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2015 DIGILAW 926 (CAL)

Ranjan Goswami v. Coal India Ltd.

2015-11-26

ARIJIT BANERJEE

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JUDGMENT : Arijit Banerjee, J. In the present writ application the petitioner prays for a direction on the respondent authorities to provide him with a job under the National Coal Wages Agreement Scheme (in short NCWA Scheme). The petitioner's case:- 2. The petitioner's father, Shiba Pada Goswami, was appointed as a General Mazdoor in 1978 by the Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (in short BCCL) at the Basantimata Colliery. On 6th February, 1998 the said Shiba Pada Goswami, a permanent employee of Basantimata Colliery, died in harness. 3. Since the petitioner's father was the sole earning member of the family, upon his death, the family faced tremendous financial crisis. Accordingly, the petitioner made an application dated 18th May, 1998 before the Chief General Manager, Basantimata Colliery stating that the said Shiba Pada Goawami did not disclose the name of the petitioner and his brother in the service register of the company but that, in fact, they were the two sons of the deceased and as such, the service benefits should be released in their favour. 4. An application dated 18.9.1998 was also made by the Mother-In-Law of the said deceased to the Personnel Officer, Basantimata Colliery to include the name of the petitioner in the live roster so that after attaining majority he may be provided with a job at the Colliery. 5. The Mother-In-Law of the deceased wrote a letter dated 6th May, 2002 to the agent, Basantimata Colliery, for providing employment to the petitioner when he attains the age of majority i.e. 18 years of age. On receiving such application, the Manager called upon the petitioner to produce certain documents which the petitioner did. 6. The petitioner made a claim for being employed by a letter dated 7th March, 2010. By a letter dated 17th March, 2010, the agent, Basantimata Colliery, informed the petitioner that his claim for employment had been received after a lapse of more than 12 years from the date of death of Shiba Pada Goswami and, as such, his claim could not be considered. 7. By a letter dated 17th March, 2010, the agent, Basantimata Colliery, informed the petitioner that his claim for employment had been received after a lapse of more than 12 years from the date of death of Shiba Pada Goswami and, as such, his claim could not be considered. 7. Through his Advocate's letter dated 4th September, 2012, the petitioner made a further demand for justice wherein it was stated that apart from being entitled to being employed under the died-in-harness quota, the petitioner also had a right to be employed under the 'Land Looser Quota' in view of the fact that several acres of land belonging to the deceased Shiba Pada Goswami had been taken possession of by the Colliery authorities. There has been no response to the said demand for justice. 8. In the aforesaid premises, the petitioner prays for an order directing the respondents to provide employment to the petitioner under the died-in-harness scheme as per Clause 9:5:0 of the NCWA Act VI. Respondent's contention:- 9. Appearing on behalf of the respondent authorities, Mr. Banerjee, Ld. Senior Counsel, has urged three points. 10. Firstly, he submitted that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. It was submitted that the registered office of BCCL is situated at Dhanbad and all the decisions were taken from the Head Office situated at Koila Bhawan, Koila Nagar, Dhanbad. Admittedly, the deceased was working in Dhanbad. It will be evident from page 20 (Annexure P4 of the writ petition) that the application was made to Personnel Officer, Dhanbad. The petitioner was a resident of Dhanbad and the entire cause of action arise outside the territorial jurisdiction of this Court. In this connection Ld. Counsel relied on the following decisions:- (a) Unreported judgment of Division Bench of this Court in A.P.O. 12 of 2014 arising out of WP 677 of 2011 (Bharat Coking Coal Ltd v. Mangal Majhi). (b) Unreported decision of this Court in W.P. 888 of 2012 (Bijoy Bouri v. Coal India Ltd.) (c)Unreported decision of a Division Bench of this Court in A.P.O. 441 of 2004 arising out of WP 405 of 1999 (Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Sri Sudama Das). (d) Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee reported in (2008) 3 SCC 456 . 11. Secondly, Mr. (d) Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Kalyan Banerjee reported in (2008) 3 SCC 456 . 11. Secondly, Mr. Banerjee argued that the petitioner is guilty of inordinate delay and laches in approaching this court and on that ground alone the petition should be dismissed. He submitted that the ethos for affording compassionate appointment is that the family of the bread earner is not washed away upon his death. It is judicially recognised that compassionate appointment is a weak right and such right cannot be asserted after a considerable period has elapsed following the death of the employee. If the family of the deceased could survive for a considerable period of time after the demise of the employee, it would show that the family was not in need of compassionate appointment. Generally, after a period of five years from the date of demise of the concerned employee, the question of compassionate appointment would not arise. In this connection, Mr. Banerjee relied on the following decisions:- (a) Unreported judgment of this Court in W.P. 612 (W) of 2015 (Sri Uttam Kumar v. Eastern Coalfields Ltd.). (b) Unreported judgment of Division Bench of this Court in APOT 582 of 2012 arising out of WP 350 of 2012 (Sri Prasenjit Das v. Coal India Ltd.). (c) State of UP v. Paras Nath reported in (1998) 2 SCC 412 . (d) Eastern Coalfields Ltd. v. Anil Badyakar reported in (2009) 13 SCC 112 . 12. The third point urged by Mr. Banerjee is that the name of the petitioner has not been disclosed by the deceased employee as his dependant in the service records. Hence, the petitioner cannot maintain the present application. The petitioner's contention in reply:- 13. In reply, Mr. Ganguly, Ld. Counsel for the petitioner submitted that since BCCL has an office within the territorial jurisdiction of this Court, this court has jurisdiction to entertain the present petition. In support of his contention he relied on the following decisions:- (a) Nawal Kishore Sharma v. Union of India reported in 2015 (2) SLR 623 (SC). (b) Trinath Sethi v. Coal India Ltd. reported in (2007) 3 CLT 493 (HC). (c) Indro Deo Yadav v. Coal India Ltd. (unreported) in WP No. 1356 of 1997 (Cal). (d) Ram Brich Muchi v. Coal India Ltd. reported in 2003 (2) WBLR (Cal) 79. (e) Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2000 SC 2966 . (b) Trinath Sethi v. Coal India Ltd. reported in (2007) 3 CLT 493 (HC). (c) Indro Deo Yadav v. Coal India Ltd. (unreported) in WP No. 1356 of 1997 (Cal). (d) Ram Brich Muchi v. Coal India Ltd. reported in 2003 (2) WBLR (Cal) 79. (e) Navinchandra N. Majithia v. State of Maharashtra reported in AIR 2000 SC 2966 . (f) Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. M/s. Auroma Coke Ltd. reported in 119 (1) CWN (Cal) 110. (g) Satrughan Majhi @ Bakshi v. Coal India Ltd (unreported) in FMA 427 of 2009 (Cal). (h) Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Smt. Champarani Sethi (unreported) in APO 613 of 2005 arising out of WP 2013 of 2003 (Cal). 14. On the point of delay Mr. Ganguly relied on the following decisions:- (a) M/s. Dehri Rohtas Light Railway Company Ltd. v. District Board, Bhojpir reported in AIR 1993 SC 802 . (b) T. Ramalaxmi v. The Managing Director, M/s. Nharat Heavy Plates & Vest Ltd. reported in 1997 LAB. I.C. 984. (c) Bhawani Prasad Sonkar v. Union of India reported in (2011) 4 SCC 209 . (d) Sourish Ganguly v. Coal India Ltd. (unreported) in WP 3715 (W) of 2009 (Cal). (e) Mohan Mahato v. Central Coalfield Ltd. reported in AIR 2008 SC 39 . (f) Sujit Kora v. Coal India Ltd. reported in 2002 (2) CHN 557 . Court's View:- 15. Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India provides as follows:- "A. 226(2). The power conferred by Clause (1) to issue directions, orders or writs to any Government authority or person may also be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which the cause of action, wholly or in part, arises for the exercise of such power, notwithstanding that the seat of such Government or authority or the residence of such person is not within those territories." On a meaningful reading of the said provision it is clear that the a High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution where either the seat of the respondent authority is within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court or if the cause of action, whole or part, arises within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court. It may sometimes be the case that where the place where the seat of the respondent authority is situate and the place where the cause of action arises are the same. 16. In the case of Nawal Kishor Sharma (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that since the writ petitioner received the letter of refusal disentitling him from refusing disability compensation at his home in Bihar, a part or fraction of cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the Patna High Court and as such, the Patna High Court had jurisdiction to entertain the writ petition. In Trinath Sethi (supra), a Division Bench of this court reiterated and reaffirmed the principal of law that mere situation of any head office in a particular territorial jurisdiction ipso facto would not confer any jurisdiction on the concerned High Court but for attracting the territorial jurisdiction of any particular High Court at least a part of the cause of action must arise within the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court. In the case of Indra Deo Yadav (supra), a Ld. Single Judge of this court held that if the respondent authority against whom relief is sought for, is having its place of business within the territorial jurisdiction of the concerned High Court, that High Court would have jurisdiction to entertain an application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In Ram Brich Majhi (supra), a Division Bench of this court held that the High Court can entertain and try a writ petition even though no part of the cause of action may have arisen within its territorial jurisdiction, in the event the situs of the authority or of any other respondent is within the territorial jurisdiction of such High Court. In Navinchandra N. Majhi (supra), the Hon'ble Apex Court held that the powers conferred on the High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution could be exercised by any High Court exercising jurisdiction in relation to the territories within which 'the cause of action, whole or in part, arises' and it is no matter that the seat of the authority concerned is outside the territorial jurisdiction of that High Court. In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. (supra), a Division Bench of this court reiterated that a petitioner can invoke the writ jurisdiction of a High Court notwithstanding the situs of the respondent authority, provided a part of the cause of action arises within the jurisdiction of such court. In Satrughan Majhi @ Bakshi (supra), a Division Bench of this court reiterated that the High Court having jurisdiction to entertain an application under Article 226 of the Constitution is the High Court within the territorial limits of which the seat of the respondent authority is situated or part or whole of cause of action arise. The seat of the respondent authority was interpreted to be the registered office of Eastern Coalfields Ltd. which was the concerned authority in that case. In Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. v. Champarani Sethi (supra), a Division Bench of this court held that in the facts of that case part of cause of action had arisen within this court's jurisdiction and as such, the writ petition was maintainable in this court. 17. From a reading of the aforesaid decisions and also on a true construction of Article 226(2) of the Constitution of India, in my opinion, what transpires is that the High Court having jurisdiction to entertain a writ application is the High Court within the territorial limits of which the registered office/head office of the respondent authority is situated or within the territorial limits of which part or whole of the cause of action has arisen. In the present case it is not disputed that the registered office of BCCL is situated at Dhanbad in Jharkhand, beyond the territorial jurisdiction of this court. It will also appear from the annexures to the writ petition that the requests that were made on behalf of the petitioner for compassionate appointment were addressed to the Agent, Basantimata Colliery, Area No. 12 BCCL or to the Personnel Officer of the Basantimata Colliery, both at Dhanbad, Jharkhand. It further appears that the letter refusing employment to the writ petitioner was issued by the agent, Basantimata Colliery and received by the petitioner at Dhanbad, outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court. In my view, the entire cause of action of the petitioner has arisen outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court and the seat of the BCCL is situated at Dhanbad, outside the jurisdiction of this Court. In my view, the entire cause of action of the petitioner has arisen outside the territorial jurisdiction of this court and the seat of the BCCL is situated at Dhanbad, outside the jurisdiction of this Court. The Calcutta office of BCCL has absolutely no nexus or connection with the grievance of the petitioner and, in my view, the writ jurisdiction of this court cannot be invoked on the basis of the situs of the Calcutta office of BCCL. 18. In view of the aforesaid, the preliminary objection of Ld. Counsel for the respondent is upheld. I hold that this court does not have the territorial jurisdiction to entertain the instant writ petition. Accordingly, the writ petition is dismissed. I, however, make it clear that in view of my finding that this court does not have territorial jurisdiction to entertain and try the writ petition, I have not examined the merits of the petitioner's claim including the issue of delay and all such issues are left open. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs. 19. WP 1228 of 2013 is accordingly disposed of.