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2015 DIGILAW 950 (CAL)

Prabhawati Sharma v. Usha Pandey

2015-12-08

ASHIS KUMAR CHAKRABORTY

body2015
JUDGMENT Ashis Kumar Chakraborty, J. This is an application for review of the judgment and decree dated January 31, 2014 of this Court, passed by a learned Single Judge of this Court who has since retired, dismissing the second appeal of the defendants-tenants in an ejectment suit and affirming the judgment and decree for ejectment passed by both the trial Court and the lower appellate Court. The substantial question of law that was framed by the Court for decision in the second appeal was as follows: “Whether the courts below substantially erred in law in decreeing the suit against the defendants for eviction without making any provision for accommodation of the defendants in the newly constructed building when there was a concession by the plaintiff’s witness no. 1 that the defendants should be accommodated in the newly constructed building, but the area and the rent could be settled as per decision of the Court?” By the judgment under review dated February 11, 2014, this Court decided the aforementioned substantial question of law against the defendants-appellants. who are the applicants in this review application From the records of the second appeal, which were placed before me during the course of hearing of this application, it appears that the plaintiffs-respondents filed the suit for eviction, against the applicants-appellants, before the learned Judge Presidency Small Causes Court, 2nd Bench, Calcutta for recovery of possession of the suit property, on the grounds that they reasonably require the suit property for constructing a new building after demolishing the existing dilapidated building comprising the suit property and that they also reasonably require the suit property for their own use and occupation with their respective family members, so that after constructing the new building all their respective families can stay at the new building. The suit property comprises two rooms of premises no. 50A Shankaritala Street in Cantral Kolkata. Admittedly, the tenancy of the applicants-appellants in respect of the suit property comprising two rooms of the building at Premises No. 50/A, Shankaritala Street, in Central Kolkata at a monthly rental of Rs. 60, was governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, hereinafter called as “the Act of 1956”. 50A Shankaritala Street in Cantral Kolkata. Admittedly, the tenancy of the applicants-appellants in respect of the suit property comprising two rooms of the building at Premises No. 50/A, Shankaritala Street, in Central Kolkata at a monthly rental of Rs. 60, was governed by the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, hereinafter called as “the Act of 1956”. After considering the pleadings of the plaintiffs-respondents and the applicants -defendants in their plaint and written statement respectively, the trial Court framed various issues in the suit including, whether the plaintiffs reasonably require the suit premises for the purpose of building and rebuilding and whether the plaintiffs reasonably require the suit premises for their own use and occupation. Of course, apart from the said two issues, other issues were also framed like, whether the defendants were defaulters in payment of rent and if the defendants had sublet a portion of the suit premises to a third party without the consent of the plaintiffs. However, the said issues have no bearing in this application as those were decided by the trial Court against the plaintiffs-respondents and the same have been accepted by them. The trial Court proceeded on the basis that the grounds of ejectment for reasonable requirement of the suit premises urged by the plaintiffs were for building or rebuilding under Section 13(1)(f) of the 1956 Act and also for their own use and occupation under Section 13(1)(ff) of the 1956 Act. It may be pointed out that a landlord can obtain an order of eviction against the tenant under Section 13(1)(f) of the 1956 Act for reasonable requirement of the suit premises for the purpose of building or rebuilding or for making substantial additional alteration to the building, subject to the condition under Section 18A of the Act that after construction of the new building or completion of the substantial additional alteration to the existing building, the tenant will be put back into possession of the area comprising his tenancy in the suit premises either in the new building or in the original building after additional alteration, as the case may be. The provisions in clauses (f) and (ff) and sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the 1956 Act will be extracted at a later stage of this judgment. The provisions in clauses (f) and (ff) and sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the 1956 Act will be extracted at a later stage of this judgment. With regard to the issue whether the plaintiffs reasonably require the suit premises for the purpose of building and rebuilding, after considering material evidence on record, the learned trial Judge found that the building of the suit premises is in dilapidated condition, the Corporation has issued a notice declaring the building of the suit premises to be an unsafe building, a portion of the building comprising the suit premises has already been collapsed and vacated by the other occupiers, but as there was no proof that the area of the newly constructed building which would be allotted to the defendants-tenants, the learned trial Judge held that the plaintiffs could not prove the ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(f) read with Section 18A of the 1956 Act and decided the said issue against the plaintiffs. The learned trial Judge, however, after considering all material evidence adduced by the parties found that the plaintiffs have proved that they require the suit premises for the accommodation of their respective families. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta vs. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth reported in AIR 1964 SC 1676 and the decision of this Court in the case of Jogesh Chandra Sen vs. Smt. Kiron Bala Saha reported in AIR 1977 Cal 167 the learned trial Judge held that though there is a prayer of the plaintiffs regarding requirement of the suit premises for the purpose of building and rebuilding but, there is no bar to make a prayer for requirement of the suit premises for their own use and occupation as well for the use and occupation of their family members and the plaintiffs have been able to establish their requirement the suit premises for their own occupation. The learned trial Judge further held that it is upto the plaintiffs to decide, whether they will reside in the said building with its present structure or whether they will renovate or reconstruct the same after demolishing the existing structure or not. With these findings, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit for eviction against the defendants on the ground of Section 13(1)(ff) of the 1956 Act. With these findings, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit for eviction against the defendants on the ground of Section 13(1)(ff) of the 1956 Act. The defendants-applicants challenged the eviction decree passed by the learned trial Court by filing an appeal, being Appeal No. 53 of 2009, before the learned Judge, 5th Bench, City Civil Court at Calcutta. By a judgment dated January 31, 2011, the lower appellate Court rejected the said appeal and affirmed the judgment and decree for eviction passed by the learned trial Judge against the defendant-appellant. The learned lower appellate Court affirmed the finding of the learned trial Judge that the building comprising the suit premises is in dilapidated condition, a portion of the building has already been collapsed and that the plaintiffs reasonably require the suit premises for their own use and occupation. Considering the ratio of the decision of the Supreme Court in the cases of Kusum Devi vs. Mohan Lal reported in (2009)11 SCC 594 , by the judgment dated January 31, 2011 the learned lower appellate Court affirmed the judgment and eviction decree passed by the learned trial Judge in favour of the plaintiffs and dismissed the appeal of the defendant-tenant. Against the above judgment and decree passed by the learned lower appellate Court, the defendants-tenants filed the second appeal before this Court which was admitted by the Division Bench after framing the substantial question of law as mentioned above. However, as already stated by the judgment under the review this Court answered the above substantial question of law against the defendants -appellants and dismissed the second appeal by affirming the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below. After considering the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta vs. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth reported in AIR 1964 SC 1676 , Arya Samaj, Sagar & Ors. vs. Pinjamal & Anr. reported in AIR CJ 1987(1) 102 (SC), Radhey Shyam & Ors. After considering the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta vs. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth reported in AIR 1964 SC 1676 , Arya Samaj, Sagar & Ors. vs. Pinjamal & Anr. reported in AIR CJ 1987(1) 102 (SC), Radhey Shyam & Ors. vs. Kalyan Mal reported in (1984)4 SCC 447 and Kusum Devi vs. Mohan Lal reported in (2009) 11 SCC 594 relied by the plaintiffs-respondents, this Court held that since the ground of reasonable requirement as provided in Section 13(1)(ff) of the 1956 Act stood proved before both the learned Courts below, although there is a statement of the plaintiffs in their evidence while deposing on the ground of Section 13(1)(f) of the 1956 Act, a relief under Section 18A of the 1956 Act in favour of the defendants cannot be part of the decree of eviction passed by both the learned Courts below. Mr. Hiranmoy Bhattacharya, learned Counsel appearing for the applicants in this review application strenuously urged that the judgment of this Court in the second appeal, deciding the aforementioned substantial question of law in the negative, particularly in view of the concession made by the plaintiffs’ witness PW-1 that an accommodation may be given to the defendants in the newly constructed building, is vitiated by any error of law apparent on the face of the record and as such the instant review application filed by the applicants -appellants should be allowed. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, in the instant case, the plaintiffs-respondents had prayed for the decree for eviction against the defendants on the grounds of reasonable requirement of the suit premises for building and rebuilding under Section 13(1)(f), as also on the ground of reasonable requirement for their own accommodation under Section 13(1)(ff) of the 1956 Act. According to Mr. Bhattacharya, in the instant case, the plaintiffs-respondents had prayed for the decree for eviction against the defendants on the grounds of reasonable requirement of the suit premises for building and rebuilding under Section 13(1)(f), as also on the ground of reasonable requirement for their own accommodation under Section 13(1)(ff) of the 1956 Act. He contended that once the plaintiffs invoked the ground of eviction under Section 13(1) (f) of the 1956 Act, they had to fulfil the condition under Section 18A of the 1956 Act and as such when the learned lower appellate Court affirmed the judgment and decree for eviction passed by the learned trial Court on the ground of reasonable requirement of the suit premises of the plaintiffs for their own use and occupation, based on the concession of the plaintiffs’ witness and in view of the provisions in Section 18A of the 1956 Act, the learned lower appellate Court ought to have made a provision in the decree for eviction for the accommodation of the defendants in the new building to be constructed at the suit premises. Thus according to him, the judgment under review passed by this Court in the second appeal not interfering the judgment of the lower appellate Court is vitiated by the error of law apparent on the face of the record. Mr. Kasinath De, learned counsel appearing for the respondents- plaintiffs, however, raised serious objection with regard to the maintainability of the review application. He contended that from the judgment of this Court it is evident that the second appeal was decided after considering all the relevant provisions of law as also the decisions of the Supreme Court on the subject and by no means the said judgment and decree can be alleged to be vitiated by any mistake apparent on the face of the record within Rule (1) of Order XLVII of the Code of Civil Procedure. In support of his contention, Mr. De relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Union of India vs. Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Limited & Ors. reported in (2013)8 SCC 337 and Manik Chandra Sasmal vs. Rabindra Nath De reported in 2015(2) CHN (SC) 29 and the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Ranjeet Khanna vs. Chirangu Deen reported in 2014 AIR CC 2819. reported in (2013)8 SCC 337 and Manik Chandra Sasmal vs. Rabindra Nath De reported in 2015(2) CHN (SC) 29 and the decision of the learned Single Judge of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Ranjeet Khanna vs. Chirangu Deen reported in 2014 AIR CC 2819. He contended that it is well settled principle of law that the term “mistake or error apparent on the face of the record” appearing in Rule (1) of Order XLVII of the Code signifies an error which is evident on the face of the record and does not require detailed or lengthy argument, scrutiny or elucidation of facts or legal position and that a review petition has a limited propose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise. Mr. De further submitted that after considering the various decisions of the Supreme Court both the learned Courts below, as also this Court in the said judgment dated February 11, 2014, have rightly held that a landlord can sue the tenant for his eviction on the grounds both under clauses (f) and (ff) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act of 1956, that is, on the grounds of reasonable requirement of the suit premises both, for building or rebuilding purpose as also for his own use and occupation, but once the landlord has proved that he reasonably requires the suit premises for his own use and occupation, the landlord is entitled to recover possession of the suit premises on the ground of clause (ff) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the 1956 Act irrespective of the fact, whether he would occupy his property, after constructing a new building or after making substantial addition or alterations to the existing building. In this regard, he relied on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta vs. Indradaman Amratlal Sheth reported in AIR 1964 SC 1676 , Arya Samaj, Sagar & Ors. vs. Pinjamal & Anr. reported in AIR CJ 1987(1) 102 (SC), Kusum Devi vs. Mohan Lal reported in (2009) 11 SCC 594 and Radhey Shyam & Ors. vs. Kalyan Mal reported in (1984)4 SCC 447 , which were also considered by this Court in the judgment sought to be reviewed in this application. vs. Pinjamal & Anr. reported in AIR CJ 1987(1) 102 (SC), Kusum Devi vs. Mohan Lal reported in (2009) 11 SCC 594 and Radhey Shyam & Ors. vs. Kalyan Mal reported in (1984)4 SCC 447 , which were also considered by this Court in the judgment sought to be reviewed in this application. I have considered the materials on record as also the submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the appellants-applicants and the respondents, respectively. From the judgment sought to be reviewed it is evident that this Court considered the fact that both the learned Courts below held that the plaintiffs proved that they reasonably require the suit premises for their own use and occupation, the building comprising the suit property is in dilapidated condition and the corporation has already issued a notice that the building comprising the suit property is an insecured and dangerous building. From the substantial question of law framed by the Division Bench of this Court for the decision in the second appeal, it is evident that the facts that the plaintiffs require the suit premises for their own use and occupation, that the building of the suit premises is in dilapidated condition and that there is a requirement of construction of a new building after demolishing the existing structure of the building are not disputed by the appellants-applicants, but their sole contention in the second appeal was that they are entitled to obtain accommodation in the newly constructed building in respect of the area and at the rate has been decided by the Court on the ground of a concession by the plaintiffs’ witness PW-1. After considering the law laid down in the said case of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta (supra), Radhey Shyam (supra) and Kusum Devi (supra) where the Supreme Court considered the provisions in Section 13(1)(g) and 13(1)(hh) Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House, Rates Control Act, 1947 and in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) and Kusum Devi (supra), where the Supreme Court considered the provisions in Section 12(1)(f) and (h) and Section 12(1)(e) and (g) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 respectively, which are pari-materia with the provisions in Section 13(1)(f) and (ff) of the 1956 Act, while deciding the second appeal, this Court held that since the ground of reasonable requirement as provided in Section 13(1)(ff) of the 1956 Act stands proved by both the learned Courts below, the landlord is not required to comply with the provisions of Section 18A of the 1956 Act, although there is a statement of the plaintiffs in the evidence while deposing on the ground of Section 13(1)(f) of the 1956 Act, there is no question of reinstatement at all in favour of the defendants and as such the relief under Section 18A of the 1956 Act in favour of the defendants cannot be a part of the decree. With these findings this Court found that the lower appellate Court has arrived at a correct conclusion in passing a decree of affirmance of the trial Court’s judgment in a right way and that there is no scope of interference with the said judgment at all. As has been held by the Supreme Court in the case of Sandur Manganese and Iron Ores Limited (supra) and Manik Chandra Sasmal (supra) and by the Single Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court in the case of Ranjeet Khanna (supra) cited on behalf of the respondents-plaintiffs, it is trite law that the words “error apparent on the face of record”, appearing in Order XLVII Rule 1 of the Code, must be such an error which must strike one, on mere looking at the record and would not require any long drawn process of reasoning on points where there may conceivably be two opinion and a review application cannot be allowed to be “an appeal in disguise.” This well settled principle of law could not be disputed by Mr. Bhattacharya appearing for the applicants in this review application. Bhattacharya appearing for the applicants in this review application. In the background of the aforementioned well settled principle of law, let me now consider whether the applicants have made out any case for the review of the judgment passed by this Court dismissing the second appeal, by affirming the judgments and decrees passed by both the learned Courts below in favour of the plaintiffs-respondents. In the instant case, the question raised in the second appeal was one of interpretation of clauses (f) and (ff) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the 1956 Act which are extracted hereinbelow: “13. Protection of tenant against eviction-(1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any other law, no order or decree for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be made by any Court in favour of the landlord against a tenant except on one or more of the following grounds, namely (f) subject to the provisions of sub-section (3A) and section 18A, where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for purposes of building or re-building or for making thereto substantial additions or alterations, and such building or re-building, or additions or alterations, cannot be carried out without the premises being vacated; (ff) subject to the provisions of sub-section (3A), where the premises are reasonably required by the landlord for his own occupation if he is the owner or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held and the landlord or such person is not in possession of any reasonably suitable accommodation; In the case of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta (supra), a question arose before the Supreme Court with regard to the scope and effect of the grounds of eviction of a tenant under Section 13(1)(g) and (hh) of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as “the Bombay Act”). For the sake of convenience Section 13(1)(g) and (h) of the said Act are extracted hereinbelow: “13. For the sake of convenience Section 13(1)(g) and (h) of the said Act are extracted hereinbelow: “13. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act but subject to the provisions of Section 15, a landlord shall be entitled to recover possession of any premises if the Court is satisfied (g) that the premises are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for occupation by himself or by any person for whose benefit the premises are held or where the landlord is a trustee of a public charitable trust that the premises are required for occupation for the purposes of the trust; or (gg) that the premises consist of not more than two floors and are reasonably and bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing them and such demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting new building on the premises sought to be demolished.” After considering the aforementioned provisions of Section 13(1)(g) and (hh) of the Bombay Act, in the said case of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta (supra), the Supreme Court held that once the landlord establishes that he bona fide requires the premises for his own occupation, he is entitled to recover possession of it from the tenant in view of the provisions of Section 13(1)(g) of the Act. The Supreme Court further held that when the plaintiff-landlord bona fide required the premises for his own occupation, even if he has to demolish the premises and erect a new building, the provisions of Section 13(1)(hh) of the said Bombay Act cannot apply; the provisions of Section 13(1)(hh) of the Bombay Act , will apply to cases where the landlord does not require the premises for his own occupation, but requires them for erecting a new building and in such case the provisions contained in sub-section (3A) of the said Bombay Act requiring the landlord to give certain undertakings with regard to the construction of the new building do not apply. Further, in the case of Radhey Shyam (supra) a question arose for the decision the Supreme Court with regard to the applicability of the grounds of eviction of a tenant contained in Section 12(1)(f) and (h) of the Madhya Pradesh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as “the Madhya Pradesh Act”). In this connection, Section 12(1) (e), (f), (g) and (h) of the Madhya Pradesh Act is extracted below: “12. In this connection, Section 12(1) (e), (f), (g) and (h) of the Madhya Pradesh Act is extracted below: “12. Restriction on eviction of tenants – (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or contract, no suit shall be filed in any Civil Court against a tenant for his eviction from any accommodation except on one or more of the following grounds only, namely:- e) that the accommodation let for residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for occupation as a residence for himself or for my member of his family, if he is the owner thereof, or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned; f) that the accommodation let for non-residential purposes is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of continuing or starting his business or that of any of his major sons or unmarried daughters if he is the owner thereof or for any person for whose benefit the accommodation is held and that the landlord or such person has no other reasonably suitable non-residential accommodation of his own in his occupation in the city or town concerned; g) that the accommodation has become unsafe, or unfit for human habitation and is required bona fide by the landlord for carrying out repairs which cannot be carried out with the accommodation being vacated; h) that the accommodation is required bona fide by the landlord for the purpose of building or rebuilding or making thereto any substantial additions or alterations and that such building or rebuilding or alteration cannot be carried out without the accommodation being vacated; Section 18 of the Madhya Pradesh Act provides that the court while granting decree on the grounds specified in clause (g) or (h) of sub-section (1) of Section 12, shall ascertain from the tenant whether he would like to be placed in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof from which he is to be evicted and on his so electing, shall record the fact of the election in the order specifying the date on or before which he shall deliver possession so as to enable the landlord to commence the work of repairs or building or rebuilding, as the case may be, and on the tenant delivering the possession within the date specified, the landlord shall, within one month of the completion of such work, place the tenant in occupation of the accommodation or part thereof. The ground of eviction under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Act is bona fide requirement of the landlord and the one under Section 12(1)(h) is for building or rebuilding of the suit premises subject to obligation of the landlord under Section 18 of the Act to provide accommodation of equal extent to the tenants in the new building to be constructed by him. In the said case of Radhey Shyam (supra) the landlord filed the suit for eviction against the tenant on both the grounds under clauses (f) and (h) of Section 12(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Act. The trial Court, first appellate Court and the High Court found that the plaintiff-landlord proved his bona fide requirement of the suit property and ordered eviction of the tenant under Section 12(1)(f) and (h) of the Act. The defendant-tenant raised a contention before the Supreme Court that since the Courts have ordered their eviction also under Section 12(1)(h) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, Section 18 of the said Act is attracted and it is obligatory on the part of the landlord to provide accommodation of equal extent to the tenants in the new building to be constructed by him. The Supreme Court, however, by following the decision in the case of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta (supra) rejected such contention of the tenants-appellants and held that when the landlord proved the ground of bona fide requirement of the suit premises for his own occupation, he is entitled to recover possession of the suit premises from the tenant under Section 12(1)(f) of the Madhya Pradesh Act and Section 18 of the Act shall not be applicable in the case. Similarly, in the case of Kusum Devi (supra) a question arose for the decision of the Supreme Court, whether a landlord can sue a tenant for his eviction on both the grounds under 12(1)(e) and 12(1)(g) of the Madhya Pradesh Act, that is, for bona fide requirement of his own occupation and also for bona fide requirement to carry out repairing of the suit premises which has become unsafe and unfit for human habitation and obtain a decree for eviction on both the said grounds. As mentioned above, if a Court passes a decree for eviction against the tenant under Section 12(1)(g) or Section 12(1)(h) of the Madhya Pradesh Act , the tenant has a right to be put into possession of the area covered by his tenancy in the repaired building or the new building, as the case may be. After considering all the aforementioned and other decisions of the Court, in paragraph 50 of the said decision the Supreme Court held that a Court can pass decree under clauses (e) and (g) both, in that eventuality, the same shall be deemed to have been passed mainly under clause (e) and Section 18 of the Act shall not apply. The provisions contained in Section 13(1)(f) and (ff) and Section 18A of the Act of 1956 applicable to the instant case, are pari-materia with the provisions contained in Sections 13(1)(g) and 13(1)(hh) of the Bombay Act, 1947 and the provisions contained in Section 12(1)(g) and 12(1)(h), Section 12(1)(e) and Section 12(1)(f) and Section 18 of the Madhya Pradesh Act. Therefore, the ratio of the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases of Ramniklal Pitambardas Mehta, (supra) Radhey Shyam (supra) and Kusum Devi (supra) are squarely applicable in this case involving Section 13(1) (f) and (ff) and Section 18A of the Act of 1956. Thus, following the sound logic and reasoning laid down by the Supreme Court in the said cases, when a landlord has sued his tenant for his eviction on both the grounds under clauses (f) and (ff) of sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act of 1956 and the landlord has proved both the said grounds of eviction and obtained the decree on the ground of clause (f) or on both the grounds of (f) and (ff) of 13(1) of the Act, Section 18A of the Act shall not apply and any statement made by the landlord or his witness in support of the ground of eviction under Section 13(1)(f) of the Act that he is ready to accommodate the tenant in the new building shall be of no consequence. From the judgment of this Court sought to be reviewed by the appellants-applicants, it is ex facie evident that while deciding the second appeal, this Court considered and followed all the aforementioned decisions of the Supreme Court. From the judgment of this Court sought to be reviewed by the appellants-applicants, it is ex facie evident that while deciding the second appeal, this Court considered and followed all the aforementioned decisions of the Supreme Court. Accordingly, the judgment of this Court deciding the substantial question of law in the second appeal against the defendant-appellant is not vitiated by any error of law. For the aforesaid reasons, I find no merit in this review application, and the same stands dismissed, with costs assessed at Rs. 5,000/-(Rupees five thousand only) to be paid by the appellants-applicants to the respondents within one month from this date. In the event of nonpayment of said amount of costs, the respondents shall be entitled to execute this order against the appellants-applicants. Consequently, the application CAN 5780 of 2014 also stands rejected. Urgent certified photostat copies of this order, if applied for, be supplied to the parties subject to compliance with all requisite formalities.