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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 951 (MP)

Ayub Khan v. Tarannum Khan

2015-09-09

SUJOY PAUL

body2015
ORDER 1. In view of commonality of issues involved, these petitions were analogously heard on the joint request of the parties and are decided by this common order. 2. The facts are taken from Miscellaneous Criminal Case No.2009/2010. The complainant filed a complaint case against the petitioners on the ground that they had taken her to her in-law's place. At that place, she has been misbehaved and assaulted. The petitioners demanded Rs.1.00 lac as dowry. In the complaint, it is mentioned that later on she came back to her parental house at Gwalior. In 2001, a daughter was born from the wedlock. In the complaint, it is specifically mentioned that the husband took the complainant with him on various occasions but ultimately left her at her parental house at Gwalior. Thus, complaint was preferred to punish the petitioners under section 498A read with section 34 IPC. 3. Shri Gohadkar and Shri Achara challenged the complaint on the ground that it is hopelessly barred by time and the Court at Gwalior does not have jurisdiction because the alleged incident had taken place at Bombay. They relied on certain judgments. In addition, Shri Gohadkar contended that during pendency of this matter, the complainant has secured divorce and she has married somebody. 4. Prayer is opposed by Shri J. P. Mishra, learned counsel for the complainant. He submits that at this stage, no interference is warranted. 5. No other point is pressed by the parties. 6. I have heard the parties and perused the record. 7. Section 468(2)(c) of CrPC reads as under :- “468. Bar to taking cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation- (1) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Code, no Court shall take cognizance of an offence of the category specified in sub-section (2), after the expiry of the period of limitation. (2) The period of limitation shall be – (a) xxx xxx xxx (b) xxx xxx xxx (c) three years, if the offence is punishable with imprisonment for a term exceeding one year but not exceeding three years.” A plain reading of this provision shows that limitation is three years because the punishment for offence under section 498A IPC is only three years. A plain reading of averments of complaint shows that it was filed for certain allegations beyond the said period of limitation. A plain reading of averments of complaint shows that it was filed for certain allegations beyond the said period of limitation. Apart from this, the averments of complaint show that after marriage, the complainant went to her in-law's house. In the complaint itself, the address of in-laws house is given as “Jakariya Agadhi Compound, New Prakash Nagar, Dargah Cross Road, Bhandup, Sonapur, Mumbai-78 (Maharashtra)”. 8. The apex Court in (2004)8 SCC 100 (Y. Abraham Ajith and others v. Inspector of Police, Chennai and another), opined as under :- “Sections 177 reiterates the well-established common law rule referred to in Halsbury's Laws of England that the proper and ordinary venue for the trial of a crime is the area of jurisdiction in which, on the evidence, the facts occur and which alleged to constitute the crime. There are several exceptions to this general rule and some of them are, so far as the present case is concerned, indicated in section 178 CrPC. A significant word used in section 177 is “ordinary”. Use of the word indicates that the provision is a general one and must be read subject to the special provisions contained in CrPC. No such exception is applicable to the case at hand. In the instant case, the complainant herself left the house of the husband on 15.4.1997 on account of alleged dowry demands by the husband and his relations. There is thereafter not even a whisper of allegations about any demand of dowry or commission of any act constituting an offence much less at C. That being so, the logic of section 178(c) CrPC relating to continuance of the offences cannot be applied. The crucial question is whether any part of the cause of action arose within the jurisdiction of the concerned Court. In terms of section 177 CrPC, it is the place where the offence was committed. In essence, it is the cause of action for initiation of the proceedings against the accused.” (Emphasis Supplied) The same view is followed by the apex Court in 2007(1) JLJ 198 (SC)= 2007(1) MPHT 14 (SC) (Manish Ratan and others v. State of M.P. and another), wherein it is held as under :- “In a case of this nature, an offence cannot be held to be a continuing one, only because the complainant is forced to leave her matrimonial home.” 9. In view of the aforesaid legal position, I find force in the arguments of Shri Gohadkar and Shri Achara that the complaint is erroneously filed and entertained at Gwalior. The complaint is barred by time and is filed before a Court, which does not have jurisdiction to deal with it. 10. For the aforesaid reasons, the petitions deserve to be and are hereby allowed. Private Complaint Case No.5707/2009 (Smt. Tarannum v. Iqbal Khan and others), pending in the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gwalior is set aside to the extent it relates to the petitioners. ..........