JUDGMENT AND ORDER Manojit Bhuyan, J. By order dated 21.12.2005 this Second Appeal was admitted for hearing on the following substantial questions of law: "Whether the plaintiff's suit is maintainable in the present form in view of the fact that it was instituted for eviction of defendant from the suit land by delivery of khas possession without any prayer for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land?" 2. Title Suit No.3 of 2002 was instituted by the respondent/plaintiff Sri Anil Chandra Sarmah Adhyapak before the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) No.1, Golaghat praying for khas possession of the suit land as described in the schedule to the plaint by evicting the defendants therein i.e. Sri Anil Bawri and others. The suit land comprises of a plot of land measuring 3 Kathas covered by Dag No. 308 of PP No. 29 under Kaziranga Mouza Bokakhat, Sub Division Golaghat. The case set out by the respondent/plaintiff, in brief, was that he had purchased the suit land from one Sri Dayal Kayastha on 17.11.1975 by executing a registered Sale Deed (Exhibit-4). On such purchase the respondent/plaintiff allowed Dayal Kayastha to remain in possession of his house situated on the suit land. Said Dayal Kayastha died in the year 1993 and after his death his widow Maloti Kayastha (Proforma Defendant No.3 in the suit) permitted Anil Bawri and Lakhi Bawri to stay in that house. However, at one point of time said Maloti Kayastha left to reside with her daughter at Mowkhuti. Thereafter, on 31.01.1995 the respondent/plaintiff had asked the appellants/defendants to vacate the suit land and on their refusal to do so had instituted a case under Section 145 of the Criminal Procedure Court, which however, was dismissed. Hence the suit for khas possession evicting the appellants/defendants from the suit land. 3. The appellants/defendants had contested the suit by filing written statement, contending, inter alia, that the respondent/plaintiff had no right, title and interest as well as possession over the suit land. In all, the suit is vague, barred by limitation, not maintainable and undervalued. 4. On the rival pleadings the issues framed in the suit are as follows: "(1) Is there any cause of action in the suit? (2) Whether the suit is barred by Law of limitation? (3) Whether the suit is properly valued? In all, the suit is vague, barred by limitation, not maintainable and undervalued. 4. On the rival pleadings the issues framed in the suit are as follows: "(1) Is there any cause of action in the suit? (2) Whether the suit is barred by Law of limitation? (3) Whether the suit is properly valued? (4) Whether the plaintiff has right, title and interest over the suit land? (5) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for khas possession of the suit land by evicting the defendants? (6) Whether the proforma defendant No.3 permitted the defendant No.1 and 2 to occupy the house standing on the suit land after the death of her husband Dayal Kayastha in 1993? (7) Whether the defendant No.1 and 2 has adverse possession over the suit land? (8) To what relief or reliefs the parties are entitled?" 5. For determining the merits of the suit, as many as, six (6) witnesses were examined from the respondent/plaintiff side and as many as three (3) witnesses from the appellants/defendants side. 6. The learned trial court took note of the arguments advanced by the appellants/defendants to the effect that the respondent/plaintiff never claimed right, title and interest of the suit land as required under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, and was, therefore, not entitled to possession of the suit land. On appreciation of oral and documentary evidence as well as the provisions under the Evidence Act the learned Trial Court held that Exhibit-4 i.e. the Sale Deed by which the respondent/plaintiff derived his title, was not admissible in evidence. The primary issues i.e. issue Nos. 4, 5 & 7 were decided in the negative and as a result, the suit was dismissed on contest without costs vide judgment dated 13.07.2004 and decree dated 19.07.2004. 7. Title Appeal No. 11 of 2004 was preferred by the respondent/plaintiff Sri Anil Chandra Sarmah Adhyapak before the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Golaghat. After noticing the facts and the issues framed by the learned Trial Court, the learned Appellate Court set out the point for determination, being, whether the appellant has right, title and interest over the suit land. After noticing the facts and the issues framed by the learned Trial Court, the learned Appellate Court set out the point for determination, being, whether the appellant has right, title and interest over the suit land. As regards the Issue No.4, the finding and decision of the learned trial court was reversed by holding that the appellant Anil Chandra Sarmah Adhayapak has right, title and interest over the suit land and further that the respondents/defendants have failed to prove that they have acquired right, title and interest over the suit land by way of adverse possession. In so far as Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act is concerned, the learned appellate court had duly noticed the stand of the appellants/defendants, in that, the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief as he failed to pray for a decree for declaration of his right, title and interest over the suit land. Answering to the said stand and on appreciation of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, the learned Appellate Court held that making such declaration is within the discretion of the Court and in fact, the learned trial court had also framed an issue on this point. Accordingly, in view of the discretion allowed by the Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act the learned Appellate Court held that the respondents/plaintiffs are entitled to a declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land. The appeal was allowed by setting aside the judgment and decree passed by the learned trial court. The right, title and interest of the respondent/plaintiff Sri Anil Chandra Sarmah Adhyapak over the suit land stood declared with further relief that he is entitled to vacant possession of the suit land by eviction of the appellant/defendants therefrom. The plaintiff suit was decreed with costs vide judgment dated 31.08.2005 and decree dated 06.09.2005 in the said Title Appeal No. 11 of 2004. 8. At the outset this Court puts on record that this Second Appeal is looked into only to the extent permitted and limited under the law and as such the decision is confined only to the substantial question of law as formulated. 9. Mr. 8. At the outset this Court puts on record that this Second Appeal is looked into only to the extent permitted and limited under the law and as such the decision is confined only to the substantial question of law as formulated. 9. Mr. P.S. Deka, learned counsel for the appellants/defendants have urged that in the absence of any specific pleadings and prayer in the suit with regard to right, title and interest, whether the appellate court was justified in framing a new issue and to decide upon it. In this context reference was also made to Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 10. This Court on perusal of the records finds that the question on right, title and interest was not a new issue framed by the learned Appellate Court. In fact, this question was squarely framed as Issue No.4 before the learned Trial Court, which, however, was not found in favour of the respondent/plaintiff by the learned Trial Court below. The discussion on the question of right, title and interest of the respondent/plaintiff over the suit land was also conclusively discussed by the learned Appellate Court. With regard to the question whether a declaration of right, title and interest could have been made in the absence of any such prayer, the learned Appellate Court held that Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act permits exercise of discretion to make declaration of status or right. 11. On the substantial question of law so formulated vis-a-vis, the provision under Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, this Court is of the opinion that the discretion which the Court has to exercise under Section 34 is a judicial discretion. 12. As held by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Veruareddi Ramaraghava Reddy v. Konduru Seshu Reddy, reported in AIR 1967 SC 436 , the provisions of Section 42 (now Section 34) of the Specific Relief Act is not exhaustive of the cases in which a declaratory decree may be made and the Courts have power to grant such a decree independently of the requirements of the Section. What would be the consequence of a suit if relief of declaration of title is not specifically mentioned in the relief portion of plaint? The answer can be had from the case of Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M. Papiah and Another, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1809 . What would be the consequence of a suit if relief of declaration of title is not specifically mentioned in the relief portion of plaint? The answer can be had from the case of Corporation of the City of Bangalore v. M. Papiah and Another, reported in AIR 1989 SC 1809 . The Apex Court held that for deciding the nature of a suit the entire plaint has to be read and not merely the relief portion. A suit cannot be dismissed on the ground that the relief of declaration of title and possession has not been specifically mentioned as a relief in the plaint. 13. Turning to the case in hand, indeed, there is no prayer for a decree to declare the respondent/plaintiff's title. However, a bare reading of the plaint does not leave any manner of doubt that the suit has been filed for establishing the title of the plaintiff, which was denied and rebutted by the appellants/defendants in their written statement. Further, pin-pointed issue with regard to the question of right, title and interest had also been framed and evidence led. Prayer for declaration of title was inherent in the plaint. The relief sought for by the respondent/plaintiff in the plaint was for a decree of khas possession by evicting the appellants/defendants from the suit land. The nature of the relief is such that it cannot be granted without the declaration. 14. The Trial Court's decision in dismissing the suit rests upon the finding that the Sale Deed (Exhibit-4) is not admissible in evidence (which was let in by way of secondary evidence by producing the certified copy of it) and situated thus the plaintiff had failed to prove his purchase of the suit land. No decision was forthcoming with regard to maintainability of the suit vis-a-vis the provisions of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act. 15. Dis-entitlement of any relief for failure to pray for a decree for declaration of right, title and interest over the suit land in view of Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act was urged by the Appellants/defendants before the Appellate Court and the same was answered as follows: "The learned counsel Sri T. Ali, appearing for the defendants submitted that the appellant is not entitled to any relief as he failed to pray for a decree declaring his right, title and interest over the suit land. The learned counsel Sri T. Ali, relied upon Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act to substantiate his plea. After hearing the learned counsel for the appellant and after going through the relevant provisions of law, I have sufficient reasons to disagree with the contentions of the learned counsel for the appellant. Law has provided that the Court has the discretion to make such a declaration. The learned Trial Court framed an Issue on this point and in this appeal……. It is true that the appellant failed to pray for a decree, declaring his right, title and interest over the suit land. Hence, in view of the decision of the Issue No.4 and in view of the discretion allowed by Section 34 of the Specific Relief Act, I, hereby, hold that the appellant has right, title and interest over the suit land." 16. There is no gainsaying that to enable an order of declaration a plaintiff must establish (i) that he is entitled to any legal character or any right as to property; (ii) that the defendants are denying or interested to deny, the plaintiff's title to such legal character or right, and (iii) the declaration sought is that the plaintiff is entitled to such legal character or right. 17. The prerequisites are present and can be had from the nature of the suit as made out in the plaint. The first appellate Court, in the opinion of this Court, had properly exercised discretion putting an end to the disputes between the parties, denial of which would have materially injured the defendant/plaintiff. 18. For the reasons above, this Court holds that the judgment and decree of the appellate Court in Title Appeal No.11 of 2004 does not call for interference and the same is hereby affirmed. 19. I have heard Mr. P.S. Deka, learned counsel for the appellants. None appeared to represent the respondent. This instant appeal stands dismissed, however, without any order as to costs.