ORDER 1. The present revision is arising out of order dated 20.11.2014 passed in Execution Case No.9-A/2002 (Abhay Kumar v. Ramkumar Pandey). 2. Facts of the case reveal that one Abhay Kumar has filed a civil suit claiming specific performance of the contract against Shri Ram Kumar and Shri Rammanohar and the same was decreed by judgment and decree dated 22.9.2014. As per paragraph 42 of the judgment, the plaintiff was directed to pay stamp duty along with Penalty in respect of agreement dated 19.11.1995 (Ex.P-2) keeping in view the Indian Stamp Act, 1899 (M.P. Amendment Act, 1990), section 2 Schedule I Entry No.23. The trial Court has also directed that the entire remaining sale consideration be also paid within a period of 2 months. The third condition imposed by the trial Court was that after payment of stamp duty and after payment of the remaining sale consideration, i,e., Rs.65,000/-, the defendants No.1 and 2 shall execute a sale-deed in favour of the plaintiff. There was a specific condition in the judgment, i.e., Condition No.7 that in case, within a period of 2 months, stamp duty and penalty is not paid in respect of Ex.P-2 which is an agreement to sale, the plaintiff will not be entitled for execution of the sale -deed. There was a specific condition in the judgment, i.e., Condition No.7 that in case, within a period of 2 months, stamp duty and penalty is not paid in respect of Ex.P-2 which is an agreement to sale, the plaintiff will not be entitled for execution of the sale -deed. The terms and conditions, as stated in paragraph 42, are reproduced in Hindi (as the judgment is in Hindi), as under: ß42- vr% mDr foospu ds vk/kkj ij oknh dk nkok fuEukuqlkj fMØh fd;k tkdj vkns'k fn;k tkrk gS fd % 1- oknh vuqca/k&i= fnukafdr 19-11-1995 ¼izn'kZ ih&2½ ij Hkkjrh; LVkai ,DV 1899½ e-iz- la'kks/ku ,DV 1990 dh /kkjk 2 vuqlwph 1&, bUVªh uacj 23 ds vuqlkj LVkEi M~;wVh vkSj isuYVh nks ekg ds vUnj vnk djsxkA 2- oknh dks ;g Hkh funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk gS fd og izfroknh Ø-2 dks 'ks"k foØ; ewY; nks ekg ds vUnj vnk djsxkA 3- oknh }kjk mijksDr vuqlkj LVkai M~;wVh vkSj isuYVh fu;ekuqlkj vnk djus ij vkSj izfroknh Ø-2 dks crkSj fodz; ewY; 65]000@& #i;s vnk djus ij og izfroknh Ø-1 dh vksj ls izfroknh izfroknh Ø-2 }kjk oknxzLr edku uacj 88 ckyd`".k ckiwth ekxZ cM+uxj dk foØ;&i= fu"ikfnr djkus dk vf/kdkjh jgsxkA 4- oknh foØ; i= ds fu"iknu dk laiw.kZ [kpkZ Lo;a ogu djsxkA 5- oknh dks ;g Hkh vf/kdkj gksxk fd izfroknhx.k }kjk foØ;&i= fu"ikfnr u djkus ij U;k;ky; ds }kjk foØ;&i= laikfnr djk ldsxkA 6- izfroknhx.k dks ;g Hkh funsZf'kr fd;k tkrk fg fd os oknxzLr edku dks nks ekg rd fdlh vU; O;fDr dks u rks foØ; djsxsa u varfjr djsxsA 7- oknh }kjk nks ekg ds vUnj izn'kZ ih&2 ds foØ; vuqcaa/k ds laca/k esa LVkai M~;wVh vkSj isuYVh vnk u djus ij og fMØh fu"iknu djk ikus dk vf/kdkjh ugha gksxkA 8- izdj.k dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks ns[krs gq, izfroknhx.k viuk Lo;a dk vkSj oknh dk okn O;; ogu djsaxsA 9- vfHkHkk"kd 'kqYd izekf.kr gksus ij vFkok rkfydk vuqlkj tks Hkh de gks yxkbZ tk,A rn~uqlkj t;i= cuk;k tk,AÞ 3. It is noteworthy to mention that on 22.11.2004 an amount of Rs.65,000/- was deposited by the plaintiff, however, it is again an admitted fact that Stamp Duty and Penalty was not paid by the plaintiff nor the amount was deposited with the Court. It is noteworthy to mention that on 22.11.2004 an amount of Rs.65,000/- was deposited by the plaintiff, however, it is again an admitted fact that Stamp Duty and Penalty was not paid by the plaintiff nor the amount was deposited with the Court. An appeal was preferred in the matter and the same was registered as Miscellaneous Appeal No.2674/2004 and an interim order was passed on 27.1.2005 meaning thereby, after expiry of 2 months period granted by the trial Court to deposit the amount, as stated above. The decree-holder finally withdrew the appeal by filing an application before this Court. This Court has passed the following order in Miscellaneous Appeal No.2674/2004, on 18.11.2011 : C.R.No. 35/2015 2.9.2015 : Appellant by Mr. A. K. Sethi senior advocate with Mr. Harish Joshi and Mr. Kamal Eran, Advocates. Respondent No.1 by Mr. Brajesh Pnadya, Advocate. Respondent No.2 with Mr. Anand Pathak, advocate. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the respondent No. 1 Ramkumar has died. Therefore, he prays for time to move appropriate application for bring legal representatives of respondent No.1 on record. Respondent No.2 who is cousin of respondent No.1 is present in Court submits that respondent No.1 is alive and is at present at Jabalpur in connection with his medical treatment. Keeping in view the statement made by respondent No.2 who is present in Court, prayer made by the appellant stands rejected. Being aggrieved by award dated 22.9.2004 passed by Additional District Judge, Ujjain in COS No.9 -A/2002 whereby the suit filed by appellant for specific performance was allowed and a decree was passed in favour of the appellant and against respondents directing the appellant to pay stamp duty and penalty on the agreement dated 19.11.1995 and to pay sale consideration of Rs.65,000/- within two months. It was further directed that upon payment of stamp duty and penalty and sale consideration, the respondents shall execute sale-deed in favour of the appellant. Being dissatisfied with the condition of payment of stamp duty and penalty, present appeal has been filed. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the appeal itself is not maintainable as it is filed under Order 43 rule 1 CPC while the appeal ought to have been filed under section 96 CPC after payment of full court-fees. Being dissatisfied with the condition of payment of stamp duty and penalty, present appeal has been filed. Learned counsel for the respondents submits that the appeal itself is not maintainable as it is filed under Order 43 rule 1 CPC while the appeal ought to have been filed under section 96 CPC after payment of full court-fees. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that appellant be permitted to withdraw the appeal with a liberty to move appropriation application Order 47 rule 1 CPC before the Court below. This prayer is opposed by the learned counsel for the respondents. From perusal of the record, it is evident that this Court vide order dated 27.1.2005 has passed the order in the following words : “The stay application is considered and allowed and the operation of the impugned order relating to the stamp duty and penalty is, hereby, stayed. The sale deed will be executed as per the judgment and decree after the decision on the issue of the payment of the stamp duty and penalty. The amount deposited by the appellant, i.e., Rs.65,000/- be invested in the nationalized Bank for the period of two years in the fixed deposit. Keeping in view the prayer made by the learned counsel for the appellant, appeal filed by the appellant is disposed of with a direction that appellant shall be at liberty to move appropriate application before the competent Court." 4. An execution application was preferred on 30.3.2012 and an objection was raised by the present applicants on 22.3.2013 stating that the decree cannot be executed as the terms and conditions of the decree were not fulfilled meaning thereby, the amount was not deposited as directed by the trial Court. However, the objection has been rejected. Learned counsel for the applicant has vehemently argued before this Court that the question of executing the decree does not arise in the light of the specific conditions mentioned in the judgment and decree, i.e., clause 7 as the amount was not paid in time, i.e., the condition of paying the amount within a period of 2 months, as directed by the trial Court. 5. On the other hand, Mr. 5. On the other hand, Mr. A.K. Sethi, learned senior counsel for the respondent has argued before this Court that the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court was stayed on 27.1.2005 and the stay continued upto 18.11.2011 and thereafter application was preferred for depositing the amount, however, as no permission was granted by the trial Court/executing Court, the amount has not been deposited and, therefore, the decree-holder is not at fault and either this Court or the executing Court should grant liberty to the decree holder to deposit the amount as per clause 7. 6. Heard learned counsel for the parties at length and perused the record. 7. Clause 7 of paragraph 42 makes it very clear that the decree holder was required to deposit Rs.65,000/- within a period of 23 months towards the remaining sale consideration and he was also required to deposit the stamp duty and penalty in respect of agreement Ex.P-2 dated 19.11.1995. The amount of Rs.65,000/- was deposited on 22.11.2004. 8. The Issue before this Court is whether the amount was deposited within 60 days or not. 9. It is an undisputed fact that the judgment and decree was passed on 22.9.2004. The amount of Rs.65,000/- was deposited on 22.11.2004 meaning thereby, there is a delay of one day in depositing the amount. 10. In the case of Brijmohandas and another v. Punjab National Bank and others, reported in 1982 JLJ 92 , almost similar issue has been dealt with while calculating the period in respect of limitation. The Division Bench of this Court by taking into account the General Clauses Act, 1897, in paragraph 23 has held as under : 23. There it would be relevant to refer to section 9 of the General Clauses Act 1897 (Act No. X of 1897) sub-section (1) of section 9 of this Act provides that in any General Act or regulation made after the commencement of this Act it shall be sufficient to the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from” and for the purpose of including the last in a series of the days or any other period of time to use the word “to”. Sub-section (2) further provides that the Section applies also to all Central Acts made after the third day of January 1868, and to all regulations made on or after the 14th day of January 1887. It therefore, follows that section 9 only lays down the statutory recognition to the well established principle relating to the interpretation of statutes that ordinarily in computing time, the rule observed is to exclude the first day and to include the last day. Applying the terms of section 9 and the general rule of construction of statutes, the date on which the goods were received at the destination station has to be excluded. On perusal of the evidence referred to in paragraph 22 above, it is thus clear that as regards the railway receipt No.670242 Ex.P-25, its goods were received at the destination station on 20.2.1970 and delivered to the defendant No.2 on 6.3.1970, i.e., much after the expiry of the period of 7 days after the termination of transit as defined in section 77(c )(3) and section 77(5) of the Railways Act, and as such the defendant respondenta No.3(a) and (b) were totally absolved of their liabilities as far as the goods covered by the railway receipt No. 670242 (Ex.P-25) were concerned. But because the goods covered by the railway receipt Nos.670035 to 670041 (Exs.P-9 to P-15) and Railway receipt No.6711112 (Ex.P-26) are concerned the same were delivered to defendant No.2 before the expiry of the period of 7 days after the termination of transit and therefore respondent No.3(a) and (b) were not so absolved of the liability under the provisions of section 77(c )(3) read with section 77(5) of the Railways Act. 11. The Division Bench has held that the first day on which the amount was due is to be ignored and the last day on which the amount has been deposited, has to be taken into consideration while computation of time. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgment, as the amount was deposited on 22.11.2004, it was certainly deposited with a delay of one day. 12. Not only this, the judgment and decree was passed on 22.9.2004. From 22.9.2004 till 27.1.2005, i.e., the day this Court has granted stay in Miscellaneous Appeal No.2674/2004, there was no interim order. Keeping in view the aforesaid judgment, as the amount was deposited on 22.11.2004, it was certainly deposited with a delay of one day. 12. Not only this, the judgment and decree was passed on 22.9.2004. From 22.9.2004 till 27.1.2005, i.e., the day this Court has granted stay in Miscellaneous Appeal No.2674/2004, there was no interim order. The stay was granted after expiry of 2 months period and, therefore, this Court is of the considered opinion that as the amount was not deposited in respect of stamp duty and penalty within a period of 2 months, the question of executing sale deed of the present applicants does not arise. 13. In the case of Rajendra Kumar Chachan v. Banne Singh and others, reported in AIR 2014 Raj. 102 , the Rajasthan High Court in paragraph 12 and 13 has held as under : 12. In view of the aforestated legal and factual position the Court comes to an irresistable conclusion that the respondent plaintiffs having not paid the purchase money to the petitioner defendant No.9 within the time limit fixed by the Court in the decree. The provisions contained in section 14 of the said Act and of the order XX rule 14 had come into play and the suit itself had stood dismissed consequently the execution proceedings had also stood terminated and there was no question of executing Court permitting the respondent plaintiffs to deposit the purchase money as directed in the impugned order. On the dismissal of the suit even the execution proceedings did not survive. The Court therefore holds that the impugned order passed by the executing Court is not only without jurisdiction but illegal perverse and liable to be set aside. 13. Since the execution proceeding were not maintainable in the eye of law the orders passed by the executing Court therein more particularly the order permitting the respondent plaintiffs to take over the possession of the suit premises by the breaking open the lock, were also without any authority of law. The respondents No.1 and 2 are therefore required to be directed to hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises to the petitioner. In that view of the matter the impugned order is set aside. The objections filed by the petitioner are allowed and the execution petitioner of the respondent plaintiffs No.1 and 2 is dismissed. The respondents No.1 and 2 are therefore required to be directed to hand over the peaceful and vacant possession of the suit premises to the petitioner. In that view of the matter the impugned order is set aside. The objections filed by the petitioner are allowed and the execution petitioner of the respondent plaintiffs No.1 and 2 is dismissed. The respondents No.1 and 2 are directed to handover the possession of the suit premises to the petitioner within 2 weeks from today. 14. In the aforesaid case also the decree-holder was required to deposit the amount within the time prescribed and as the amount was not deposited by the decree holder, the execution proceeding by the executing Court were held to be beyond jurisdiction and were held to be illegal. 15. Hon’ble the Supreme Court of India in the case of Sulleh Singh and others v. Sohan Lal and another, reported in AIR 1975 SC 1957 , and the apex Court in paragraphs 3, 3A, 4, 5, 13 and 15 has held as under : 3. The respondents filed this suit for possession by preemption of the land in payment of Rs.30,000/- on allegations that the respondents were on the date of sale tenants of the land under the vendors. The respondents alleged that their right of preemotion was superior to that of the vendees. They also alleged that the sale took place for Rs.30,000/- only and the remaining was fictitiously mentioned in the deed of sale. The suit was dismissed on the ground that one suit on behalf of the four plaintiffs, who were tenants of different parts of the land, was not maintainable. 3A On appeal the suit was remanded for re-trial. 4. At the trial on remand, two plaintiffs withdrew from the suit. The trial court directed the remaining two plaintiffsrespondents Sohan Lal and Nathi to deposit Rs.6,300/- and Rs.5,670/- respectively on or before 1 April, 1969 less 1/5th of the pre-emotion amount already deposited by them. The trial Court gave the respondent Sohan Lal a decree for possession by preemotion in respect of Killa Nos.14/1. 17 and 18/1 of Rectangle 37. The plaintiffs- respondents aggrieved by the order. The trial Court gave the respondent Sohan Lal a decree for possession by preemotion in respect of Killa Nos.14/1. 17 and 18/1 of Rectangle 37. The plaintiffs- respondents aggrieved by the order. filed an appeal alleging that the respondent Sohan Lal was a tenant of Killa No.24 under the vendors and the decree should have been passed in their favour for the whole of the land and that decree should have been passed in favour of Sohan Lal in respect of Killa No.24 of Rectangle 37. The other ground in the appeal was that the decree should have been passed in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents for whole of the land. 5. The Additional District Judge on 29 July, 1969 passed a decree for possession by pre-emotion in favour of respondent Sohan Lal on payment of Rs.9,100/- and he was directed to deposit this amount in Court on or before 20 August, 1969. The Addition District Judge passed a decree for possession by preemption in favour of respondent Sohan Lal of Killa No.24 of Rectangle 37. The decree in favour the respondent Nathi was maintained without change. 13. In the present case, the lower appellate Court did not grant any stay to the plaintiffs-respondents. In view of the fact that the plaintiffs respondents did not deposit the amount as directed by the trial Court (1) AIR 1954 SC 50 . (2) [1969]2 SCR 514 on or before 1 April, 1969, it became mandatory on the lower appellate Court by reason of the ruling of this Court in Naguba Appa’s case (supra), to dismiss the suit. The observations of this Court in Naguba Appa’s case (supra), that the pre-emptor is bound to comply with the directions of the Trial Judge unless that decree is altered in any manner by a Court of Appeal do not mean that where the deposit is not made in accordance with the directions of the trial Court, the appellate Court can extend the time for payment. Thereafter, the lower appellate Court was in error in extending the time for payment till 2nd August, 1969. Thereafter, the lower appellate Court was in error in extending the time for payment till 2nd August, 1969. 15.The contention of the appellants that the lower appellate Court was wrong in extending the time for payment is correct because the failure of the plaintiffs-respondents to deposit the amount in terms of the trial Court’s decree would result in pre-emptor’s suit standing dismissed by reason of their default in not depositing the pre-emption price. The contention of the appellants that the High Court was wrong in not setting aside the order of extension of time passes by the lower appellate Court is correct. It is only if the plaintiffs-respondents had paid the decretal amount within the time granted by the trial Court or if the plaintiffs-respondents had obtained another order from the lower appellate Court granting any order of stay that the lower appellate Court might have considered the passing of appropriate order in favour of preemptors. The High Court should have allowed the appellants’ appeal and not made any distinction in dismissing plaintiffrespondent Nathi’s suit and allowing plaintiff-respondent Sohan Lal any extension of time to make the payment. Further, it appears that the plaintiff respondent Sohan Lal did not pay the amount. 16. In the aforesaid case also, there was a direction of the trial Court to deposit the amount within a time framework and the same was not done. Extension was granted by the lower appellate Court and the same was held to be bad in law. 17. In the case of Naguba Appa v. Namdev, reported in AIR 1954 SC 50 , in paragrapn 2, the apex Court has held as under : 2. It was contended on behalf of the appellant that the decision of the High Court was wrong inasmuch as an appeal having been preferred from the trial Court’s decree in the pre-emption suit, the preemptor was justified in not depositing the amount within the time fixed by the decree. This argument cannot be sustained. Mere filing of an appeal does not suspend the decree of the trial Judge and unless that decree is altered in any manner by the Court of appeal, the preemptor is bound to comply with its directions. This argument cannot be sustained. Mere filing of an appeal does not suspend the decree of the trial Judge and unless that decree is altered in any manner by the Court of appeal, the preemptor is bound to comply with its directions. In our opinion, the High Court was right in holding that the preemptor’s suit stood dismissed by reason of his default in not depositing the pre-emption price within the time fixed in the trial Court’s decree. It was next contended that the decree drawn up by the trial Judge was not in accordance with the provisions of Order 20 rule 14 in that it contained no direction to the effect that if the deposit was not made within the time fixed the suit will stand dismissed. In our view, this contention is not sound because the dismissal of the suit is as a result of the mandatory provisions of Order 20 rule 14 and not by reason of any decision of the Court and the omission to incorporate this direction in the decree could not in any way affect the rights of the parties. 18. In the aforesaid case also an appeal was preferred against the judgment and decree and it was held by the apex Court that non compliance of the directions with regard to the deposit of the amount within fixed time will not entitle the decree-holder to claim relief. 19. In the case of Rameshwar Dass Gupta v. State of U.P., reported in 1997(I) MPWN 163 Page 239, it has held that a decree has to be executed as per the provisions under Order 21 and the Execution Court cannot amend or enlarge the decree. 20. In the light of the aforesaid judgment, this Court is of the considered opinion that in the present case, the executing Court also erred in law and facts in dismissing the application preferred by the present applicants, especially in the light of the fact that the amount in question was not deposited within 2 months. 21. The apex Court in the case of P. R. Yelumalai v. N.M. Ravi, reported in 2015 SAR (Civil) 549, has taken a similar view. 21. The apex Court in the case of P. R. Yelumalai v. N.M. Ravi, reported in 2015 SAR (Civil) 549, has taken a similar view. The apex Court in the aforesaid case has held that in case of a conditional decree, if the decree-holder fails to deposit the remain sale consideration within the specified time as per the judgment and decree, rejection of execution petition on the ground of delay in depositing of sale consideration is in order and the order passed by the executing Court has to be held as valid order. 22. The Full Bench of Allahabad High Court in the case of Habib Mian and another Vv Mukhtar Ahmad and another, reported in AIR 1969 All. 296 , in paragraphs 34, 44 and 45 has held as under : "34. The result is that 1 agree with the conclusions of Brother Pathak, though for somewhat different reasons, that the appeal should be allowed with costs. 44. Upon that view of the matter, I would hold that the decree-holder was bound to get the appeal dismissed between March 17, 1952, the date of the decree, and March 31, 1953, when the first instalment became payable. The period is over one year and it can be reasonably supposed that it was considered sufficient by the parties for the decree-holder to secure the dismissal of the appeal. If within this period the decree-holder failed in getting the appeal dismissed, the suit would be considered as having been dismissed and this would be before the date upon which the first instalment would otherwise have been payable by the judgment-debtors. If the decree-holder succeeded in getting the appeal dismissed within this period, clearly the judgment-debtors would be liable to pay the first instalment on March 31, 1953, in accordance with the terms of the decree and, thereafter, further instalments annually. 45. In my opinion, inasmuch as the decree-holder failed to get the appeal dismissed before March 31, 1953, the suit must be deemed to have been dismissed and, in the circumstances, there being no decree which could be executed against the judgment-debtors, the execution application is liable to be dismissed on that ground." 23. In the aforesaid case also, the terms and conditions of the compromise decree were not fulfilled within the time framework and in those circumstances the Full Bench has held that the decree in question is unexecutable. 24. In the aforesaid case also, the terms and conditions of the compromise decree were not fulfilled within the time framework and in those circumstances the Full Bench has held that the decree in question is unexecutable. 24. The apex Court in the case of Government of Orissa v. M/s. Ashok Transport Agency and others, reported in 2002 SAR (CIVIL) 457, has taken a similar view. 25. The apex Court in the case of Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash, reported in AIR 1977 SC 1201 , in paragraph 3, has held as under : 3. Now, the law is well settled that an executing Court cannot go behind the decree nor can it question its legality or correctness. But there is one exception to this general rule and that is that where the decree sought to be executed is a nullity for lack of inherent jurisdiction in the court passing it, its invalidity can be set up in an execution proceeding. Where there is lack of inherent jurisdiction, it goes to the root of the competence of the Court to try the case and a decree which is a nullity is void and can be declared to be void by any Court in which it is presented. Its nullity can be set up whenever and whenever it is sought to be enforced or relied upon and even at the stage of execution or even in collateral proceedings. The executing Court can, therefore, entertain an objection that the decree is a nullity and can refuse to execute the decree. By doing so, the executing court would not incur the reproach that it is going behind the decree, because the the decree being null and void, there would really be no decree at all. 26. In the aforesaid case, it has been held that the executing Court cannot go behind the decree nor it can question its legality or correctness. 27. In the present case, as the terms and conditions of the decree were not satisfied within the time framework, in the light of the aforesaid judgment, the executing Court was left with no other choice except to allow the application preferred by the applicant and this Court is of the considered opinion that the executing Court has erred in law and facts in rejecting the application preferred by the present applicant. 28. 28. In the case of Ramchandra Govind v. Laxman Savleram, reported in AIR 1938 Bom. 447, wherein it was held that the judgment debtor was asked to deposit the money within 15 days from certain date and the amount was deposited and the issue was whether the date on which theorder has been passed and the amount so deposited, has to be taken into account or not, or has to be excluded. The Bombay High Court has held that the first day on which the order has been passed has to be excluded and in the present case also if the first date on which the order was passed is excluded, then the amount was certainly deposited beyond the period of 60 days. 29. In the light of the aforesaid, it can be safely gathered that the decree holder has not complied with the terms and conditions laid down in the judgment and decree as per paragraph 42 of the judgment dated 22.9.2004 by not depositing the amount of remain sale consideration within 60 days and by not at all depositing the amount towards the court-fees and penalty. It is pertinent to note that the amount has not been deposited till date. 30. This Court is of the considered opinion that the objection preferred by the present applicants deserves to be allowed and is accordingly allowed. The impugned order dated 20.11.2014 is set aside. As a result, the execution Case No.9-A of 2002 (Abhay Kumar v. Ramkumar Pandey) is dismissed.