Oral Judgment: 1. This writ petition filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India takes exception to the order dated 28-2-2014 passed by the trial Court allowing the application moved by the present respondents for setting aside the ex parte order passed against them in Special Civil Suit No.674/2008 and granting them opportunity to file their written statement. 2. The facts relevant for adjudication of the reliefs sought in the writ petition are that the petitioners are the original plaintiffs who have filed suit for recovery of an amount of Rs.2,32,62,249/- against the respondents with interest. It is not necessary to go into the basis for seeking said relief in the suit. The defendant Nos.1A,1B & 1C were duly served with the suit summons, but they failed to file their written statement. The trial Court, therefore, passed an order on 23-4-2009 directing that the suit would proceed without any written statement of said defendants. Thereafter on 9-1-2014, said defendants moved an application vide Exhibit-62 for setting aside the earlier order directing the suit to proceed ex parte and for permission to file written statement on record. The plaintiffs filed their reply opposing said application. In the reply, it was also stated that there was considerable delay in moving the application below Exh.62 and in absence of any explanation whatsoever for said delay, the application was liable to be rejected. The trial Court by its order dated 28-2-2014 allowed aforesaid application by imposing costs on said defendants. This order is impugned in the present writ petition. 3. Shri R. L. Khapre, the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the trial Court was not justified in allowing the application moved by the defendant Nos.1A to 1C for setting aside the ex parte order and granting them permission to file written statement. According to him, the trial Court did not consider the stand taken by the plaintiffs in their reply to aforesaid application. He submitted that as the application below Exhibit-62 for setting aside the ex parte order was moved beyond the period of three years without seeking condonation of delay in that regard, the trial Court could not have allowed the said application. He submitted that as the application below Exhibit-62 for setting aside the ex parte order was moved beyond the period of three years without seeking condonation of delay in that regard, the trial Court could not have allowed the said application. He also submitted that under provisions of Article 137 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for short the said Act), it was not permissible for the said defendants to seek the relief of filing written statement on record without having the delay condoned. In support of the contention that provisions of Article 137 of the said Act were applicable in the present circumstances, the learned Counsel relied upon the judgment of the learned Single Judge in Akola Zilla Parishad Akola v. Laxman Baluji Manatkar and another 1980 Mh.L.J. 675 and judgment of the Kerala High Court in C. L. Cleetus v. South Indian Bank Ltd., and Anr AIR 2007 Kerala 301. He then submitted that in absence of any application for condonation of delay, the relief as sought vide Exhibit-62 could not have been granted. In that regard, he placed reliance on the decisions reported in Ballumal A. Jaisingh vs. M/s J. J. Builders and others 2003(3) Mh.L.J. 238, V. K. Saboo and Anr vs. Additional Collector, Nagpur and Ors 2005(1) Mh.L.J. 1147 and Union of India & anr. v. Swanand Engineer & anr. 2006(6) BCR 500. It was then urged that after passing of the order below Exhibit-32 directing the suit to proceed without written statement on 10-1-2009, the proceedings in said suit had been stayed in view of interim orders passed in Civil Revision Application No.57/2009 by this Court. Though the civil suit was stayed for the period from 7-9-2009 till 13-8-2010, the said defendants were not precluded from filing any application for setting aside the ex parte order and for filing their written statement. For said submission, the learned Counsel relied on the judgments in Sujanbai Haribhau Kakde and others v. Motiram Gopal Saraf and another 1980 Mh. L.J. 578 and Vashdev Bheroomal Pamnani v. M/s M. Bipinkumar and Co. AIR 1987 Bombay 226. It was then submitted that even otherwise there was no explanation whatsoever for the delay caused in moving the application vide Exhibit-62. As said delay was not explained, the trial Court was not justified in allowing said application. L.J. 578 and Vashdev Bheroomal Pamnani v. M/s M. Bipinkumar and Co. AIR 1987 Bombay 226. It was then submitted that even otherwise there was no explanation whatsoever for the delay caused in moving the application vide Exhibit-62. As said delay was not explained, the trial Court was not justified in allowing said application. In that regard, he placed reliance on the decision of the Division Bench in Mathuradas Mohta College of Science, Nagpur v. R. T. Borkar & others 1997 (2) Mh.L.J. 168 . He, therefore, submitted that the impugned order could not be sustained and the same was required to be set aside. 4. Shri M. P. Khajanchi, the learned Counsel appearing for the respondents supported the impugned order. He submitted that the trial Court acted within its jurisdiction when it allowed the application moved by the defendant Nos.1A to 1C. As good cause was shown, the said defendants were permitted to file their written statement after setting aside the ex parte order against them. In this regard, he placed reliance on judgment of learned Single Judge in Bhumika w/o Ravi Ajgaonkar vs. Ravi Harikant Ajgaonkar 2010 (7) Mh.L.J. 851. He then submitted that the trial Court had permitted said defendants to file their written statement by imposing costs and hence, the course as prescribed by provisions of Order 9 Rule 7 of the Code had been followed. In that regard, he sought to draw support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Vijay Kumar Madan & ors. v. R. N. Gupta Technical Education Society and ors., 2002(3) All MR 223. Without prejudice to aforesaid submissions, it was urged that Article 137 of the said Act would not apply when an application for setting aside an ex parte order coupled with a prayer for permission to file written statement was moved. In that regard, he placed reliance on the judgment of the Division Bench in Vijay Agarwal and others v. Harinarayan G. Bajaj and others 2013(4) Mh.L.J. 298 . He also relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Harihar Nath and others v. State Bank of India and others 2006 (4) SCC 457 to urge that filing of an interlocutory application was not governed by provisions of Article 137 of the said Act. He also relied upon judgment of the Supreme Court in Harihar Nath and others v. State Bank of India and others 2006 (4) SCC 457 to urge that filing of an interlocutory application was not governed by provisions of Article 137 of the said Act. He, therefore, submitted that discretion having been exercised in favour of the said defendants by the trial Court, the same did not call for any interference whatsoever. 5. I have given thoughtful consideration to the aforesaid submissions and I have also considered the various judgments relied upon by the Counsel for the parties. At the outset, it may be stated that though the writ petition has been filed under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, in view of the recent decision of the Supreme Court in Radhey Shyam and another vs. Chabi Nath and others 2015(3) SCALE 88, invocation of Article 226 of the Constitution of India for laying challenge to an order passed by the civil court has been held to be not permissible. The challenge, therefore, will have to be examined only under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. The decision in Shail (Smt.) vs. Manojkumar and others 2004(3) Mh.L.J. 503 has been referred to in Radhey Shyam (supra) with regard to observations made in respect of exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In para 3 therefor, it has been observed thus: “3. In Surya Dev Rai vs. Ram Chander Rai, 2004(1) Mh.L.J. (S.C.) 633 = (2003) 6 SCC 675 this Court has held that in exercise of power of superintendence conferred under Article 227 of the Constitution of India on the High Court, the High Court does have power to make such directions as the facts and circumstances of the case may warrant, may be, by way of guiding the inferior Court or tribunal as to the manner in which it would proceed hence and the High Court has the jurisdiction also to pass itself such a decision or direction as the inferior Court or tribunal should have made.” In the light of aforesaid law, the challenge has been examined under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 6. 6. The facts indicate that on 10-1-2009, the trial Court had rejected the application moved by the defendant Nos.1A to 1C for grant of time to file written statement and thereafter on 23-4-2009, the suit was directed to proceed ex parte against the said defendants. These orders were sought to be set aside by moving an application below Exhibit-62 on 9-1-2014. The issue, therefore, that arises for consideration is whether limitation prescribed by Article 137 of the said Act would apply when the defendant seeks for permission to file written statement on record after setting aside the ex parte order passed against him? 7. Article 137 of the said Act being relevant, the same is being reproduced here under: PART II OTHER APPLICATIONS Description of application Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 137. Any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this division. Three years When the right to apply accrues. After a defendant has been set ex parte, he can appear and assign good cause for his previous nonappearance. Said course is prescribed by provisions of Order 9 Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (for short the Code). Said provision, therefore, contemplates moving of an application by appearing before the Court and after assigning good cause for his previous nonappearance, seek setting aside of the ex parte order. 8. A somewhat similar question was considered by learned Single Judge in Akola Z. P. Akola (supra). It was held that though Order 9 Rule 7 of the Code did not speak of the defendant applying for setting aside an ex parte order, the purport of said Rule indicated that such an application was required to be moved by the defendant. It was, therefore, held that such course would attract provisions of Article 137 of the said Act. Similar view has been taken by the Kerala High Court in C.L. Cleetus (supra) wherein the argument that an application under provisions of Order 9 Rule 7 could be moved at any point of time was repelled and it was held that such application would be governed by provisions of Article 137 of the Code. Similar view has been taken by the Kerala High Court in C.L. Cleetus (supra) wherein the argument that an application under provisions of Order 9 Rule 7 could be moved at any point of time was repelled and it was held that such application would be governed by provisions of Article 137 of the Code. Hence, said submission made on behalf of the petitioners that the application moved by the defendant Nos.1A to 1C was required to be preferred within the limitation prescribed by Article 137 of the said Act deserves to be accepted. 9. In Vijay Agrawal and others (supra), the Division Bench considered the question as to whether an application for amendment of the pleadings under Order 6 Rule 17 of the Code would be subject to the provisions of Article 137 of the said Act. After considering various decisions of the Supreme Court including the decision in Hariharnath (supra), the Division Bench held that Article 137 of the said Act was not applicable to an interlocutory application made during pendency of the suit for amending the written statement. In Hariharnath (supra) it was held by the Supreme Court that an application seeking leave to proceed with a pending suit or proceedings under Section 446(1) of the Companies Act, 1956 would not attract Article 137 of the said Act. It was held that Article 137 of the said Act is intended to apply to applications for enforcement of a claim or adjudication of a right or liability in a Court. It was further observed that if no “relief” or “remedy” with reference to any claim or right or obligation or liability was sought, then provisions of Article 137 of the said Act would not be applicable. In the present case, the concerned defendants had prayed for setting aside the ex parte order and for permission to file written statement on record. The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court support the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the respondents were seeking relief of setting aside the ex parte order and placing the written statement on record. This aspect can also be viewed from another angle. The aforesaid observations of the Supreme Court support the submissions made on behalf of the petitioners that the respondents were seeking relief of setting aside the ex parte order and placing the written statement on record. This aspect can also be viewed from another angle. In Vijaykumar Madan (supra), the Supreme Court held that an application under provisions of Order 9 Rule 7 of the Code could be made only if the defendant wishes the proceedings to be relegated back and to re-open the proceedings from the date wherefrom they became ex parte so as to convert the ex parte hearing into bi-parte. This, therefore, contemplates the defendant seeking relief of being relegated back to the earlier position after re-opening the proceedings. As the defendants seek relief in that regard, such application seeking said relief would, therefore, be governed by Article 137 of the said Act. 10. Having held that the provisions of Article 137 of the said Act would apply if the defendant prays for setting aside the ex parte order and seeks permission to file written statement, it would be necessary to consider whether such prayer had been made by the defendant Nos.1A to 1C vide Exhibit-62. In said application, the said defendants sought to give reasons for their non-appearance in the proceedings even after service of the summons. There are no pleadings whatsoever as regards delay in moving said application and the reasons for said delay. On the other hand, the petitioners in their reply to the aforesaid application have taken a clear stand that the delay in moving the said application had not at all been explained. The trial Court in the impugned order did not consider the aspect of delay and allowed application on the ground that the matter was required to be decided on merits. As the aspect of delay has not been considered by the trial Court, it is not necessary to examine the correctness of the reasons for allowing the application below Exhibit 62. Hence, question of applicability of the ratio of the decision in Bhumika Ajgaonkar (supra) does not arise. 11. It cannot be ignored that on expiry of period of three years being the period of limitation under Article 137 of the said Act, a right accrued in favour of the present petitioners. Hence, question of applicability of the ratio of the decision in Bhumika Ajgaonkar (supra) does not arise. 11. It cannot be ignored that on expiry of period of three years being the period of limitation under Article 137 of the said Act, a right accrued in favour of the present petitioners. If the defendant Nos.1A to 1C desired to participate in the proceedings by setting aside the ex parte order and by filing their written statement which application was moved beyond the period of limitation as prescribed, then it is obvious that the said defendants were required to seek condonation of delay in doing so. Consideration of aforesaid application for setting aside the ex parte order and for filing the written statement on record in absence of an application for condonation of delay would be an exercise without jurisdiction. The law in this regard is well settled in view of the judgment of the Division Bench in V. K. Saboo and another (supra), Mathuradas Mohta College of Science (supra), Ballumal Jaising (supra) and Union of India and another (supra). 12. There is also considerable force in the submission made on behalf of the petitioners that though the proceedings in the civil suit had been stayed by virtue of an interim order passed in C.R.A. No.57/2009, the said defendants were not precluded from atleast applying to the trial Court for setting aside the ex parte order and for permission to file the written statement on record. Reliance placed in that regard on the decisions in Sujanbai Kakde (supra) and Vashdev Pamnani (supra) is apposite. 13. From the aforesaid, it is clear that the trial Court by allowing the application below Exhibit-62 has exercised jurisdiction with material irregularity inasmuch as the prayers made by the defendant Nos.1A to 1C have been granted though they were made beyond the period of limitation and in absence of any prayer for condonation of delay. Though it was submitted on behalf of the petitioners that having failed to apply for condonation of delay, the impugned order deserves to be set aside and the suit deserves to proceed further, in my view an opportunity deserves to be granted to the defendant Nos.1A to 1C to apply to the trial Court and seek condonation of delay in moving the application below Exhibit-62. As the question is with regard to filing of written statement and contesting the suit on merits, such opportunity needs to be granted. Moreover, as observed by the Supreme Court in Shail (supra) under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court has power to guide the trial Court as to the manner in which it should proceed with the matter pending before it. 14. The aforesaid discussion, therefore, leads to the following conclusion: (1) The order dated 28-2-2014 passed below Exhibit-62 by the trial Court is set aside. (2) The defendant Nos.1A to 1C are at liberty to apply to the trial Court and seek condonation of delay in moving the application under provisions of Order 9 Rule 7 of the Code. (3) If such application is made, the plaintiffs are free to oppose the same on its own merits and the trial Court shall decide such application in accordance with law uninfluenced by any observations made herein above. (4) Rule is made partly absolute in aforesaid terms with no order as to costs.