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2015 DIGILAW 929 (CAL)

Dablu Mal v. State of West Bengal

2015-11-27

INDRAJIT CHATTERJEE, NADIRA PATHERYA

body2015
JUDGMENT : Nadira Patherya, J. This appeal is directed against the order of conviction and sentence dated 6th February, 2007 and 7th February, 2007 passed by the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Fast Track, 1st Court, Rampurhat, Birbhum in Sessions Trial No. IV/July/2003 arising out of Sessions Case No.107 of 2002 under Sections 498A and 302 I.P.C. Whereby and where under the accused appellant was directed to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life for the offence committed under Section 302 I.P.C. and rigorous imprisonment for three years with fine of Rs.2000/- in default to suffer simple imprisonment for two months for the offence committed under Section 498A I.P.C. 2. The case of the prosecution is that the victim girl and the accused appellant were married for four years before the date of incident. The initial years of marriage was peaceful. Subsequently, the accused appellant developed an illicit relation with a lady of the village to which the victim girl protested. Such protest resulted in torture both physical and mental on the victim girl as a result of which she left her matrimonial home for her parental home. 15 to 16 days prior to the fated day she informed her parents of the physical and mental torture caused to her by the accused appellant. The accused appellant came to the parental home of the victim girl to take her back. Initially the victim girl was not inclined to accompany the accused appellant but left her parental home on being persuaded to do so by her parents and on the undertaking of the accused appellant not to mix with the lady of the village. 4 to 5 days after her return to her matrimonial home the victim girl died and on receiving the news of her death the de facto complainant (father) filed a written complaint with the Murarai Police Station which was registered as Murarai P.S. Case No.73/1999 dated 4th August, 1999. An inquest was held and post mortem conducted. Investigation was undertaken and charge sheet submitted under Sections 498A and 302 I.P.C. The case was committed to the Court of the Additional District and Sessions Judge, Rampurhat who transferred the case to the Trial Court for trial. Charges were framed under Sections 498A and 302 I.P.C. The charges were read out and explained to the accused appellants who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Charges were framed under Sections 498A and 302 I.P.C. The charges were read out and explained to the accused appellants who pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. Trial started and the prosecution examined in all 14 witnesses. Defence did not adduce evidence. The accused appellant was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. On appreciation of the oral evidence and documents exhibited the order of conviction and sentence was passed. 3. The case of the appellant is that the date of incident is 4th August, 1999. The FIR was filed on 4th August, 1999 at 8.15 p.m. by the de facto complainant (father) of the victim girl who during the pendency of the case died. P.W.11 is the mother, P.W.12 is the postmortem doctor and P.W.13 is the I.O. The rest of the witnesses were either declared hostile or were formal witness. The postmortem report does not state whether the death was accidental, homicidal or suicidal. There is no mention of strangulation too. Therefore, the question of involvement of the accused appellant is not evident. In a proceeding under Section 302 I.P.C. the burden of proof is on the prosecution to prove its case and suspicion which forms the basis of conviction, however strong will not take the place of proof. Suspicion is evident from the evidence of P.W. 13. The case of physical and mental torture has not been proved by the prosecution, as the only witness who has spoken about mental and physical torture is P.W.11 (mother) when she mentioned quarrel and illicit relation. But the said is devoid of proof. P.W.3 found the body outside the village. A charge is to be framed under Section 212 Cr.P.C. The charge framed is defective, as there is no specific charge that the victim girl died in her matrimonial house, i.e., the house of the accused. Therefore, the defence was not called upon to answer to such charge. P.W.11 says that the inquest was prepared in her presence at the P.S. as this was the place she first visited. The Magistrate made the inquest in the hospital which P.W.11 did not visit. P.W.3 (co-villager) says that signature was taken on a blank sheet while P.W.5 (brother of accused) signed the inquest report. But this is contra to the evidence of P.W.13. The Magistrate made the inquest in the hospital which P.W.11 did not visit. P.W.3 (co-villager) says that signature was taken on a blank sheet while P.W.5 (brother of accused) signed the inquest report. But this is contra to the evidence of P.W.13. Therefore, the inquest report cannot be relied on as it was prepared in the police station according to P.W.11 and the theory of the inquest being made in the courtyard is belied. 4. In view of the aforesaid, the evidence of P.W.13 cannot be relied on. P.W.11 also did not sign the inquest or the FIR. The inquest was made in U.D. case in the courtyard. This is supported by the evidence of P.W.13. This is in conflict with the evidence of P.W.11 who has stated that the inquest was made in her presence at the police station. P.W.3 found the body outside the village and he signed on a blank sheet of paper, which according to him is the inquest report. P.W.5 signed later. There is no mention in the F.I.R that the body was found in the house of the accused. Therefore, the evidence of P.W.13 (I.O.) need not be believed. At the time of inquest the body was turned with the help of the accused appellant. This is contrary to the evidence of P.W.13 who has said that the accused appellant was not present at the P.O. This is also contradictory to the statement made in the inquest report. In all probability the accused was arrested at the time of inquest and that is the reason his help was taken in the police station. There is no evidence with regard to finding, the dead body in the matrimonial home. There is no eyewitness to the case and the case is based on circumstantial evidence. P.W.11 (mother) has specifically stated that the accused had nothing to do with the victim girl. It cannot be a case under Section 302 I.P.C. but at best may be a case under Section 304 Part-II I.P.C., as there is lack of evidence with regard to the death of the victim girl at the house of the accused appellant. Quarrel has been highlighted but the quarrel was on a regular basis. There was no provocation so grave or sudden to result in the death of the victim girl. P.W.5 and P.W.8 stayed in the house nearby. Quarrel has been highlighted but the quarrel was on a regular basis. There was no provocation so grave or sudden to result in the death of the victim girl. P.W.5 and P.W.8 stayed in the house nearby. The cause of quarrel has been highlighted in the FIR and the evidence of P.W.11, but P.W.13 (I.O.) did not investigate the aspect of provocation. There was no inquiry with regard to residence of the mother and brother although joint-ness is evident. Ownership of family dwelling house was also not ascertained. Prosecution was required to give evidence of altercation which prosecution has failed to do. Earlier provocation, if any, was condoned by the victim girl by returning to her matrimonial home. Thereafter, there was no question of any provocation, grave or sudden, as the victim girl and the accused were not on speaking term as will appear from the evidence of P.W.11. 5. Although in Exhibit-4 it has been mentioned that the cause of death was strangulation resulting from family dispute between the accused appellant and the victim girl, but there is no evidence in this regard. Onus was cast on the prosecution to prove its case which the prosecution failed to discharge. The prosecution was duty bound to show that the victim girl and the accused were last seen together. Evidence is silent in this regard. Therefore, the benefit of doubt should go to the accused in case two interpretations are possible. There is no evidence of last seen together or altercation. The defence may have failed to adduce evidence but weakness of the defence's case cannot lead the Court to believe that the prosecution has proved its case. Prosecution's case must stand on its own feet. There is no direct evidence and the case is based on circumstantial evidence. The theory of last seen together is not applicable as prosecution did not run this case. The time of death is not known. The victim girl was found dead in the morning and in view of 2010 (6) SCC 525 (Niranjan Panja v. State of West Bengal), the accused be acquitted. Exhibit-9 is the seizure list. No bed sheet was seized. There is no evidence to connect the entry of the accused to the P.O. No article has been seized from the house of the accused. 6. The P.O. has been changed deliberately. Exhibit-9 is the seizure list. No bed sheet was seized. There is no evidence to connect the entry of the accused to the P.O. No article has been seized from the house of the accused. 6. The P.O. has been changed deliberately. P.W.3 found the dead body outside the village this cannot be ruled out. The P.O. could not have been the house of the accused and therefore has been changed. There is nothing reliable on record to show that the victim girl was found in her matrimonial home. Father has also not said about going to the house of the accused. P.W.3 signed on a blank sheet while P.W.5 signed later on and both have signed the inquest report. There is no evidence about the death of the victim girl in the house of the accused. Motive is to be proved by the prosecution which it has failed to do. The accused appellant and P.W.7 have denied the illicit relation. This also finds mention in the statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. There is no evidence to point to an illicit relation and suspicion cannot tantamount to prove. The suggestion put to the accused has also been denied. P.W.7 has been declared hostile and has not supported the case of illicit relationship. Therefore, no motive exists nor has it been proved. The charge is defective and is not under Section 212 Cr.P.C. and as held in 2010 (10) SCC 130 (Main Pal v. State of Haryana) the accused be given benefit of doubt. No time has been specified. The place, is the village which is a wide area. The fingerprints have not been taken. Therefore, the investigation is defective and prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the accused. 7. Reliance is placed on 2012 (9) SCC 650 (Bhimanna v. State of Karnataka) and 2012 (10) SCC 476 (Darbara Singh v. State of Punjab) for the prejudice theory and failure of justice. The evidence of P.W.11 is inadmissible as it is nothing but hearsay. It was not put to the accused while being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. It was also not put to P.W.11 and P.W.13 that the body was found in the house of the accused. The question under Section 313 Cr.P.C must be so couched so that it can be understood by the accused. The accused is a labourer, ignorant and illiterate person. The question under Section 313 Cr.P.C must be so couched so that it can be understood by the accused. The accused is a labourer, ignorant and illiterate person. The question put was neither separate nor simple but in jumble form. Therefore, grave prejudice has been caused to the accused appellant and in view of 2009 (6) SCC 583 (Sk. Maqsood v. State of Maharashtra) the matter be sent on remand. Conviction is based on material not placed to the accused appellant during Section 313 examination and in view of 2014 (12) SCC 133 (Prakash v. State of Karnataka) the conviction is bad. The evidence of P.W.9 is inadmissible as on that day he was not in the village. The evidence of P.W.5 and P.W.8 were also not put to the appellant while being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. P.W. 9 has not said that the victim girl and the accused often quarrelled. The statement of P.W.6 was not put in examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C, therefore, cannot be considered. The body was not found or seen at the house. As no chain has been identified and in view of 2010 (2) SCC 748 (Musheer Khan v. State of Madhya Pradesh) the order of conviction be set aside. That the accused was not present in the room, will appear from the evidence of P.W.5 and P.W.6 who did not find him in the house. It is not the prosecution's case that after the incident the accused fled. P.W.7 has stated that the accused left his home which has been denied by P.W.8 and P.W.9. Mother of the accused first discovered the body of the victim girl, but she has not been summoned as a witness. P.W.13 has stated that accused was not there. But at the time of inquest at 10.00 a.m. he helped to turn the body. In a case of circumstantial evidence greater proof of motive is necessary as held in 1997 (7) SCC 156 (Tanviben Pankajkumar Divetia v. State of Gujarat) and 2010 (9) SCC 189 (Babu v. State of Kerala). In case of contradiction the evidence which supports the case be considered. P.W.5 to P.W.9 have stated that the accused was not present at the P.O. and the investigation is defective. 8. The evidence of P.W.11 is not in conformity with that of P.W.3 and P.W.5. In case of contradiction the evidence which supports the case be considered. P.W.5 to P.W.9 have stated that the accused was not present at the P.O. and the investigation is defective. 8. The evidence of P.W.11 is not in conformity with that of P.W.3 and P.W.5. P.W.3 has stated that his signature was taken on a blank sheet of paper while P.W.5 has said he signed later. P.W.13 has stated that the inquest was made in the courtyard. This is belied by the evidence of P.W.11 who said that the inquest report was prepared in the police station. Therefore, the courtyard theory is belied from the aforesaid. Defacto complainant died before the Trial started and, therefore, could not be examined. AIR 1990 SC 2140 (Kishore Chand v. State of H.P.) is relied on for the effect of a fabricated inquest report. AIR 1977 SC 45 (State of A.P. v. Rayavarapu Punnayya) is relied on for the alternative submission which alternative submission was not explored by the Trial Court. As per 2014 (10) SCC 298 (Kusha Laxman Waghmare v. State of Maharashtra)intent is of importance in a case under Section 304 Part-II and in the instant case there was no intent, therefore, the said alternative submission be accepted. With regard to the importance of hostile witness reliance is place on 2010 (8) SCC 233 (S. Arul Raja v. State of Tamil Nadu). A doubt has arisen in the prosecution case with regard to whether the lady was killed in her matrimonial home and there is no clinching evidence in this regard. In fact, the evidence is conflicting. The victim girl was found bleeding from her mouth injury. She was lying dead on the bed. The blood stained material exhibits were not seized e.g. pillow and bed sheet. No fingerprint evidence was relied on as inquest was prepared in the police station. The evidence of P.W.13 cannot be relied on. Similarly, the evidence of P.W.9 and P.W11 cannot be relied on as it is nothing but hearsay. For all the said reasons the order of conviction and sentence be set aside. 9. Counsel for the State respondents submits that as within seven years of marriage the victim girl died, under Section 174 a magisterial inquest was also conducted. Similarly, the evidence of P.W.9 and P.W11 cannot be relied on as it is nothing but hearsay. For all the said reasons the order of conviction and sentence be set aside. 9. Counsel for the State respondents submits that as within seven years of marriage the victim girl died, under Section 174 a magisterial inquest was also conducted. From the F.I.R. it will appear that the accused appellants were residents of village Kestara which is under Murarai P.S. At the time of inquest the place of occurrence was fixed being the courtyard of the house. This finds support from Exhibit-8 and the evidence of P.W.13. Strangulation was the cause of death as will appear from the postmortem report and although a plea of defective charge sheet has been taken, the said could have been challenged but no proceeding was initiated. Therefore, the charge as framed was not only accepted but also sought to be answered by the accused appellant. Section 215 Cr.P.C. and Section 464 Cr.P.C. be considered in this respect. While the evidence of P.W.1 to P.W.5 need not be looked into as some of the witness were formal and the others were hostile. But the evidence of P.W.6, P.W.7, P.W.8 and P.W.9 must be considered. P.W.6 is the elder brother of the accused appellant who on hearing the news came to the house of the accused appellant but did not find the body there, as it was taken by the police. P.W.7 the sister-in-law of the victim girl also proved through her evidence that the accused appellant and the victim girl resided together and although she came to the matrimonial house but did not find the accused in the house. P.W.8 and P.W.9 have both stated that the accused appellant and the victim girl lived together as husband and wife. P.W.9 has also said that the accused appellant quarrelled with his wife. P.W.11 is not a signatory to the inquest report. P.W.12 has spoken of the cause of death. P.W.13 has categorically stated that he visited the place of occurrence during investigation. Exhibit-8 according to him is a rough sketch map and no suggestion was put to him in cross-examination that the place of occurrence was not correctly depicted by him. It is in cross-examination that P.W.13 has categorically stated that he conducted the inquest at the residence of the accused appellant. Exhibit-8 according to him is a rough sketch map and no suggestion was put to him in cross-examination that the place of occurrence was not correctly depicted by him. It is in cross-examination that P.W.13 has categorically stated that he conducted the inquest at the residence of the accused appellant. He also stated that the inquest was made in the courtyard of the house. No alibi has been taken. The conduct of the accused appellant was unnatural as being husband of the victim girl he ought to have filed an F.I.R. with regard to the incident. Under Section 35 of the Evidence Act, the challan by which the body was taken is admissible in view of the official entry made. Under Section 114(f) of the Evidence Act presumption goes in favour of the prosecution and special knowledge under Section 106 of the Evidence Act is attracted. 10. Reliance is placed on 2014 (6) SCC (Cri) 666 (State of Rajasthan v. Thakur Singh) and 2009 (6) SCC 61 (Narendra v. State of Karnataka). Section 304, Part-II I.P.C. will have no application as it was not an act executed in the heat of the moment. Therefore, the order of conviction and sentence be upheld. 11. In reply it has been stated that it cannot be said that the prosecution has proved its case with certainty. 2014 (6) SCC (Cri) 666 (supra) is distinguishable, on facts as the place of occurrence therein was fixed. In the instant case the place of occurrence is not fixed. The dead body was also found in the room in the reported decision and as no explanation was given by the husband present, therefore, the order was passed. 2009 (6) SCC 61 (supra) is also distinguishable on facts as the victim therein died at the matrimonial home and, therefore, Section 106 was resorted to. Therefore, orders be passed as sought. 12. Having considered the submission of the parties the victim girl was married to the accused appellant four years before the date of incident. The case of the prosecution is that the accused appellant had an illicit relationship with a lady of the village. The victim girl repeatedly asked the accused appellant not to mix with the lady, but the accused appellant did not pay heed. This resulted in quarrel between the victim girl and the accused appellant. The case of the prosecution is that the accused appellant had an illicit relationship with a lady of the village. The victim girl repeatedly asked the accused appellant not to mix with the lady, but the accused appellant did not pay heed. This resulted in quarrel between the victim girl and the accused appellant. Physical and mental torture was inflicted on the victim girl by the accused appellant. This will be evident from the F.I.R. filed, and the evidence of the prosecution witness. 13. Before Trial commenced the F.I.R. maker (father) died. P.W.2, P.W.3, P.W.5, P.W.6, P.W.7, P.W.8 and P.W.9 were declared hostile. P.W.1, P.W.4, P.W.10, P.W.13 and P.W.14 are formal witness. The F.I.R. maker in the F.I.R. has stated that quarrel would take place between the accused appellant and the victim girl in particular over his moral vice. At the time of inquest too there is mention of quarrel which has been termed as "conjugal feud" and "lack of peace". P.W.9 though declared hostile has stated that the accused would quarrel with the victim girl. 14. P.W.11 is the mother of the victim girl. She has deposed about infliction of torture and the accused appellant not behaving well with the victim girl. She has also deposed of the illicit relation of the accused appellant with a woman of the village. That the victim girl visited her paternal house a few days before the date of incident is revealed from the evidence of P.W.9 and P.W.11. P.W.11 has categorically stated that the accused appellant went to the paternal home of the victim girl to bring her back and only on the assurance given by the accused appellant that he would not mix with the lady that the victim girl returned to her matrimonial home. It was only 4/5 days after her return that the victim girl was found dead in her matrimonial home. The defence failed to demolish the evidence of P.W.11 with regard to illicit relation. There was also no speaking term between the accused appellant and the victim girl and the accused appellant wanted nothing from the victim girl has emerged from the evidence of P.W.11 which has not been shaken in cross-examination. The aforesaid, therefore establishes the incident of quarrel and non-existence of good relation between the accused appellant and the victim girl. 15. There was also no speaking term between the accused appellant and the victim girl and the accused appellant wanted nothing from the victim girl has emerged from the evidence of P.W.11 which has not been shaken in cross-examination. The aforesaid, therefore establishes the incident of quarrel and non-existence of good relation between the accused appellant and the victim girl. 15. The victim girl was found dead on 4th August, 1999 and the F.I.R. was filed at 8:15 hours on the same day. The inquest was made at 10:00 a.m. on 4th August, 1999 in the courtyard of the house of the accused and although P.W.3 has stated that the body of the victim girl was found outside the village, his evidence cannot be relied on as he was declared hostile. P.W.7, P.W.8 and P.W.9 have all stated that the accused appellant and the victim girl lived together. P.W.11 (mother) has also said that the victim girl returned to her matrimonial home and 4/5 days later they were informed of her death. The I.O. (P.W.13) has also stated that he visited the place of occurrence and prepared the sketch map. The place of occurrence in the sketch map is bed-room of the accused appellant. In his cross-examination he has stated that the inquest was prepared in the residence of the accused appellant. It is again in cross-examination that P.W.13 (I.O.) has stated that the inquest was made on the body of the victim girl in the courtyard of the accused's house. From the aforesaid, therefore, it is evident that the victim girl died in her matrimonial house and although P.W.11 has stated that the inquest was made at the police station in her presence, she is not a signatory to the inquest report. P.W.5 may have signed the inquest later but has not said that he signed on a blank sheet as P.W.3 did. Therefore, preparation of inquest report at the place of occurrence must be accepted. If inquest is accepted then death at matrimonial home must also be accepted. At 8:15 hours on 4th August, 1999 the F.I.R. was filed, therefore the offence was committed before that, when the victim girl was in the custody and protection of the accused appellant. 16. At the time of inquest the front side of the throat was found pressed in and swollen. At 8:15 hours on 4th August, 1999 the F.I.R. was filed, therefore the offence was committed before that, when the victim girl was in the custody and protection of the accused appellant. 16. At the time of inquest the front side of the throat was found pressed in and swollen. P.W.11 (mother) also found a mark of injury on the throat of the victim girl, her daughter. The postmortem doctor (P.W.12) did not give any opinion regarding cause of death in his report and reserved his opinion but on dissection he found subcutenous hematoma in the front of the neck. A final report was also submitted by the postmortem doctor and collected by P.W.13 (I.O.) as per his evidence. In the opinion of the postmortem doctor the death was due to strangulation leading to suffocation. This was not shaken by the defence in cross-examination. 17. The instant case is not based on ocular evidence but is based on circumstantial evidence in which the chains must be linked without delink. The victim girl and the accused appellant were married four years before the incident. Quarrel took place between them due to the illicit relation of the accused appellant with a lady of the village. The victim girl had left her matrimonial home and had gone to her paternal home, 4/5 days before the incident the accused appellant went to bring her back. She was not inclined to return but on the assurance of the accused appellant that he would not mix with the woman of the village, she returned and 4/5 days later was found dead in her matrimonial house by strangulation. Each of the events has been linked without delink. The postmortem doctor has identified the injuries which point to death by strangulation. The prosecution therefore proved its case and as the death of the victim girl took place in her matrimonial home, Section 106 of the Evidence Act comes into play. It was for the accused appellant to prove either the presence of a 3rd person or his absence from the place of occurrence at the time of occurrence. No alibi has been taken nor has the burden of fact which was within the special knowledge of the accused appellant been discharged. Therefore, the order of conviction and sentence calls for no interference and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. 18. No alibi has been taken nor has the burden of fact which was within the special knowledge of the accused appellant been discharged. Therefore, the order of conviction and sentence calls for no interference and the appeal is accordingly dismissed. 18. To accept the alternative submission of Counsel for the accused appellant it is necessary to consider Section 300 I.P.C. which defines murder, as follows :- "300. xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Secondly) - xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Thirdly) - xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx (Fourthly) - If the person committing the act knows that it is so imminently dangerous that it must, in all probability, cause death or such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, and commits such act without any excuse for incurring the risk of causing death or such injury as aforesaid". 19. The postmortem doctor (P.W.12) has in his evidence stated that his final opinion is that the death of the victim girl was caused by strangulation leading to suffocation. In the light of the aforesaid to consider converting the offence from Section 302 to Section 304 Part-II I.P.C. would be contrary to the established principles of law. In fact, to invoke the exceptions to Section 300 I.P.C. provocation, sudden fight or quarrel in the heat of passion would be necessary, each of which is missing in the instant case. No case of false implication was pursued or suggested by the defence. 20. The cases relied on by Counsel for the accused appellant will not aid its case as 2010 (6) SCC 525 (supra) is for the theory of last seen together which is not the case of the prosecution. The victim girl was found dead in her matrimonial home in the morning. The F.I.R. was filed at 8:15 hours. The defacto complainant came to know of the victim girl being in critical condition from Durga Prasad Mal (P.W.2) who was declared hostile. P.W.11 (mother) and her husband, father of the victim girl, on receiving news immediately came to the P.S. therefore the incident could not have taken place at 8:15 hours but prior thereto during which time the victim girl was in the custody of her husband, the accused appellant. 21. 2012 (10) SCC 476 (supra) and 2012 (9) SCC 650 (supra) have been relied on for the proposition of failure of justice for defective charge framed. The charge was framed, read out and explained to the accused appellant. 21. 2012 (10) SCC 476 (supra) and 2012 (9) SCC 650 (supra) have been relied on for the proposition of failure of justice for defective charge framed. The charge was framed, read out and explained to the accused appellant. It is only thereafter he sought to be tried and pleaded not guilty. He also answered to the charge. The charge was never challenged by him and it cannot be said that he was not given a fair or full opportunity to defend himself. Therefore, it is covered under Section 215 and 464 I.P.C. and cannot aid the accused appellant. 22. It cannot be said that the questions put to the accused appellant was not understood by him as he has given an answer to each question despite his right not to give an answer. Therefore, 2009 (6) SCC 583 (supra) or 2014 (12) SCC 133 (supra) cannot aid the accused appellant. To none of the questions put did the accused appellant take the plea of not understanding any of the questions. 23. There is no dispute with the proposition laid down in 1997 (7) SCC 156 (supra), 2010 (9) SCC 189 (supra) and 2010 (2) SCC 748 (supra) with regard to circumstantial evidence and each event being linked without the chain of circumstances getting snapped and as noted above there is no delink of the chain of events in the instant case. Motive is also apparent in the instant case, viz., the illicit relation of the accused appellant with a woman of the village. 24. In AIR (1990) SC 2140 (supra) fabrication of record during investigation has been deplored. There is no dispute with the said proposition. 25. There is no dispute with the proposition propounded in AIR (1977) SC 45 (supra) but all that has to be seen is if it can be made applicable to the facts of the instant and on an assessment of the facts it cannot be said that the act done by the accused appellant was without the intent to cause such bodily injury which would cause her death. Therefore, the decision cited will not apply to the facts of this case. It is for the said reason that the decision reported in 2014 (10) SCC 298 (supra) will also not apply to the instant case. 26. There is no dispute with the proposition reported in 2010 (8) SCC 233 (supra). 27. Therefore, the decision cited will not apply to the facts of this case. It is for the said reason that the decision reported in 2014 (10) SCC 298 (supra) will also not apply to the instant case. 26. There is no dispute with the proposition reported in 2010 (8) SCC 233 (supra). 27. 2009 (6) SCC 61 (supra) and 2014 (6) SCC (Cri) 666 (supra) both aid the prosecution as in both the cases Section 106 Evidence Act was made applicable. In 2009 (6) SCC 61 (supra), the victim girl was found dead in the bedroom of the matrimonial home while in 2014 (6) SCC (Cri) 666 (supra) the victim girl was found dead in the room bolted by the accused appellant from within. In the instant case the victim girl was found dead in the early hours of the date of incident in her matrimonial home when she was in the custody of the accused appellant. No alibi has been taken by the accused appellant nor any explanation given. 28. In view of the aforesaid the order of conviction and sentence calls for no interference and this appeal is accordingly dismissed. Let a photostat copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the parties on priority basis upon compliance of all formalities. I agree Appeal dismissed.