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2015 DIGILAW 933 (MP)

Manjula Choudhary v. Priyanka Chauhan

2015-09-03

B.D.RATHI, R.S.JHA

body2015
ORDER : Ravi Shankar Jha, J. This appeal has been filed by the appellant under the provisions of section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act (for short "the Act") being aggrieved by the order passed by the learned Single Judge in C.P. No. 505/2013 dated 24-6-2015. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that by the aforesaid impugned order the learned Single Judge has held as under:- "Under such facts and circumstances of the case, in the opinion of this Court, respondent has acted in utter disregard to the mandate issued by the Writ Court and confirmed by the Writ Appellate Court, as this Court finds no justification in treating the performance of the petitioner for three spells, namely, 27-9-2008 to 31-3-2009, 1-4-2009 to 31-3-2010 and 1-4-2010 to 31-12-2010 as 'average' by the Screening Committee and taking into consideration the alleged fourth spell remark, namely, 1-1-2011 to 31-12-2011 as 'poor' for denying the claim of regularization as Administrative Officer. That apart, similarly situated employees have been regularized, as well discussed by the Writ Court in para 20 of the order, thereby petitioner has been subjected to typical hostility and depravity. Respondent in fact and in effect has attempted to scuttle the mandate contained in the order of the Writ Court and defied the directions issued thereunder. As such, respondent is found to have committed contempt of Court. However, before proceeding against the respondent for contempt of Court and to impose suitable punishment, it is considered apposite to allow an opportunity to respondent/contemnor-Smt. Manjula Choudhary to purge the contempt or to show cause as to why she should not be punished for contempt of Court. Accordingly, office is directed to issue notice to respondent on the aforesaid count returnable/within two weeks for appearance on 14th July, 2015. State of Bihar and Others Vs. Rajendra Singh and Another (2004) AIR SCW 4812, referred to." 2. It is submitted that after holding that the appellant has committed contempt of Court the learned Single Judge has thereafter proceeded to grant opportunity to the appellant either to purge the contempt or to show cause as to why she should not be punished for contempt. Rajendra Singh and Another (2004) AIR SCW 4812, referred to." 2. It is submitted that after holding that the appellant has committed contempt of Court the learned Single Judge has thereafter proceeded to grant opportunity to the appellant either to purge the contempt or to show cause as to why she should not be punished for contempt. It is submitted by the learned senior counsel for the appellant that the learned Single Judge has failed to take into consideration the fact that in the original petition filed by the respondent W.P. No. 6939/2011, this Court had simply issued a direction to consider the case of the respondent for regularization which direction was upheld and affirmed in W.A. No. 194/2013. It is submitted that pursuant to the aforesaid direction the appellant has considered the case of the respondent for regularization and rejected the same by order dated 2-9-2013, it is urged that the Court has gone into the correctness of the order dated 2-9-2013 passed by the appellants, examined the correctness of the performance appraisal made by the appellant and has thereafter recorded a finding that the order passed by the appellant amounts to circumventing the directions issued by this Court in W.P. No. 6939/2011. It is stated that the learned Single Judge while passing the impugned order has exceeded the jurisdiction conferred upon the Court in contempt proceedings as the Court could not have gone into the merits of the order passed by the appellant in compliance and thereafter force the appellant under threat of contempt to issue an order of regularization in favour of the respondent. 3. The learned counsel for the respondent per contra at the very outset objects to the maintainability of the appeal on the ground that no order of punishment has been passed by the learned Single Judge in C.P. No. 505/2013 which is still pending adjudication and in such circumstances, the appeal under section 19 of the Act, is not maintainable. The learned counsel for the respondent further submits that the learned Single Judge has rightly held that the appellant has committed contempt of this Court in rejecting the claim for regularization made by the respondent and therefore there is no ground to entertain this appeal which may be dismissed. 4. In view of the preliminary objection regarding maintainability raised by the respondent we propose to deal with it as the first issue. 4. In view of the preliminary objection regarding maintainability raised by the respondent we propose to deal with it as the first issue. To properly appreciate the rival contentions of the parties in this regard, it would be apposite to refer the provisions of section 19(1) of the Act, which is in the following terms:- "19. Appeals. -- (1) An appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt - (a) where the order or decision is that of a single Judge, to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court; (b) where the order or decision is that of a Bench, to the Supreme Court: Provided that where the order or decision is that of the Court of the Judicial Commissioner in any Union territory, such appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court." 5. We need not elaborately deal with the interpretation of this section as the provision of section 19 of the Act, had come up before the Supreme Court on several occasions in which the issue as to the maintainability of the appeal against the order passed in contempt jurisdiction was considered in the cases of Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, (1975) 3 SCC 535 , Midnapore Peoples' Co-op. Bank Ltd. and Others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 399, Purshotam Dass Goel Vs. Hon'ble Mr. B.S. Dhillon and Others, (1978) 2 SCC 370 , Union of India (UOI) and Others etc. Vs. Mario Cabral e Sa, (1982) 3 SCC 262 , D.N. Taneja Vs. Bhajan Lal, (1988) 3 SCC 26 , State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another (1996) 4 SCC 411 , and J. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, (1996) 6 SCC 291 , Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Share Holders Welfare Association Vs. S.C. Sekar and Others (2009) 2 SCC 784 , and R.N. Dey and Others Vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik and Others, (2000) 4 SCC 400 . 6. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another (1996) 4 SCC 411 , and J. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, (1996) 6 SCC 291 , Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Share Holders Welfare Association Vs. S.C. Sekar and Others (2009) 2 SCC 784 , and R.N. Dey and Others Vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik and Others, (2000) 4 SCC 400 . 6. From a perusal of the aforesaid judgments of the Supreme Court it is apparent that in some cases the Supreme Court has permitted filing of appeal under section 19 holding that the appeals filed against the orders passed in contempt proceedings other than the orders imposing punishment are appealable while in some cases the Supreme Court has held that an appeal under section 19 of the Act, is maintainable only against an order imposing punishment. 7. In the case of Midnapore Peoples' Co-op. Bank Ltd. and Others Vs. Chunilal Nanda and Others, (2006) 5 SCC 399, the scope and extent of the power to punish for the contempt and the provision for appeal has been extensively considered by the Supreme Court and the law relating to the aforesaid provisions has been summarized in the following terms:- "10............The scope of section 19 has been considered by this Court in Baradakanta Mishra Vs. Justice Gatikrushna Misra, Chief Justice of the Orissa High Court, (1975) 3 SCC 535 , Purshotam Dass Goel Vs. Hon'ble Mr. B.S. Dhillon and Others, (1978) 2 SCC 370 , Union of India (UOI) and Others etc. Vs. Mario Cabral e Sa, (1982) 3 SCC 262 , D.N. Taneja Vs. Bhajan Lal, (1988) 3 SCC 26 , State of Maharashtra Vs. Mahboob S. Allibhoy and another (1996) 4 SCC 411 , and J. Parihar Vs. Ganpat Duggar and others, (1996) 6 SCC 291 `. These cases dealt with orders refusing to initiate contempt proceedings or initiating contempt proceedings or acquitting/exonerating the contemnor or dropping the proceedings for contempt. In all these cases, it was held that an appeal was not maintainable under section 19 of the CC Act as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt. These cases dealt with orders refusing to initiate contempt proceedings or initiating contempt proceedings or acquitting/exonerating the contemnor or dropping the proceedings for contempt. In all these cases, it was held that an appeal was not maintainable under section 19 of the CC Act as the said section only provided for an appeal in respect of orders punishing for contempt. 10.1 In Baradakanta Mishra (supra), a three Judge Bench of this Court held that an order declining to initiate a proceeding for contempt amounts to refusal to assume or exercise jurisdiction to punish for contempt and therefore, such a decision cannot be regarded as a decision in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The question as to whether an appeal would be maintainable under section 19 where the Court initiates a proceeding for contempt but after due consideration and hearing finds the alleged contemnor not guilty of contempt, or having found him guilty declines to punish him, was left open. 10.2 In Purushotam Dass Goel (supra), certain aspects of section 19 were left open. This relevant portion is extracted below: "The (contempt) proceeding is initiated under section 17 by issuance of a notice. Thereafter, there may be many interlocutory orders passed in the said proceeding by the High Court. It could not be the intention of the legislature to provide for an appeal to this Court as a matter of right from each and every such order made by the High Court. The order or the decision must be such that it decides some bone of contention raised before the High Court affecting the right of the party aggrieved (Underlining by this Court). Mere initiation of a proceeding for contempt by the issuance of the notice on the prima facie view that the case is a fit one for drawing up the proceeding, does not decide any question... It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable to this Court under section 19 (Underlining by this Court). A final order, surely, will be appealable. It is neither possible, nor advisable, to make an exhaustive list of the type of orders which may be appealable to this Court under section 19 (Underlining by this Court). A final order, surely, will be appealable. ***** If the alleged contemnor in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being barred under section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to this Court under section 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court (Underlining by this Court). We are not called upon to express our final opinion in regard to such an order, but we merely mention this type of order by way of an example to show that even orders made at some intermediate stage in the proceeding may be appealable under section 19." 10.3. While Baradakanda Mishra (supra) and Purushotam Dass (supra) left open the question whether an appeal under section 19 would be maintainable in certain areas, in D.N. Taneja (supra), a three-Judge Bench of this Court, categorically held that appeals under section 19 would lie only against the orders punishing the contemnor for contempt and not any other order passed in contempt proceedings. We extract below the relevant portions from the said decision: "The right of appeal will be available under sub-section (1) of section 19 only against any decision or order of a High Court passed in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. When the High Court does not impose any punishment on the alleged contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt. The jurisdiction of the High Court is to punish. When no punishment is imposed by the High Court, it is difficult to say that the High Court has exercised its jurisdiction or power as conferred on it by Article 215 of the Constitution. It is true that in considering a question whether the alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not, the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and, if necessary, examines witnesses and, thereafter, passes an order either acquitting or punishing him for contempt. It is true that in considering a question whether the alleged contemnor is guilty of contempt or not, the Court hears the parties and considers the materials produced before it and, if necessary, examines witnesses and, thereafter, passes an order either acquitting or punishing him for contempt. When the High Court acquits the contemnor, the High Court does not exercise its jurisdiction for contempt, for such exercise will mean that the High Court should act in a particular manner, that is to say, by imposing punishment for contempt. So long as no punishment is imposed by the High Court, the High Court cannot be said to be exercising its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt under Article 215 of the Constitution. The aggrieved party under section 19(1) can only be the contemnor who has been punished for contempt of Court." (emphasis supplied) 10.4. In Mahboob S. Allibhoy (supra), this Court reiterated the above position thus: "On a plain reading section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of the High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. In other words, if the High Court passes an order in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish any person for contempt of Court, then only an appeal shall be maintainable under sub-section (1) of section 19 of the Act. As sub-section (1) of section 19 provides that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order, an impression is created that an appeal has been provided under the said sub-section against any order passed by the High Court while exercising the jurisdiction of contempt proceedings. The words 'any order' have to be read with the expression 'decision' used in the said sub-section which the High Court passes in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. 'Any order' is not independent of the expression 'decision'. They have been put in an alternative form saying 'order' or 'decision'. In either case, it must be in the nature of punishment for contempt. If the expression 'any order' is read independently of the "decision" then an appeal shall lie under Sub-section (1) of section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result." 10.5. J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar (supra) is nearest to this case on facts. If the expression 'any order' is read independently of the "decision" then an appeal shall lie under Sub-section (1) of section 19 even against any interlocutory order passed in a proceeding for contempt by the High Court which shall lead to a ridiculous result." 10.5. J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar (supra) is nearest to this case on facts. A contempt petition was filed alleging that the seniority list drawn pursuant to the order of the High Court was not in conformity with the said order. The High Court found it to be so, but held that the disobedience was not wilful and, therefore, did not punish for contempt. But the High Court gave a direction to redraw the seniority list. The State Government challenged the said direction in an intra Court appeal. The Division Bench held that the appeal was not maintainable under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, but was maintainable as an intra-Court appeal as the direction issued by the single Judge would be a "judgment" within the meaning of that expression in section 18 of the Rajasthan High Court Ordinance. Accordingly, the Division Bench set aside the direction of the learned Single Judge to re-do the list. The said order was challenged before this Court. This Court confirmed the decision of the Division Bench and held as follows: "Therefore, an appeal would lie under section 19 when an order in exercise of the jurisdiction of the High Court punishing the contemnor has been passed. In this case, the finding was that the respondents had not wilfully disobeyed the order. So there is no order punishing the respondent for violation of the orders of the High Court. Accordingly, an appeal under section 19 would not lie. ***** The question is whether seniority list is open to review in the contempt proceedings to find out, whether it is in conformity with the directions issued by the earlier Benches. It is seen that once there is an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. The preparation of the seniority list may be wrong or may be right or may or may not be in conformity with the directions. But that would be a fresh cause of action for the aggrieved party to avail of the opportunity of judicial review. But that cannot be considered to be the wilful violation of the order. After re-exercising the judicial review in contempt proceedings, a fresh direction by the learned single Judge cannot be given to redraw the seniority list. In other words, the learned Judge was exercising the jurisdiction to consider the matter on merits in the contempt proceedings. It would not be permissible...." 11. The position emerging from these decisions, in regard to appeals against orders in contempt proceedings may be summarized thus : "I. An appeal under section 19 is maintainable only against an order or decision of the High Court passed in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, that is, an order imposing punishment for contempt. II. Neither an order declining to initiate proceedings for contempt, nor an order initiating proceedings for contempt nor an order dropping the proceedings for contempt nor an order acquitting or exonerating the contemnor, is appealable under section 19 of the CC Act. In special circumstances, they may be open to challenge under Article 136 of the Constitution. III. In a proceeding for contempt, the High Court can decide whether any contempt of Court has been committed, and if so, what should be the punishment and matters incidental thereto. In such a proceeding, it is not appropriate to adjudicate or decide any issue relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties (Underlining by this Court). IV. Any direction issued or decision made by the High Court on the merits of a dispute between the parties, will not be in the exercise of 'jurisdiction to punish for contempt' and therefore, not appealable under section 19 of Contempt of Courts Act. The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under section 19 of the Act. can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions (Underlining by this Court). The only exception is where such direction or decision is incidental to or inextricably connected with the order punishing for contempt, in which event the appeal under section 19 of the Act. can also encompass the incidental or inextricably connected directions (Underlining by this Court). V. If the High Court, for whatsoever reason, decides an issue or makes any direction, relating to the merits of the dispute between the parties, in a contempt proceedings, the aggrieved person is not without remedy. Such an order is open to challenge in an intra-Court appeal (if the order was of a learned Single Judge (Underlining by this Court) and there is a provision for an intra-Court appeal), or by seeking special leave to appeal under Article 136 of the Constitution of India (in other cases). The first point is answered accordingly." 8. Subsequently, the Supreme Court in the case of Tamilnad Mercantile Bank Share Holders Welfare Association Vs. S.C. Sekar and Others, (2009) 2 SCC 784 , has again taken this aspect into consideration in paragraphs 38 to 40 in the following terms:- "38. In Purshottam Dass Goel v. Justice B.S. Dhillon (supra) this Court held: "3....He submitted that initiation of the proceeding by the High Court will be without jurisdiction if it is in violation of section 20. It may be so. If the alleged condemner in response to the notice appears before the High Court and asks it to drop the proceeding on the ground of its being barred under section 20 of the Act but the High Court holds that the proceeding is not barred, it may well be that an appeal would lie to this Court under section 19 from such an order although the proceeding has remained pending in the High Court. We are not called upon to express our final opinion in regard to such an order, but we merely mention this type of order by way of an example to show that even orders made at some intermediate stage in the proceeding may be appealable under section 19." Mr. Andhyarujina submitted that such observation was made by this Court having regard to a situation where the contempt proceedings had been entertained by a Court beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under section 20 of the Act. 39. Andhyarujina submitted that such observation was made by this Court having regard to a situation where the contempt proceedings had been entertained by a Court beyond the period of limitation as prescribed under section 20 of the Act. 39. We may repeat that it may be a different matter if the Court while passing an order decided some disputes raised before it by the contemnor asking it to drop the proceedings on one ground or the other. Thus, in a given situation, an appeal would be maintainable even against a notice to show cause. (Underlining by this Court). Here even such a notice has not been issued and thus the question of satisfying the Court by showing cause that the contemnors/respondents had not committed any contempt did not arise. Allegations had not been made against the Chairman of the meeting. The contempt proceedings had been initiated only against the Managing Director of the Bank. 40. Although we need not go into the larger question of maintainability of the appeal in view of the fact that the matter had been referred to a Three Judge Bench in Dharam Singh v. Gulzari Lal and others, SLP (Civil) No. 18852 of 2005 decided on 19-9-2005, but prima facie, in view of the decision of this Court in Purshottam Das (supra) there cannot be any doubt that in a situation where order has been passed adverse to the interest of the alleged contemnor an appeal would be maintainable particularly where a judgment has been passed by a Court which is beyond its jurisdiction (Underlining by this Court). This aspect of the matter has also been considered in R.N. Dey and Others Vs. Bhagyabati Pramanik and Others, (2000) 4 SCC 400 , wherein it was opined:- "10. In our view the aforesaid contention of the learned counsel for the respondents requires to be rejected on the ground that after receipt of the notice, officers concerned tendered unconditional apology and after accepting the same, the High Court rejected the prayer for discharge of the rule issued for contempt action. When the Court either suo motu or on a motion or a reference, decides to take action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. When the Court either suo motu or on a motion or a reference, decides to take action and initiate proceedings for contempt, it assumes jurisdiction to punish for contempt. The exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt commences with the initiation of a proceeding for contempt and if the order is passed not discharging the rule issued in contempt proceedings, it would be an order or decision in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. Against such order, appeal would be maintainable (Underlining by this Court)." 9. It is pertinent to note that the Supreme Court in the case of Midnapore (supra) and in the case of Tamilnad (supra) has also taken note of the three Judges decision in the case of D.N. Taneja Vs. Bhajan Lal, (1988) 3 SCC 26 , upon which reliance has been placed by the respondent to contend that the power of appeal is limited to cases of imposition of punishment and has thereafter gone on to entertain the petitions and issue appropriate orders. 10. It is also significant to observe that the Supreme Court in the case of Tamilnad (supra), R.N. Dey (supra) and Purushotam Dass Goel (supra) has held the appeal to be maintainable against the orders by which punishment has not been imposed even after taking note of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of D.N. Taneja (supra) and in spite of the fact that a reference in this regard is pending decision before a larger Bench in the case of Dharam Singh v. Gulzari Lal and others, SLP (Civil) No. 18852 of 2005. 11. In view of the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court, the facts of this case need to be examined to determine as to whether the appeal is maintainable in the present case. 12. In the instant case the learned Single Judge has categorically recorded a finding in the impugned order dated 24.06.2015 to the effect that the appellant has committed contempt of the Court and after recording such a finding against the appellant a show cause notice has been issued asking the appellant either to purge the contempt or to show cause as to why the appellant may not be punished. It is also apparent that the finding of fact that the appellant has committed contempt has already been recorded by the learned Single Judge and the only issue left to be decided is the quantum of punishment. 13. In view of the aforesaid undisputed facts, we are in agreement with the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant that he cannot at this stage appear before the learned Single Judge in the contempt proceedings and contend that he is not guilty of having committed contempt of the Court as a final opinion against the appellant holding him guilty of having committed contempt has already been recorded by the learned Single Judge. In other words, it is apparent that the finding that the appellant is guilty of contempt has already been recorded by the learned Single Judge in the impugned order which finding is incidental to and inextricably connected with the ultimate order that shall be passed in exercise of the power to punish for contempt (See para 11(iv) exception in the case of Midnapur (supra). It is also undisputed and apparent that by the impugned order the contempt Court has finally decided the main bone of contention between the parties thereby adversely effecting the rights of the appellant (See para 3 in the case of Purushottamdas Goel (supra). A perusal of the impugned order further indicates that the prayer of the appellant to drop the proceedings has not been accepted and the appellant has not been discharged of the rule issued in the contempt proceedings and therefore the impugned order is an order or decision passed in exercise of the jurisdiction to punish for contempt and an appeal against such an order would be maintainable [(See para 10 of the decision in the case of R.N. Day (supra)] 14. In the facts and circumstances of the case it is apparent that by the impugned order the learned Single Judge has finally taken a decision that the appellant is guilty of having committed contempt of the Court and that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge in the contempt proceedings is an order or decision in exercise of jurisdiction to punish for contempt and therefore, an appeal against the said order is maintainable, in view of the decision of the Supreme Court rendered in the case of R.N. Dey (supra), Purushotam Dass Goel (supra) and the exception stated in paragraph 11 (iv) in the decision of the Supreme Court in Midnapore (supra). We are also of the considered opinion that the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge has held the appellant guilty and has also recorded certain findings against the appellant in respect of the merits of the case, therefore, even otherwise this Court (Division Bench) has the power to entertain the appeal against the impugned order in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Midnapur (supra), paragraph 11(v) and in the case of Parents Association of Students Vs. M.A. Khan and Another (2009) 2 SCC 641 , as under:- "17. If Mr. Mishra is correct in his contention that an appeal was maintainable under section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, such an appeal would also lie before a Division Bench of the High Court. It may, subject to just exceptions, not matter much as to whether an appeal is entertained under the said provision or under the Letters Patent of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court, therefore, could entertain an appeal subject, of course, to the allocation of subject-matters by the Chief Justice of the High Court." The preliminary objection raised by the respondent as to maintainability is accordingly rejected. 15. We now proceed to consider the second issue raised by the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that the learned Single Judge has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in the contempt Court while issuing the directions which are beyond and in addition to the directions issued by this Court in the original proceedings i.e. W.P. No. 6939/2011. 16. 15. We now proceed to consider the second issue raised by the learned counsel for the appellant to the effect that the learned Single Judge has exceeded the jurisdiction vested in the contempt Court while issuing the directions which are beyond and in addition to the directions issued by this Court in the original proceedings i.e. W.P. No. 6939/2011. 16. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant that in the instant case the learned Single Judge in the first petition, W.P. No. 6939/2011, filed by the respondent had disposed of the petition by issuing a direction to the respondents to consider the case of the petitioner for regularization in paragraph 23 of the order dated 24-4-2013 in the following manner:- "Accordingly, this petition deserves to be allowed. The respondents are directed to consider the case of the petitioner for regularization from the due date. The respondents shall complete the exercise of consideration of the petitioner within a period of two months and pass order thereupon For the reasons stated above, impugned advertisement is quashed." 17. It is stated that the writ appeal filed by the present appellant before the Division Bench of this Court in W.A. No. 194/2013 was dismissed by affirming the directions issued by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No. 6939/2011 by making the following observations:- "In such circumstances, in our opinion, the writ Court has rightly issued directions to consider the case of the respondent No. 1 for regularization." 18. It is further urged by the learned counsel for the appellant that the direction issued by this Court in W.P. No. 6939/2011 and W.A. No. 194/2013 were only to the extent of a consideration of the case of the respondent for regularization. The learned counsel for the appellant states that the case of the respondent was duly considered by the Expert Selection Committee pursuant to the decisions of this Court and she was not found fit for regularization as is evident from the Annexure P/3 dated 5-5-2013. 19. The learned counsel for the appellant states that the case of the respondent was duly considered by the Expert Selection Committee pursuant to the decisions of this Court and she was not found fit for regularization as is evident from the Annexure P/3 dated 5-5-2013. 19. It is contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that as the appellant has complied with the directions issued by this Court in the writ petition filed by the respondent and after duly considering the case for regularization it has been rejected, therefore, they had complied with the order passed by this Court and no further action in compliance is required to be taken by them. It is also stated that there was no positive direction issued by this Court in the writ petition filed by the respondent to regularize the petitioner therefore the finding recorded in the impugned order dated 24-6-2015 to the effect that the appellant has committed contempt is contrary to law and consequently, the issuance of the show cause notice to the appellant proposing to impose punishment for committing contempt or to purge the contempt is without jurisdiction. It is also contended by the learned counsel for the appellant that the Supreme Court in a series of decisions including the decision rendered in the case of Midnapor and Tamilnad (supra) and Special Deputy Collector (L.A.) Vs. N. Vasudeva Rao and Others AIR 2008 SC 944 , and others has categorically held that in contempt proceedings the contempt Court is only required to see as to whether the direction issued by the Court has been complied with or not and that the contempt Court cannot go into the merits of the case and grant relief beyond the relief that had been granted in the original petition. It is submitted that in view of the aforesaid law the direction issued by the learned Single Judge and the finding recorded by him goes beyond the dispute that was involved in W.P. No. 6939/2011 and therefore, is not sustainable. 20. It is submitted that in view of the aforesaid law the direction issued by the learned Single Judge and the finding recorded by him goes beyond the dispute that was involved in W.P. No. 6939/2011 and therefore, is not sustainable. 20. The learned counsel for the respondents per contra submits that the learned Single Judge has taken into consideration the fact that the reasons for rejecting the respondents case for regularization had already been considered and rejected by the Court in paragraph 13 of the order passed in W.P. No. 6939/2011 and has therefore rightly held that the appellant cannot be permitted to reject the case of the respondent for regularization on the same grounds that have already been rejected and it is on this count that the learned Single Judge has found that the appellant has committed contempt. It is further submitted that in the impugned order the learned Single Judge has recorded a finding to the effect that the documents filed by the appellant in response to the notice issued to them in the contempt proceedings were concocted and forged and therefore the appellant has committed contempt of this Court. It is prayed that in view of the aforesaid the appeal be dismissed. 21. The scope of extent of power to be exercised in contempt proceedings has already been discussed and elaborated by the Supreme Court in the case of J.S. Parihar (supra), relevant portion of which has been reproduced in paragraph 10.5 of the decision in the case of Midnapur (supra) and has also been separately held in paragraph 11(iii) of the decision in the same case (Midnapur) which has been reproduced in the preceding paragraphs. In the case of Special Deputy Collector (L.A.) Vs. N. Vasudeva Rao and Others, AIR 2008 SC 944 , the Supreme Court in paragraph 10 has held as under:- "10. The law as to nature of order that can be passed in contempt proceedings had been elaborately dealt with by this Court in several cases. In Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Subedar Devassy PV (2006) 1 SCC 613 , it was held as follows: "2. While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. In Union of India (UOI) and Others Vs. Subedar Devassy PV (2006) 1 SCC 613 , it was held as follows: "2. While dealing with an application for contempt, the Court is really concerned with the question whether the earlier decision which has received its finality had been complied with or not. It would not be permissible for a Court to examine the correctness of the earlier decision which had not been assailed and to take a view different from what was taken in the earlier decision. A similar view was taken in K.G. Derasari and Another Vs. Union of India (UOI) and Others, (2001) 10 SCC 496 . The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction is primarily concerned with the question of contumacious conduct of the party who is alleged to have committed default in complying with the directions in the judgment or order. If there was no ambiguity or indefiniteness in the order, it is for the party concerned to approach the higher Court if according to him the same is not legally tenable. Such a question has necessarily to be agitated before the higher Court. The Court exercising contempt jurisdiction cannot take upon itself the power to decide the original proceedings in a manner not dealt with by the Court passing the judgment or order. Though strong reliance was placed by learned counsel for the appellants on a three-Judge Bench decision in Niaz Mohammad and others, etc. etc. Vs. State of Haryana and others, (1994) 6 SCC 332 , we find that the same has no application to the facts of the present case. In that case the question arose about the impossibility to obey the order. If that was the stand of the appellants, the least it could have done was to assail correctness of the judgment before the higher Court." The above position was earlier highlighted in Prithawi Nath Ram Vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, (2004) 7 SCC 261 ." 22. In that case the question arose about the impossibility to obey the order. If that was the stand of the appellants, the least it could have done was to assail correctness of the judgment before the higher Court." The above position was earlier highlighted in Prithawi Nath Ram Vs. State of Jharkhand and Others, (2004) 7 SCC 261 ." 22. From a perusal of the aforesaid decisions of the Supreme Court as well as the decision in the case of J.S. Parihar (supra) it is clear that/once an order is passed by the authority in compliance of the directions issued by the Court whether rightly or wrongly, fresh cause of action arises for seeking redressal before an appropriate forum unless and until it is established that the order of compliance is in fact in blatant violation of the directions of the Court, whether the order passed by the authority is right or wrong or whether it is in conformity with the directions issued by the Court or not would be grounds for giving rise to a fresh cause of action to the aggrieved party for invoking judicial review but such an order cannot be considered to be a wilful violation of the previous order passed by the Court nor can the Court exercising jurisdiction in contempt proceedings consider the validity of the order on merits. The rival contentions of the parties and the validity of the impugned order are considered in the light of the aforesaid law laid down by the Supreme Court. 23. Before we enter into the question of correctness of the impugned order, two facts need to be clearly stated. Firstly, that the respondent had initially filed W.P. No. 6939/2011 praying for a relief of regularization and the learned Single Judge as well as the Division Bench in writ appeal, in spite of recording a finding in favour of the respondent did not grant the relief of regularization but disposed of the matter by directing the respondents to consider the claim of the petitioner for regularization. Secondly, the appellant/authorities pursuant to the directions issued by this Court had constituted a committee of five persons to consider the case of the respondent for regularization and after considering her case for regularization it has been rejected by order dated 2-9-2013 which order has not been challenged by the respondents and continues to remain in existence. Secondly, the appellant/authorities pursuant to the directions issued by this Court had constituted a committee of five persons to consider the case of the respondent for regularization and after considering her case for regularization it has been rejected by order dated 2-9-2013 which order has not been challenged by the respondents and continues to remain in existence. Apparently, the aforesaid two undisputed facts have not been taken into consideration by the contempt Court while passing the impugned order. 24. From a perusal of the impugned order passed in the contempt proceedings it is clear that the learned single Judge has quoted paragraph 13 of the order passed by this Court in W.P. No. 6939/2011 wherein the Court has taken into consideration the service record of the respondents and stated that the appellants had found the services of the respondents satisfactory and it is for that reasons that she had been given another chance by extending her contractual period for one year. On the basis of the aforesaid assessment of the respondent's record by this Court in W.P. No. 6939/2011 and the consequent recording the opinion that the services of the respondent was satisfactory, the contempt Court by the impugned order has stated that once this Court in W.P. No. 6939/2011 has recorded an opinion that the petitioner's services were satisfactory the appellants cannot be permitted thereafter to reject her claim for regularization on the ground that her services were unsatisfactory. The contempt Court in the impugned order has also taken into consideration the grading of the respondent for the period 1-11-2011 to 31-12-2011 wherein the appellants had graded her performance as "poor" which grading was not considered or placed before this Court in the initial round of litigation in W.P. No. 6939/2011 and was placed before the contempt Court for the first time by the appellants. The contempt Court has considered the effect and impact of this grading in the ACR folder and has recorded a finding to the effect that the said report is fabricated and has been prepared only to deny the legitimate claim of the respondent for regularization. 25. The contempt Court has considered the effect and impact of this grading in the ACR folder and has recorded a finding to the effect that the said report is fabricated and has been prepared only to deny the legitimate claim of the respondent for regularization. 25. From the aforesaid analysis it is manifestly clear that the contempt Court in the impugned order has considered the service record of the respondent and has recorded a finding on merits that the case for regularization could not have been rejected by the appellants which is apparently not permissible in law and is beyond the scope of powers conferred upon the Court in contempt proceedings as has been held by the Supreme Court but in the above quoted cases. We are also constrained to say so as the contempt Court while passing the impugned order has failed to take note of the fact that this Court in paragraph 13 of the order passed in W.P. No. 6939/2011 after taking into consideration the service record of the respondent has itself stated and recorded a finding to the effect that it was as clear as noon day that the case of the respondent had not been considered for regularization or that her case was considered and she was not found fit for regularization and it is on this count that the Court had disposed of the petition with a direction to consider the case of the petitioner for regularization. In paragraph 14 of the order passed in W.P. No. 6939/2011 the writ Court, after taking into consideration the facts of the case has stated that the "pivotal question for decision was as to whether the petitioner was entitled to be considered for regularization". Similar observations regarding right of the respondent to be considered for regularization have also been made in paragraphs 22 and 23 in the order passed in W.P. No. 6939/2011. These observations of the learned Single Judge made in W.P. No. 6939/2011 have been affirmed by the Division bench in W.A. No. 194/2013. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that this Court in W.P. No. 6939/2011 and in W.A. No. 194/2013 had not issued any positive direction in favour of the respondent to regularize her service but had only issued a direction for consideration of her case for regularization. 26. From the aforesaid, it is apparent that this Court in W.P. No. 6939/2011 and in W.A. No. 194/2013 had not issued any positive direction in favour of the respondent to regularize her service but had only issued a direction for consideration of her case for regularization. 26. From a perusal of the impugned order passed in the contempt proceedings it is also clear that the learned single Judge has gone into the merits of the case in detail and has in fact even considered the correctness of the ACR gradings recorded by the appellant subsequently which were neither considered nor were on record of W.P. No. 6939/2011 or W.A. No. 194/2013 and has recorded an adverse finding on merits against the appellant in respect of the ACR gradings for the period 1-11-2011 to 31-12-2011 and thereafter has held the appellant to be guilty of contempt. 27. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the order passed by the learned Single Judge whereby the finding on merits of the order passed by the appellants rejecting the case for regularization of the respondent had been recorded, is beyond the jurisdiction of the contempt proceedings and that such an order could not have been passed in contempt proceedings. At best, the contempt Court could only have examined as to whether the directions issued by this Court in the previous petitions to consider the case of the, respondent for regularization had been complied with or not but the contempt Court, in our considered opinion, could not have gone into the validity of the order passed by the appellants rejecting the respondent's case for regularization. 28. We are also of the considered opinion that this Court in W.P. No. 6939/2011 or in W.A. No. 194/2013 had not issued any directions to the appellant to pass an order of regularization in favour of the respondent but had only directed that her case for regularization be considered and that pursuant to the said directions the appellants have considered and rejected the respondent's case for regularization by the order dated 2-9-2013 and, therefore, no case for initiating contempt proceedings against the appellants is made out. 29. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge in C.P. No. 505/2013, dated 24-6-2015 is hereby quashed. 29. In the light of the aforesaid discussions, the impugned order passed by the learned Single Judge in C.P. No. 505/2013, dated 24-6-2015 is hereby quashed. The finding recorded by the learned Single Judge to the effect that the appellant has committed contempt of Court is also set aside. The show cause notice and the direction to purge the contempt issued by the impugned order is also quashed. All the observations and findings recorded in the impugned order regarding validity and correctness of the proceedings for consideration of the respondent's case for regularization and the consequent rejection of her case are also hereby set aside. As we have held that the only direction issued was for consideration of the respondent's case for regularization which direction has been complied with, therefore, we are also of the considered opinion that no case of initiating contempt proceedings against the appellant is made out. Consequently, the contempt proceedings initiated and pending before the learned Single Judge in C.P. No. 505/2013 is also hereby quashed. 30. It is, however, clarified that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case and, therefore, in case the respondent feels that the order rejecting her case for regularization, dated 2-9-2013 is not in accordance with law or that her case for regularization has not been properly considered and has been wrongly rejected, the respondent would be at liberty to assail the order dated 2-9-2013 by taking up appropriate proceedings against the same in accordance with law. It is further observed that in case the respondent does so, any observation made in the contempt petition or by this Court in the present appeal shall not come in the way of the respondent in doing so, nor would any observation made by this Court in the present appeal or the impugned order passed in the contempt petition be taken to be any finding recorded against the appellant or the respondent and the fresh proceedings shall be considered and decided on its own merits without being influenced by any observation or finding recorded therein. With the aforesaid observations and directions the appeal filed by the appellant stands allowed.