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Calcutta High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 937 (CAL)

Susama Saha v. Kolkata Municipal Corporation

2015-12-02

HARISH TANDON

body2015
JUDGMENT : Harish Tandon, J. 1. A short but interesting point is raised in this Revisional Application touching the competence and/or powers of the Special Officer (Building) to discharge the statutory duty and function of the Municipal Commissioner vested under section 400(1) of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 as delegatee. An action has been taken against the Petitioner under Section 400(1) of the said Act alleging that they have illegally and unauthorizedly undertaken the construction work in violation of the different provisions of the said Act and the Rules framed thereunder. The Special Officer (Building) is acting as a delegatee to the Municipal Commissioner and hearing the proceeding and passing orders for demolition in the event such construction violates any of these statutory provisions. Such order is amenable to be challenged before the Building Tribunal by way of an appeal and against the Appellate Order further challenge can be made before the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. This is how the matter has come up before this Court and a point is raised at the behest of the Petitioner on the validity of the powers exercised by the Municipal Commissioner under Section 48 of the said Act. 2. The object and the purpose behind the incorporation of the Kolkata Municipal Corporation Act was to amend and consolidate the law relating to municipal affairs in the city of Kolkata. The said Act contains the exhaustive provisions relating to constitution of the Corporation, powers and functions of the Municipal Authorities, election of the Councillors, conduct of business, maintenance of the municipal records, imposition of taxes and recovery thereof and providing civil amenities including the town planning and maintenance of the buildings and so on so forth. 3. Before proceeding to address the core issue as above, it would be relevant and profitable to narrate the different provisions of the said Act. Section 2 of the said Act contains the definition Clause assigning meaning of the different words or expressions used in the said Act for the purpose of interpretations and the meaning thereof. Section 3 of the Act postulates the Municipal Authorities for the purpose of carrying out the provision of the said Act and to be comprised of the Corporation, Mayor-in-Council and the Mayor. Section 3 of the Act postulates the Municipal Authorities for the purpose of carrying out the provision of the said Act and to be comprised of the Corporation, Mayor-in-Council and the Mayor. Sub-Section (2) of Section 4 of the Act specifies the Corporation as a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and may sue or be sued in such name. It shall be so appointed by notification issued by the State Government to take charge of the Municipal Government of Kolkata to be known as Kolkata Municipal Corporation. It is relevant to record that the expression “Calcutta” has been substituted by the word “Kolkata” by Section 5 of the West Bengal Capital City (Change of Name) Act, 2001, which came into force from 1st day of January, 2001. Section 5 of the Act relates to constitution of the Corporation which consists of 141 elected Councillors and such persons having special knowledge or experience in municipal administration as the State Government may nominate from time to time. However, the restriction was imposed upon such persons not to have a right to vote in the meeting of the Corporation. Sub-Section (2) of Section 5 mandates that the said 141 Councillors shall be elected by the Constituencies and for the purpose of the same each word described in Schedule II of the Act shall constitute the Constituency. Out of those elected Councillors one member shall be elected at the first meeting of the Corporation as Mayor and one member as Chairman. Section 8 of the Act provides that the Mayor-in-Council consisting of Mayor, the Deputy Mayor and not more than 10 (ten) other elected members of the Corporation shall be responsible to the Corporation and shall transact the business which shall be determined by the Corporation by Regulations. 4. The entire argument is advanced on the provision contained in Chapter III and IV of the Act and therefore it is necessary to quote the relevant Sections for better understanding and determination of the issue indicated above:- “S.14. 4. The entire argument is advanced on the provision contained in Chapter III and IV of the Act and therefore it is necessary to quote the relevant Sections for better understanding and determination of the issue indicated above:- “S.14. Offices of the Corporation - (1) Save as otherwise provided in the Act, the Corporation shall have the following officers, namely:- (a) the Municipal Commissioner, (b) such number of Joint Municipal Commissioners as the Mayor-in-Council may, from time to time, determine, (c) the Controller of Municipal Finances and Accounts, (d) the Chief Municipal Auditor, (e) the Municipal Engineer-in-Chief, (f) such number of Deputy Municipal Commissioners and Chief Municipal Engineers as the Mayor-in-Council may, from time to time, determine, (g) the Chief Municipal Architect and Town Planner, (h) the Chief Municipal Health Officer, (i) the Chief Municipal Law Officer, and (j) the Municipal Secretary. (2) The Municipal Commissioner, a Joint Municipal Commissioner, the Controller of Municipal Finances and Accounts and the Chief Municipal Auditor referred to in sub-section (1) shall be appointed:- (a) by the State Government in consultation with the Mayor-in-Council, by notification, from amongst persons who are or have been in the service of Government, or (b) if so directed by the State Government, by the Mayor-in-Council in consultation with the State Public Service Commission, or (c) by the Mayor-in-Council, with the prior approval of the State Government, from amongst officers who are or have been in the service of the Corporation: Provided that the appointment of officers under clause (a) shall be on such terms and conditions and for such period, not exceeding five years in the first instance, as the State Government may determine: Provided further that the State Government may, in consultation with the Mayor-in-Council, extend the period of appointment from time to time, so, however, that the total period of extension shall not exceed five years. (3) The other officers referred to in clauses (e) to (j) of sub-section (1) shall be appointed:- (a) by the Mayor-in-Council in consultation with the State Public Service Commission, or (b) by the State Government in consultation with the Mayor-in-Council, by notification, from amongst persons who are or have been in the service of Government, if the Mayor-in-Council so decides: Provided that no Government employee above 60 years of age shall be appointed. (4) The method of, and the qualifications required for, recruitment, and the terms and conditions of service including conduct, discipline and control, of officers appointed by the Mayor-in-Council shall be such as may be prescribed. (5) Notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions of this section, the State Government may, at any time in the case of any person appointed under clause (a) of sub-section (2) as the Municipal Commissioner or as a Joint Municipal Commissioner or as the Controller of Municipal Finances and Accounts or as the Chief Municipal Auditor or appointment under clause (b) of sub-section (3), terminate his appointment as such: Provided that if, in the case of any such officer, the Mayor-in-Council so decides, the State Government shall terminate the appointment of such officer. (6) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (2) or sub-section (3), prior approval of the State Government shall be necessary in the case of appointment of a person not recommended by the State Public Service Commission. S.15. Salary and other conditions of service of Municipal Commissioner and other officers. - (1) The officers appointed under clause (a) of sub-section (2), or clause (b) of sub-section (3), of section 14 shall be paid out of the Municipal Fund such salary and allowances as may, from time to time, be determined by the State Government. (2) Leave may be granted by the State Government to the officers appointed under clause (a) of subsection (2), or clause (b) of sub-section (3), of section 14 on the recommendation of the Mayor and where such leave is granted to any such officer, the State Government shall appoint another person to officiate in his place. (3) If any of the officers referred to in sub-section (1) is in the service of Government, the Corporation shall make such contribution towards his leave allowances, pension and provident fund as may be required by or under the conditions of his service under Government or the terms and conditions of his service under the Corporation, as the case may be, to be paid by or for him. (4) If any of the officers referred to in sub-section (1) of section 14 is not an officer in the service of Government, his leave allowances, superannuation or retirement gratuity or pension and the proportions of his pensionary or provident fund contribution payable respectively from his salary and from the Municipal Fund shall be governed by rules: Provided that:- (a) the amount of leave and leave allowances, gratuity or pension shall in no case, except with the special sanction of the State Government, exceed the amount admissible to Government servants of equivalent rank; and (b) the conditions of grant of such leave and the conditions of superannuation or retirement shall in no case, except with the special sanction of the State Government, be more favourable than those for the time being applicable to such Government servants. S.16. Filling of casual vacancies in the posts of officers appointed by the State Government. - If any vacancy occurs in the office of any of the officers referred to in clause (a) of sub-section (2), or clause (b) of sub-section (3), of section 14 by reason of death, resignation, removal or otherwise, the State Government may in consultation with the Mayor-in-Council, appoint another person to officiate in his place for a period not exceeding six months. S.17. Establishment of the Corporation and schedule of posts. - (1) The posts of officers and employees of the Corporation, other than those referred to in sub-section (1) of section 14, shall constitute the establishment of the Corporation. (2) The Corporation shall, by regulation, classify the posts of officers and employees constituting the establishment of the Corporation into four categories, namely, category A post, category B post, category C post and category D post, on the basis of the scales of pay of such posts. (3) The Corporation shall maintain a schedule of posts which shall include the designation and the number of posts under each designation of officers and employees constituting the establishment of the Corporation and the schedule shall be in three parts of which Part I shall include category A posts, Part II shall include category B posts and Part III shall include category C posts and category D posts. (4) Every year the Municipal Commissioner shall place before the Mayor-in-Council for its consideration the schedule of posts along with the proposals, if any, for such changes therein as he may consider necessary: Provided that no upward revision of the size of the establishment of the Corporation shall be made without the prior sanction of the State Government. (5) The Mayor-in-Council shall, after consideration of the schedule of posts along with the proposals, if any, for changes therein, place the same along with its recommendations, if any, before the Corporation for approval before the presentation of the budget estimate to the Corporation by the Mayor. (6) The Municipal Commissioner shall revise the schedule of posts as approved by the Corporation. (7) The Mayor-in-Council may sanction any category C post or category D post for a period not exceeding six months. S.18. Appointing authorities. - Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the appointing authority in respect of the posts of officers and employees constituting the establishment of the Corporation shall be,- (a) in the case of category A posts, the Municipal Commissioner, (b) in the case of category B posts, a Joint Municipal Commissioner, (c) in the case of category C posts and category D posts, such officer or officers of the Corporation as the Municipal Commissioner may, with the prior approval of the Mayor-in-Council, designate in this behalf. S.19. Appointment to category A posts, category B posts, category C posts and category D posts. - (1) Appointment to a category A post or a category B post shall be made on the recommendation of the Municipal Service Commission. (2) Appointment to a category C post or a category D post shall be made in such manner as may be determined by regulation. (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), prior approval of the State Government shall be necessary in the case of appointment of a person not recommended by the Municipal Service Commission. S.20. Service Regulations. - The method of, and the qualifications required for, recruitment to category A posts, category B posts, category C posts and category D posts and the terms and conditions of service of persons appointed thereto including pension, gratuity and provident fund shall be determined by regulations. S.23. Age of superannuation of officers and employees of the Corporation. S.20. Service Regulations. - The method of, and the qualifications required for, recruitment to category A posts, category B posts, category C posts and category D posts and the terms and conditions of service of persons appointed thereto including pension, gratuity and provident fund shall be determined by regulations. S.23. Age of superannuation of officers and employees of the Corporation. - Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter or elsewhere in this Act or in any rules or regulations made thereunder, the age of superannuation of officers and employees of the Corporation shall be determined by the State Government and no such officer or employee shall, after retirement, be reemployed in any post without the prior sanction of the State Government. S.24. Dispensation of consultation with State Public Service Commission or Municipal Service Commission. - Notwithstanding anything contained in this Chapter, it shall not be necessary to consult the State Public Service Commission or the Municipal Service Commission, as the case may be, in the case of appointment of a person as an officer or employee of the Corporation:- (a) if the person to be appointed is or has been in the service of Government, or (b) if the post to be filled up is for a term of six months, or (c) if the period for which the appointment is made does not exceed six months. S.25. Dismissal of officers and employees of the Corporation under certain circumstances. - (1) If any officer or employee of the Corporation is habitually in debt or acquires directly or indirectly by himself or by any officer or employee of the Corporation any share or interest in any contract with or on behalf of the Corporation, such officer or employee shall be dismissed by his appointing authority: Provided that for the purpose of this sub-section, any debt owed by an officer or employee of the Corporation to a co-operative society or a body corporate constituted or established by or under any enactment in force for the time being shall not be taken into consideration: Provided further that nothing in this sub-section shall apply to the acquisition by an officer or employee of the Corporation of any share or interest in any company, incorporated under any enactment in force for the time being, which contracts with or is employed by the Corporation. (2) If any officer or employee of the Corporation is, after the commencement of this Act, convicted of an offence against the State or of an offence involving moral turpitude and is sentenced either to rigorous imprisonment for any term or to simple imprisonment for a term of not less than six months, he shall be deemed tio have been dismissed from the service of the Corporation with effect from the date of such conviction. (3) If the conviction resulting in the dismissal of an officer or employee of the Corporation under sub-section (2) is set aside by a competent court, such officer or employee shall be deemed to have been suspended from the service of the Corporation from the date of conviction till the date on which the conviction is set aside. (4) The State Government may, of its own motion or on receipt from an officer or employee of the Corporation deemed to have been dismissed under sub-section (2), an application accompanied by a certified copy of the judgment relating to the conviction resulting in such dismissal, by order in writing, exempt such officer or employee from the operation of sub-section (2) and thereupon such officer or employee shall be deemed to have been suspended from the service of the Corporation from the date of conviction until his release on the expiry of the term of imprisonment. (5) An application under sub-section (4) may be made to the State Government within two months from the date of conviction. Such application shall be disposed of by the State Government within three months of its receipt. Explanation. - The expression “offence against the State” shall mean an offence included in Chapter VI or Chapter VII of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). S.26. Constitution of Municipal Service Commission. - (1) The Corporation shall, as soon as may be after the commencement of this Act, constitute a Municipal Service Commission consisting of- (a) a Chairman, and (b) three other members. (2) The Chairman and one of the other members shall be nominated by the Corporation on the recommendation of the Mayor-in-Council, the two members, one of whom shall be an officer of the Department of Scheduled Castes and Tribes Welfare of the State Government, shall be nominated by the State Government. (2) The Chairman and one of the other members shall be nominated by the Corporation on the recommendation of the Mayor-in-Council, the two members, one of whom shall be an officer of the Department of Scheduled Castes and Tribes Welfare of the State Government, shall be nominated by the State Government. (3) The Chairman and other members shall hold office for a term of (four years or till attaining the age of sixty-two years, whichever is earlier). (4) A person who holds office as Chairman or other member of the Municipal Service Commission shall, on the expiration of his term of office, be ineligible for appointment to any post under the Corporation. (5) The qualifications for appointment as Chairman or other member of the Municipal Service Commission shall be such as may be provided by regulations. (5A) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained elsewhere in this Act or in any other law for the time being in force, the Municipal Service Commission constituted under sub-section (1) shall also select such personnel for the Howrah Municipal Corporation constituted under the Howrah Municipal Corporation Act, 1980 (West Ben. Act LVIII of 1980), or (the Municipal Corporations constituted under the West Bengal Municipal Corporation Act, 2006 (West Ben. Act XXXIX of 2006), or any Municipality or Notified Area Authority or Industrial Township Authority constituted under the West Bengal Municipal Act, 1993 (West Ben. Act XXII of 1993) as the State Government may, by notification, determine from time to time. (5B) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section the Municipal Service Commission shall also select such personnel for such posts in the organizations or agencies or authorities under the Control of Department of Municipal Affairs and Department of Urban Development, Government of West Bengal as the State Government may, by notification, determine from to time.) (6) The Corporation shall by regulations provide for:- (a) the salaries, allowances, if any, and conditions of service of the Chairman and other members of the Municipal Service Commission; (b) the manner in which the Municipal Service Commission shall perform the duties imposed upon it by or under this Act; (c) the number of officers and other employees of the Municipal Service Commission and their salaries and allowances; and (d) the terms and conditions of service including discipline, control and conduct of officers and other employees of the Municipal Service Commission. S.28. General powers of the Corporation. S.28. General powers of the Corporation. - Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules and the regulations made thereunder, the municipal Government of (Kolkata) shall vest in the Corporation. S.33. Executive power of the Corporation to be exercised by Mayor-in-Council. - (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act and the rules and the regulations made thereunder, the executive power of the Corporation shall be exercised by the Mayor-in-Council. (2) All executive actions of the Mayor-in-Council shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Corporation. S.39. Powers and functions of the Municipal Commissioner. - (1) The Municipal Commissioner shall be the principal executive officer of the Corporation and shall, subject to the supervision and control of the Mayor,- (a) exercise the powers and perform the functions specifically conferred or imposed upon him by or under this Act or by any other law in force for the time being; (b) assign the duties, and supervise and control the acts and proceedings, of all officers and employees of the Corporation. (2) All officers and employees of the Corporation shall be subordinate to the Municipal Commissioner. S.45. Contracts. - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Corporation may enter into and execute all such contracts as it may consider necessary or expedient under, or for any of the purposes of, this Act. (2) All officers and employees of the Corporation shall be subordinate to the Municipal Commissioner. S.45. Contracts. - (1) Subject to the other provisions of this Act, the Corporation may enter into and execute all such contracts as it may consider necessary or expedient under, or for any of the purposes of, this Act. (2) With respect to any contract under sub-section (1), the following provisions shall have effect:- (a) every contract shall be executed on behalf of the Corporation by the Municipal Commissioner or such other officer of the Corporation as the Mayor-in-Council may direct or authorise from time to time; (b) no such contract which under the provisions of this Act cannot be entered into without the approval or sanction of any authority or officer under this Act shall be entered into by any officer referred to in clause (a) until and unless such approval or sanction has been duly obtained; (c) no contract involving an expenditure exceeding ten thousand rupees or such higher amount as the Mayor-in-Council may fix shall be entered into by any officer referred to in clause (a) unless the same has been previously approved by the Mayor-in-Council; (d) every contract involving an expenditure exceeding two thousand rupees but not exceeding ten thousand rupees or such higher amount as may be fixed under clause (c) entered into by an officer referred to in clause (a) shall be reported by such officer to the Mayor-in-Council within one month of such contract. S.46. Manner of execution of contracts. - (1) The manner of execution of contracts under this Act shall be determined by regulations. (2) No contract which is not entered into in accordance with the provisions of this Act or any regulation made thereunder shall be binding on the Corporation. S.48. Delegation of powers and functions. - (1) The Corporation may by resolution delegate, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the resolution, any of its powers or functions to the Mayor-in-Council. (2) The Mayor-in-Council may by order delegate, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, any of its powers or functions to the Mayor or to the Municipal Commissioner. - (1) The Corporation may by resolution delegate, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the resolution, any of its powers or functions to the Mayor-in-Council. (2) The Mayor-in-Council may by order delegate, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, any of its powers or functions to the Mayor or to the Municipal Commissioner. (3) Subject to such standing orders as may be made by the Mayor-in-Council in this behalf:- (a) the Mayor may by order delegate, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, any of his powers or functions to the Deputy Mayor or the Municipal Commissioner; (b) the Municipal Commissioner may by order delegate, subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, any of his powers or functions including the powers or functions under section 397, sub-section (1) of section 400 and sub-section (1) of section 411 to any other officer or any employee of the Corporation; (4) Notwithstanding anything contained in this section, the Mayor-in-Council, the Mayor, the Municipal Commissioner, or the other officer referred to in clause (c) of sub-section (3), shall not delegate:- (a) any of its or his powers or functions delegated to it or him under this section, or (b) such of its or his powers or functions as may be prescribed. S.49. Doubts as to powers or functions of municipal authorities. - If any doubt arises as to whether any particular power or function appertains to any municipal authority or the Municipal Commissioner, the Mayor shall refer the matter to the State Government and the decision thereon of the State Government shall be final.” 5. It can be deciphered from the aforesaid provisions that apart from the Mayor-in-Council and the different committees provided in Chapter II of the Act, the organisation of the Corporation shall also consist of the officers and the employees to assist for smooth functioning of the Corporation. Section 14(1) clearly expresses the persons designated therein to be officers and sub-Section (2) and sub-Section (3) thereof relates to their Appointing Authorities. Section 14(1) clearly expresses the persons designated therein to be officers and sub-Section (2) and sub-Section (3) thereof relates to their Appointing Authorities. It is, therefore, clear that the Municipal Commissioner, Joint Municipal Commissioner, the Controller of Municipal Finances and Accounts and the Chief Municipal Auditor shall be appointed by the State Government in consultation with the Mayor-in-Council from the persons who are/or have been in the service of the Government or by the Mayor-in-Council in consultation with the State Public Service Commission if so directed by the State Government or by the Mayor-in-Council with the prior approval of the State Government provided they are and have been in service of the Corporation as officers. 6. The officers referred to sub-Section (1) of Section 14 shall be appointed by the Mayor-in-Council in consultation with the State Public Service Commission or by the State Government in consultation with the Mayor-in-Council from the officers who have been or are in service of the Government. In the later case no Government employee over the age of 60 years shall be appointed. Sub-Section (6) of Section 14 contains a Non-Obstante Clause in so far as sub-Section (2) and sub-Section (3) of that Section is concerned and can be appointed by the Mayor-in-Council without any recommendation from the State Public Service Commission subject to the prior approval of the State Government. 7. Admittedly the post of the Special Officer (Building) is not included in the category of the officers incorporated in Section 14(1) of the said Act and therefore such appointment does not require the adherence of the aforesaid provisions. 8. Section 17, which gains importance in the present context envisaged the post of the officers and employees of the Corporation other than those referred in sub-Section (1) of Section 14 to constitute the establishment of the Corporation. Sub-Section (2) of Section 17 makes the position more clear as it vested the powers in the Corporation to classify the post of officers and employees constituting the establishment of Corporation in four categories namely, Category A, Category B, Category C and Category D posts on the basis of the scales of pay of such posts provided the Regulation in this regard is framed. The Corporation is further required to maintain the Schedule of posts in three parts of which the Part 1 shall include Category A post, Part 2 to include Category B post and Part 3 should be confined to Category C and Category D posts. Every changes in the Schedule of posts shall be placed before the Mayor-in-Council by the Municipal Commissioner every year along with the proposals but no upward revision of the size of the establishment of the Corporation shall be made without the prior sanction of the State Government. Sub-Section (7) of Section 17 implies the Mayor-in-Council to sanction any post pertaining to Category C and Category D provided the period does not exceed six months. Section 18 of the Act defines the Appointing Authorities for such posts wherein the Municipal Commissioner is an Appointing Authority for Category A post, Joint Municipal Commissioner for Category B Post and any officer designated by the Municipal Commissioner with prior approval of the Mayor-in-Council in case of Category C and Category D post. 9. So far as the appointments of Category A and Category B posts are concerned, these shall be made on the recommendation of the Municipal Service Commission and in case of appointment of Category C and Category D post it shall be made in such manner as may be prescribed by Regulations. Sub-Section (3) of Section 19 makes it imperative that a prior approval of the State Government shall be necessary in case of appointments of officers or employees in Category A and B posts not recommended by the Municipal Service Commission. The manner and the requisite clarification required for recruitment of the persons in the aforesaid categories and their terms and conditions of service shall be determined by Regulation in terms of Section 20 thereof. 10. The power of delegation is provided under Section 48 of the Act upon the Corporation to the Mayor-in-Council with corresponding powers to delegate upon the Municipal Commissioner. Clause (b) of sub-Section (3) of Section 48 of the Act expresses the power of delegation to be exercised by the Municipal Commissioner to discharge the powers and functions mentioned therein to any other officer or any employee of the Corporation. Clause (b) of sub-Section (3) of Section 48 of the Act expresses the power of delegation to be exercised by the Municipal Commissioner to discharge the powers and functions mentioned therein to any other officer or any employee of the Corporation. Indubitably, the Special Officer (Building) is discharging the functions and duties of the Municipal Commissioner so conferred, as delegatee under sub-Section (1) of Section 400 of the Act on the basis of an order of the Municipal Commissioner. 11. The point, therefore, boils down is to whether the Special Officer (Building) is an officer or an employee of the Corporation. To put it in any other words, can the Municipal Commissioner delegate its power to a person who is neither an officer nor an employee of the Corporation? 12. Mr. G.C. Ghosh, the learned Advocate for the Petitioner submits that the Special Officer (Building) is neither an officer under Section 14 of the Act nor an officer under Section 17 thereof. He vehemently submits that delegation of power exercised by the Municipal Commissioner is restricted to officers and employees of the Corporation and therefore the Special Officer (Building), who is neither an officer nor an employee cannot discharge the duties and functions of the Municipal Commissioner as delegatee. To put it differently, Mr. Ghosh submits that if the order of demolition, passed in assumption of such power which is invalid, all actions including the orders by the Special Officer (Building) is per-se illegal, void and unsustainable. According to Mr. Ghosh, there is no Regulations framed by the Corporation or the State Government and therefore the Special Officer (Building) cannot be brought either in the ‘A’ Category post or a ‘B’ Category post. Lastly, he submits that if the order of the Municipal Commissioner delegating his powers conferred under Section 400(1) of the Act is illegal, void and contains incurable defects, the order passed by the Special Officer (Building), who assumed jurisdiction on the basis of the said order are an order passed by an authority lacking inherent jurisdiction and therefore is a nullity. 13. Mr. Biswajit Mukherjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the Corporation in A.S.T 193 of 2015 submits that the Special Officer (Building) is an officer of the Corporation recognised under Section 17 of the Act and therefore there is no infirmity and/or illegality in delegating the power by the Municipal Commissioner to him. 13. Mr. Biswajit Mukherjee, the learned Advocate appearing for the Corporation in A.S.T 193 of 2015 submits that the Special Officer (Building) is an officer of the Corporation recognised under Section 17 of the Act and therefore there is no infirmity and/or illegality in delegating the power by the Municipal Commissioner to him. He further submits that the CMC Service Regulation not only permits the temporary appointment but also the officiating appointments in or against the permanent posts and such appointment can be terminated after serving notice within the specific period. He strenuously submits that the appointment as a Special Officer (Building) is temporary in nature, for a limited period under the said Service Regulation and therefore the order of the Municipal Commissioner delegating his duties and functions under Section 400(1) of the Act cannot be impinged as illegal and/or void. According to him, apart from the above, Section 45 of the Act confers power on the Corporation to enter into and execute contracts necessary and expedient for any purpose of the Act. By placing an Office Order No. DMC(P)/G/V/98/2013-14 Dated 05/09/13 Mr. Mukherjee would submit that the engagement as a Special Officer (Building) is limited for six months at consolidated remuneration of Rs. 40,000/- per month which clearly envisages that those are contractual appointments under the aforesaid Section. He audaciously submits that there is no fetter in the said Act to engage and appoint an officer or an employee by the Corporation on contractual basis. To further the argument, Mr. Mukherjee submits that the source to appoint the Special Officer for a limited period of six months can be traced from Section 24 of the Act. He, thus concludes by saying that the Special Officer (Building) is an officer appointed by invoking the aforesaid provisions and therefore the delegation by the Municipal Commissioner under Section 48 is valid, legal and cannot be struck down. 14. Mr. Alok Ghosh, appearing for the Corporation in the other Revisional Applications adopts and reiterates the submission of Mr. Mukherjee. Additionally, it is submitted that Section 24 of the Act has a unique feature inasmuch as the opening sentence contains a Non-Obstante Clause which over rides the other provisions of the said chapter or the Act. 14. Mr. Alok Ghosh, appearing for the Corporation in the other Revisional Applications adopts and reiterates the submission of Mr. Mukherjee. Additionally, it is submitted that Section 24 of the Act has a unique feature inasmuch as the opening sentence contains a Non-Obstante Clause which over rides the other provisions of the said chapter or the Act. According to him, if an appointment is made for a term of six months, the usual formalities is not required to be adhere to and therefore such appointment cannot be said to be bad and illegal. He strenuously submits that the order of the Special Officer (Building) cannot be interfered with simply on the ground that subsequently such power has been found to be illegal and/or taken away by a subsequent legislation or an order of the Court and placed reliance upon the judgments of (1981) 3 SCC 132 Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1984 (Supp) SCC 196 Union of India & Anr. v. G.M. Kokil & Ors., (2012) 7 SCC 683 Union of India & Ors. v. S. Srinivasan. Mr. Ghosh further submits that there is no necessity to consult the State Service Commission or the Municipal Service Commission for an appointment of an officer or an employee for a term of six months and therefore the appointment of the Special Officer (Building) which is primarily for six months is within the powers of the authority conferred under the said Act. He, therefore, concludes with the submission that there is no illegality in passing an order under Section 400(1) of the Act by the Special Officer (Building) as delegatee of the Municipal Commissioner. 15. It is an admitted position that the Municipal Commissioner is empowered to delegate any of its powers and functions including the powers and functions conferred under sub-Section (1) of Section 400 to any other officer or any employee of the Corporation and such delegation of power can only be made by an order of the Municipal Commissioner envisaged under Section 48 of the Act. It is apparent from the language employed under Clause (b) of sub-Section (3) of Section 48 of the Act that the Municipal Commissioner may by order delegate any of its powers and functions embodied therein to any other officer or any employee of the Corporation. It is apparent from the language employed under Clause (b) of sub-Section (3) of Section 48 of the Act that the Municipal Commissioner may by order delegate any of its powers and functions embodied therein to any other officer or any employee of the Corporation. The Special Officer (Building) is not included within the category of the officers depicted in sub-Section (1) of the Section 14 of the Act. The meticulous examination of the specifications included in Section 14 of the Act manifest the appointment of such officers by the State Government in consultation with Mayor-in-Council or with the State Public Service Commission or by the Mayor-in-Council with prior approval of the State Government. 16. It is further clear that the Municipal Commissioner, Joint Municipal Commissioner, the Controller of Municipal Finances and Accounts and the Chief Municipal Auditor can only be appointed by the State Government in consultation with the Mayor-in-Council by notification amongst the persons who are or have been in the service of the Government or by a Mayor-in-Council if directed by the State Government in consultation with the State Public Service Commission or with the prior approval of the State Government and in case of other officers named in sub-Section (1) of Section 14 of the Act, those shall be appointed by the Mayor-in-Council in consultation with the State Public Service Commission or by the State Government in consultation with Mayor-in-Council by notification. There is a ceiling of the maximum age i.e. 60 years for appointment in such category of the officers i.e. the officer included in Clause (e) to (j) of sub-Section (1) of Section 14. 17. The other category of the officers and employees can be traced from Section 17 of the Act which is evident from sub-Section 1 thereof. Those categories of the officers and employees constituting the establishment of the Corporation are to be classified in Four Categories on the basis of the scales of pay of such posts and such classification can only be made by Regulations. It is, therefore, manifest that the officers other than defined in sub-Section 1 of Section 14 are to be classified by Regulation and not otherwise. 18. Though Mr. Mukherjee relies upon the Municipal Service Regulations but could not appraise the Court whether such Regulations has been duly notified and/or implemented. It is, therefore, manifest that the officers other than defined in sub-Section 1 of Section 14 are to be classified by Regulation and not otherwise. 18. Though Mr. Mukherjee relies upon the Municipal Service Regulations but could not appraise the Court whether such Regulations has been duly notified and/or implemented. The power to make Regulation is evident from the provisions of Section 602 of the Act which says- “S.602. Power to make regulations. - The Corporation may make regulations, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or the rules made thereunder for discharging its functions under this Act.” 19. Such Regulation making power is brindled and subject to the conditions indicated in Section 602 of the Act. Section 604 of the Act mandatorily requires approval of the State Government otherwise such Regulation cannot be treated as valid. Neither Mr. Mukherjee nor Mr. Ghosh could conquer that the Draft Regulation was ever published in the Official Gazette or have received the approval of the State Government. It is, thus, mere sheets of paper having no legal sanction and therefore does not partake the statutory flavour. Though there is no Regulations which is a requirement of Section 17, the fact remains that the Corporation is appointing various persons as officers or employees constituting the establishment of the Corporation by drawing an artificial line amongst the four categories of the posts. It is surprising that since the promulgation of the Act which came into force on and from 28th December, 1981 there is no Regulations framed for regulating the post of the officers and employees referred in Section 17(1) of the Act. It is, however, argued by the Corporation that the Special Officer (Building) is put in Category A post and his appointment is limited to six months. Section 18 makes the Municipal Commissioner an Appointing Authority in case of Category A post which is subject to the other provisions of the Act. 20. The much stress is laid on the provisions contained under Section 24 of the Act which starts with a Non-Obstante Clause and exempt the consultation with the State Public Service Commission or Municipal Service Commission for appointment of a person as an officer or employee of the Corporation if the appointment is for a term of six months. 20. The much stress is laid on the provisions contained under Section 24 of the Act which starts with a Non-Obstante Clause and exempt the consultation with the State Public Service Commission or Municipal Service Commission for appointment of a person as an officer or employee of the Corporation if the appointment is for a term of six months. It is somewhat settled that any statutory provision starting with “notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or in this Chapter or in any law for the time being in force” is intended to give the enacting part of the Section in case of conflict, an over-riding effect over the provisions mentioned therein. It is, therefore used as legislative device to modify the ambit of the different sections contained in the chapter and to have its over-riding effect in a specified circumstances. Ordinarily, there is a close proximity between a Non-Obstante Clause and the enacting part of the Section. The Non-Obstante Clause has to be read in the context it is used and in the event the language is clear and unambiguous and does not led to uncertainty, it is to be so construed and be given a full effect to. 21. There is a fallacy in the argument of Mr. Ghosh in relying upon Section 24 of the Act containing Non-Obstante Clause. The combined reading of Section 18, 19 and 24 of the Act makes abundantly clear that the Municipal Commissioner is an Appointing Authority in case of Category A post and such appointment shall be made on recommendation of the Municipal Service Commission. Section 24 which contains a Non-Obstante Clause as the expression goes “notwithstanding anything contained in this chapter”, it shall not be necessary to consult the State Public Service Commission or the Municipal Service Commission for an appointment to the post for a term of six months. It, therefore, over-rides the provisions contained in that chapter where the said Section 24 appears in case of the requirement of consultation with the State Public Service Commission or the Municipal Service Commission. It is, thus, explicit that the Municipal Commissioner may not seek recommendation from the Municipal Service Commission in case of an appointment of an officer coming under Category A post if the appointment is for a term of six months. There was no difficulty and/or ambiguity in this regard until sub-Section (3) of Section 19 is noticed. It is, thus, explicit that the Municipal Commissioner may not seek recommendation from the Municipal Service Commission in case of an appointment of an officer coming under Category A post if the appointment is for a term of six months. There was no difficulty and/or ambiguity in this regard until sub-Section (3) of Section 19 is noticed. The said sub-Section also begins with the Non-Obstante Clause and provides the dispensation of the recommendation from the Municipal Service Commission but makes it imperative to have the prior approval of the State Government. If both the provisions containing the Non-Obstante Clause are jointly read and harmoniously interpreted there is no inconsistency and/or contradiction between the said provisions. Though it is a requirement of law that the Municipal Commissioner shall appoint an officer in an “A” category post on the recommendation of the Municipal Service Commission but in case of an appointment for a period of six months the consultation and/or recommendation from the Municipal Service Commission is not necessary but it does not absolve the Municipal Commissioner from further statutory liability to seek the prior sanction from the State Government for such appointment. 22. This Court, therefore, does not agree and concur with the submission of Mr. Ghosh that the Municipal Commissioner enjoins unfettered right to appoint a person in “A” Category post for a period of six months. The Office Order produced before the Court in course of an argument does not reveal that the prior sanction of the State Government was taken as the person to be appointed as a Special Officer (Building) has not been recommended by the Municipal Service Commission. The aforesaid argument sans substratum and therefore is unacceptable. 23. According to Section 48 of the Act it appears that the Municipal Commissioner can delegate any of his powers and functions including the powers and functions conferred under sub-Section 1 of Section 400 but such delegation can only be made to any other officer or employee of the Corporation. The officer must be a validly appointed officer and be included in the establishment of the Corporation before the Municipal Commissioner delegates the powers and functions. Since the post of the Special Officer is not recognised either in the Act or in the Regulation the person appointed on such post cannot be brought within the ambit of the officer or an employee of the Corporation. Since the post of the Special Officer is not recognised either in the Act or in the Regulation the person appointed on such post cannot be brought within the ambit of the officer or an employee of the Corporation. This Court, therefore, holds that the order of Municipal Commissioner to delegate his powers and functions under sub-Section 1 of Section 400 of the Code is bad, illegal and contrary to the provisions contained under Section 48 of the Act. 24. It leads to another limb of argument advanced by Mr. Ghosh on the De-Facto Doctrine that even the appointment of the Special Officer (Building) is not found to be legal, the aforesaid doctrine being a doctrine of necessity and based on public policy his decisions or judgments cannot be impugned and be declared void. The strong reliance is placed on a judgment of the Supreme Court in case of Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of Andhra Pradesh reported in 1981 (3) SCC 132 where Chinappa Reddy, J. speaking for the majority recognised the applicability of the De-Facto Doctrine and gave judicial recognition in the Indian legal system. The point arose in the said report was the effect of the declaration made by the Supreme Court with regard to the appointment of the Additional Sessions Judge to be invalid and the judgment pronounced by the said Judge prior to the said declaration. It was urged by the appellant therein that the appointment of the Additional Sessions Judge was quashed by the Supreme Court and therefore the judgment pronounced by him are to be treated as void as he was never appointed as a District Judge. The observations made in case of Pulin Behari Das v. King Emperor reported in 16 CWN 1105 was quoted with approval to the effect that the Act of the officer de-facto performed by them within the scope of their assumed official authority, in the interest of public or third person and not for their own benefit, are generally as valid as if they were the act of the officer de jure. The ratio laid down in the said report is that if a person is appointed to a post without following the procedures laid down therefore and if he discharges the functions and the powers without being a party thereto, his judgments and orders cannot be declared invalid. The ratio laid down in the said report is that if a person is appointed to a post without following the procedures laid down therefore and if he discharges the functions and the powers without being a party thereto, his judgments and orders cannot be declared invalid. It would be apt to reproduce the observations recorded in Paragraph 19 thereof wherein the law on the said subject is summarised: “19. In our view, the de facto doctrine furnishes an answer to the submissions of Shri Phadke based on Section 9 of the Criminal Procedure Code and Article 21 of the Constitution. The judges who rejected the appeal in one case and convicted the accused in the other case were not mere usurpers or intruders but were persons who discharged the functions and duties of judges under colour of lawful authority. We are concerned with the office that the Judges purported to hold. We are not concerned with the particular incumbents of the office. So long as the office was validly created, it matters not that the incumbent was not validly appointed. A person appointed as a Sessions Judge, Additional Sessions Judge or Assistant Sessions Judge, would be exercising jurisdiction in the Court of Session and his judgments and orders would be those of the Court of Session. They would continue to be valid as the judgments and orders of the Court of Session, notwithstanding that his appointment to such Court might be declared invalid. On that account alone, it can never be said that the procedure prescribed by law has not been followed. It would be a different matter if the constitution of the court itself is under challenge. We are not concerned with such a situation in the instant cases. We, therefore, find no force in any of the submissions of the learned Counsel.” 25. The judgment rendered in case of Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra) is further noticed and applied in a later decision rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Union of India & Ors. v. S. Srinivasan reported in (2012) 7 SCC 683 in the following- “51. We, therefore, find no force in any of the submissions of the learned Counsel.” 25. The judgment rendered in case of Gokaraju Rangaraju (supra) is further noticed and applied in a later decision rendered by the Supreme Court in case of Union of India & Ors. v. S. Srinivasan reported in (2012) 7 SCC 683 in the following- “51. In this regard we may refer with profit the decisions in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P. and M.M. Gupta v. State of J&K wherein this Court, while quashing the appointments of the respondents, had clarified that the orders and judgments delivered by them during the period they had continued to function as District Judges on the basis of invalid appointments could not be rendered as legally invalid and void. In the larger interest of justice, they are treated as valid and binding. Relying on the said dictum, we clarify the position accordingly.” 26. The De-Facto Doctrine has its applicability where there exists an office but the person who is appointed to hold such office is not legally appointed and the actions/decisions and the orders passed by him before the declaration of his appointment as void is saved under such doctrine. The De-Facto Doctrine is introduced in the legal parlance as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and the individual where those interests were involved in the official acts of a person exercising the duties of an office without being unlawful officer as held in Pulin Behari Das v. King Emperor reported in 16 CWN 1105. 27. I am afraid whether such doctrine can be extended even to a case where the post is non-existent and have been created without an authority of law and the person appointed on such post discharges the functions and duties in such capacity. The aforesaid observations get strengthen from the observation of the Apex Court in case of Pushpadevi M. Jatia v. M.L. Wadhawan reported in 1987 (3) SCC 367 wherein it is held:- “21. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for another reason. Where an office exists under the law, it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as validity of his acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with the insignia of the office, and exercises its powers and functions. We are unable to accept the submission of the learned counsel for another reason. Where an office exists under the law, it matters not how the appointment of the incumbent is made, so far as validity of his acts are concerned. It is enough that he is clothed with the insignia of the office, and exercises its powers and functions. The official acts of such persons are recognised as valid under the de facto doctrine, born of necessity and public policy to prevent needless confusion and endless mischief. In Gokaraju Rangaraju case, Chinnappa Reddy, J. explained that this doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public. He quoted the following passage from the judgment of Sir Ashutosh Mukherjee, J. in Pulin Behari Das v. King Emperor at p. 574: The substance of the matter is that the de facto doctrine was introduced into the law as a matter of policy and necessity, to protect the interest of the public and the individual where those interests were involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duties of an office without being lawful officers. The doctrine in fact is necessary to maintain the supremacy of the law and the preserve peace and order in the community at large. The learned Judge also relied upon the following passage from the judgment of P. Govindan Nair, J. in P.S. Menon v. State of Kerala at p. 170: This doctrine was engrafted as a matter of policy and necessity to protect the interest of the public and individuals involved in the official acts of persons exercising the duty of an officer without actually being one in strict point of law. But although these officers are not officers de jure they are by virtue of the particular circumstances, officers, in fact, whose acts, public policy requires should be considered valid.” 28. The reference can further be usefully made to another decision of the Three Judge Bench of the Supreme Court in case of Central Bank of India v. C. Bernard reported in 1991(1) SCC 319 . It is held that the De-Facto Doctrine has two requisites namely:– (i) the position of an office and the performance of the duties attached thereto. (ii) colour of title i.e. apparent right to the office and acquiescence in the position thereof by the public. It is held that the De-Facto Doctrine has two requisites namely:– (i) the position of an office and the performance of the duties attached thereto. (ii) colour of title i.e. apparent right to the office and acquiescence in the position thereof by the public. The exception of the aforesaid doctrine is carved out in the following words:- “5. Taking the last submission first we think that in the facts and circumstances of this case the de facto doctrine can have no application. Under paragraph 19.14 of the bi-partite agreement the Chief Executive Officer was entitled to decide which officer should be empowered to hold an enquiry and take disciplinary action in the case of each office or establishment. Under this paragraph only an officer of the Bank could be empowered to hold an enquiry and take disciplinary action against a delinquent. The names of officers so empowered were required to be published on the Bank’s notice board. Accordingly, Shri U.B. Menon was appointed an Enquiry Officer/Disciplinary Authority under paragraph 19.14 of the bi-partite agreement while he was still in service. It is indeed surprising that an officer who was due to retire within a few days only was chosen to act as an Enquiry Officer and Disciplinary Authority by the order dated January 9, 1979. Shri U.B. Menon was intimated about his appointment by the letter of January 23, 1979, i.e. hardly a week before his superannuation on January 31, 1979. After his retirement from service he proceeded with the enquiry and concluded it by the end of 1979. The respondent was then served with a second show cause notice on the question of punishment and thereafter the impugned order of discharge was passed on January 14, 1980. There is nothing on the record to show that any formal decision was taken by the appellant to continue the services of Shri U.B. Menon as an official of the Bank. Shri Shetye is right when he contends that an Enquiry Officer need not be an officer of the Bank; even a third party can be appointed an Enquiry Officer to enquire into the conduct of an employee. Saran Motors (P) Ltd. v. Vishwanath. But there can be no doubt that a non-official cannot act as a Disciplinary Authority and pass an order of punishment against the delinquent employee. Saran Motors (P) Ltd. v. Vishwanath. But there can be no doubt that a non-official cannot act as a Disciplinary Authority and pass an order of punishment against the delinquent employee. It is for this reason that the learned Single Judge of the High Court observed that on retirement Shri U.B. Menon was nobody in the hierarchy of authorities to impose punishment on the delinquent. He, therefore, held that the order of punishment was clearly incompetent and without jurisdiction. The learned counsel for the appellant submitted that since the initial appointment of Shri U.B. Menon was valid, his actions and decisions could not be invalidated by his subsequent retirement. According to him he continued to function as an Enquiry Officer de facto and hence his actions and decisions were saved. The de facto doctrine has two requisites, namely, (i) the possession of the office and the performance of the duties attached thereto, and (ii) colour of title, that is, apparent right to the office and acquiescence in the possession thereof by the public. According to this doctrine the acts of officers de facto performed within the sphere of their assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third parties and not for their own interest, are generally held valid and binding as if they were performed by de jure officers. This doctrine dates back to the case of Abbe de Fountaine decided way back in 1431 to which reference was made by Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, J. in Pulin Behari Das v. King Emperor. Mookerjee, J. held that as the complaint was made after complying with Section 196, Criminal Procedure Code, by the order of or under authority from local Government which was de facto, the proceedings were valid. On the same principle it was further held that the Court of Sessions, assuming it was not the holder of a de jure office, was actually in possession of it under the colour of title which indicated the acquiescence of the public in its actions and hence its authority could not be collaterally impeached in the proceedings arising from the conviction of Pulin and his co-accused. Again, in Immedisetti Ramkrishnaiah Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh the Government nominated nine persons on a Market Committee which nomination was later set aside by the High Court. Again, in Immedisetti Ramkrishnaiah Sons v. State of Andhra Pradesh the Government nominated nine persons on a Market Committee which nomination was later set aside by the High Court. However, before the High Court pronounced its judgment, the Market Committee had functioned as if it had been properly constituted. Between the date of its constitution and the date of the High Court decision it had taken several decisions, issued notifications, etc. which were the subject matter of challenge on the ground that its constitution was ab initio bad in law. Chinnappa Reddy, J. relying on the observations of Mookerjee, J., in Pulin case 2 concluded that the acts of the Market Committee de facto performed within the scope of its assumed official authority, in the interest of the public or third persons and not for his own benefit are generally as valid and binding as if they were performed by a de jure Committee. The Allahabad High Court in Jai Kumar v. State upheld the judgments of the District Judges whose appointments were later struck down by this Court on the principle that the acts of officers de facto are not to be questioned because of the want of legal authority except by some direct proceeding instituted for the purpose by the State or by someone claiming the office de jure, or except when the person himself attempts to build up some right, or claim some privilege or benefit by reason of being the officer which he claims to be. In all other cases, the acts of an officer de facto are valid and effectual, while he is suffered to retain the office, as though he were an officer by right and the same legal consequences will flow from them for the protection of the public and of the third parties. This Court in Gokaraju Rangaraju v. State of A.P. was required to consider the question of the effect of the declaration of this Court holding the appointment of an Additional Sessions Judge invalid on judgments pronounced by him prior to such declaration. This Court observed that the de facto doctrine is founded on good sense, sound policy and practical experience. It is aimed at the prevention of public and private mischief and the prevention of public and private interest. It avoids endless confusion and needless chaos. This Court observed that the de facto doctrine is founded on good sense, sound policy and practical experience. It is aimed at the prevention of public and private mischief and the prevention of public and private interest. It avoids endless confusion and needless chaos. It, therefore, seems clear to us that the de facto doctrine can be invoked in cases where there is an appointment to office which is defective; but notwithstanding the defect to the title of the office, the decisions made by such a de facto officer clothed with the powers and functions of the office would be as efficacious as those made by a de jure officer. The same would, however, not be true of a total intruder or usurper of office. 6. In our view, the submission of Shri Shetye based on the de facto doctrine is clearly misconceived. Shri U.B. Menon can hardly be described as a person occupying or being in possession of an office to which certain duties affecting the members of the general public can be said to be attached. The de facto doctrine, as explained earlier, envisages that acts performed de facto by officers within the scope of their assumed official authority are to be regarded as binding as if they were performed by officers de jure. While the de facto doctrine saves official acts done by an officer whose appointment is found to be defective the private parties to a litigation are precluded from challenging the appointment in any collateral proceedings. But the doctrine does not come to the rescue of an intruder or usurper or a total stranger to the office. Obviously the doctrine can have no application to the case of a person who is not the holder of an office but is merely a bank employee, for that matter an ex-employee. We, therefore, see no merit in this contention.” 29. Even in case of Gokaraju (supra) the Apex Court in express words excludes the operation of the De-Facto Doctrine to a case where the constitution of the post itself is under challenge. This Court, therefore, does not find that the aforesaid decision can render any help to the Corporation and shall save the actions taken by the Special Officer (Building). 30. This Court, therefore, finds that the order impugned cannot be sustained in the eye of law and is hereby quashed and set aside. This Court, therefore, does not find that the aforesaid decision can render any help to the Corporation and shall save the actions taken by the Special Officer (Building). 30. This Court, therefore, finds that the order impugned cannot be sustained in the eye of law and is hereby quashed and set aside. It is open to the Municipal Commissioner to initiate a proceeding de novo strictly in terms of the provisions of the Act. 31. The Revisional Applications are, thus, allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.