JUDGMENT : Biswanath Somadder, J. The writ petition was filed in the year 2014 and was dismissed for default on 20th January, 2015. The matter was subsequently restored by an order dated 19th June, 2015. Consequently, the writ petition appeared before this Court on 16th July, 2015. None appeared in support of the writ petition on that day even at the time of second call. This Court, while taking note of the fact that the writ petition was earlier dismissed for default and subsequently restored, dismissed the writ petition for the second time, while observing as follows: “The carriage of proceedings lies with the petitioner and she ought to have been diligent enough to prosecute the matter after it was dismissed for default and subsequently restored. However, she is apparently not interested in prosecuting her matter with due diligence and in right earnest. The writ petition is, therefore, liable to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.” After two and a half months from the date of second dismissal of the writ petition, an application, being CAN 10368 of 2015, was filed by the applicant/writ petitioner praying for recalling of the order dated 16th July, 2015, and for restoration of the writ petition. After one and a half month therefrom, another application, being CAN 11231 of 2015 was filed praying for condonation of delay in filing of the restoration application, being CAN 10368 of 2015, beyond the period of thirty days from date of the order of second dismissal, ie., 16th July, 2015. It is quite evident from the records that the writ petitioner was not at all diligent while conducting her case. Once her writ petition was dismissed for default on 20th January, 2015, and subsequently restored by an order dated 19th June, 2015, the writ petition was required to be pursued vigorously and prosecuted with due diligence and in right earnest. A lis cannot be successively brought back to life merely because a litigant has a right to file a recalling application seeking restoration of his/her lis after each dismissal. This will result in a situation where a litigant, having carriage of proceedings, is allowed to keep his/her lis pending indefinitely before a Court of law thereby causing immense prejudice to the other side who is invariably kept on tenterhooks for an indefinite period of time. This will result in a situation where a litigant, having carriage of proceedings, is allowed to keep his/her lis pending indefinitely before a Court of law thereby causing immense prejudice to the other side who is invariably kept on tenterhooks for an indefinite period of time. It will also result in a situation simply unheard of and unacceptable in a modern justice system, i.e., a lis pending in perpetuity. Successive applications for recalling, emanating from each order of dismissal in respect of a single lis and consequently having the said lis restored to its original file and number each and every time is an unacceptable proposition, which, if indulged by a Court, will encourage a litigant to adopt such tactics only in order to keep his/her lis pending for an indefinite period of time. The closure of a lis, not prosecuted with due diligence or in right earnest by a litigant, therefore, is inevitably warranted, especially when it is evident from record that a litigant is having his/her lis restored successively, consequent upon each order of dismissal, by having the same recalled, each and every time. At this stage, this Court suo motu notices three judgments of the Supreme Court, all relating to restoration of matters consequent upon recalling of the orders of dismissal. In Rafiq & Anr. v. Munshilal & Anr., reported in AIR 1981 SC 1400 , the fact situation that led to the Supreme Court allowing restoration of the appeal before the Allahabad High Court was the lawyer’s slackness in providing satisfactory explanation as to why the recalling application – which was prepared and drafted and an affidavit was sworn on 29th October, 1980, but not presented before the High Court till 12th November, 1980 – cannot make an innocent litigant suffer merely because his chosen advocate defaulted. In Jwala Prasad v. Ajodhya Prasad, reported in AIR 1983 SC 304 , the fact situation which led to the Supreme Court allowing the appeal and setting aside the order of the Allahabad High Court as well as the order passed by the Additional District Judge was based on the application for restoration of the revision application being taken up by the Second Additional District Judge in his chamber and dismissed without giving an opportunity to the appellant of being heard, even though the appellant had mentioned the matter on the same day before the Second Additional District Judge. In Savithri Amma Seethamma v. Aratha Karthy & Ors., reported in AIR 1983 SC 318 , the Supreme Court allowed the appeal preferred against the order rejecting the application for rehearing of a revision application. The order rejecting the application for rehearing had been passed by the High Court treating the application as if it were a review application. The Supreme Court observed that the advocate engaged by the appellant could not appear at the hearing of the revision application preferred by the first respondent because he was occupied in another Court and this particular fact was stated by the learned advocate in the affidavit made by him in support of the application for rehearing. It was under such circumstances, the Supreme Court held, inter alia, that the appellant had sufficient cause for not being present at the hearing of the revision application and the learned Single Judge of the High Court, in such circumstances, ought to have allowed the application and re-heard the civil revision petition applying the principle underlying Order XLI Rule 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure. None of the three judgments of the Supreme Court referred above, therefore, goes into the moot question posed by this Court in the instant matter and that is, whether a lis can be allowed to be kept pending in perpetuity, thereby causing immense prejudice to the other side, simply because consequent upon each order of dismissal, a recalling application is maintainable. The answer is clearly in the negative for such reasons as discussed hereinbefore. In such facts and circumstances, this Court is of the view that the two applications, being CAN 10368 of 2015 and CAN 11231 of 2015, are liable to be dismissed and are accordingly dismissed. Urgent photostat certified copy of this order, if applied for, be given to the learned advocates for the parties.