JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This Regular Second Appeal is directed against the judgement and decree dated 10.1.2005 passed by learned District Judge, Hamirpur in Civil Appeal No. 39 of 2004, whereby he reversed the judgement and decree passed by learned trial court dated 31.12.2003 and decreed the suit of the plaintiffs- respondents. 2. The facts as set out in the plaint are that plaintiffs - respondents alongwith Sh. Setu Ram proforma respondent, filed a suit claiming themselves to be joint owners in possession with defendants of old khasra No. 571 measuring 36 Kanals 4 Marlas. They pleaded that part of this land donated by new khasra No. 565 measuring 8 Kanals 6 Marlas, Tika Bharoli Bhagaur, Tappa Hathol, Tehsil Nadaun, District Hamirpur, H.P. (the suit land) in consolidation in 1983 was allotted to the plaintiffs. Since, then the suit land is coming in possession of the plaintiffs and recorded in jamabandi 1985-86. But the defendants in connivance with the consolidation authorities in 1993. Vide mutation No. 362 dated 12.7.93 got allotted portion of the suit land to the extent of 3 Kanals 2 Marlas in their favour on the basis of tenancy. Defendants were never tenants of the plaintiffs prior or after consolidation proceedings. So mutation No. 362 dated 12.7.1993 in the name of defendants is illegal, null and void. Taking undue advantage of wrong entries, the defendants are adamant to dispossess the plaintiffs from the suit land and thus liable to be prohibited from doing so. 3. The defendants- appellants in joint written statement claimed that out of the suit land, they were allotted 3 Kanals 2 Marlas land vide order dated 19.4.1993 in remand case No. 28/89 decided by the Consolidation Officer, Hamirpur and on the basis of which, mutation No. 362 dated 12.7.1993 was rightly sanctioned. It was reflected in jamabandi 1990-91 showing them in possession as owners of 3 Kanals 2 Marlas land donated by Khasra No. 365/1. In lieu of this land, plaintiffs got land of the defendants vide order dated 19.4.1993 of the Consolidation Officer in remand case No. 28/89. The order has attained finality. The plaintiffs have no locus-standi to challenge the same. As the matter of tenancy has been adjudicated upon by a competent court, so the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. The order has attained finality. The plaintiffs have no locus-standi to challenge the same. As the matter of tenancy has been adjudicated upon by a competent court, so the Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit. Order of Consolidation Officer was passed on merits and acquired finality, objections qua maintainability, locus-standi, cause of action, jurisdiction and limitation were also raised. 4. By way of rejoinder, the plaintiffs re-asserted their case and controverted the contrary pleas of the defendants. On 10.5.2000 the following issues were framed by the learned trial Court: 1. Whether the plaintiffs are owners in possession of the land in suit and any change in revenue record and allotment of 3 Kanals 2 Marlas to defendants by the C.O. Hamirpur on the basis of tenancy is illegal, beyond facts and law behind the plaintiffs hence null and void and not binding upon the plaintiffs ? OPP 2. If issue No.1 is proved, whether the plaintiffs are entitled to the relief of injunction as prayed for? OPP 3. Whether the suit is not maintainable in the present form? OPD 4. Whether the plaintiffs have no locus standi to file the suit? OPD 5. Whether the plaintiffs have no cause of action to file the suit? OPD 6. Whether this Court has no jurisdiction to try the suit? OPD 7. Whether the suit is barred by limitation? OPD 8. Whether the defendants are entitled to special costs under Section 35-A CPC? OPD 9. Relief. 5. The learned trial court after recording the evidence and evaluating the same dismissed the suit and in the appeal preferred against the same, the judgement and decree passed by the learned trial court were set-aside, as a result whereof the suit of the plaintiff was decreed and the defendants- appellants were restrained from causing any interference in any manner of the suit land. 6. On 2.5.2005, the appeal was admitted on the following substantial questions of law: - 1. Whether the findings of the learned first appellate Court are dehors the evidence on record and un-sustainable? 2. Whether the findings of the learned first appellate court are beyond the pleadings of the parties? 3. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit? I have heard the learned senior counsel for the appellants as also the learned counsel for the respondents and gone through the records of the case. 7. 2. Whether the findings of the learned first appellate court are beyond the pleadings of the parties? 3. Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to try this suit? I have heard the learned senior counsel for the appellants as also the learned counsel for the respondents and gone through the records of the case. 7. Since all the substantial questions of law are somehow interconnected and interrelated, I proceed to answer them jointly. 8. It cannot be disputed that the first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal, the parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law and also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself on all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. 9. The scope, ambit and power of the first appellate court while deciding the first appeal have been subject matter of various judicial pronouncements and I only need to refer to the recent pronouncement of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Shasidhar and others vs. Smt. Ashwini Uma Mathad and another 2015 AIR SCW 777 where the Hon’ble Supreme Court held as follows:- “11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and on perusal of the record of the case and examining the issue arising in this appeal, we find force in the submissions of the learned counsel for the appellants. 12. The powers of the first appellate Court, while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 read with Order XLI Rule 31 of the Code, are indeed well defined by various judicial pronouncements of this Court and are, therefore, no more res integra. 13. As far back in 1969, the learned Judge – V.R. Krishna Iyer, J (as His Lordship then was the judge of Kerala High Court) while deciding the first appeal under Section 96 of the CPC in Kurian Chacko vs. Varkey Ouseph, AIR 1969 Kerala 316, reminded the first appellate Court of its duty as to how the first appeal under Section 96 should be decided. In his distinctive style of writing and subtle power of expression, the learned judge held as under: “1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two Courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. In his distinctive style of writing and subtle power of expression, the learned judge held as under: “1. The plaintiff, unsuccessful in two Courts, has come up here aggrieved by the dismissal of his suit which was one for declaration of title and recovery of possession. The defendant disputed the plaintiff's title to the property as also his possession and claimed both in himself. The learned Munsif, who tried the suit, recorded findings against the plaintiff both on title and possession. But, in appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge disposed of the whole matter glibly and briefly, in a few sentences. 2. An appellate court is the final Court of fact ordinarily and therefore a litigant is entitled to a full and fair and independent consideration of the evidence at the appellate stage. Anything less than this is unjust to him and I have no doubt that in the present case the learned Subordinate Judge has fallen far short of what is expected of him as an appellate Court. Although there is furious contest between the counsel for the appellant and for the respondent, they appear to agree with me in this observation.....” (Emphasis supplied) 14. This Court in a number of cases while affirming and then reiterating the aforesaid principle has laid down the scope and powers of the first appellate Court under Section 96 of the Code. 15. We consider it apposite to refer to some of the decisions. 16. In Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (Deceased) by L.Rs . (2001) 3 SCC 179 , this Court held (at pages 188-189) as under: “ .........the appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions put forth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court......while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate court had discharged the duty expected of it............” 17. The above view has been followed by a three- Judge Bench decision of this Court in Madhukar & Ors. v. Sangram & Ors. , (2001) 4 SCC 756 , wherein it was reiterated that sitting as a court of first appeal, it is the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. 18. In H.K.N. Swami v. Irshad Basith , (2005) 10 SCC 243 , this Court (at p. 244) stated as under: “3 . The first appeal has to be decided on facts as well as on law. In the first appeal parties have the right to be heard both on questions of law as also on facts and the first appellate court is required to address itself to all issues and decide the case by giving reasons. Unfortunately, the High Court, in the present case has not recorded any finding either on facts or on law. Sitting as the first appellate court it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording the finding regarding title.” 19. Again in Jagannath v. Arulappa & Anr. (2005) 12 SCC 303 , while considering the scope of Section 96 of the Code this Court (at pp. 303-04) observed as follows: “2. A court of first appeal can reappreciate the entire evidence and come to a different conclusion.........” 20. Again in B.V Nagesh & Anr. vs. H.V.Sreenivasa Murthy, (2010) 13 SCC 530 , this Court taking note of all the earlier judgments of this Court reiterated the aforementioned principle with these words: “3. How the regular first appeal is to be disposed of by the appellate court/High Court has been considered by this Court in various decisions. Order 41 CPC deals with appeals from original decrees. Among the various rules, Rule 31 mandates that the judgment of the appellate court shall state: (a) the points for determination; (b) the decision thereon; (c) the reasons for the decision; and (d) where the decree appealed from is reversed or varied, the relief to which the appellant is entitled. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. 4. The appellate court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial court. The first appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions putforth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate court. Sitting as a court of first appeal, it was the duty of the High Court to deal with all the issues and the evidence led by the parties before recording its findings. The first appeal is a valuable right and the parties have a right to be heard both on questions of law and on facts and the judgment in the first appeal must address itself to all the issues of law and fact and decide it by giving reasons in support of the findings. (Vide Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari , (2001) 3 SCC 179 at p. 188, para 15 and Madhukar v. Sangram , (2001) 4 SCC 756 at p. 758, para 5.). 5. In view of the above salutary principles, on going through the impugned judgment, we feel that the High Court has failed to discharge the obligation placed on it as a first appellate court. In our view, the judgment under appeal is cryptic and none of the relevant aspects have even been noticed. The appeal has been decided in an unsatisfactory manner. Our careful perusal of the judgment in the regular first appeal shows that it falls short of considerations which are expected from the court of first appeal. Accordingly, without going into the merits of the claim of both parties, we set aside the impugned judgment and decree of the High Court and remand the regular first appeal to the High Court for its fresh disposal in accordance with law.” 21. The aforementioned cases were relied upon by this Court while reiterating the same principle in State Bank of India & Anr. vs. Emmsons International Ltd. & Anr. (2011) 12 SCC 174 . This Court has recently taken the same view on similar facts arising in Vinod Kumar vs. Gangadhar, 2014(12) Scale 171.” 10. The aforementioned cases were relied upon by this Court while reiterating the same principle in State Bank of India & Anr. vs. Emmsons International Ltd. & Anr. (2011) 12 SCC 174 . This Court has recently taken the same view on similar facts arising in Vinod Kumar vs. Gangadhar, 2014(12) Scale 171.” 10. Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present case, I find that the learned first appellate court while deciding the first appeal failed to keep the aforesaid principles in consideration and rendered the impugned decision. This would be apparent from the bare perusal of the judgement rendered by the learned trial court where apart from other grounds it had dismissed the suit on the ground of jurisdiction as would be evident from para-25 of its findings, which reads thus: “25. In the case in hand, the scheme of H.P. Holdings (Consolidation and Prevention of Fragmentation) Act, 1971 provides for the equally efficacious remedies against the order passed by the Consolidation Officer and thus it cannot be said that the adequacy and sufficacy of remedies is not provided under the said Act. Further more, it is not established on record that the Consolidation Authority while dealing with the present matter violated the basic principles of natural justice and the provisions of the said Act. I am of the view that although a civil court jurisdiction in such like matters is not absolutely barred, but in the facts and circumstances of the present case the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is barred.” 11. But surprisingly, the learned appellate court did not even touch this aspect of the matter and went on to formulate the following points, which according to it arose for determination in the appeal: 1. Whether the plaintiffs were able to prove their possession over the entire suit land of Khasra No.565 and contrary findings deserves to be set aside after accepting the appeal. 2. Relief. 12. Thereafter, it answered point No. 1 in favour of the respondents and allowed the appeal. The learned lower appellate court has though reversed the findings of the learned trial court, but it has not at all adverted to the reasoning as given by the learned trial court and has therefore not discharged its duties as cast upon it under the law. 13. The learned lower appellate court has though reversed the findings of the learned trial court, but it has not at all adverted to the reasoning as given by the learned trial court and has therefore not discharged its duties as cast upon it under the law. 13. The learned lower appellate court was required to come into close quarters with reasoning assigned by the learned trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different findings. The question of jurisdiction went to the root of the case and unless and until the court came to the conclusion that it in fact had the jurisdiction, it could not have proceeded any further. This was a duty expected to be discharged by the learned first appellate court being not only a final court whose findings remain immune from challenge in this court, but being also a final court of law because even an erroneous decision may not be vulnerable before this court in second appeal. 14. It is more than settled that jurisdiction of this court while exercising powers under section 100 CPC have now ceased to be available to correct mere errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law unless question of law be a substantial one. This was so observed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Santosh Hazari vs. Purushottam Tiwari (deceased) by LRS (2001) 3 SCC 179 in the following terms:- “15. A perusal of the judgment of the trial Court shows that it has extensively dealt with the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the parties for deciding the issues on which the parties went to trial. It also found that in support of his plea of adverse possession on the disputed land, the defendant did not produce any documentary evidence while the oral evidence adduced by the defendant was conflicting in nature and hence unworthy of reliance. The first appellate court has, in a very cryptic manner, reversed the finding on question of possession and dispossession as alleged by the plaintiff as also on the question of adverse possession as pleaded by the defendant. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court . The first appellate court has, in a very cryptic manner, reversed the finding on question of possession and dispossession as alleged by the plaintiff as also on the question of adverse possession as pleaded by the defendant. The appellate Court has jurisdiction to reverse or affirm the findings of the trial Court . First appeal is a valuable right of the parties and unless restricted by law, the whole case is therein open for rehearing both on questions of fact and law. The judgment of the appellate Court must, therefore, reflect its conscious application of mind and record findings supported by reasons, on all the issues arising along with the contentions putforth, and pressed by the parties for decision of the appellate Court . The task of an appellate court affirming the findings of the trial Court is an easier one. The appellate court agreeing with the view of the trial court need not restate the effect of the evidence or reiterate the reasons given by the trial court; expression of general agreement with reasons given by the court, decision of which is under appeal, would ordinarily suffice (See Girijanandini Devi v.Bijendra Narain Choudhary, AIR 1967 SC 1124 . We would, however, like to sound a note of caution. Expression of general agreement with the findings recorded in the judgment under appeal should not be a device or camouflage adopted by the appellate court for shirking the duty cast on it . While writing a judgment of reversal the appellate court must remain conscious of two principles. Firstly, the findings of fact base d on conflicting evidence arrived at by the trial court must weigh with the appellate court, more so when the findings are based on oral evidence recorded by the same Presiding Judge who authors the judgment. This certainly does not mean that when an appeal lies on facts, the appellate court is not competent to reverse a finding of fact arrived at by the trial Judge. As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. (See: Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai (1983) 1 SCC 35 ). As a matter of law if the appraisal of the evidence by the trial Court suffers from a material irregularity or is based on inadmissible evidence or on conjectures and surmises, the appellate court is entitled to interfere with the finding of fact. (See: Madhusudan Das v. Narayanibai (1983) 1 SCC 35 ). The rule is – and it is nothing more than a rule of practice – that when there is conflict of oral evidence of the parties on any matter in issue and the decision hinges upon the credibility of witnesses, then unless there is some special feature about the evidence of a particular witness which has escaped the trial Judge’s notice or there is a sufficient balance of improbability to displace his opinion as to where the credibility lie, the appellate court should not interfere with the finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact. (See Sarju Pershad Ramdeo Sahu v. Jwaleshwari Pratap Narain Singh, AIR 1951 SC 120 ). Secondly, while reversing a finding of fact the appellate court must come into close quarters with the reasoning assigned by the trial court and then assign its own reasons for arriving at a different finding. This would satisfy the court hearing a further appeal that the first appellate Court had discharged the duty expected of it. We need only remind the first appellate courts of the additional obligation cast on them by the scheme of the present Section 100 substituted in the Code. The first appellate Court continues, as before, to be a final court of facts; pure findings of fact remain immune from challenge before the High Court in second appeal. Now the first appellate court is also a final court of law in the sense that its decision on a question of law even if erroneous may not be vulnerable before the High Court in second appeal because the jurisdiction of the High Court has now ceased to be available to correct the errors of law or the erroneous findings of the first appellate court even on questions of law unless such question of law be a substantial one.” 15. Since the learned lower appellate court has not at all adverted to the question of jurisdiction, therefore, its findings have been rendered vulnerable and cannot be sustained. 16. The substantial questions of law are accordingly answered in favour of the appellants. 17. Since the learned lower appellate court has not at all adverted to the question of jurisdiction, therefore, its findings have been rendered vulnerable and cannot be sustained. 16. The substantial questions of law are accordingly answered in favour of the appellants. 17. Consequently, the appeal succeeds and the judgement and decree passed by the learned first appellate court are set aside and the case is remanded to the said court for decision afresh on all questions including the question of jurisdiction. Since the suit has been instituted in the year 1996, the learned lower appellate court shall make all endeavours to decide the same expeditiously and in no event later than 31st December 2015. The parties through their learned counsel are directed to appear before the learned first appellate court on 5.8.2015. The records be returned forthwith so as to reach the concerned court well before the date fixed.