Judgment 1. This Petition coming on for hearing upon perusing the petition and affidavit filed in support thereof on the file of the High Court and upon hearing the arguments of Mr. K. Thilageswaran, Counsel for Petitioners in both the petitions and of Mr. S. Sithirai Anandan, Counsel for the respondents in both the petitions the court made the following order: These petitions are filed to condone the delay of 619 days in preferring the appeals against the order of acquittal passed by the Judicial Magistrate’s Court, Fast Track Court (Magistrate Level II), Coimbatore in C.C.Nos. 367 and 356 of 2011 dated 19.12.2012. 2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner as a complainant preferred private complaints against the respondent under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and after contesting, the cases were ended in acquittal. It is further submitted that the petitioner’s company without knowing the fact in which Court they have to file an appeal, preferred the appeals in C.A.Nos. 12 and 13 of 2013 before the District and Sessions Court, Coimbatore. After knowing the fact, the petitioner has made an endorsement to withdraw those appeals and the District and Sessions Court, Coimbatore dismissed the appeals by a docket order dated 27.01.2014. Therefore, the petitioner has come forward with the petitions with the delay of 619 days. Hence the petitioner prayed for condonation of delay and they are ready to pay any costs to the respondent for the delay caused. 3. Resisting the same, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the petitioner is a company and ignorance of law is not an excuse. Even though the District and Sessions Court, Coimbatore dismissed the appeals on 27.01.2014 stating that the Court has no jurisdiction, the petitioner has represented the appeal papers only on October 2014 and the delay of nine months is not property explained. It is further submitted that only to drag the respondent before this Court, the petitioner has come forward with these petitions. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the petitions. To substantiate his arguments, he relied upon the decision of this Court. 4. Considered the rival submissions made on both sides and perused the typed set of papers. 5. It is further submitted that only to drag the respondent before this Court, the petitioner has come forward with these petitions. Hence, he prayed for dismissal of the petitions. To substantiate his arguments, he relied upon the decision of this Court. 4. Considered the rival submissions made on both sides and perused the typed set of papers. 5. It is an admitted fact that the petitioner herein as a complainant preferred private complaints against the respondent under Section 138 of Negotiable Instruments Act and after contesting the same, the cases were ended in acquittal. It is also admitted that the petitioner herein has preferred appeals against the judgment of acquittal before the District and Sessions Court, Coimbatore and the same were dismissed on 27.01.2014. But, admittedly, the present appeals have been presented before this Court only on 29.10.2014. 6. On perusal of affidavit filed by the petitioner reveals that the petitioner has not stated why he has not preferred this appeal before this Court as soon as the appeal preferred before the Sessions Court was dismissed on 27.01.2014. In para-7 of the affidavit, it was stated that unexpected and unavoidable works of both official and personal, he could not approach this Court in time. 7. As per the dictum of the Apex Court reported in AIR 1998 SC 3222 (N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy), it was specifically held that if the length of delay is immaterial, sufficient cause for condonation of delay has to be explained. It is appropriate to extract para-9 to11, which read as follows: “9. ……. Length of delay is no matter, acceptability of the explanation is the only criterion. Sometimes delay of the shortest range may be uncondonable due to want of acceptable explanation whereas in certain other cases delay of very long range can be condoned as the explanation thereof is satisfactory. Once the Court accepts the explanation as sufficient it is the result of positive exercise of discretion and normally the superior Court should not disturb such finding, much less in revisional jurisdiction, unless the exercise of discretion was on wholly untenable grounds or arbitrary or perverse. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. But it is a different matter when the first Court refuses to condone the delay. In such cases, the superior Court would be free to consider the cause shown for the delay afresh and it is open to such superior Court to come to its own finding even untrammeled by the conclusion of the lower Court. 10. The reason for such a different stance is thus: The primary function of a Court is to adjudicate the dispute between the parties and to advance substantial justice. Time limit fixed for approaching the Court in different situations is not because on the expiry of such time a bad cause would transform into a good cause. 11. Rules of limitation are not meant to destroy the right of parties. They are meant to see that parties do not resort to dilatory tactics, but seek their remedy promptly. The object of providing a legal remedy is to repair the damage caused by reason of legal injury. .. … “ 8. Further, in the judgment of the Apex Court reported in 2011 (4) SCC 363 (Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead), repl. By legal heirs) vs. State of Andhra Pradesh and others), in para-19, 23, 28 and 29, it was held as follows: “19. We have considered the submissions made by the learned counsel. At the outset, it needs to be stated that generally speaking, the courts, in this country, including this Court, adopt a liberal approach in considering the application for condonation of delay on the ground of sufficient cause under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. This principles is well settled and has been set out succinctly in Collector, Land Acquisition v. Katiji (1987) 2 SCC 107 . 20. .. .. 21. .. .. 22. .. .. 23. The concepts of liberal approach and reasonableness in exercise of the discretion by the Courts in condoning delay, have been again stated by this Court in Balwant Singh v. Jagdish Singh (2010) 8 SCC 685 as follows:- (SCC p-696, paras 25-26). “25. We may state that even if the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. “25. We may state that even if the term ‘sufficient cause’ has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of ‘reasonableness’ as it is understood in its general connotation. 26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise (sic a lis). These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favour of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party. Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly.” 24. .. .. 25. .. .. 26. .. .. 27. .. .. 28. We are at a loss to fathom any logic or rationale, which could have impelled the High Court to condone the delay after holding the same to be unjustifiable. The concepts such as “liberal approach”, “justice oriented approach”, “substantial justice” cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. Especially, in cases where the Court concludes that there is no justification for the delay. In our opinion, the approach adopted by the High Court tends to show the absence of judicial balance and restraint, which a Judge is required to maintain whilst adjudicating any lis between the parties. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. We are rather pained to notice that in this case, not being satisfied with the use of mere intemperate language, the High Court resorted to blatant sarcasms. 29. The use of unduly strong intemperate or extravagant language in a judgment has been repeatedly disapproved by this Court in a number of cases. Whilst considering applications for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, the Courts do not enjoy unlimited and unbridled discretionary powers. All discretionary powers, especially judicial powers, have to be exercised within reasonable bounds, known to the law. The discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason. Whims or fancies; prejudices or predilections cannot and should not form the basis of exercising discretionary powers.” As per the dictum of the Apex Court, for condonation of delay, the discretion has to be exercised in a systematic manner informed by reason and justice must be done to both parties. Further, the condonation of delay is only a discretion that too judicial discretion and while exercising the judicial discretion, the Court should consider the loss causes to the opposite party. 9. In the case on hand, no explanation has been given by the petitioner/complaint, who is the company, as to why it has not preferred the appeals in time. In such circumstances, the petitioner cannot file appeals when ever they want to prefer. 10. It is a well settled dictum of the Apex Court that the delay cannot be condoned merely because the Government has filed this appeal with a petition for condonation of delay stating that on the basis of administrative grounds, they have not filed the same in time. Considering the above decisions, I am of the view that the petitioner herein has not given sufficient reason for condonation of delay. So, the delay has not been properly explained. Hence, I do not find any reason to condone the delay and therefore, the petition stands dismissed.