Research › Search › Judgment

Gujarat High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 929 (GUJ)

Mahuva Pradesh Sahakari Khand Udyog Mandli Ltd. v. Kanchangiri Bhikhangiri Goswami

2015-09-21

V.M.PANCHOLI

body2015
ORDER : V.M. Pancholi, J. 1. This petition is filed under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, wherein, the petitioner has challenged interim order dated 25.11.2014 passed by Industrial Court, Surat, in Revision Application (IC) No. 10 of 2013. 2. Heard learned Senior Counsel Mr. K.M. Patel with learned advocate Mr. Varun K. Patel for the petitioner and learned advocate Mr. A.K. Clerk for respondent workman. 3. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. K.M. Patel for the petitioner submitted that respondent-workman was working as clerk in the Share Department of the petitioner society. Petitioner issued show cause notice dated 03.11.2003 to the respondent workman for the misconduct committed by him. Thereafter he filed the reply on 20.11.2003. His reply was found unsatisfactory and therefore the departmental inquiry was initiated against the respondent workman by issuing charge-sheet dated 16.12.2003, for committing misconduct as per Clause 24 of Certified Standing Orders of the petitioner society. Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that after giving reasonable opportunity to represent the case to the respondent workman, the inquiry officer submitted his report. Thereafter second show cause notice was given on 09.02.2004. Respondent workman gave his reply to the second show cause notice and thereafter the respondent workman was dismissed from service from the petitioner society by an order dated 19.02.2004. Respondent-workman therefore filed T-Application No. 349/2004 before labour Court, Surat, wherein he has challenged the order of dismissal. It is further contended that petitioner produced documentary evidence relating to departmental inquiry. Respondent workman filed pursis/application raising the preliminary issue about the validity and legality of the departmental inquiry conducted against him. Labour Court thereafter passed an order on 16.06.2009 for deciding the issue regarding validity and legality of the departmental inquiry against the respondent workman as preliminary issue and after considering the material on record, the labour Court passed an order on 08.02.2013 below Exh. 30 in T-Application No. 349 of 2004 and declared that the departmental inquiry conducted by the petitioner against the respondent workman was just, legal and in consonance with principles of natural justice. 4. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. K.M. Patel thereafter submitted that respondent workman filed Revision Application (IC) No. 10 of 2013 against the order dated 08.02.2013 passed by labour Court, Surat, below Exh. 30 before the Industrial Court, Surat. He further submitted that petitioner and the respondent filed written arguments before the Industrial Court. 4. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. K.M. Patel thereafter submitted that respondent workman filed Revision Application (IC) No. 10 of 2013 against the order dated 08.02.2013 passed by labour Court, Surat, below Exh. 30 before the Industrial Court, Surat. He further submitted that petitioner and the respondent filed written arguments before the Industrial Court. By the impugned order dated 25.11.2014, Industrial Court, Surat, declared the departmental inquiry conducted by the petitioner against the respondent workman as illegal and in violation of principles of natural justice. Petitioner has therefore filed this petition against the said order. 5. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. K.M. Patel appearing for the petitioner tried to contend on the merits of the case. However, at this stage learned advocate Mr. A.K. Clerk appearing for the respondent workman has taken preliminary objection and submitted that the present petition is not maintainable as the petitioner has challenged the order passed by Industrial Tribunal by which Industrial Court has held that departmental inquiry conducted against the respondent workman is illegal. Learned advocate Mr. Clerk for the respondent submitted that the present petition is not maintainable in view of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court in different cases. Thus, learned advocate Mr. Clerk requested this Court to decide the issue with regard to maintainability of the petition without going into the merits of the case. Thus, this Court has to consider the preliminary objection taken by the learned advocate for the respondent workman first. Hence, learned advocate Mr. Clerk has submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in the case of The Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe, reported in AIR 1975 (SC) 1900 that the employer cannot be permitted to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the labour Court by challenging the decision on the question of legality and validity of the inquiry before the High Court. Learned advocate Mr. Clerk thereafter has placed reliance upon decision rendered by this Court in the case of Gujarat State Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. & 1 v. Industrial Tribunal & 1, reported in 2010 (2) GLH 710 and submitted that this Court has held that petition challenging the order on the question of legality and validity of inquiry is not maintainable. 6. Learned advocate Mr. 6. Learned advocate Mr. Clerk appearing for the respondent thereafter has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Ramshray Ramsukh Verma v. Reliance Industries Limited, reported in 2004 (III) CLR 491 and more particularly the observations in para 10 of the said judgment. 7. At this stage learned advocate Mr. Clerk submitted that Letters Patent Appeal No. 1676 of 2004 was filed against the decision rendered by learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 14016 of 2003. However, Hon'ble Division Bench dismissed the said Letters Patent Appeal by an order dated 21.09.2005 and thereby confirmed the decision rendered by Learned Single Judge, which is reported in 2004 (3) CLR 491. 8. Learned advocate Mr. Clerk thereafter relied upon the order dated 17.03.2003 passed by Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 655 of 2002, whereby, Letters Patent Appeal filed against the order passed by Learned Single Judge was dismissed. In the said order, it has been observed as under: "However, the Labour Court has passed the order on 1st January, 2002, declaring the discharge order as illegal and it is this order of the Labour Court, which was challenged before the learned Single Judge of this Court in Special Civil Application No. 2510/2001. While confirming the order of the Labour Court, the learned Single Judge of this Court in his order dated 25-2-2002 has followed the decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Cooper Engineering Ltd. v. P.P. Mundhe reported in AIR 1975 SC 1900 , as well as the decision of this Court in the case of Cadila Healthcare Ltd. v. Union of India reported in 1998 (2) GLH 513 and held that the issue involved in this petition is directly covered by the observations made in the aforesaid decision. The learned Single Judge has, therefore, come to the conclusion that the interim order challenged in this petition under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India could not be entertained. The learned Single Judge has, however, held that it was open to the petitioner to challenge the said interim order while challenging the final order, if at all, it is adverse to the petitioner, by filing writ petition before this Court. The learned Single Judge has, however, held that it was open to the petitioner to challenge the said interim order while challenging the final order, if at all, it is adverse to the petitioner, by filing writ petition before this Court. The learned Single Judge has further directed to the Labour Court to examine the matter on merits without being influenced by the observations made in the interim order and the Labour Court to decide the entire reference on merits on the fresh evidence, that may be led by the employer before the Labour Court independently in accordance with law." 9. Learned advocate Mr. Clerk has placed reliance upon order dated 05.03.2015 passed by this Court in Special Civil Application No. 1780 of 2015, wherein, this Court after considering the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of The Cooper Engineering Ltd. (supra), disposed of the said petition. Learned advocate Mr. Clerk therefore submitted that present petition be dismissed only on this limited ground without going into the merits of the case. 10. On the other hand, learned Senior Counsel Mr. K.M. Patel appearing for the petitioner gave reply to the preliminary objection taken by learned advocate for the respondent with regard to maintainability of this petition. Learned Senior Counsel submitted that the decisions relied upon by the learned advocate for the respondent are given in connection with the issue decided under the provisions of the Industrial Disputes Act and not under Bombay Industrial Relations Act (hereinafter referred to as 'BIR Act' for short). He further contended that the labour Court has passed an order in favour of the petitioner, whereby, the preliminary issue was decided in favour of the petitioner that the departmental inquiry conducted by the petitioner is legal and not in violation of principles of natural justice. The respondent workman has therefore challenged the said order by filing Revision Application under Section 85 of BIR Act. Thus, the respondent workman has challenged the interim order passed by labour Court by filing Revision Application. At this stage, learned Senior Counsel referred and relied upon provisions contained in Section 85 of the BIR Act, which reads as under: "85. Industrial Court to exercise superintendence over Labour Courts The Industrial Court shall have superintendence over all Labour Courts and may (a) call for returns. At this stage, learned Senior Counsel referred and relied upon provisions contained in Section 85 of the BIR Act, which reads as under: "85. Industrial Court to exercise superintendence over Labour Courts The Industrial Court shall have superintendence over all Labour Courts and may (a) call for returns. (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and procedure of such Courts in matters not expressly provided for by this Act and, in particular, for securing the expeditious disposal of cases; (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such Courts; (d) settle a table of fees payable for process issued by a Labour Court or the Industrial Court." 11. After referring the aforesaid provisions, learned Senior Counsel submitted that the jurisdiction of the Industrial Court while exercising revisional jurisdiction is analogous to the jurisdiction vested in the High Courts under Article 227 of the Constitution and cannot be similar to appellate jurisdiction. Thus, Industrial Court can rectify the errors apparent on the face of the record not otherwise. In the present case, Industrial Court has exceeded its jurisdiction and therefore the said order is illegal and perverse, therefore this petition is filed. He therefore submitted that preliminary objection taken by the learned advocate for the respondent workman is required to be discarded. 12. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Patel has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in case of Saurashtra Majoor Mahajan Sangh v. Una Taluka Khedut Sahakari Khand Udyog Ltd. and Anr, reported in 1995 (1) GLR 580 , particularly, paragraphs No. 11 to 14, which reads as under: "11. In order to decide the aforesaid controversy, let us examine certain provisions of the Act. The Labour Court has power to decide certain disputes which have been mentioned in Sec.78 of the Act. Against certain decisions that may be made by the Labour Court appeal is provided under Sec 84. It is an undisputed position that against interim order passed under Sec.119D of the Act appeal dies not lie to Industrial Court as provided under Sec.84 Section 119D confers power on Labour Court to pass interim orders as it may consider just and proper. Section 85 of the Act provides that Industrial Court shall have superintendence over Labour Courts. It is an undisputed position that against interim order passed under Sec.119D of the Act appeal dies not lie to Industrial Court as provided under Sec.84 Section 119D confers power on Labour Court to pass interim orders as it may consider just and proper. Section 85 of the Act provides that Industrial Court shall have superintendence over Labour Courts. Since the controversy is with regard to the scope of the powers of the Industrial Court under Sec.85 of the Act, it would be proper to reproduce the section itself. Section 85 of the Act reads as follows. "85. (1) The Industrial Court shall have superintendence over all Labour Courts and may (a) call for returns. (b) make and issue general rules and prescribe forms for regulating the practice and procedure of such Courts in matters not expressly provided for by this Act and, in particular, for securing the expeditious disposal of cases; (c) prescribe forms in which books, entries and accounts shall be kept by the officers of any such Courts; (d) settle a table of fees payable for process issued by a Labour Court or the Industrial Court. (2) The Industrial Court may, by order in writing and for reasons to be stated therein, withdraw any proceeding under this Act pending before a Labour Court and transfer the same to another Labour Court for the disposal of the proceeding; and the Labour Court to which the proceeding is so transferred may dispose of the proceeding but subject to any special directions in the order of transfer, proceed either de novo or from the stage at which it was so transferred." If one compares the provisions of Art.227 of the Constitution of India with the language of Sec.85 of the Act, it becomes clear that the powers of superintendence conferred upon High Court under Art.227 of the Constitution of India. The difference is that the powers of superintendence of High Court are in relation to all Courts and Tribunals throughout the territory in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, while the powers of superintendence of Industrial Court are in relation to "all Labour Courts." 12. The question as regards the scope of powers under Sec.85 of the Act came up for consideration before Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case Sree Talkies v. Industrial Court, Maharashtra, reported in 1970 LIC 1354. The question as regards the scope of powers under Sec.85 of the Act came up for consideration before Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in the case Sree Talkies v. Industrial Court, Maharashtra, reported in 1970 LIC 1354. In that case an employee of the cinema talkies filed application before the Labour Court making grievance that his services were illegally terminated and he was unlawfully prevented from discharging the duties as employee. The Labour Court rejected the application. Against the decision of the Labour Court appeal under Sec.84 of the Act was preferred before the Industrial Court. The Industrial Court allowed the appeal and held that the employer was under duty to hold inquiry even after serving show cause notice and take suitable action after holding the inquiry. The Industrial Court, therefore, reversed and set aside the order of the Labour Court and remanded the matter for disposal according to law. Against this order of the Industrial Court a petition under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India was preferred before the Bombay High Court. It was contended that no appeal is provided under Sec.84 as far as decisions rendered in applications under Sec. 78(1) of the Act are concerned. This contention was upheld by the Bombay High Court. However, the Court considered the powers of the Industrial Court under Sec.85 of the Act. In para 8 of the reported decision the Bombay High Court has observed that the powers of superintendence conferred upon Industrial Court under Sec. 85 of the Act were almost similar to that of the power of High Court under Art. 227 of the Constitution of India. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has observed as follows: "This power of superintendence appears prima facie to be unlimited and the language of Sec. 85 is almost identical with the language of Art.227 of the Constitution. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has observed as follows: "This power of superintendence appears prima facie to be unlimited and the language of Sec. 85 is almost identical with the language of Art.227 of the Constitution. Now the scope of the power of superintendence has been well settled and in view of the language of Sec. 85 of the Bombay Act it will be only reasonable to hold that the Industrial Court possesses powers to interfere with the orders of the Labour Courts, provided any errors apparent on the face of the record are evident from any orders passed by such Labour Courts and not in findings of facts recorded by them." We are in respectful agreement with the aforesaid position of law expressed by the Division Bench of the Bombay High Court. 13. The scope and width of revisional powers are to be considered by the language of the statute which provides for revision. This is the law laid down by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Ram Dass v. Ishar Chander & Ors., reported in 1988 (3) SCC 131 . In paras 13, 14 and 15 of the reported decision the Supreme Court has considered the provisions of E.P. Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949. In the context of the provisions of Sec. 15(5) of the said Act it was held that the High Court had much wider jurisdiction because the language of Sec. 15(5) of the Act empowered the High Court to satisfy itself as to the legality and propriety of the order under revision. As far as the nature and scope of revisional jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction is concerned, the Hon'ble Supreme Court referred to its decision in Sri Raja Lakshmi Dyeing Works v. Rangaswamy Chettiar, reported in 1980 (4) SCC 259 thus: "Appeal" and "revision" are expression of common usage in Indian statutes and the distinction between "appellate jurisdiction" & revisional jurisdiction is well know though not well defined. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has been done in the case of second appeals under the CPC and under some Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, appellate jurisdiction involves a rehearing, as it were, on law as well as fact and is invoked by an aggrieved person. Such jurisdiction may, however, be limited in some way as, for instance has been done in the case of second appeals under the CPC and under some Rent Acts in some States. Ordinarily, again, revisional jurisdiction is analogous to a power of superintendence and may some times be exercised even without its being invoked by a party. The extent of revisional jurisdiction is defined by the statute conferring such jurisdiction. .............. Revisional jurisdiction as ordinarily understood with reference to our statutes is always included in appellate jurisdiction but not vice-versa. There are general observations. The question of the extent of appellate or revisional jurisdiction has to be considered in each case with reference to the language employed by the state. After referring to the aforesaid decision the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that in that particular case the High Court was conferred with much wider jurisdiction and it could reappraise evidence if the finding of the appellate Court were found to be infirm in law. However, the law laid down by the Supreme Court is that the scope and width of powers of revisional authority is required to be determined by the language of the statute which confer such jurisdiction. 14. In the instant case, the revisional jurisdiction of the Industrial Court is conferred by Sec. 85 of the Act. As indicated herein above it is analogous to the provisions of Art.227 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, it would be necessary to examine the scope of powers of High Court under Art.227of the Constitution of India. In this connection reference may be made to a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Khalil Ahmed v. Tufilhussein Somasbhai, reported in AIR 1988 secured creditor 184. In para 13 of the decision the Supreme Court has referred to its earlier decision in the case of Venkatlal G. Pittie v. Bright Bros. (Pvt.) Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 1939 , and where it cannot be said that there was no error apparent on the face of the record, the error if any has to be discovered by long process of reasoning, the High Court should not exercise jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution. (Pvt.) Ltd., AIR 1987 SC 1939 , and where it cannot be said that there was no error apparent on the face of the record, the error if any has to be discovered by long process of reasoning, the High Court should not exercise jurisdiction under Art. 227 of the Constitution. In this connection the Supreme Court has also referred to its decision in the case of Satyanarayanan Laxminarayanan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Tirumale, AIR 1960 SC 137 and thereafter the Supreme Court observed as follows: "Where two views are possible and the trial Court has taken one view which is a possible and plausible view merely because another view is attractive, the High Court should not interfere and would be in error in interfering with the finding of the trial Court or interfering under Art. 227 of the Constitution over such decision". 13. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Patel thereafter contended that against the decision rendered by the Learned Single Judge in the case of Gujarat State Fertilizers and Chemicals Ltd. (supra), Letters Patent Appeal No. 1396 of 2010 was preferred and Hon'ble Division Bench by an order dated 20.04.2015 disposed of the said Letters Patent Appeal, wherein this Court observed in para No. 3 and 4 as under: "3. With the consent of the parties and without entering into the merits of the matter, to save the interest of the employee-respondent No. 2 as prolonging of the litigation will deprive him of further promotion, the judgment and order dated 13.4.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge as well as the order below Exh. 23 dated 21.7.2009 passed by the learned Industrial Tribunal, Vadodara in Reference (IT) No. 130 of 2004 are quashed and set aside. 4. Learned advocate Mr. Naik submits, on instructions from Mr. Piyush Upadhyay, Chief Industrial Relations Officer, that all consequential benefits to the employee will be granted within one month from today. The Industrial Tribunal, Vadodara will dispose of the reference within 30 days of production of this order." 14. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Patel therefore submitted that in view of the aforesaid decisions and in view of the provisions contained in Section 85 of BIR Act, when the Industrial Court has committed an error and exceeded its jurisdiction, this Court can entertain this petition and present petition is maintainable and therefore this petition be heard on its own merits. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Patel therefore submitted that in view of the aforesaid decisions and in view of the provisions contained in Section 85 of BIR Act, when the Industrial Court has committed an error and exceeded its jurisdiction, this Court can entertain this petition and present petition is maintainable and therefore this petition be heard on its own merits. Petitioner is having good case on merits and therefore the petition be decided on its own merits. 15. I have considered arguments canvassed on behalf of learned advocates for the parties. I have also considered the material produced on record. The issue which is required to be decided by this Court at this stage is, in view of the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of The Cooper Engineering Ltd. (supra) and in view of various decisions rendered by this Court whether this petition is maintainable or not. 16. In the case of the Cooper Engineering Ltd. (supra) the Hon'ble Supreme Court in paragraphs No. 22 and 23 has held as under: "22. We are, therefore, clearly of opinion that when a case of dismissal or discharge of an employee is referred for industrial adjudication the labour court should first decide as a preliminary issue whether the domestic enquiry has violated the principles of natural justice. When there is no domestic enquiry or defective enquiry is admitted by the employer, there will be no difficulty. But when the matter is in controversy between the parties that question must be decided as a preliminary issue. On that decision being pronounced it will be for the management to decide whether it will adduce any evidence before the labour court. If it chooses not to adduce any evidence, it will not be thereafter permissible in any proceeding to raise the issue. We should also make it clear that there will be no justification for any party to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the labour court by questioning its decision with regard to the preliminary issue when the matter, if worthy, can be agitated even after the final award. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication. 23. It will be also legitimate for the High Court to refuse to intervene at this stage. We are making these observations in our anxiety that there is no undue delay in industrial adjudication. 23. In the present case, however, besides the long delay that has already taken place, since the law laid down by this Court was not very clear at the time of the award in casting a duty upon the labour court to decide the preliminary issue and also in view of the submission of the appellant that it is prepared to pay the entire salary of the workman upto-date it will meet the interest of justice if the order of reinstatement is converted to one of compensation in terms of his entire salary from the date of dismissal to the date of this decision except for what has already been paid to him instead of remitting the matter to the labour court for disposal in the light of this judgment by setting aside the award." 17. This Court has considered the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in case of The Cooper Engineering Ltd. (supra), the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Ramshray Ramsukh Verma (supra) and Dinesh Mills Limited v. Kedarnath R. Pandey, reported in 1998 II CLR 480 on the issue of preliminary objection with regard to maintainability of petition. 18. This Court in another decision given in the case of Ramshray Ramsukh Verma (supra) has observed in para No. 3.4 as under: "3.4. Learned advocate Shri N.R. Shahani appearing for the petitioner has assailed the said order dated 6.12.01 passed by the Industrial Court, Ahmedabad and contended that the Industrial Court ought not to have interfered with the order passed by the Labour Court dated 12.3.01. He has contended that the strike has already been held to be illegal and if the finding of the Industrial Court to the effect that the departmental inquiry conducted by the respondent is valid is allowed to be sustained, the petitioner-workman would have virtually no defence left in the main proceedings which are pending before the Labour Court and that therefore according to the contention of the learned advocate Shri Shahani, the order of the Industrial Court is not interlocutory in nature but completely and conclusively decides the issues against the petitioner. He, therefore, urges this Court to interfere with the order of the Industrial Court. Alternatively, he submits that even the issue decided by the Labour Court in its order dated 12.3.01 with respect to the validity of the departmental inquiry was at the interlocutory stage and that therefore, the Industrial Court also should not have entertained the revision application since the Industrial Court would not have been justified in interfering with the order of the Labour Court at an interlocutory stage. He further contends that the Industrial Court erred in exercising the powers of revision under section 85 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act. According to the learned advocate Shri Shahani, the powers of revision could not have been exercised by the Industrial Court for setting aside the findings arrived at by the Labour Court." and thereafter, held in paragraphs No. 10 and 11 as under: "10. Coming back to the facts of the individual cases, in Special Civil Application No. 8754 of 2003, the order under challenge being that of the Industrial Court, deciding the validity of the departmental inquiry being at an interlocutory stage, no interference would be called for. I am unable to accept the contention of the leaned advocate Shri Shahani for the petitioner that the petition is required to be entertained since the Industrial Court also was dealing with a revision application of the respondent which in itself was challenging an interlocutory order passed by the Labour Curt. Though it may be true that the Industrial Court itself was considering the order passed by the Labour Court at an interlocutory stage and that therefore it would have been desirable if the Industrial Court had not entertained the revision petition, that by itself would not justify the exercise of powers under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India. In the facts of the present case, since the underlying principle is to avoid further delay and to ensure speedy disposal of the industrial dispute, the order of the Industrial Court being at an interlocutory stage, it would be just and proper to refuse to exercise the jurisdiction under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in view of the above mentioned decisions. One more reason for coming to the said conclusion is that the petitioner had not filed any reply before the Industrial Court in response to the revision application filed by the respondent and even reading the order of the Industrial Court, the above contention does not appear to have been taken by the petitioner during the course of the arguments also. I am unable to accept the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner that the Industrial Court in exercise of its powers under section 85 of the Bombay Industrial Relations Act could not have passed the order in question since the Industrial Court enjoys superintending powers over the Labour Courts and that therefore this is not a case of order having been passed without jurisdiction and in view of what is stated hereinabove I am not entertaining the petition on the ground that the order under challenge is an interlocutory order and the legality of the order passed by the Industrial Court is not examined. A somewhat peculiar situation arising in the present petition, however, is that the Industrial Court has by the impugned order already upheld the legality of the departmental inquiry conducted by the respondent though at an interlocutory stage. It is not in dispute that against the final order that may be passed by the Labour Court, appeal would lie to the Industrial Court. If the findings of the Industrial Court in the impugned order are not specified to be of interim nature, in the appeal the same would come in the way of the petitioner, in case ultimately the Labour Court decides the issue against the petitioner. To obviate this difficulty, it is provided that the decision of the Industrial Court under challenge, namely, the order dated 6th December 2001 would not in any manner come in the way of the petitioner in case the Labour Court ultimately decides against the petitioner and the petitioner is required to file appeal before the Industrial Court against the order of the Labour Court. Subject to these observations, I find that the petition is not required to be entertained. 11. Subject to these observations, I find that the petition is not required to be entertained. 11. Coming to the facts of Special Civil Application No. 14016 of 2003, I find that the Industrial Tribunal has decided the legality of the departmental inquiry conducted by the petitioner Corporation as a preliminary issue and at the interlocutory stage, interference by this Court would not be permissible. I do not find any justification to interfere with the order of the Industrial Tribunal at this stage as the issue decided is at an interlocutory stage and any party aggrieved by the final verdict in the main dispute will have ample opportunity to challenge the same before the appropriate Court. I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned advocate for the petitioner Shri Clerk that the peculiar facts of the case would justify interference at this stage. The decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Cooper Engineering (supra) cannot be dissected in such a way and I do not find any warrant or justification in the said decision to hold that if the order of the Labour Court/Industrial Tribunal while deciding the legality of the departmental inquiry conducted by the employer at an interlocutory stage is defective on certain grounds, this Court would be in a position to interfere with the same. In view of this discussion, I find no merit in the petition and the same is required to be rejected." 19. Thus, keeping in mind the aforesaid decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court, in the facts of the present case, when the labour Court has passed an interim order deciding the preliminary issue in favour of the petitioner that the departmental inquiry conducted by the petitioner is legal and not violative of principles of natural justice, the said order was challenged by the respondent workman before the Industrial Tribunal. The Tribunal considered the facts of the case and exercised its powers given under Section 85 of the BIR Act and held that the departmental inquiry conducted by the petitioner is violative of principles of natural justice and therefore order passed by labour Court was quashed and set aside. Thus, no prejudice is caused to the petitioner as the petitioner would get chance to lead additional evidence to prove the misconduct of the respondent workman if prayed for in the written statement. Thus, no prejudice is caused to the petitioner as the petitioner would get chance to lead additional evidence to prove the misconduct of the respondent workman if prayed for in the written statement. The petitioner employer cannot be permitted to stall the final adjudication of the dispute by the labour Court by challenging the decision by filing petition before this Court. Though it may be true that Industrial Court itself was considering the order passed by the labour Court at an interlocutory stage and that therefore it would have been desirable if the Industrial Court had not entertained the Revision Application preferred by the respondent workman, that by itself would not justify the exercise of powers under Article 227 of the Constitution of India by this Court. Since the underline principle is to avoid further delay and to ensure speedy disposal of the industrial dispute, the order of the Industrial Court being at an interlocutory stage, it would be just and proper to refuse to exercise the jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India in view of aforesaid decisions rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court. 20. At this stage it is required to be noted that respondent workman was terminated on 19.02.2004. The labour Court decided the preliminary issue of validity of inquiry by the order dated 08.02.2013, though application was given in 2009. The Industrial Court has passed the impugned order on 25.11.2014. In the meantime, the respondent workman has reached the age of superannuation on 22.07.2010. Thus, even in the facts of the present case also the petitioner cannot be permitted to stall the proceedings before the labour Court by challenging the order passed by the Industrial Court in Revision Application at interim stage. 21. Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Patel for the petitioner has placed reliance upon the decision rendered by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in case of Saurashtra Majoor Mahajan Sangh (supra), there is no dispute with regard to proposition laid down by the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court. However, as discussed above in view of the various other decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court and in view of the facts of the present case, this order is passed by this Court. 22. However, as discussed above in view of the various other decisions rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as well as this Court and in view of the facts of the present case, this order is passed by this Court. 22. In view of the aforesaid, the petition is hereby dismissed without going into the merits of the case. However, it is clarified that it is open for the petitioner to lead fresh evidence before the labour Court independently in accordance with law and the labour Court shall decide the case without being influenced by this order passed by this Court. It is also made clear that it is open to the petitioner to challenge the interim order while challenging the final order, if at all it is adverse to the petitioner, by filing writ petition before this Court.