ORDER : Anand Byrareddy, J. Heard the learned Counsel for the petitioner and the learned Counsel for the respondent. 2. The petitioner is a registered trade union and seeks to espouse the cause of its members, who claimed to be workmen under the respondent. The respondent is a Government company. The petitioner claims that in the charter of demand, it had raised a demand in respect of 18 workmen, who were appointed as trainees or apprentices, but required to carry out permanent nature of work and were hence claiming permanent status and to be treated as permanent employees under the provisions of the Certified Standing Orders. They had been appointed as such since the year 1995. The respondent immediately had terminated the services of 18 workmen without following the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the `ID Act', for brevity), which amounted to unfair labour practise and illegal retrenchment and accordingly an industrial dispute was raised before the Conciliation Officer and conciliation having failed, a reference was made to the Labour Court and the matter was adjudicated. The Labour Court having held against the claim of the workmen, the present petition is filed. 3. The learned Counsel for the petitioner would point out that insofar as 18 workmen are concerned, they were appointed as trainees and they were trained initially for a period of 6 months and it is inexplicable that they were continued to be treated as trainees and had been continuously engaged in the place of permanent workmen and the nature of work was of a permanent nature though the nomenclature was `trainee'. It is only to exploit the workmen that such a method has been adopted and to compound the manner in which exploitation was carried out, an artificial break was introduced to claim that they continued to be trainees. As on the date of raising of the industrial dispute, the said workmen had been continuously employed for over seven years. It is this glaring circumstance which was urged as a ground seeking the relief of permanence, which the Labour Court has unfairly denied. 4. As on the date of raising of the industrial dispute, the said workmen had been continuously employed for over seven years. It is this glaring circumstance which was urged as a ground seeking the relief of permanence, which the Labour Court has unfairly denied. 4. It is pointed out that Clause 15 of the Certified Standing Orders (CSO) was applicable to the respondent-company and they had a right to be appointed as a permanent workmen as contemplated under Clause 11 of the CSO and merely because the management had not produced before the Court their job requirement schedule, it was concluded that the Managing Director was not empowered to employ the workmen to permanent posts. It is not in dispute that they had been employed for more than 240 days, every year and if they had to be terminated it ought to have been in accordance with the provisions of Section 25-F of the ID Act and that not having been done, it clearly was an illegal retrenchment and hence they were entitled to consequential benefits. 5. It is contended that the Court below as not justified to placing reliance on a decision of the Apex Court in Secretary, State of Karnataka and Others v. Umadevi and Others, (2006) 4 SCC 1 , when on the other hand, the law laid down by the Apex Court in Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation v. Casteribe Rajya Parivahan Karmachari Sanghatana, (2009) 8 SCC 556 , was clearly applicable to the present case on hand and therefore, the Counsel seeks that the petition be allowed. 6. The learned Counsel for the respondent, on the other hand, seeks to contend that it was true that 18 workmen were engaged as trainees for various period between 1995 and 2004. They were engaged as trainees fora fixed period on the terms and conditions set out in the letter of engagement issued to each of these trainees and immediately on the expiry of the period specified, the training stood terminated. They did not have a vested right in seeking absorption in the service of the company. They were engaged as trainees fora fixed period on the terms and conditions set out in the letter of engagement issued to each of these trainees and immediately on the expiry of the period specified, the training stood terminated. They did not have a vested right in seeking absorption in the service of the company. In any event, the respondent-company being a Government Company, engagement of any employees would only be on the basis of the recruitment rules, the eligibility criteria, which the candidates have to specify during regular recruitment process and availability of vacancies in the relevant positions was a precondition for such engagement and absorption. The mere contention that they have been repeatedly engaged as trainees over several years is to meet certain demands on orders placed by the Government for purposes of production of goods, which the respondents have engaged. This by itself would not confer any vested right on the said workmen. Therefore, the Labour Court was justified in its conclusion that a clear relationship of employer and employee was not established and that the workmen concerned had not demonstrated their entitlement to any such regularisation or even a claim to illegal retrenchment in the absence of employer and employee relationship. 7. On a plain examination of the record, the glaring circumstance that though these workmen were claiming to be trainees, their repeated engagement on each occasion leads to a presumption that they were indeed exploited by the respondent-company which is a shame for a Government run company. However, in the eye of law, no relationship of employer and employee is created. It is not evident that they were appointed against vacant sanctioned posts and were trained in order to be absorbed. The respondent has not chosen to do so. Therefore, the question of "lifting the veil" as it were, to address the exploitation alleged and the ruse adopted by the respondent-company to engage the services of the workmen in respect of permanent nature of work, but on the other hand, to treat them as trainees for all purposes, including payment of their remuneration, cannot be found as a fact by this Court in the face of findings arrived at by the Labour Court with reference to the material documents that were relied upon. The legal position as regards the scope and effect of the judgment preceding Umadevi's case and the judgments rendered thereafter, vis-a-vis the judgment now relied upon by the learned Counsel for the petitioner, namely, Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporations case, it cannot be said that the case of the petitioner is advanced by reference to the Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation's case, though the law laid down in Umadevi's case and subsequent judgments has not been overruled Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation's case and unless an employee is appointed against a sanctioned post and has continued in service for a long time, without the intervention of the Court orders and it is only in such circumstances that for a limited period, it was open for such workmen to claim regularisation and hence reliance sought to be placed on Maharashtra State Road Transport Corporation's case would not be applicable, as that judgment was rendered in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and especially since an individual workman, who had earlier approached Courts had been granted certain benefits, which was extended to the workman, who had instituted the proceedings, which was the subject-matter of the said judgment, through a union. 8. In the light of the above, the petition lacks merit and is dismissed.