ORDER : 1. Whether the registering authority under the Registration Act, 1908 can refuse to register document presented before it by going into the aspects relating to the title of the property or issues about legality of the transaction, is the question posed for consideration in these two cognate petitions. 2. By filing the captioned petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, the respective petitioners have prayed to set aside order dated 13th April, 2015 passed by respondent No. 2 registering authority herein whereby the said authority refused to register sale deed dated 28th March, 2014 executed in favour of the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 8436 of 2015. A further direction is prayed for against respondent No. 2 to register the sale deed and release the document. 2.1 Since both the petitions involve same facts and the challenge in both is to the very order, they were heard together and are being decided simultaneously by this judgment. The relevant facts are set out with reference to first captioned Special Civil Application No. 8436 of 2015 and the words the petitioner and the respondents hereinafter have their reference accordingly. 3. The petitioner-Sitaram Sugars and Allied Industries Limited happens to be the purchaser of the property in auction. Respondent No. 1-Baroda Central Co-operative Bank Limited had advanced a cash credit facility to one Sardar Sugar Co-operative Limited, which was an affiliated member of the said Baroda Central Co-operative Bank. The properties of Sardar Sugar Co-operative Limited were mortgaged with the Baroda Central Co-operative Bank. The amount of loan was not repaid within the stipulated time. Respondent No. 1 Baroda Co-operative Bank filed a case under Section 96 of the Gujarat Co-operative Societies Act, 1961 before the Board of Nominees, Vadodara, for recovery of Rs. 14,09,58,000/- with interest at 16.5%, which came to be decreed in favour of the Bank on 14th September, 2010. The Recovery Officer issued notice for recovery, ultimately assumed possession of the properties and published advertisement dated 01st March, 2011 for auctioning the properties. The petitioner-Sitaram Sugars and Allied Industries Limited participated in the auction and stood as highest bidder. 3.1 It appears that the State Government lodged its charge in respect of the said properties. It further appears that in the meanwhile the District Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Vadodara filed Revision Application No. 55 of 2013 before the State Government seeking cancellation of the auction-sale. 3.1 It appears that the State Government lodged its charge in respect of the said properties. It further appears that in the meanwhile the District Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Vadodara filed Revision Application No. 55 of 2013 before the State Government seeking cancellation of the auction-sale. In the said proceedings, on 30th April, 2013, an order of status quo was passed by the revisional authority, which was challenged by respondent No. 1-Baroda Central Co-operative Bank Limited by filing Special Civil Application No. 9739 of 2013. The Baroda Central Co-operative Bank Limited also filed Special Civil Application No. 8597 of 2012 before this Court, in which an interim order of status quo was granted. 3.2 The petitioner was joined as respondent No. 5 in aforesaid Special Civil Application No. 9739 of 2013. In view of objection allegation of the State Government that the properties were valued less than the market price, this Court by order dated 18th September, 2013 directed Gujarat Industrial and Technological Company (GITCO) to carry out the valuation. As per the report of GITCO the value of the properties was less than the valuation shown by the Bank. On 05th December, 2013 this Court passed order, with consensus of learned advocates appearing for the parties to re-auction the properties. Thus a re-auction was ordered with concurrence of all the parties including the State Government. 3.3 The aforesaid order dated 05th December, 2013 is extracted in its relevant part:- 1. To see that the best price of the property is obtained, it is decided that the properties be re-auctioned by a Committee, comprising of the Officer of the High Court, not below the rank of Deputy Registrar; Director of Sugar for the State of Gujarat and an Officer appointed by the petitioner Bank Shri Mahesh Z. Patel, Sale Officer. 2. The terms and conditions of auction shall be substantially the same as determined by the petitioner Bank in the previous auction conducted by it, except, that the person who is interested in purchasing the property, shall have to deposit the EMD @ 10% of the upset price fixed at Rs. 31,67,91,000/- (since respondent No. 5 had agreed to pay an amount of Rs. 31,67,91,000/- in the earlier auction though the valuation estimated by the company is Rs. 31,67,91,000/- (since respondent No. 5 had agreed to pay an amount of Rs. 31,67,91,000/- in the earlier auction though the valuation estimated by the company is Rs. 30,26,000/- which is lower than the property purchased by respondent No. 5 in earlier auction), as EMD by Demand Draft favouring the Registrar, High Court of Gujarat. 3 to 4………….. 5. As the respondent No. 5 i.e. auction purchaser has already deposited an amount of Rs. 8 crores in the month of July, 2011, Respondent No. 5 shall be given the option to match the highest offer received in the auction without participating therein or if he so chooses to participate in the auction and his offer will be considered without EMD. 6. It is further directed that the confirmation of the auction will be subject to the further orders of this Court. 3.4 In the said Special Civil Application No. 9739 of 2013 Rule was issued on 26th December, 2013. By observing that as per the report submitted by the Sale Committee, the petitioner had offered the highest price and the auction had become final, the Court directed the Recovery Officer to proceed and to accept the amount from the present petitioner-respondent No. 5 in that petition. The auction-purchase price Rs. 31,67,91,000/- was not deposited within the stipulated time for some reason. The petitioner moved Civil Application No. 2903 of 2014 in which order was passed on 25th March, 2014 by this Court permitting the petitioner to deposit the Demand Draft to which the State Government objected to. In the said order dated 25th March, 2014, this Court overruled the objection of the State Government and stated that the same was technical and when the applicant was ready to deposit and pay the amount in compliance of the Courts order, such objection could not have been raised by the State Government. The Court further directed the Recovery Officer to execute the sale deed in favour of the present petitioner. 3.5 The sale in favour of the petitioner thus stood confirmed. The Recovery Officer of Baroda Central Co-operative Bank issued the following sale certificate dated 29th March, 2014. The Court further directed the Recovery Officer to execute the sale deed in favour of the present petitioner. 3.5 The sale in favour of the petitioner thus stood confirmed. The Recovery Officer of Baroda Central Co-operative Bank issued the following sale certificate dated 29th March, 2014. SALE CERTIFICATE TO Whomsoever it may concern This is to certify that according to the direction of Hon'ble Gujarat High Court, Ahmedabad, in the civil applications No. 9739/2013 on 26-12-2013 and No. 2903 of 2014 on 25-03-2014, the Deed of Conveyance having Registration No. 359 dated 28-03-2014 has been executed by the Recovery officer, C/O The Baroda Cent. Co-Op. Bank Ltd. Vadodara, on 28-03-2014 in favour of M/s. Sitaram Sugars and Allied Industry Ltd. Dombivali, (East) Dist. Thane (Maharashtra) for the sale consideration Rs. 31,67,91,000/- (Rupees Thirty one core sixty seven lacks ninety one thousand only) for Sell of Movable and immovable properties of The Sardar Co-Operative Sugar Industries Ltd. Ladhod, Tal-Bodeli, District-Chhota Udaipur (previously known as Tal.-Sankheda, District Vadodara). This certificate has been issued under provision of Rule 128(5) of The Gujarat Co-Op. Societies Rules-1965. Place: Vadodara Date : 29-03-2014 The Baroda Central Co-Op. Bank Ltd. Sd/- Recovery Officer. 3.6 The Sale Deed was executed in favour of the petitioner-auction purchaser after the confirmation of sale as above, the petitioner paid stamp duty of Rs. 01,55,22,760/- and presented the said sale document before the Sub-Registrars Office, Sankheda, District Chhotaudaipur, on 28th March, 2014 which was recorded at Serial No. 359 of 2014. The petitioner thereafter addressed several letters requesting the office of Sub-Registrar to release the document, stating that the entire business affairs and the activities of the petitioners factory was brought to a standstill for want of release of the original Conveyance Deed. The correspondence produced on record indicated that there was no clear response from the office of Sub-Registrar except stating at one stage by letter dated 28th July, 2014, that the Taluka was bifurcated and as the subject matter would fall under Bodeli Taluka, hence the petitioner should contact the office of Sub-Registrar, Bodeli. The petitioners continuous requests did not yield result. It appears that a Civil Application No. 11563 of 2014 was required to be filed by the petitioner seeking release of sale document. The petitioners continuous requests did not yield result. It appears that a Civil Application No. 11563 of 2014 was required to be filed by the petitioner seeking release of sale document. 3.7 In the meantime the State Government challenged order dated 25th March, 2014 passed in Special Civil Application No. 9739 of 2013 by filing Letters Patent Appeal No. 1174 of 2014, together with Civil Application for condonation of delay. They came to be dismissed by the Division Bench by order dated 17th October, 2014. While examining the challenge to the confirmation of sale, the Letters Patent Bench noted in paragraph 10 of the order. “It is not the case of the appellant herein that the property was under-valued or that the sale is at a lower amount than the market value of the property. One of the grievances raised by Mr. Oza, learned AGP, during the course of the hearing was that the amount ought not to have been ordered to be deposited with the respondent No. 2 Bank, but ought to have been deposited with this Court or with the State government. He submitted that he cannot dispute the earlier order passed by the learned single Judge for the sale of the property through the constitution of the sale committee by the Court. He is not in a position to dispute that the sale committee has submitted the report and the respondent No. 1 herein was the sole offerer and the full amount of consideration has been paid. He submitted that the principal grievance on the part of the Government is to have priority in the payment of realization of Government money and, therefore, the appeal has been preferred. He submitted that in any case, the revision is pending for examining the said aspect and so will be the case in the main SCA, but the present appeal is limited for the direction issued by the learned single Judge for execution of the sale deed in favour of the sole offerer.” 3.8 The Letters Patent Bench noted also that the ultimate question was of determining inter se priority for the claim of debt between the Bank and the State. The Division Bench found the challenge by the State Government without merit and dismissed the proceedings, observing. The Division Bench found the challenge by the State Government without merit and dismissed the proceedings, observing. “In our view, the question of inter se priority amongst the claimants may be the secured creditor or the Government, as creditor or Government dues, would stand on a different footing and different consideration in contradistinction to the sale of the property. When the sale was through the Committee constituted by the Court and when there is no material produced on record, nor even during the course of the hearing that the valuation was not properly made or under-valued and there was any under-valuation of the property or that the property has not fetched appropriate price and the learned single Judge has directed for execution of the sale deed after formation of the sale committee, it may not be said that any error has been committed by the learned single Judge while issuing the impugned direction. On the aspect of amount of the money realized to remain with this Court or with the State Government, the appellant can move the learned single Judge. We are sure that if such an application is made, the learned single Judge shall examine in accordance with law after hearing both the sides. But in our view such would not be a valid ground to entertain the appeal, nor it can be said that on account of the same, the order passed by the learned single Judge should be interfered with.” 4. Heard learned senior counsel Mr. Mihir Thakore assisted by learned advocate Ms. M. O. Narsinghani for the petitioner of Special Civil Application No. 8436 of 2015, learned advocate Mr. V.C. Vaghela appearing for petitioner of second captioned petition and for respondent No. 1 in the first petition as well as learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Manan Mehta for the respondent authorities in both the petitions. 4.1 While learned Assistant Government Pleader raised by way of preliminary aspect the contention about alternative remedy, both the learned advocates for the parties chose to address the Court on all issues including merits of the controversy simultaneously. Manan Mehta for the respondent authorities in both the petitions. 4.1 While learned Assistant Government Pleader raised by way of preliminary aspect the contention about alternative remedy, both the learned advocates for the parties chose to address the Court on all issues including merits of the controversy simultaneously. 4.2 Learned senior counsel for the petitioner assailing the impugned order submitted that on two erroneous grounds the registering authority did not register the Conveyance Deed produced before him, namely that in the revenue records the property was shown as of restricted tenure; the authority secondly stated that in view of Circular issued by the Superintendent of Registration, since the property had the said encumbrance, the registration was refused. He submitted that these grounds for refusing the registration were statutorily irrelevant and the authority introduced itself to the aspect of legality of the transaction and title of the property which was outside the scope of his powers under the Act. It was submitted that the Registration Act contained express provisions, and only on those grounds, the registering officer was empowered to refuse the registration. Learned senior counsel embellished his submissions by taking the court through the scheme of the Registration Act, 1908 and also by highlighting the objects and reasons in the background for which the Act came to be enacted. Learned senior counsel relied on the commentary from Rustamji on Registration (4th Edition, 1989). The Circular relied on in the impugned order, submitted learned senior counsel, was not valid. He relied on decisions of this Court in Arunbhai Ramjibhai Patel vs. State of Gujarat, 2015 (1) GLR 1 : AIR 2014 Guj 129 and Rajiv Maheshkumar Mehta vs. State of Gujarat, 2012 (2) GLH 457 : AIR 2013 Guj 9 to assert that the Circular was without any sanction in law. 4.3 It was submitted that the order passed by respondent No. 2 Sub-Registrar was outside the purview of his powers under the Act, therefore this Court may quash and set aside the same. Referring to the reliefs claimed in the petition, it was submitted that on one hand the order suffered from jurisdictional error which was required to be rectified by issuing writ of certiorari, whereas also the authority was also required to act in accordance with law by issuing a writ of mandamus and release the document after registration. Referring to the reliefs claimed in the petition, it was submitted that on one hand the order suffered from jurisdictional error which was required to be rectified by issuing writ of certiorari, whereas also the authority was also required to act in accordance with law by issuing a writ of mandamus and release the document after registration. Asserting that this was a fit case where the Court should exercise its powers under Article 226 of the Constitution, learned senior counsel highlighted the concept of what is termed as certiorarified mandamus and relied on in that regard the commentaries from Law of Writs by V.G. Ramchandran, Volume II, 6th Edition. 4.4 Learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. Manan Mehta by his emphatic submissions, at the outset, contended that alternative remedy was available to the petitioner under Section 72 and Section 77 of the Registration Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for sake of brevity). It was submitted that as the remedy of appeal and thereafter one of filing civil suit were available, this Court may not entertain the present petition straightway invoking Article 226 of the Constitution and the petitioner may be relegated to avail the alternative remedy. Learned Assistant Government Pleader relied on decision of this Court in Prasant Jayantilal vs. Sub-Registrar, Ahmedabad, 1998 (1) GCD 754 . Another decision of Rajasthan High Court in Jeevan Ram vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1954 Rajasthan 53 was relied on for the same purpose that a shortcut to get immediate relief by filing of writ petition may not be permitted. 4.5 Learned senior counsel for the petitioner countering the contention on aspect of the alternative remedy, submitted that existence of alternative remedy is not an absolute embargo and it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case as to whether the same should be taken as a factor not to exercise the writ jurisdiction. He submitted that where the order is found to be without jurisdiction, writ of certiorari would lie. It was submitted that in passing the impugned order respondent No. 2 has travelled beyond his powers and refused the registration, therefore, petitioner is entitled to seek relief before this Court. He submitted that where the order is found to be without jurisdiction, writ of certiorari would lie. It was submitted that in passing the impugned order respondent No. 2 has travelled beyond his powers and refused the registration, therefore, petitioner is entitled to seek relief before this Court. Learned senior counsel for the petitioner pressed into service the following decisions - State of U.P. vs. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 , Syed Yakoob vs. K.S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 , M/s. Baburam Prakash Chandra Maheshwari vs. Antarim Zila Parishad Now Zila Parishad, Muzaffarnagar, AIR 1969 SC 556 , A.V. Venkateswaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay vs. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506 , Committee of Management vs. Vice-Chancellor, AIR 2009 SC 1159 , M/s. Godrej Sara Lee Limited vs. Assistant Commissioner, AIR 2009 SC (Supp) 2423, Sandeep Texturisers Private Limited vs. State of Gujarat, 2013 (1) GLH 430 and Gafur Khan vs. State of Rajasthan, AIR 2003 Raj 233 . 4.6 Learned Assistant Government Pleader addressing the Court on the merits of the impugned order, relied on the contents of affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of respondent No. 2. He firstly contended referring to paragraph 11 of the reply affidavit that the Sub-Registrar has powers to refuse registration of the document under Section 71 of the Act and that the authority has correctly exercised such powers. It was next submitted that the impugned order is a reasoned order. It was thirdly contended that the registering authority has got power and jurisdiction to refuse the registration and that the reasons supplied in the order are good and valid reasons. It was fourthly submitted that the property in question which is reflected in the village form No. 7/12 is a restricted tenure land. He submitted that though respondent No. 2 may not consider how and why the land is of such nature, but a duty is cast on him to consider the relevant documents produced before him relating to the property made subject-matter of the Conveyance Deed. It was submitted that as from the documents produced, the restricted tenure of the land was reflected, the same was rightly considered. It was submitted that as from the documents produced, the restricted tenure of the land was reflected, the same was rightly considered. It was fifthly submitted that the State Government had issued a circular dated 31st August, 2010/21st September, 2010 providing that when a document is presented for registration, the registering authority would consider the aspect whether the property covered under the transaction had any encumbrance on it; it was submitted that the said circular was issued with a view to check and prevent the occurrences of bogus or benami transfers. Learned Assistant Government Pleader reiterated that respondent No. 2 has passed a reasoned order in accordance with Section 71 of the Act. 5. In order to examine and appreciate the controversy, it would be useful to pay a brief visit to the provisions of the Registration Act, 1908, so as to find out the powers of the registering authority inter alia focusing as to on what grounds the registering authority may refuse to register the document. Section 19 of the Act refers to the documents which are in language not understood by the registering office. Section 20 mentions about the documents containing blanks, alteration etc. Section 21 requires that the document would have to contain description of the property sufficient to identify the same, whereas Section 22 states about proper description of the houses and land in the document by reference to government maps or surveys. Sections 23 to 25 are about the time for presenting the document. Section 28 which figures in the next Part V is regarding place for registering the document relating to land. Part VI contains groups of provisions relating to presenting the documents for registration. 5.1 Section 32 provides as to who can present the document for registration. Section 33 is ancillary to Section 32 and provides as to in what circumstances and which category of power of attorney are to be recognized for the purpose of Section 32. Under Section 34, the registering officer has to satisfy himself that a person executing the document or his representative or assign appears before him; the authority has to further satisfy about the identity of such person. Section 35 lays down the procedure to be followed by the registering authority when the document is admitted to have been executed or is denied to have been executed as the case may be. Section 35 lays down the procedure to be followed by the registering authority when the document is admitted to have been executed or is denied to have been executed as the case may be. Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 35, which are not necessary to be elaborated, deal with the course to be adopted by the registering authority when persons are present or where any persons denies the execution of the document or the executant appears to be dead. Section 52 provides for duties of the registering officer when the document is presented. Group of Sections 58 to 61 is regarding the procedure to be adopted upon a document is admitted to registration. 5.2 From the provisions noticed above, it is quite discernible that the registering officer can refuse the registration of a document on specific grounds and considerations. If the document is in the language which the registering officer does not understand, the language not commonly used in the District (Section 19) or the documents contains interlineations, blanks, erasures or alterations, the same will be liable to be refused to be registered (Section 20); where the property under conveyance is not sufficiently described for its identification, and also for the requirement of description of the houses and land by reference to government maps and surveys, the registration can be refused by the registering authority (Sections 21 and 22). The document would have been presented within the time prescribed (Section 23) etc. It may not be registered if not presented in the proper place of the office (Section 28). The registration of the document may be refused by the registering office if not presented by the executant or by person who is representative or assign in law of the executant (Section 32), and also for the consideration mentioned about the executant or his representative, his identify, admission to execution etc. (Sections 33, 34 and 35). The grounds on which Sub-Registrar or Registrar may refuse registration are in the above sense exhaustive. 5.3 Rule 45 of the Registration Rules, 1970 provides for certain requirements to be verified by the registering officer before accepting a document for registration. Rule 45 reads as under. 45. Certain requirements to be verified before accepting a document for registration:— (1) A registering officer shall, before accepting any document for registration not concern himself with its validity but see that:— (a) It is properly stamped. Rule 45 reads as under. 45. Certain requirements to be verified before accepting a document for registration:— (1) A registering officer shall, before accepting any document for registration not concern himself with its validity but see that:— (a) It is properly stamped. (b) It is presented within the proper time and in the proper office. (c) It is presented by a competent person. (d) If it relates to immovable property, that it is not open to objection under section 21 or 22. (e) If any document is in a language which he does not understand, the provisions of section 19 are complied with. (f) Any interlineations blanks, erasures or alterations appearing in the document are attested by the signature or initials of the person or persons executing the same as required by section 20. (g) The deed does not contravene the provisions of Sub-Section (1) of Section 5 of the Foreign Exchange Regulation Act, 1947. (h) Whether sale certificate and prior permission in writing of the authorities concerned are produced before him in original, if the deed relates to transfer of Government built property. (2) If on presentation of the document, the fees prescribed under section 78 are not paid demand, the registering officer shall refuse to register the document. 5.4 The object of the Registration Act is to accord legal sanctity of form and legal importance to the documents of certain class. The Act offers solemnity of form to certain documents which are made compulsorily registerable. The object of registering the document highlighted in a Calcutta High Court decision in K. Roy and Others vs. Ram Nath Das, AIR 1945 Calcutta 837, is to provide information to the people who may deal with the property as to the nature and extent of rights which persons may have in relation to the property; the object is to give notice to the world at large that such document has been registered. The registration is intended to prevent fraud and forgery. It facilitates availment of a reliable and comparable account of all transactions by which title may be affected. It could be said that the registration of a document is a record maintained of the transaction. The registration is intended to prevent fraud and forgery. It facilitates availment of a reliable and comparable account of all transactions by which title may be affected. It could be said that the registration of a document is a record maintained of the transaction. 5.5 The Apex Court in Rajni Tandan vs. Dulal Ranjan Gosh Dastidar, (2009) 14 SCC 782 : 2009 AIR SCW 5416 observed that the object of registration of document is designed to guard fraud by obtaining a contemporaneous publication and unimpeachable record of each document. It further held that since there was no allegation of fraud, a duty was cast upon the registering officer under Section 32 of the Act only to satisfy himself that document executed by a person by whom it purported to have been signed. 6. From the above statutory conspectus it could be seen that the Registration Act is a complete Code in itself, more particularly in respect of the powers envisaged for the registering authority to register or to refuse the registration of a document presented before it. The Sub Registrar or Registrar who are the registering officers being the creatures of the statute, their powers to register a document are derivable only from the statutory provisions. The question of registration of document cannot be considered on any ground other than those expressly stated in the Act being the grounds discussed in paragraph 5.2 above. Rule 45 of the Rules unequivocal to specifically say that the registering officer is not to concern himself with regard to the validity of the document. The Rule mentions the grounds which can form basis of examination by the registering officer. 6.1 The powers of the registering authority having been clearly defined and demarcated in the Act for registration of a document, it is not open to the authority to embrace for its decision to refuse the registration any other ground than one traceable under the Act. As already noted, the registration of a document is merely an event which notifies the factum of execution of document. It evidences occurrence of a transaction affecting title qua any person or property. When a document is registered, the property conveyed passes from one person to another. The title in such property as it stands and of the kind it had vested in the vendor travels along. It evidences occurrence of a transaction affecting title qua any person or property. When a document is registered, the property conveyed passes from one person to another. The title in such property as it stands and of the kind it had vested in the vendor travels along. 6.2 What necessarily follows is that the registration of a document has nothing to do with legality of transaction. Nor it has anything to do with nature of title that passes, or with title related question of the property being conveyed. If a document presented for registration satisfies legal requirements under the Registration Act and is sufficiently stamped, etc. the registering authority cannot refuse to register the same. Authority adversion to any aspect of defect in title or legality of the transaction to make it a ground for refusal to register would be in excess and dehors his statutory powers. 7. The registering authority is not a surveyor who would find out the perfections in the title of vendor. He is not to act as a scientist to attempt some discoveries in the realm of the title of the property. Nor the registering officer is supposed to assume the role of a legal person to search and verify the antecedents and credence of the title of the property. 8. The decisions rendered by different High Courts on the issue are unanimous and they converge to the proposition held as above. These decisions which were pressed into service by learned senior counsel to successfully strengthen his submission, deserve a reference. In Punjab and Haryana High Court in Krishna Gopal Kataria vs. State of Punjab, AIR 1986 P & H 328 the High Court ruled that there was no power with the registering authority to refuse the registration otherwise than under the provisions of the Act. An Allahabad High Court decision in Krishnakumar vs. Court of District Registrar/ADM Raibareli, AIR 2010 All 165 takes the similar view. Two decisions of Jharkhand High Court in Nageshvar Thakur vs. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2004 Jhar 11 (1) and in Shakuntala Devi vs. State of Jharkhand, AIR 2010 Jhar 56 were relied on. In that, the documents in question were not registered on the ground that the inquiry regarding title of petitioner was to be made and the Sub Registrar was directed to inquire into the title of the vendor. In that, the documents in question were not registered on the ground that the inquiry regarding title of petitioner was to be made and the Sub Registrar was directed to inquire into the title of the vendor. It was held that there was no provision in the Registration Act empowering the District Sub-Registrar to refuse the registration of the document and to hold inquiry on the question of title before registration of the document, and what has to be only seen by the registering authority that the document was duly stamped on the valuation given in the document. In Gopal s/o Dwarkaprasad Pandey vs. District Collector, 2003 Bom LR 909 the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court held that the refusal for registration of a document on the ground of absence of title to such property is per se illegal on part of the registering authority. In Sarvajanik Jan Kalyan Parmarthik Nyas. vs. State of M.P. and Others, AIR 2008 MP 86 was relied on where the Madhya Pradesh High Court disapproved the reason of pendency of dispute of title for not registering the document holding it to be invalid ground in law. 8.1 In Bihar Deed Writers Association vs. State of Bihar, AIR 1989 Patna 144, the registering authority had refused to register the document on the ground of violation of the Ceiling Act. The High Court held that it was not for the registering authority to ascertain title to its satisfaction and Section 35 of the Ceiling Act had nothing to do with the registration. 9. Reverting to the impugned order, the Sub-Registrar has mentioned two grounds for refusing to register the conveyance deed. First is that as per the revenue record being Form 7/12 abstracts showed the property as government waste land and in its nature restricted tenure, and that a permission in writing of the competent authority was not produced. The second ground is the Circular dated 21st September, 2010 of the Superintendent of Registration providing that before accepting any document for registration, its genuineness should be examined so as to ensure unencumbered title of the property concerned. The reliance on the Circular of the Superintendent of Registration is of no avail, as its requirement clearly falls outside the ambit of the Registration Act. The reliance on the Circular of the Superintendent of Registration is of no avail, as its requirement clearly falls outside the ambit of the Registration Act. The registering authority has no concern, and it is not his business to consider whether the property conveyed has a clear title or it is having an encumbrance. Secondly, any aspect of the legality of the transaction or the extent of rights passing or alleged infirmity or inchoateness in the title of the vendor are the aspects not to be looked into by the registering officer. 9.1 In Rajni Tondon (2009 AIR SCW 5416) (supra) the Apex Court noted that in the case before it, there was no allegation of fraud, and in that view a duty cast on the registering officer under Section 32 of the Act was limited to satisfying himself that the document was executed by the person by whom it purported to have been signed. It was observed by the Supreme Court that the Registrar being so satisfied and upon being presented with the document, had to proceed with the registration of the same. In the present case also, the question of fraud is not at all arising and the sale of the property by the petitioner is upon confirmation by the Court. There is no room for disputing the execution of the sale conveyance which was executed after the confirmation of auction sale and came to be presented before respondent No. 2 for registration. 9.2 Therefore the reason that revenue record being 7/12 Form mentions the land to be of restricted tenure cannot be said to be a valid ground and the same is not available to respondent No. 2-Sub-Registrar so as to refuse the registration of the document in question. It amounts to an inquiry about title of the property conveyed under the Deed which is outside the statutory powers of respondent No. 2. An inquiry into title, the extent or nature of title and all such other attendant questions referable to title are an extraneous consideration for the registering authority. Respondent No. 2 shall be forbidden to go into such aspects and refuse the registration. 10. An inquiry into title, the extent or nature of title and all such other attendant questions referable to title are an extraneous consideration for the registering authority. Respondent No. 2 shall be forbidden to go into such aspects and refuse the registration. 10. Coming to the aspect of alternative remedy, it is a recognized principle that rule of alternative remedy is a rule of discretion and it is not always in all cases that the existence of alternative remedy is a ground to invariably refuse to exercise the writ jurisdiction. From the decision of the Apex Court in A.V. Venkateshwaran, Collector of Customs, Bombay vs. Ramchand Sobhraj Wadhwani, AIR 1961 SC 1506 following pertinent observations may be noticed. “The only point, therefore requiring to be considered is whether the High Court should have rejected the writ petition of the respondent in limine because he had not exhausted all the statutory remedies open to him for having his grievance redressed. The contention of the learned Solicitor-General was that the existence of an alternative remedy was a bar to the entertainment of a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution unless (1) there was a complete lack of jurisdiction in the officer or authority to take the action impugned. or (2) where the order prejudicial to the writ petitioner has been passed in violation of the principles of natural justice and could, therefore, be treated as void or non est. In all other cases, he submitted, Courts should not entertain petitions under Article 226, or in any event not grant any relief to such petitioners.” 10.1 The Court stated:- “We see considerable force in the argument of the learned Solicitor-General. In all other cases, he submitted, Courts should not entertain petitions under Article 226, or in any event not grant any relief to such petitioners.” 10.1 The Court stated:- “We see considerable force in the argument of the learned Solicitor-General. We must, however, point out that the rule that the party who applies for the issue of a high prerogative writ should, before he approaches the Court, have exhausted other remedies open to him under the law, is not one which bars the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the petition or to deal with it, but is rather a rule which Courts have laid down for the exercise of their discretion.” 10.2 Firmly enough propounded are the three circumstances in which the existence of alternative remedy may not stand in the way as dissuading factor to exercise writ jurisdiction and grant relief where the order is in pointed violation of fundamental right, where there is a blatant violation of natural justice; thirdly, where the authority passing the order lacks jurisdiction and passes the order despite there is want of powers statutorily available. The other facet is that the alternative remedy should be efficacious and effective. Section 72 of the Act provides for appeal to the Registrar, from orders of Sub Registrar refusing registration on the ground other than denial of execution. Section 77 further provides that a suit may be filed in case of order of refusal by Registrar seeking a decree. As noted, since the impugned order is based on the grounds not traceable from the realm of the statutory powers of the registering authority, the submission on behalf of the petitioner could be countenanced that it justified issuance of writ of certiorari to correct the error. As far as the remedy of filing suit under Section 77 is concerned, it is cumbersome and time-consuming remedy therefore cannot be considered as an efficacious alternative remedy. 10.3 The Gafur Khan ( AIR 2003 Raj 233 ) (supra) was a case under the Registration Act wherein the Rajasthan High Court did not accept the plea of alternative remedy and set aside the order of the Sub-Registrar who had refused the registration of the document even though in that case the executrix appeared before him and was identified by the lawyer and the Sub-Registrar had also recorded the evidence of executrix that she had executed the document. 10.4 It is a principle stated that rule of alternative remedy would apply stricter in cases where writ of mandamus is claimed and the rule may be relaxed in cases where writ of certiorari would issue if the grounds therefor are shown to exist. This stems from the following observations of the Supreme Court in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Mohammed Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86 . “It must be borne in mind that there is no rule, with regard to certiorari as there is with mandamus, that it will lie only where there is no other equally effective remedy. It is well established that, provided the requisite grounds exist, certiorari will lie although a right of appeal has been conferred by statute. The fact that the aggrieved party has another and adequate remedy may be taken into consideration by the superior court in arriving at a conclusion as to whether it should, in exercise of its discretion, issue a writ of certiorari to quash the proceedings and decisions of inferior courts subordinate to it and ordinarily the superior court will decline to interfere until the aggrieved party has exhausted his other statutory remedies, if any. But this rule requiring the exhaustion of statutory remedies before the writ will be granted is a rule of policy, convenience and discretion rather than a rule of law and instances are numerous where a writ of certiorari has been issued in spite of the fact that the aggrieved party had other adequate legal remedies.” 10.5 The statement of law observed was as under, in the result this Court held that the existence of their legal remedies was not per se a bar to the issue of a writ of certiorari and that the Court was not bound to relegate the petitioner to the other legal remedies available to him. 10.6 The reason for aforesaid proposition may be searched in the kind of orders to which the writ of certiorari is attracted. This writ lies where the tribunal or forum or statutory authority has acted in absence of statutory powers to pass an order or has acted to usurp the powers not vested in it, committing thereby an error of jurisdictional exercise. This writ lies where the tribunal or forum or statutory authority has acted in absence of statutory powers to pass an order or has acted to usurp the powers not vested in it, committing thereby an error of jurisdictional exercise. In Syed Yakoob ( AIR 1964 SC 477 ) (supra) the Supreme Court stated as to what kind of errors could be corrected by a writ of certiorari, which is a writ of supervisory jurisdiction as under:- “What can be corrected by a writ has to be an error of law; but it must be such an error of law as can be regarded as one which is apparent on the face of the record. Where it is manifest or clear that the conclusion of law recorded by an inferior Court or Tribunal is based on an obvious misinterpretation of the relevant statutory provision, or sometimes in ignorance of it, or may be, even in disregard of it, or is expressly founded on reasons which are wrong in law, the said conclusion can be corrected by a writ of certiorari. In all these cases, the impugned conclusion should be so plainly inconsistent with the relevant statutory provision that no difficulty is experienced by the High Court in holding that the said error of law is apparent on the face of the record. It may also be that in some cases, the impugned error of law may not be obvious or patent on the face of the record as such and the Court may need an argument to discover the said error; but there can be no doubt that what can be corrected by a writ of certiorari is an error of law and the said error must, on the whole, be of such a character as would satisfy the test that it is an error of law apparent on the face of the record.” 10.7 A relief may be a blend of writ of certiorari and a writ of mandamus. In his Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995 Edition) de Smith states the prerogative orders may be granted either single or in combination. In his Judicial Review of Administrative Action (1995 Edition) de Smith states the prerogative orders may be granted either single or in combination. Where, for example, an applicant is aggrieved by decision, certiorari may be sought to quash it, together with an order of mandamus to compel the decision maker to determine the issue in accordance with law.' The Supreme Court has in Chengleput Bottlers vs. Majestic Bottling Company, (1984) 3 SCC 258 : AIR 1984 SC 1030 observed that sometimes it is prudent to couple a writ of certiorari with a writ of mandamus to control the exercise of discretionary power. 11. The impugned order passed by respondent No. 2 amounts to exercise of powers not vested in him under the law. Respondent No. 2-registering authority has transgressed his sphere of powers under the statute. It has refused the registration raising title related aspect which is not his function. An authority acting and deciding by transgression the limits of the powers available to him under the relevant statute, only acts without jurisdiction. A decision arrived at dehors the statutory powers and therefore without jurisdiction is amenable to writ of certiorari. This being the kind of vice and the nature of error in the impugned order, the Court is inclined to exercise discretion in favour of the petitioner. 12. Looking at the facts closely, they would show that even on factual foundation, the order is erroneous, for, even the doubtfulness about the title and the encumbrance on the property perceived by the authority were incorrect. The property was purchased by the petitioner as a highest bidder in the auction which was finalised and the sale was confirmed by the orders of this Court mentioned hereinabove. At one stage the State Government itself raised an objection as regards the valuation of the property pursuant to which an expert values report was directed to be obtained by this Court and the auction sale was finally conducted with concurrence of the State Government, and the property was conveyed to the petitioner-the successful bidder. The sale conveyance was duly executed thereafter upon confirmation of sale by this Court. It could not be gainsaid that as an auction-purchaser the title that passed in petitioners favour was one perfected in law. The sale conveyance was duly executed thereafter upon confirmation of sale by this Court. It could not be gainsaid that as an auction-purchaser the title that passed in petitioners favour was one perfected in law. 12.1 The question left was, at the best, one of inter-se priority of the State Government vis-a-vis other creditor and whether the States claim for its debt was a priori in nature. This issue was quite distinct and separate than the validity of sale of the property in auction as above. The Letters Patent Bench made the pertinent observations quoted in paragraph 3.8 hereinabove to bring home the issue. Furthermore and finally, there was no dispute that the Conveyance Deed presented for registration was duly executed, was properly stamped and met with other requirements under the Registration Act. Respondent No. 2 was statutorily bound to register the same. 13. In view of above discussion it has to be held that in passing the impugned order, respondent No. 2 has acted outside the realm of his powers available under the Registration Act, 1908. The order and the grounds on which the order is rested, stands dehors the statutory powers which could be exercised by respondent No. 2 for refusing registration of the document. Consequentially the impugned order is rendered without jurisdiction and is accordingly liable to be set aside. In the result, impugned order dated 13th April, 2015 passed by respondent No. 2-Sub Registrar, Bodeli, District Chhota Udaipur is hereby quashed and set aside and the consequences shall follow. 14. The present judgment shall govern other cognate Special Civil Application No. 9326 of 2015 wherein the same order passed by respondent No. 2 is challenged, and the said petition shall stand disposed of accordingly. Rule is made absolute in Special Civil Application No. 8436 of 2015. Order accordingly.