ORDER : B.S. Patil, J. 1. These two revision petitions arise out of the judgment and decree passed by the Small Causes Court at Bengaluru in S.C. No. 1178/2013 and S.C. No. 1179/2013. 2. Parties to these two petitions are one and the same. Facts involved and the legal questions raised are also one and the same. In fact, though the Court below has passed separate judgments, reasons assigned and the conclusion reached are similar. In both the cases, 'A' schedule property is same. Lessor and Lessee are common. Even the sub-lessee to whom the lessee has sub-let is also common, but the shop premises that were sub-let are different in both the cases. They are described in 'B' schedule to the suit. In the above circumstances, both these cases are heard together and are disposed of by this common order. 3. Both the suits were filed by the landlord/lessor for ejectment of the tenant/lessee. The Court below has decreed the suits with costs directing defendant No. 2 -sub-tenant/sub-lessee to handover vacant possession of suit schedule T3' property in favour of the plaintiff within 30 days from the date of the order. 4. Briefly stated, facts leading to the case are that plaintiff- M/s. Rao Bahadur Gubbi Thotadappa Charitable Trust is a Charitable Trust as the name itself suggests. The suit schedule 'A' property is the property of the Trust. Defendant No. 1 was inducted as tenant under the plaintiff in respect of the suit schedule 'A' premises situated at Belli Basavana Gudi Beedi, Mamulpet, Bengaluru; lease was created by a registered Lease Deed executed on 17.08.1987 for a period of 25 years and the same expired on 31.08.2012. Lessee - defendant No. 1 sublet T3' schedule property in favour of defendant No. 2. Even before the expiry of lease period, plaintiff called upon the lessee - defendant No. 1 and the sub-lessee - defendant No. 2 to vacate and handover possession of 'A' & T3' schedule properties on or before 31.08.2012. However, defendant No. 1 requested the plaintiff through letter dated 17.05.2012 to continue their tenancy; plaintiff replied through his advocate on 19.06.2012 rejecting the request and calling upon them to vacate on expiry of the lease period; despite the same, defendants did not vacate the premises. However, defendant No. 1 requested the plaintiff through letter dated 17.05.2012 to continue their tenancy; plaintiff replied through his advocate on 19.06.2012 rejecting the request and calling upon them to vacate on expiry of the lease period; despite the same, defendants did not vacate the premises. Therefore, contending that the occupation of the defendants from 01.09.2012 had become unauthorized occupation, a legal notice was issued on 15.02.2013 terminating the tenancy of the defendants and also calling upon them to vacate the premises. Despite receipt of notice, defendants did not vacate the same. Hence, the plaintiff instituted the two suits. 5. Defendant No. 2 alone filed written statement denying the contentions of the plaintiff. He urged that the suit itself was not maintainable; Lease Deed itself was void and illegal as all the Trustees did not jointly execute the Lease Deed and that the eviction petition could not have been filed by splitting the tenancy. 6. Based on the pleadings, the Court below framed the following points for consideration: "i) Whether the plaintiff proved that the 1st defendant was a tenant in respect of 'A' schedule property and the 2nd defendant was a subtenant in the portion of 'A' schedule property under the plaintiff? ii) Whether the plaintiff has terminated the tenancy as per law?" 7. Plaintiff examined the Chief Executive Officer of the Trust as P.W.1 and produced and marked Exs.P1 to P9. Defendant No. 2 examined himself as D.W.1. No documents were marked by him. The Court below has decreed the suit holding that admittedly plaintiff had leased the premises on rent to defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 1 in turn had sublet 'B' schedule property in favour of defendant No. 2; plaintiff had filed S.C. No. 995/2013 against defendant No. 1 separately which was pending; defendant No. 2 though examined himself as D.W.1 by filing affidavit did not subject himself for cross-examination. The Court below further found that ownership of the property by the plaintiff was not in dispute and the tenancy between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 was also not in dispute and therefore, it had to be held that plaintiff had established the relationship of landlord and tenant between the plaintiff and defendant No. 1 and defendant No. 2 as sub-tenant of the premises. In view of the expiry of the lease period and termination of the lease by issuing legal notice, the Court below found that the tenancy had been validly terminated and therefore, defendants were liable to be evicted from the premises. 8. I have heard the learned counsel for both parties and perused the entire materials on record. 9. The first contention of the petitioner - defendant No. 2 is that the Court below was not right and justified in rejecting the application filed by him seeking to set aside the order dated 17.04.2015 and for permission to offer himself for cross-examination and also in refusing permission for reopening the case for cross-examination of P.W.1. In this regard, I have perused the order dated 28.04.2015 and the entire order sheet leading to the rejection of the prayer for permission to D.W.1 to offer himself for cross-examination and also to provide him opportunity to cross-examine P.W.1. The Court below has rejected this request holding that the order sheet disclosed that defendant No. 2 was dragging on the proceedings on one or the other pretext; many opportunities had been given to the defendant for adducing evidence; every time he got reopened the case for cross-examination of the plaintiff as well as for his evidence, he intentionally avoided and dragged on the matter and the last of the applications had been filed after the matter was reserved for judgment. 10. Order sheet maintained by the Court below discloses that on 13.10.2014, application filed by defendant No. 2 had been allowed and permission was granted to the defendant to cross-examine P.W.1 on payment of costs and the matter was adjourned to 28.10.2014, but on the said day, he did not cross examine P.W.1. Thereafter, though the matter was listed on two occasions for the said purpose, defendant did not cross-examine P.W.1. Hence, on 04.12.2014, cross-examination of P.W.1 was taken as nil and the matter was posted for the evidence of defendant, but even on that day, he did not lead his evidence. Therefore, evidence of defendant was taken as nil after couple of hearings on 06.01.2015. 11. Matter was posted on 17.01.2015 for arguments and on that day, arguments of the plaintiff were heard and the case was adjourned to 21.01.2015 for defendant's arguments. On 21.01.2015, defendant filed applications to reopen the case to provide him an opportunity. Therefore, evidence of defendant was taken as nil after couple of hearings on 06.01.2015. 11. Matter was posted on 17.01.2015 for arguments and on that day, arguments of the plaintiff were heard and the case was adjourned to 21.01.2015 for defendant's arguments. On 21.01.2015, defendant filed applications to reopen the case to provide him an opportunity. The said applications were allowed on payment of costs. P.W. 1 was directed to be kept present for cross-examination by the defendant on 03.02.2015, but on the said day, plaintiff was not cross-examined by the defendant, therefore, cross-examination of P.W.1 was taken as nil. The matter was again posted for evidence of defendant's side on 20.03.2015. As the defendant did not adduce evidence, his evidence was taken as nil and the matter was adjourned to 25.03.2015 for arguments. On 25.03.2015, defendant No. 2 filed I.As. seeking permission to examine himself by filing affidavit evidence. On payment of costs of Rs. 1,000/- applications were allowed and affidavit evidence was taken on record. The case was adjourned to 07.04.2015, but defendant No. 2 remained absent on the said day, hence, the matter was adjourned to 09.04.2015. But, defendant No. 2 remained absent on the said day also, therefore, his evidence was discarded and defendant's side evidence was taken as nil and the matter was posted for arguments on 17.04.2015. 12. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned to 20.04.2015 and on 20.04.2015, it was adjourned to 22.04.2015. On 22.04.2015, arguments of the plaintiff was heard and the plaintiff filed a memo with seven citations. The matter was reserved for judgment by 25.04.2015. On 25.04.2015, the date on which judgment was to be pronounced, defendant filed I.As. for reopening and recalling the evidence of defendant and for cross-examination of P.W.1. After hearing both sides on the applications, the matter was adjourned to 28.04.2015 for orders and on 28.04.2015, I.As. were dismissed and the suits came to be decreed. 13. The picture as presented from the above discloses that despite giving series of opportunities, defendant No. 2 has not chosen to submit himself for cross-examination. The conduct of defendant No. 2 discloses that he has gone on protracting the litigation. He is a sub-tenant under defendant No. 1 and by efflux of time, the lease period has expired on 31.08.2012. He has neither paid rent, nor has he deposited any amount before the Court below towards occupation of the premises. The conduct of defendant No. 2 discloses that he has gone on protracting the litigation. He is a sub-tenant under defendant No. 1 and by efflux of time, the lease period has expired on 31.08.2012. He has neither paid rent, nor has he deposited any amount before the Court below towards occupation of the premises. The only interest he had in this case was to protract the matter so as to continue to enjoy the same. Therefore, he was adopting all types of delay tactics. Hence, left with no alternative, the Court below has rightly taken his evidence as nil and has proceeded to dispose of the case on merits. 14. A contention is advanced before this Court by the counsel for the petitioner producing an extract of the diary maintained in the Court below to urge that the date mentioned as 21/03 was struck off and overwritten as 17/4 and therefore, defendant was misled. It has to be noticed here that both the cases were being listed together. The diary does not show any overwriting in respect of S.C. No. 1179/2013. The date is clearly shown as 17/4. In respect of S.C. No. 1178/2013, the date mentioned earlier was struck off and mentioned as 17/4. Therefore, it cannot be said that defendant was misled. Hence, this contention advanced by the counsel for the petitioner cannot be accepted as the conduct exhibited by defendant No. 2 does not deserve any further opportunity to him. 15. As regards the merits of the matter, the contentions urged by the counsel for the petitioner are that no suit could have been maintained against a sub-tenant particularly because a decree has been already obtained against defendant No. 1 in S.C. No. 995/2013. That, all the Trustees having not executed the Lease Deed, the Lease Deed itself was illegal; that all the Trustees having not joined as plaintiffs to file the suit, the suit was not maintainable. That, all the Trustees having not executed the Lease Deed, the Lease Deed itself was illegal; that all the Trustees having not joined as plaintiffs to file the suit, the suit was not maintainable. In this regard, he has placed reliance on the following judgments: "i) Atmaram Ranchhodbhai v. Gulamhusein Gulam Mohiyaddin & Another - AIR 1973 Gujarat 113 (V 60 C 17) (1) ii) M/s. Karnataka Trader, Hubli v. Hiren Shamji Karamsey and Another - AIR 1987 Karnataka 204 iii) Vedakannu Nadar & Others v. Nanguneri Taluk Singikulam Annadana Chatram & Others, AIR 1938 Madras 982 iv) Abdul Rahaman v. Smt. Angur Bala Manna & Another, AIR 1974 Calcutta 16(V.61, C.6) v) L. Janakirama Iyer & Others v. P.M. Nilakanta Iyer & Others, AIR 1962 SC 633 " 16. Learned counsel for the respondent - plaintiff strongly refutes the contentions urged by the petitioner and submits that the plaintiff is a private Charitable Trust; by efflux of time, the period of lease of defendant No. 1 has come to an end; defendant No. 2 cannot have any separate right to resist the suits; as the proceedings are summary proceedings, question is only with regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant and the termination of lease. He has placed reliance on the judgment in the case of M.C. Mohammed v. Gowramma & Others, ILR 2006 Karnataka 4584 to contend that there was no need for termination of lease because by efflux of time, the lease stood terminated. He has also placed reliance on the judgment in the case of Chinnathambi v. N. Veerappa & Others - 2004 (1) Kar.L.J. 406 regarding the effect of Section 116 of the Karnataka Rent Act, 1999. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent invites the attention of the Court to Ex. P2 to contend that the Lease Deed has been executed by the President and the Secretary of the Trust. 17. Learned counsel for the respondent invites the attention of the Court to Ex. P2 to contend that the Lease Deed has been executed by the President and the Secretary of the Trust. He has placed on record the Rules of Governance of Rao Bhadhur Dharmapravartha Gubbi Thotadappa Charities Trust to show that the Trust shall be represented by the President/Secretary in all proceedings in any Court of law or office or in respect of other correspondence with any person or authority and therefore, he has contended that the Trust has instituted the suit through its Secretary and the execution of the Lease Deed was also by the President and the Secretary in terms of the Rules of Governance of the Trust framed by the Board of Trustees. 18. Having heard the learned counsel for both parties and on careful perusal of the entire materials on record, I find that even the contentions urged on merits by the learned counsel for the petitioner - defendant No. 2 are not tenable in law. First of all, the plaintiff - Trust being a private Charitable Trust, Section 1 of the Indian Trust Act makes provisions of the Act inapplicable to Public or Private Religious or Charitable Endowments. Secondly, the lease by way of registered document created in favour of defendant No. 1 in respect of 'A' schedule property has expired by efflux of time. Suit schedule 'B' property is part of suit schedule 'A' property and defendant No. 1 has sublet the same in favour of defendant No. 2. Defendant No. 1 has not contested the case. Indeed, he has suffered a decree for the entire premises. Defendant No. 2 cannot take up the plea urging that lease created in favour of defendant No. 1 itself was illegal and void because he has been inducted by defendant No. 1 itself. Further, the Rules of Governance of the Trust authorized the President or the Secretary to represent the Trust before any authority or Court of law. 19. There is no dispute raised by any of the Trustees with regard to the authority of the Secretary to file the suit. This is not a case where something is sought to be done by the office bearers of the Trust against the interest of the Trust and its beneficiaries. 19. There is no dispute raised by any of the Trustees with regard to the authority of the Secretary to file the suit. This is not a case where something is sought to be done by the office bearers of the Trust against the interest of the Trust and its beneficiaries. They have filed the suit for ejectment of the tenants from the premises to protect the interest of the Trust and for the benefit of the Trust. In the above facts and circumstances, none of the judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioner are applicable to the facts of the present case. 20. Section 108(j) of the Transfer of Property Act lays down that lessee may transfer absolutely the whole or any part of his interest in the demised property. This includes transfer by lessee by way of sub-lease. On such transfer, lessee cannot, by reason only of such transfer, cease to be subject to any of the liabilities attached to the lease. In such circumstances, the lessee cannot make a transfer to last beyond his own interest. The interest transferred will come to an end on the determination of the lease. But, if the landlord instead of demanding actual possession on the determination of lease, allows the sub-lessee to hold on, he must be deemed to have thereby renewed the tenancy in favour of the tenant or offered the tenancy to the sub-lessee and by the acceptance of rent he would create a new tenancy. If this position in law is made applicable to the instant case, it becomes clear that the landlord executed the lease in favour of lessee for a period of 25 years commencing from 17.08.1987. By efflux of time, the period has come to an end on 31.08.2012. The landlord has taken steps to issue legal notice to the lessee terminating the tenancy and notifying him of the determination of tenancy upon efflux of time. Thereafter, the landlord has filed suit for ejectment in S.C. No. 1179/2013. against the lessee. The said suit has been decreed on 28.04.2015. Indeed this decree passed against the lessee also binds the sub-lessee. However, the landlord, by way of abundant caution, had instituted another suit against the sub-lessee arraying the lessee also as a party. 21. Thereafter, the landlord has filed suit for ejectment in S.C. No. 1179/2013. against the lessee. The said suit has been decreed on 28.04.2015. Indeed this decree passed against the lessee also binds the sub-lessee. However, the landlord, by way of abundant caution, had instituted another suit against the sub-lessee arraying the lessee also as a party. 21. There is no independent right in the sub-lessee to continue in possession of the demised property after determination of the lease period by efflux of time. The sublessee is liable to be evicted from the premises. He has no right to come up with any defence independent of the defence that the lessee could have had, when the lessee has already suffered a decree of ejectment. The sub-lessee has now taken up untenable contentions regarding maintainability of eviction petition filed by the Trust through its Secretary and also contending that there cannot be a suit for ejectment in respect of part of the demised property against the sub-lessee. None of these contentions are open to the sub-lessee. The lease has been terminated by efflux of time. The lessee has suffered a decree of ejectment. The sub-lessee has no right to hold on to the property. The lessor has not recognized the tenancy of lessee or the sub-lessee after efflux of time. The conduct of sub-lessee discloses that he is interested in occupying the premises illegally and unauthorisedly. Although lease has come to an end on 31.08.2012, the sub-lessee has not accounted for his unauthorized occupation by depositing the rent/damages so far. 22. As regards the last contention urged against splitting up of tenancy based on the judgment in the case of Mohar Singh (Dead by L.Rs. v. Devi Charan & Others - AIR 1988 SC 1365 (1), it is seen that there is no question of splitting up of tenancy in the instant case. Landlord has filed the suit for ejectment of the tenant and has impleaded the sub-tenant as well. This is not a case of splitting up of tenancy. Therefore, the judgment on which reliance is placed has no application to the facts of the present case. 23. In the result and for the foregoing reasons, these revision petitions being devoid of merits are dismissed.