JUDGMENT Mahendra Dayal,J. Having lost from both the courts below, the tenant-petitioner has filed this writ petition assailing the judgment and decree passed by the Judge Small Causes, Lucknow in S.C.C. Suit No.47 of 2005 whereby the suit for recovery of arrears of rent and ejectment was decreed and the judgment and order dated 25.08.2012 passed by the Special Judge, Lucknow in S.C.C. Revision No.78 of 2010 whereby the revision was dismissed. 2. The opposite party no.3 landlord filed a suit against the petitioner with the allegation that he purchased House No.417/11 Municipal No.279/93 known as Bashir Building situated at Canal Road, Pandariba, Lucknow from Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui by means of registered sale-deed dated 04.02.1995. The petitioner was tenant in a room situated on the ground floor of the said house. The opposite party no.3, who is the landlord informed the petitioner that he had purchased the house to which the petitioner stated that he had sublet the room under his tenancy to Smt. Malti Sharma and Pradeep Sharma and had also been receiving rent from them @ Rs.125/- per month. The opposite party no.3 filed S.C.C. Suit No.59 of 1998 before the Judge Small Causes Court, Lucknow against Smt. Malti Sharma and Pradeep Sharma in which they filed their written statement denying their status as subtenant and stating that they were tenants in their independent capacity. The opposite party no.3 accepting Smt. Malti Sharma and Pradeep Sharma as his tenants demanded rent from them w.e.f. 04.02.1995 @ Rs.125/- per month but they did not pay any rent. The opposite party no.3 then issued a notice to them on 06.12.2004 demanding the arrears of rent and also asking them to hand over the vacant possession of the room under their tendency within thirty days. The said notice was served upon them on 13.12.2004 but the notice was replied by the petitioner on 09.01.2005 through his Advocate in which he stated that he was the tenant of Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui @ Rs.15/- per month. The opposite party no.3, thus, also took it as a ground for eviction that the petitioner had denied his status as landlord and had also not paid rent to him. 3. The petitioner-tenant contested the suit and filed his written statement stating therein that he had no knowledge of the alleged sale-deed dated 04.02.1995 executed by Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui in favour of the opposite party no.3. 3. The petitioner-tenant contested the suit and filed his written statement stating therein that he had no knowledge of the alleged sale-deed dated 04.02.1995 executed by Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui in favour of the opposite party no.3. It was further pleaded by him that Bashir Building is a huge building having several tenants. The father of the petitioner late Ram Adhar was tenant since last about 60 years and he died in the year 1995. It was further stated that prior to 1976 the rate of rent was Rs.6.25 paisa per month which was being paid by Bashir Ahmad but after his death his grand-son Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui started receiving the rent. The rent upto January, 2005 has been paid to Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui @ Rs.15/- per month. The petitioner further took a defence that the portion in which he is residing as a tenant was gifted to Smt. Shahida Khatoon by means of a gift deed dated 05.12.1973. Late Bashir Ahmad had donated the entire building to three different persons separately and several cases with regard to the title of Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui had been instituted in the Court of Civil Judge, Mohanlalganj, Lucknow. The petitioner also stated that he had deposited Rs.3,000/- on the first date of hearing and as such he was not liable to be evicted on the ground of arrears of rent. 4. The parties led their evidence before the learned trial court and the learned trial court on the basis of the evidence on record, came to the conclusion that Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui became landlord of the premises in question w.e.f. 04.02.1995 as such there is relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the opposite party no.3. The learned trial court further recorded a finding that the petitioner had denied the title of the opposite party no.3 landlord. With regard to the arrears of rent, the learned trial court recorded a finding that petitioner had not deposited the entire arrears of rent on the first date of hearing which was due against him. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the suit of the opposite party no.3 was decreed. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge Small Causes Court, the petitioner preferred S.C.C. Revision before the learned District Judge, Lucknow which was also dismissed by Special Judge, Lucknow vide judgment and order dated 25.08.2012. On the basis of the aforesaid findings, the suit of the opposite party no.3 was decreed. 5. Feeling aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the learned Judge Small Causes Court, the petitioner preferred S.C.C. Revision before the learned District Judge, Lucknow which was also dismissed by Special Judge, Lucknow vide judgment and order dated 25.08.2012. The revisional Court affirmed the findings recorded by the learned trial court. 6. I have heard Shri Pulkit Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Virendra Mishra, who has appeared on behalf of the opposite party no.3. 7. Learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the main ground of his eviction from the premises in question was that he had denied the title of his landlord. He further submits that there is no dispute with regard to the fact that the opposite party no.3 purchased the building in question in the year 1995 and no written notice was ever issued to him intimating that he had purchased the building from the previous owner Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui. The petitioner had been paying the rent to Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui who also did not inform the petitioner that he had sold the building to the opposite party no.3. 8. Learned counsel for the petitioner has drawn the attention of the Court towards the written statement filed by the petitioner before the learned trial court and has submitted that the petitioner had not clearly denied the title of the opposite party no.3 but had simply enquired from him as to how he became the owner and landlord of the building in question. Mere enquiry by the tenant about the ownership of his landlord, does not amount to denial of title. In support of his argument, learned counsel has relied upon a case reported in 2007 (2) ARC Page 453 - Chotey Lal Shukla vs. IXth Additional District Judge, Kanpur Nagar and another in which it has been held that although the law prohibits the tenant from questioning the title of his landlord who inducted him as tenant but a tenant is certainly entitled to question the derivative title of the subsequent landlord. The opposite party no.3 is not a person, who let out the building in question to the petitioner. The opposite party no.3 is not a person, who let out the building in question to the petitioner. It is an admitted case of the opposite party no.3 that he purchased the property in the year 1995 and as such in the absence of any intimation by the previous landlord, the petitioner was entitled to inquire about the derivative title of the opposite party no.3. 9. Learned counsel for the petitioner has further relied upon a Supreme Court decision reported in AIR 2002 SC 1264 - Sheela and others vs. Prahlad Rai Prem Prakash. In this case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that while seeking eviction of a tenant, the landlord is required to allege and prove not only that he is a landlord but also that he is owner of the premises. The concept of landlordship is different from that of ownership. A person may be a 'landlord' though not an 'owner' of the premises. The denial of landlord's title or disclaimer of tenancy by tenant is an act which is likely to effect the interest of the landlord and hence has been a ground for eviction of the tenant. In such a case, the landlord is required to prove that the tenant has renounced his character as tenant and in clear and unequivocal terms set up title of the landlord in himself or in a third party. If a tenant bona fide calls upon the landlord to prove his ownership or putting the landlord to proof of his title so as to protect himself, but without disowning the character of possession, cannot be said to deny the title of the landlord. 10. Reliance has also been placed on a decision reported in 2009 (1) ARC 391 - Brij Bhushan Mishra vs. Surita Sarbabdhikari (Smt.) and another, in which this Court has held that to constitute denial of title, a tenant should renounce his character that of tenant and set up right or title in consistent with the relationship of landlord and tenant, either in himself or third person, unless the tenant has renounced his relationship of tenant, same cannot be accepted as denial of title. 11. 11. On the basis of the aforesaid pronouncements of the Hon'ble Supreme Court and this Court, the submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that there is no dispute to the fact that the opposite party no.3 is a subsequent purchaser of the building and since he had not let out the building to the petitioner and further no intimation was ever given to him with regard to the said transaction, the petitioner in order to save and protect his tenancy, was entitled to inquire about the derivative title of the opposite party no.3. The petitioner has no where denied his status as tenant or the ownership of the opposite party no.3 but has simply inquired from him as to how he became the owner and landlord of the premises under his tenancy. This query by the petitioner does not amount to denial of title in view of the settled principles of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court referred to hereinabove. 12. It has further been argued on behalf of the petitioner that the rate of rent as stated by the petitioner was only Rs.15/- per month and he deposited the entire arrears of rent calculated at the aforesaid rate on the first date of hearing along with interest and costs of the suit. The case of the petitioner was that the rent was sent to Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui by money order, which was received by him. Thereafter the remaining arrears was deposited on the first date of hearing. Both the courts below, therefore, committed illegality in recording a finding that the petitioner was in arrears of rent and did not deposit the entire arrears on the first date of hearing. The benefit of depositing rent on the first date of hearing was denied on the ground that since the petitioner had denied the title of his landlord, therefore, he was not entitled to get the benefit of the provisions of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. 13. The benefit of depositing rent on the first date of hearing was denied on the ground that since the petitioner had denied the title of his landlord, therefore, he was not entitled to get the benefit of the provisions of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. 13. It has been argued on behalf of the opposite party no.3 landlord that so far as the finding with regard to arrears of rent is concerned, both the courts below have recorded a concurrent finding of fact that the petitioner was in arrears of rent and did not deposit the entire arrears on the first date of hearing and as such he was not entitled to get the benefit of the provisions of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. This finding of fact recorded by both the courts below cannot be interfered with by this Hon'ble Court while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India unless it is found that the finding is perverse or against the material on record. The finding with regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties is also a finding of fact which cannot be interfered with under the writ jurisdiction. He has further submitted that the learned counsel for the petitioner has failed to show as to how the finding recorded by both the courts below with regard to relationship and the arrears of rent is perverse. It has been a specific case of the opposite party no.3 that immediately after purchase of the building from Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui, the opposite party no.3 informed the petitioner that he had purchased the building and being landlord, he was entitled to receive the rent but even then the petitioner recognized Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui as his landlord and continued to pay rent to him as alleged by the petitioner, therefore, any rent paid by the petitioner to Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui after receiving information of purchase by the opposite party no.3, would not give any benefit to the petitioner. He has further submitted that even setting up title in other persons also amounts to denial of title. The petitioner instead of recognizing the opposite party no.3 as his landlord, continued to set up title in favour of Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui after receiving information of purchase by the opposite party no.3, would not give any benefit to the petitioner. He has further submitted that even setting up title in other persons also amounts to denial of title. The petitioner instead of recognizing the opposite party no.3 as his landlord, continued to set up title in favour of Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui and as such both the courts below have rightly held that the petitioner was liable to be evicted on the ground of denial of title. 14. Learned counsel for the opposite party no.3 has further submitted that there is no force in the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner that he only enquired about the derivative title of the opposite party no.3. The petitioner was well aware of the fact that the opposite party no.3 had purchased the house in dispute and the copy of the registered sale-deed was also on record and as such the petitioner was under no obligation to inquire about the title of the opposite party no.3. 15. A perusal of the record further indicates that the petitioner in his cross-examination has clearly stated that he did not recognize the opposite party no.3 as his landlord. Moreover, the rent was deposited by the petitioner in the Court with the condition that the rent should go to the rightful person. The petitioner has further stated on oath during his cross-examination that he did not recognize the opposite party no.3 as his landlord so that he may escape the liability to pay the rent. This statement on oath by the petitioner leaves no doubt that the petitioner knowingly denied the title of the opposite party no.3 only to avoid and escape the liability of payment of rent. Moreover, the deposit made by the petitioner before the courts below was not unconditional deposit and was also short of the amount due. This statement on oath by the petitioner leaves no doubt that the petitioner knowingly denied the title of the opposite party no.3 only to avoid and escape the liability of payment of rent. Moreover, the deposit made by the petitioner before the courts below was not unconditional deposit and was also short of the amount due. The learned court below has also denied the benefit of Section 20(4) to the petitioner on the ground that in case of denial of title by the tenant, he is not entitled to claim the benefit of Section 20(4) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 which gives a protection to the tenant that if a tenant is in arrears of rent he can save his liability of ejectment in case he deposits the entire arrears of rent along with interest and costs of the suit on the first date of hearing. Thus, both the courts below have rightly come to the conclusion that the petitioner was liable to be evicted on the ground of denial of title and also on the ground of arrears of rent. The payment of any rent to Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui after purchase of the building by the opposite party no.3 cannot be deemed to be a valid payment of rent and as such the petitioner is not entitled to claim adjustment of the rent, which was paid to Mohd. Aslam Siddiqui after 04.02.1995. The petitioner having denied the title of the opposite party no.3 was also not entitled to claim the benefit of the provisions of Section 20(4) of U.P. Act No.13 of 1972. 16. In the aforesaid background and the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below, I do not find any sufficient ground for interference in the impugned judgment of both the courts below while exercising writ jurisdiction and as such the writ petition is devoid of merit and is liable to be dismissed. 17. The writ petition is dismissed. However, in the circumstances of the case, the petitioner is permitted to vacate the premises in dispute within a period of three months from the date of this order, failing which, the opposite party no.3 landlord shall have liberty to enforce the decree in accordance with law.