JUDGMENT Mahendra Dayal,J. The tenant-petitioner has filed this writ petition assailing the order dated 23.04.2010 passed by the learned Prescribed Authority/Second Additional Judge Small Cause Court No.19, Lucknow in S.C.C. Suit No.34/1997 whereby the release application filed by the landlords opposite parties no. 3 and 4 was allowed and the judgment and order dated 23.02.2011 passed by the Additional District Judge/Special Judge SC/ST Act, Lucknow in Rent Appeal No.36 of 2010 whereby the appeal was dismissed. 2. The brief facts giving rise to this writ petition are that the opposite parties no.3 and 4, who are the landlords of the premises in dispute filed an application for release under Section 21(1)(a) of the U.P. Act No.13 of 1972 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act") on the ground that they were the landlords of House No.138/12 situate at Fatehganj Galla Mandi, Police Station Naka, District Lucknow, which they had purchased on 12.01.1987 from Shri Vidhya Sagar Jaiswal for their own use and occupation. The tenant-petitioner was a tenant in respect of the said house on a monthly rent of Rs.225/- per month. The landlords opposite parties no.3 and 4 had been living in House No.138/13 along with their son Ram Kishan, daughter-in-law Smt. Sunita and grand son, namely Rashu Gupta. It was further stated by them that their two married daughters namely Smt. Madhubala and Smt. Kanchan also visit their house of and on. The House No.138/13 has a shop and a godown on the first floor and on the first floor of the house there are two rooms, kitchen, latrine, bathroom and open space. There is one room and bathroom on the second floor of the house. It was further stated by them that the landlords opposite parties no.3 and 4 do not have sufficient accommodation in their occupation as a result of which Smt. Shiv Rani Devi opposite party no.4 and her daughter-in-law Smt. Sunita had strained relations between them. The opposite parties no.3 and 4 have, therefore, decided to leave House No.138/13 for their son and his family and they would reside in house in dispute after its vacation by the tenant. The opposite parties no.3 and 4 landlords issued a notice dated 06.05.1996 through their Advocate but even after receiving the notice and expiry of three years, the petitioner-tenant did not vacate the house. The opposite parties no.3 and 4 landlords issued a notice dated 06.05.1996 through their Advocate but even after receiving the notice and expiry of three years, the petitioner-tenant did not vacate the house. The opposite parties no.3 and 4 landlords stated that in House No.138/12, there is one room, three kothris, veranda and latrine on the ground floor while on the first floor, there were two rooms, tin-shed and open space. The ground floor of House No.138/13 was being used for shop and godown and the accommodation on the first and second floor is insufficient for them. The landlords also put forward a case that the petitioner-tenant has started living in Mohalla Indira Nagar near Munshipulia along with his son and family, therefore, even if the premises in dispute is released and the tenant-petitioner is asked to vacate the house in dispute, he will not suffer much hardship. The opposite parties landlords also gave an undertaking that after release they would use the premises in dispute for their own occupation. 3. The tenant-petitioner contested the release application and filed his written statement. While admitting the accommodation in his occupation, he stated that during the pendency of release application, the landlords opposite parties no.3 and 4 have constructed two rooms on the second floor and as such the house in occupation of the landlords had become a four storied building. The petitioner-tenant further pleaded that his son resides with him along with his family. There is no dispute between the opposite party no.4 and her daughter-in-law. The case of the alleged dispute has been invented only for the purpose of showing need for additional accommodation. In respect of married daughters of the opposite parties landlords, it was stated that they were already living with their respective husbands elsewhere and seldom visit the opposite parties landlords and that too for a very short time. It was also specifically denied by the tenant-petitioner that his son has any house in Indira Nagar. 4. The parties led their evidence in the form of affidavits and also produced documentary evidence but the learned Prescribed Authority on the basis of the evidence on record allowed the application for release on the ground that the son of the petitioner-tenant is living in Indira Nagar and as such he will not suffer much hardship in case the premises in question is released. The appellant Court also affirmed the finding arrived at the learned Prescribed Authority and dismissed the appeal. 5. I have heard Shri Virendra Misra, learned counsel for the petitioner and Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate assisted by Shri Mohd. Aslam Khan on behalf of the opposite parties no.3 and 4. 6. Learned counsel for the tenant-petitioner has assailed the order passed by both the courts below on the ground that the release application has been allowed without recording any specific finding that the need of the opposite parties landlords was bonafide and genuine. There is also no evidence on record to the effect that the son of the tenant-petitioner has acquired any house either in Indira Nagar or anywhere within the municipal limits of Lucknow. The opposite parties landlords had filed a copy of telephone directory along with affidavit indicating that phone number 700026 was allotted to Mr. Rohit Jaiswal, who is the son of the tenant-petitioner and the address mentioned in the telephone directory was House No.152, Rajiv Nagar. The tenant-petitioner specifically denied that his son Rohit Jaiswal has any house in Mohalla Rajiv Nagar and the telephone number was in the name of one Deval Bajpai. Except the copy of telephone directory, there was no material on record to indicate that son of the tenant-petitioner was living in Mohalla Rajiv Nagar. The learned Prescribed Authority without taking into consideration that there is no evidence on record showing the residence of Rohit Jaiswal in Mohalla Rajiv Nagar, recorded a finding that the tenant-petitioner's son had purchased a house in Indira Nagar Colony near Munshipulia, Lucknow. The tenant-petitioner had also produced the Ration Card, birth certificate of his grand-son and driving license to show that the residence of Rohit Jaiswal is house No.138/12, Fatehganj Galla Mandi but these documents were not taken into consideration by the learned Prescribed Authority merely on the ground that there were the photostat copies and were not admissible in evidence. The petitioner-tenant also produced the photograph showing the construction of house of the opposite parties landlords but the learned Prescribed Authority did not consider it as material piece of evidence simply on the ground that the house in occupation of the opposite parties landlords was not subject matter of this litigation. The petitioner-tenant also produced the photograph showing the construction of house of the opposite parties landlords but the learned Prescribed Authority did not consider it as material piece of evidence simply on the ground that the house in occupation of the opposite parties landlords was not subject matter of this litigation. The learned Prescribed Authority only on the aforesaid grounds but without recording its satisfaction that the need of the landlords was bonafide and genuine, proceeded to consider the comparative hardship of the parties. The hardship was found in favour of the opposite parties landlords on the ground that the son of the tenant-petitioner, namely, Rohit Jaiswal had an alternative accommodation with him, although acquisition of any house by Rohit Jaiswal was not at all proved. The learned appellate Court also came to the conclusion that the finding recorded by the learned Prescribed Authority was based on evidence and did not call for any interference. With regard to the construction of two rooms by the opposite parties landlords, the learned appellate Court found that even if the opposite parties landlords had constructed additional rooms, it could not be said that their need came to an end. Thus, the learned appellate Court ignoring the settled legal preposition with regard to consideration of need, affirmed the findings recorded by the learned Prescribed Authority and dismissed the appeal. 7. Shri Mohd. Arif Khan, learned Senior Advocate appearing on behalf of the opposite parties no. 3 and 4 landlords has argued that both the courts below have discussed in detail the accommodation in occupation of both the parties and their respective hardship. If the learned Prescribed Authority had failed to record in the order that the need of the opposite parties landlords was bonafide, it can easily be gathered from the perusal of the judgment that the learned Prescribed Authority after consideration of entire material on record was satisfied that the need of the opposite parties landlords was genuine and bonafide. 8. So far as the comparative of hardship is concerned, the submission on behalf of the opposite parties landlords is that the learned Prescribed Authority has recorded a definite finding that the litigation for release was pending since 1997 and during the pendency of litigation, the petitioner-tenant did not make any effort to search out for the alternative accommodation. 8. So far as the comparative of hardship is concerned, the submission on behalf of the opposite parties landlords is that the learned Prescribed Authority has recorded a definite finding that the litigation for release was pending since 1997 and during the pendency of litigation, the petitioner-tenant did not make any effort to search out for the alternative accommodation. It has been held in various pronouncements that in case the tenant fails to prove that he made sincere effort to search out alternative accommodation since the filing of release application, it would be presumed that the need of the landlords is bonafide. Reference has been made to a case reported in 2011 (29) LCD Page 1153 - Mohd. Husain Beg alias Rajjan vs. Prescribed Authority, Rae Bareli, in which it has been held that if the tenant has not made effort to search for an alternative accommodation since the filing of the release application, adverse inference should be drawn against him. He further submits that there is concurrent findings of both the courts below with regard to bonafide need and comparative hardship of the opposite parties landlords and this Hon'ble Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India cannot exercise power of judicial review and set aside the findings of fact recorded by both the courts below. Learned counsel has further submitted that there is also concurrent finding of both the courts below that the petitioner-tenant has alternative accommodation where his son is residing and as such the judgment and orders passed both the courts below cannot be faulted on the ground that the findings recorded by the courts below are erroneous. 9. The provision to release a building in occupation of the tenant is contained in Section 21 of the Act. Clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 21 empowers the Prescribed Authority to pass an order of eviction on an application by the landlord if it is satisfied that the building is bonafide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or any member of his family. The proviso to sub-section (1) provides that except in the cases provided for in the explanation, the Prescribed Authority shall also take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. The proviso to sub-section (1) provides that except in the cases provided for in the explanation, the Prescribed Authority shall also take into account the likely hardship to the tenant from the grant of the application as against the likely hardship to the landlord from the refusal of the application. Thus, a bare reading of Section 21 of the Act clearly shows that the following conditions must be fulfilled before making an order of release in favour of the landlord : - (a) there exists a relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties; (b) the building in occupation of the tenant is bonafide required by the landlord either in its existence form or after demolition and reconstruction for occupation by himself or any member of his family; and (c) the hardship caused to the landlord from the refusal of the application would be greater than the hardship caused to the tenant by allowing the release application. 10. Before an order of release is passed by the Prescribed Authority, all the aforesaid conditions must be fulfilled. In the present case, there is no dispute with regard to the relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties. The only two things to be considered by the Prescribed Authority were that the opposite parties landlords had bonafide need in respect of the premises in dispute and that they would suffer greater hardship in case the application for release is refused as compared to the hardship of the tenant by allowing the release application. 11. The need in respect of additional accommodation as envisaged in Section 21 of the Act must be a bonafide need and not a mere desire. If the landlord has a desire to have more accommodation, that will not attract the provisions of Section 21 because the intention of the legislature is that a building should be released to the landlord only if his need in respect of the accommodation in occupation is bonafide, genuine and hard pressing. It is not a case where the landlord has no accommodation at all. It is an admitted case of the parties that the opposite parties landlords have an independent house in their occupation. They need additional accommodation which is in occupation of the petitioner-tenant. Therefore, the accommodation in occupation of both the parties has to be taken into account while considering the need of the opposite parties landlords. It is an admitted case of the parties that the opposite parties landlords have an independent house in their occupation. They need additional accommodation which is in occupation of the petitioner-tenant. Therefore, the accommodation in occupation of both the parties has to be taken into account while considering the need of the opposite parties landlords. The Prescribed Authority will have jurisdiction to make an order of release only it is satisfied that the need of the landlord is bonafide and genuine. Once it is found that the need of the landlord is bonafide, the Prescribed Authority is required to proceed to consider the comparative hardship of the parties. Unless it is found that the need of the landlord is bonafide, there is no occasion to consider the comparative hardship. In this case although the Prescribed Authority has discussed in detail the evidence led by the parties but has not recorded any finding that the need of the opposite parties landlords for additional accommodation was bonafide and genuine. The learned Prescribed Authority without recording any finding as to the need of the landlord, proceeded to compare the hardship of the parties. The learned appellate Court found the need of the landlords as bonafide only on the ground that the son of the petitioner-tenant has been living separately and construction of two rooms constructed by the opposite parties landlords were not subject matter of this litigation. 12. Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act provides that where the landlord already has adequate and suitable accommodation having regard to the number of members of his family and their respective ages and his means and social status, his claim for additional requirement shall be constructed strictly. It further provided that where a residential building was let out at a time when the son of the landlord was minor and subsequently he has become major and married, the additional requirement for his son shall be given due consideration. It is not a case of the opposite parties landlords that any of his sons has become major and he requires additional accommodation for his comfortable living. The only ground set up by the opposite parties landlords is that that the opposite party no.4 and her daughter-in-law have strained relations on account of non-availability of sufficient accommodation. It is not a case of the opposite parties landlords that any of his sons has become major and he requires additional accommodation for his comfortable living. The only ground set up by the opposite parties landlords is that that the opposite party no.4 and her daughter-in-law have strained relations on account of non-availability of sufficient accommodation. It is not disputed that during the pendency of release application, the opposite parties landlords have constructed two rooms on the second floor of their house and thus, the accommodation in occupation of the landlords has increased. As per own showing of the opposite parties landlords, there are four major members and one minor son and the total accommodation for their use in the house, is two rooms, kitchen, open space, latrine on the first floor and there is one room and a bathroom on the second floor and two newly constructed rooms on the second floor. Thus, the total rooms in their occupation are five rooms along with kitchen and three bathrooms. There is no evidence on record to the effect that the relations between the opposite party no.4 and her daughter-in-law are strained on account of non-availability of sufficient accommodation. The opposite parties landlords have expressed the desire that they intend to shift to some other accommodation and leave the house in their occupation for the use of their son and his family. This desire of the opposite parties landlords cannot be said to be their bonafide need. It is not the case of the opposite parties landlords that two rooms were constructed for some other persons. Therefore, in the absence of any pleadings to this effect, it would be presumed that two rooms were constructed only to meet out the shortage of accommodation. This development during the pendency of the release application has to be taken into consideration while adjudicating the need of the opposite parties landlords. 13. The courts below have found the need of the opposite parties landlords as genuine on the ground that the son of the petitioner-tenant is residing in House No. 152, Rajiv Nagar. This development during the pendency of the release application has to be taken into consideration while adjudicating the need of the opposite parties landlords. 13. The courts below have found the need of the opposite parties landlords as genuine on the ground that the son of the petitioner-tenant is residing in House No. 152, Rajiv Nagar. This approach by both the courts below is erroneous because if the son of the petitioner-tenant had acquired some accommodation, the same could be taken into consideration while comparing the hardship of the parties but it could not form the basis of the finding that the need of the landlords was genuine because the landlords had to establish their own need and not the need of the tenant. Moreover, acquisition of a house by the son of the petitioner-tenant was also not established. Mere a copy of the telephone directory showing the telephone number and name with the address of House No.152, Rajiv Nagar does not establish that the petitioner's son has acquired this house, specially when there was documentary evidence to the effact that the telephone number indicated by the landlords opposite parties was in the name of someone else. Thus, both the courts below have committed gross illegality in taking into consideration the said house while adjudicating the bonafide need of the opposite parties landlords. As indicated hereinabove, the learned Prescribed Authority has failed to record a specific finding that the need of the opposite parties landlords was bonafide and genuine. In the absence of definite finding with regard to genuine and bonafide need, there was no occasion to have considered the comparative hardship of the parties. Both the courts below have also not considered the need applying Rule 16 of the Rules framed under the Act which is mandatory and the learned Prescribed Authority is bound to consider the same while considering the bonafide need of the landlords. 14. In view of above, the judgments and orders of both the courts below are erroneous and cannot be allowed to stand. 15. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders and judgments passed by both the courts below are hereby set aside. 14. In view of above, the judgments and orders of both the courts below are erroneous and cannot be allowed to stand. 15. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders and judgments passed by both the courts below are hereby set aside. In the circumstances of the case, the matter is remitted back to the Prescribed Authority with a direction that the learned Prescribed Authority shall decide the release application of the opposite parties no.3 and 4 afresh in the light of the observations made in this judgment after giving fresh opportunity of evidence to both the parties. Since the matter is quite old, the Prescribed Authority shall make every effort to decide the same expeditiously in accordance with law.