issued, as required under Section 439(1)(b) of the Code of Criminal Procedure to the CBI by the Court. (ii) The notice was issued to the CBI by the Advocate for the Opposite Party without indicating that the case diary was required to be brought to Court on 31st October, 2015. (iii) That the learned Vacation Judge has violated the principles of natural justice by not granting an adjournment when he was informed that neither the Investigating Officer of the case nor the Case diary was available in Court on that day. (iv) That the Vacation Court could not have granted bail when the High Court had already rejected the application for bail filed by the Opposite Party on 6th August, 2015 on several grounds which had not been considered by the learned Vacation Judge while granting bail. (v) That the Vacation Court could not have differed with the view taken by this Court while rejecting the bail application of the aforesaid party without there being substantial, compelling and cogent reasons for doing so. (vi) The learned Vacation Judge has not alluded to any change in the circumstances after the order of the High Court on 6th August, 2015 warranting a different order. 8. The learned Counsel for the CBI has referred to the judgments of the Supreme Court in the case of Gulabrao Baburao Deokar v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2013) 16 SCC 190 , State of Gujarat v. Mohanlal Jitamalji Porwal and Anr. reported in (1987) 2 SCC 364 , Shahzad Hasan Khan v. Ishtiaq Hasan Khan and Anr. reported in (1987) 2 SCC 684 , State of Utter Pradesh v. Jairam and Ors. reported in (1982) 1 SCC 176 , Bimla Devi (Smt.) v. State of Bihar and Ors. reported in (1994) 2 SCC 8 , State of M.P. v. Kajad reported in (2001) 7 SCC 673 , Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and Anr. reported in (2004) 7 SCC 528 , Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. and Anr. reported in (1994) 2 SCC 8 , State of M.P. v. Kajad reported in (2001) 7 SCC 673 , Kalyan Chandra Sarkar v. Rajesh Ranjan alias Pappu Yadav and Anr. reported in (2004) 7 SCC 528 , Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. and Anr. in Criminal Appeal No.1272 of 2015 decided by the Supreme Court on 29th September, 2015 and Neeru Yadav v. State of U.P. and Anr. in Criminal Appeal No.2587 of 2014 decided by the Supreme Court 16th December, 2014 and the judgement of the Allahabad High Court in Ramchandra Shukla v. State of U.P. and Ors reported in (1999) 39 ACC 492. We will refer to the judgments a little later. 9. Mr. Kapur, the learned Counsel for the Opposite Party on the other hand submits: (i) That sufficient notice was given to the CBI but the CBI and its Counsel chose to abandon the proceedings before the learned Vacation Judge of the Session Court, Alipore without any reason. (ii) That the application for an adjournment was made on a false ground as a copy of the case diary is always maintained in the CBI office and therefore, the absence of the Investigating Officer could not in any way have hampered the proceedings. (iii) False and reckless allegations have been made against the learned Vacation Judge by contending that he had predetermined the issue and was therefore, biased. (iv) That an application for bail and an application for quashing/cancelling an order of bail on various grounds cannot be treated at par. 10. The learned Counsel has cited Bhagirath Sinh v. State of Gujarat reported in (1984) 1 SCC 284 , Dolat Ram and Ors. v. State of Haryana reported in (1995) 1 SCC 349 , Gudikanti Narashimhulu and Ors. v. Public Prosecutor, High Court of Andhra Pradesh reported in (1978) 1 SCC 240 , State of U.P. through CBI v. Amarmani Tripathi reported in (2005) 8 SCC 21 , Mehboob Dawood Shaikh v. State of Maharashtra reported in (2004) 2 SCC 362 , Mutha Associates and Ors. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2013) 14 SCC 304 , Nityanand Rai v. State of Bihar and Anr. reported in (2005) 4 SCC 178 , Samarendra Nath Bhattacharjee v. State of W.B. and Anr. reported in (2004) 11 SCC 165 , Central Bureau of Investigation v. Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah and Anr. v. State of Maharashtra and Ors. reported in (2013) 14 SCC 304 , Nityanand Rai v. State of Bihar and Anr. reported in (2005) 4 SCC 178 , Samarendra Nath Bhattacharjee v. State of W.B. and Anr. reported in (2004) 11 SCC 165 , Central Bureau of Investigation v. Amitbhai Anil Chandra Shah and Anr. reported in (2012) 10 SCC 545 and the judgment of the Orrisa High Court in Chandramani Swain v. State of Orissa in Criminal Misc. Case No.262 of 1993 decided on 24th February, 1993. 11. The first issue that we will advert to is whether notice was given to the CBI as required under law. Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. which deals with special powers of the High Court and also Sessions Court regarding bail provides that no order for bail shall be passed unless notice is given of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor or, for reasons to be recorded in writing, the Court is of the opinion that it is not practicable to give such a notice. The learned Counsel for the CBI emphasizes before us that the words used in proviso of Section 439(1)(b) of the Cr.P.C. are "the High Court or the Court of Session shall, before granting bail to a person who is accused of an offence ……………………………………, give notice of the application for bail to the Public Prosecutor…………". He submits that the provisions of law mandate that the notice must be issued by the Court and not through the litigant or the accused. This submission, in our opinion, is not sustainable. The main purpose of the proviso is that the prosecutor must be given notice of the bail application and that the Court must consider the view of the prosecution agency before deciding whether to grant bail. The practise adopted in this High Court as well as the Sessions Court in this State is for the advocate for the accused to give notice to the Public Prosecutor that a bail application would be moved before the Court on a particular day. The P. P. is expected to be present on that day along with the case diary. 12. The P. P. is expected to be present on that day along with the case diary. 12. In the present case the object of the proviso has been sub-served when the order was passed on 9th October, 2015 directing the Opposite Party to serve the Public Prosecutor and to call for the C.D. It is true that the notice issued by the Advocate for the Opposite Party does not mention that the CBI would have to ensure that the Case Diary was available for the Court's perusal when the matter was heard on 31st October, 2015. However, it cannot be said that the notice was deficient or that because there was no mention of the requirement of the case diary to be brought to the Court, the adequate notice had not been given to the CBI. Obviously when the notice for hearing of the bail application was given and received undisputedly by the CBI, it meant that the CBI would have to be ready with the Case Diary and all other material to oppose the bail application. 13. However, in the present case an application for an adjournment was made on 31st October, 2015 on the ground that the Investigating Officer was not available on that date as he was in Raipur to testify before the Court on 30th October, 2015 which is apparent from the summons issued to him on 8th October, 2015. It is trite that justice must not only be done but must seem to be done. Accommodating the CBI because of the absence of the Investigating Officer and the Case Diary would not have led to such disastrous results so as to prejudice the Opposite Party. The Court could well have adjourned the matter to another day. There is no dispute that the Court was on vacation and the learned Judge had been assigned the matter as the Vacation Judge. We are unable to appreciate the reckless haste and precipitateness with which the learned Judge desired to dispose of a matter which was filed on 9th October, 2015, in the absence of the case diary and the Investigating Officer. It is true that speedy disposal of criminal cases is the sine qua non of the Criminal Justice System. We are unable to appreciate the reckless haste and precipitateness with which the learned Judge desired to dispose of a matter which was filed on 9th October, 2015, in the absence of the case diary and the Investigating Officer. It is true that speedy disposal of criminal cases is the sine qua non of the Criminal Justice System. However, when a case of this magnitude which has ramifications in several States besides the State of West Bengal, it was necessary for the learned Vacation Judge to act with some caution and circumspection. No earth shattering event would have occurred had he adjourned the matter to another date. It is true that the Opposite Party would have been incarcerated for a few days more but that would hardly have affected him as he was supposedly undergoing treatment in a Hospital. In fact he has been hospitalised since February 2015 after he was arrested in December 2014. He has miraculously become well after he was granted bail and is now confined to his house under police surveillance pursuant to the order passed on 5th November 2015 in this application. Therefore, in our opinion, the propriety of passing an order with such great dispatch raises a cloud of suspicion. 14. However, merely because the Sessions Court did not adjourn the matter on 31st October, 2015, as requested by the learned Counsel for the CBI he ought not to have stayed away from the Court petulantly and hope for the best. It did not give him the licence to contend in his memo filed in Court on that date that the Court had predetermined the issue or that he apprehended that no justice would be done. We expect Advocates to act with decorum without marring the dignity of the Court by using intemperate language against a judge or indeed their opposing Counsel. 15. The submission of Mr. Kapur is that although the Investigating Officer was not available the case diary could have been brought through another Investigating Officer as a copy of the same is maintained in the office of the CBI. This argument in our opinion is not tenable. It may be a practise to maintain a duplicate case diary in the office of the CBI. However, mere production of the case diary in cases where the offences are serious and relate to economic crimes may not suffice. This argument in our opinion is not tenable. It may be a practise to maintain a duplicate case diary in the office of the CBI. However, mere production of the case diary in cases where the offences are serious and relate to economic crimes may not suffice. The Investigating Officer may be required to be present in Court to assist the Public Prosecutor. Therefore, in our opinion, the learned Judge had unnecessarily thrown caution to the winds and decided the matter on that date without having the opportunity to refer to the case diary. 16. The parameters within which a bail application is to be decided are well settled. They bear repetition: The Court while granting bail is required to notice (i) the seriousness of the offence, (ii) the possibility of the accused fleeing from justice, (iii) the likelihood of the accused tampering with the prosecution evidence and witnesses, (iv) the antecedents of the accused, (v) the larger interest of the society at large or the State etc. Besides, the court is also expected to consider whether earlier applications for bail filed by the accused have been rejected and whether the accused is able to demonstrate the existence of new circumstances after the last order rejecting the application was passed. The order granting bail must reflect that the Court has considered these aspects and finds that there are compelling reasons to grant bail. 17. The impugned order does not demonstrate that the vacation judge has adhered to these principles while enlarging the Opposite Party on bail. 18. We will now advert to some of the judgments cited before us. It is not necessary to deal with each one of them invidually as the Supreme Court has reiterated the well settled principles to be borne in mind while cancelling the bail granted. 19. In the case of Gulabrao Baburao Deokar (supra) the Supreme Court has observed after referring to the judgments in the case of Bhagirath Sinh (supra), Dolat Ram (supra) and Amarmani Tripathi (supra) besides several other judgments including the case of Puran v. Ram Bilas reported in (2001) 6 SCC 338 that the High Court has the power under Section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C. to set aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order granting bail. This is independent of other grounds for cancellation of bail, such as, the accused misusing his liberty by tampering with the evidence or pressurising witnesses or any supervening circumstances which may have arisen after bail was granted. The Supreme Court noted in this case that the prosecution had applied for a remand of two days which was declined and bail was granted. The Court further held that notice under the proviso of Section 439(1) of the Cr.P.C. implies a proper and full opportunity to the prosecutor to point out as to why bail should not be granted. Unfortunately in this case the learned Judge, while acting in unseemly haste, has not observed these parameters and has granted bail. 20. In the case of Kalyan Chandra Sarkar (supra) the Supreme Court held that there is an onus on the Court to consider the subsequent application for grant of bail by noticing the ground on which the earlier bail applications had been rejected. Specific reasons would have to be given by the Court if it was of the view that bail should be granted in spite of such earlier rejection. The Court has further held that while granting bail the Court is duty bound to mention what are the fresh grounds which persuaded it to take a different view from the one in the earlier applications. This essential feature which is set out in the aforesaid judgment does not find place in the discussion by the learned Vacation Judge in the impugned order dated 31st October, 2015. Mr. Kapur attempted to submit that this was because of the literary inadequacy of the learned Judge. However, we are not impressed by this argument. 21. The learned Vacation Judge has deliberately not referred to the earlier orders disallowing the repeated bail applications filed by the Opposite Party. Reasons for refusing bail have been mentioned in the High Court's order and for that matter in the earlier orders passed by the Sessions Court on three occasions while rejecting the bail applications. There is no dispute that the Sessions Court and the High Court under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. have concurrent jurisdiction. It is trite that the Sessions Court should normally not take a different view from the decision of the High Court refusing bail unless there are compelling circumstances which warrant the enlargement of the accused on bail. There is no dispute that the Sessions Court and the High Court under Section 439 of the Cr.P.C. have concurrent jurisdiction. It is trite that the Sessions Court should normally not take a different view from the decision of the High Court refusing bail unless there are compelling circumstances which warrant the enlargement of the accused on bail. In the order impugned before us we do not find that the learned Vacation Judge has shown the courtesy of even referring to our order, let alone the reasons on which the bail application filed by the Opposite Party had been rejected by the Division Bench of the High Court. The vacation judge has not enumerated in his order the compelling circumstances which required him to take a different view from that of the High Court. The argument of Mr. Kapur was that the Opposite Party had been incarcerated for three more months after the order of the High Court and that by itself was sufficient reason to take a different view of the matter. He also points out that the Opposite Party had been interrogated after the High Court's order on 27th August and 28th August, 2015 and that the charge-sheet which was filed on 14th August 2015 did not contain any allegation against the Opposite Party. Therefore, according to him, the learned Judge could not be faulted for having passed the aforesaid order. 22. In fact, in Ram Chandra Shukla (supra) the Division Bench of the Allahabad High Court has opined that once the High Court rejects the bail application the sub-ordinate Court should not grant bail as it would amount to gross judicial indiscipline. In the case of Kajad (supra) the Supreme Court has reiterated its view in Hari Singh Mann v. Harbhajan Singh Bajwas reported in (2001) 1 SCC 169 and in State of T.N. v. S. A. Raja reported in (2005)8 SCC 380 . It has held that it was permissible to file repeated or successive bail applications. Unless there is a change in circumstances the subsequent application is not to be allowed as it would be deemed to be seeking review of the earlier judgment which is not permissible under criminal law. 23. It has held that it was permissible to file repeated or successive bail applications. Unless there is a change in circumstances the subsequent application is not to be allowed as it would be deemed to be seeking review of the earlier judgment which is not permissible under criminal law. 23. Although we do not agree with the extreme position of the Allahabad High Court that in no case could the subordinate Court grant bail once the High Court rejects it, there is no doubt that the subordinate Court can grant bail only if there are changed circumstances warranting a different order. 24. The learned Counsel for the Opposite Party has submitted that when an application for cancellation of bail is filed, it is to be decided on different parameters as compared to the considerations while deciding a bail application or the opposition to a bail application. The principle emerging from the judgments cited by Mr. Kapur is that once bail is granted to an accused it should not be cancelled unless the post-bail conduct of an accused is mischievous or a threat to the witnesses. There can be no dispute about this proposition of law. 25. However, we are faced with an order which is palpably illegal and perverse. The order does not reflect that the learned Vacation Judge has considered the reasons for which the bail had been rejected on four earlier occasions. In fact, surprisingly the learned Judge accepts that the Opposite Party is a Cabinet Minister of West Bengal, that he is a very influential person, that the magnitude of the offence is serious and huge and that it is an economic offence. However, by a strange process of reasoning the learned Judge concludes that since a crime can be perpetrated or committed by a person who is incarcerated there was no need to continue the Opposite Party in detention any further. He has observed that the personal appearance or physical presence of any influential person is not necessary to interfere with the investigation or to threaten the witnesses and therefore no purpose would be served by incarcerating the Opposite Party any further. 26. The learned Vacation Judge has ignored the observations of the Division Bench of this Court made while rejecting the bail application which are as follows: "We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. 26. The learned Vacation Judge has ignored the observations of the Division Bench of this Court made while rejecting the bail application which are as follows: "We have given our anxious consideration to the submissions of the learned Counsel appearing for the parties. We are of the view that this is not a case where it is necessary to consider only the applicant's right to liberty but also to ascertain the effect his freedom will have on the progress of investigation in this case. It is true that the charge-sheet has been filed on 18th February, 2015 implicating the applicant. However, the possibility of the applicant wielding influence on investigation, the witnesses, on the judicial process cannot be ruled out. Mr. Sibal did suggest that the petitioner would tender his resignation once he is released on bail. However we are not impressed with this offer. Even if he does resign, the petitioner's access to witnesses will not be thwarted. His clout would not be diminished. The magnitude of the scam and the fact that its tentacles are spread in various States deters us from enlarging the petitioner on bail. The larger interest of the public and the State in economic offences must be borne into mind while considering whether the applicant should be granted bail. We are not convinced that the Petitioner should be enlarged on bail only because some of the other accused are no longer in custody." 27. As mentioned earlier the vacation judge has not thought it fit to refer to this order or to explain the reasons which compelled him to take a different view from that of the High Court. 28. Mr. Kapur, the learned Counsel for the Opposite Party, submits that the CBI has indulged in "pick and choose" by preferring an application for cancellation of bail only in respect of the Opposite Party and not in respect of Sandhir Agarwal who was granted bail on the same day by the same learned Judge in Crl. Misc. Case No.5245 of 2015. This argument is merely a red17 herring. It is for the prosecuting agencies to decide which orders are to be challenged in a superior Court. Neither can the accused dictate to the prosecution agencies which matters ought to be challenged by them nor can the Court direct the prosecuting agencies to do so. Misc. Case No.5245 of 2015. This argument is merely a red17 herring. It is for the prosecuting agencies to decide which orders are to be challenged in a superior Court. Neither can the accused dictate to the prosecution agencies which matters ought to be challenged by them nor can the Court direct the prosecuting agencies to do so. In any event, as mentioned in the affidavit filed by the CBI on 17th November, 2015 the CBI is going to file an application under Section 439(2) of the Cr.P.C. for cancellation of the bail granted to Sandhir Agarwal also. 29. It would be appropriate at this stage to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court which has led the CBI to act as the prosecution agency in the Sarada Scam. In the case of Subrata Chattoraj v. Union of India and Ors reported in (2014) 8 SCC 768 the Supreme Court noticed that the Sarada Chit Fund Scam involved Rs. 10 thousand crores, affecting lacs of depositors especially from the weaker and poorer sections of the society. The Court observed thus: "Suffice it to say, that the scam of this magnitude going on for years unnoticed and unchecked, is suggestive of a deep rooted apathy if not criminal neglect on the part of the regulators who ought to do everything necessary to prevent such fraud and public loot. Depending upon whether the investigation reveals any criminal conspiracy among those promoting the companies that flourished at the cost of the common man and those who were supposed to prevent such fraud calls for a comprehensive investigation not only to bring those who were responsible to book but also to prevent recurrence of such scams in future." 30. The Supreme Court has also noted that it was abundantly clear that there are several important individuals wielding considerable influence within the State and at national level who had been identified by the Investigating Agency. The Court further directed that the investigation into this scam was not to be confined only to those directly involved in the affairs of the company but could extend to several others who needed to be questioned about their role in the sequence and unfolding of events. 31. The Court further directed that the investigation into this scam was not to be confined only to those directly involved in the affairs of the company but could extend to several others who needed to be questioned about their role in the sequence and unfolding of events. 31. Unfortunately the learned Vacation Judge has not bothered at all to either refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Subrata Chattoraj or to the Division Bench decision in CRM No.6575 of 2015. He has not noted the reasons why we had refrained from granting bail to the Opposite Party. The possibility of the Applicant (i.e., Opposite Party) in this case wielding influence on the investigation and on the eye-witnesses as well as on the judicial process could not be ruled out observed the Division Bench while rejecting the bail application. 32. The Division Bench had noted that the offer of the Opposite Party to resign as a Cabinet Minister would not diminish his clout in society and indeed in the Government or on the witnesses. The vacation Judge has not referred to these reasons nor has he observed that these reasons are no longer applicable in the present case, and therefore, the Opposite Party was entitled to bail. It is apparent that the learned Judge has completely ignored the order of the Division Bench and has granted bail on flimsy grounds. It is well-settled now that while granting bail with respect to economic offences, the Court must be cautious especially where the hard-earned money of investors who are from the poorer sections of the society is involved. It is not just the liberty of the individual but the interest of the society which must be taken into account while granting bail. The Supreme Court has opined thus in Nimmagadda Prasad v. CBI reported in (2013) 7 SCC 466 : "Economic offences constitute a class apart and need to be visited with a different approach in the matter of bail. The economic offence having deep-rooted conspiracies and involving huge loss of public funds needs to be viewed seriously and considered as a grave offence affecting the economy of the country as a whole and thereby posing serious threat to the financial health of the country". 33. Looked at from any angle, the order of the learned Vacation Judge is perverse and riddled with infirmities. 33. Looked at from any angle, the order of the learned Vacation Judge is perverse and riddled with infirmities. It has been passed against the well-settled principles of criminal jurisprudence and against judicial propriety. The anxiety to get into 'a disposal' against one's name should not lead the Judge to ignore the well settled cannons of justice. It is not only the interest of the individual citizen but equally the prosecuting agency and the society at large which must be borne in mind while deciding a bail application. In the present case the learned Judge has, in our opinion, failed to act judiciously by not granting an adjournment to the CBI and enlarging a person on bail who undoubtedly wields great influence and power in the State of West Bengal. 34. There is no doubt, therefore, that the order impugned is not sustainable and is required to be set aside. 35. Accordingly, the order dated 31.10.2015 is quashed and set aside. 36. The bail granted to the Opposite Party is cancelled. 37. The Opposite Party shall surrender before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, South 24 Parganas, immediately. 38. Mr. Kapur, the learned Counsel for the Opposite Party, seeks time of seven days to surrender so that the Opposite Party could move the Hon'ble Supreme Court. 39. We are not inclined to grant this relief to the Opposite Party. 40. Mr. Kapur further submits that documents which have been filed today by the CBI showing the tentative tour programme of the Investigating Officer of the case should be retained on record as they materially affect the case and permission be granted to him to file an application with respect to those documents. 41. When these documents were filed in the morning session, Mr. Kapur had taken great umbrage and had argued that these documents cannot be considered as they had been sought to be produced across the bar. We have therefore not referred to these documents in our order and we are not retaining them on record. 42. A copy of this order be sent to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Alipore, South 24 Parganas, immediately. 43. Urgent certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties.