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2015 DIGILAW 958 (GUJ)

SHAISHAV BHAVEN SHAH (MINOR) v. STATE OF GUJARAT

2015-09-30

ABHILASHA KUMARI

body2015
JUDGMENT : 1. Rule. Ms.Sangeeta Vishen, learned Assistant Government Pleader, waives service of notice of Rule for the respondents. Considering the facts of the case, the learned counsel for the respective parties submit that the petition may be heard and decided finally, at this stage. 2. The challenge in this petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, is to Rule 7(1)C(4) of the Gujarat Professional Medical Educational Courses (Regulation of Admission and Payment of Fees) (Amendment) Act, 2015 (“the Rules” for short), published vide Notification dated 29.05.2015, in exercise of powers conferred by subsection (1) of Section 20 read with Section 4 of the Gujarat Professional Medical Educational Colleges or Institutions (Regulation of Admission and Fixation of Fess) Act, 2007. The petitioner has further prayed to direct the respondents to distribute the NRI Dependant Quota seats on prorata basis according to the different Boards and prepare a meritlist of NRI Dependant Quota seats as per Rules 10 and 11 of the Rules. 3. The petitioner is a student who has completed the 12th standard in May 2015 from the Gujarat State Education Board. The petitioner has secured 83.25% marks in the said examination and has also appeared in the GUJCET examination, securing 98.75/120 marks. Being desirous of obtaining admission in the MBBS course, the petitioner applied for admission to the said course under the NRI Dependent Quota in (1) NHL AMC Ahmedabad, (2) AMC MET Ahmedabad (3) SMI MER Surat, (4) Karamsad Medical College Karamsad, (5) CU Shah Medical College, Surendranagar, (6) GCS Medical College, Ahmedabad and (7) Adani Medical College, Bhuj, pursuant to advertisements issued by the above colleges and institutions. According to the petitioner, Rule 7(1)C(4) of the Rules, which lay down the procedure for admission to NRI seats, is discriminatory and arbitrary as it does not take into consideration the distribution of seats between the students of the Gujarat Board and other Boards on a prorata basis, as provided in Rule 10 of the Rules in respect of the NRI Dependent Quota under which the petitioner falls. 4. 4. Mr.A.S.Asthavadi, learned counsel for the petitioner, has submitted that Rule 7(1)C(4) of the Rules stipulates that admission to the NRI seats shall be given by the management of the respective Professional Medical Educational Colleges or Institutions on the basis of inter se merit of the candidates, by taking into consideration the total theory marks obtained in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Biology, only in the manner provided in the said Rule. It is submitted that the operation of this Rule would mean that candidates from other Boards in the country, including the Gujarat Board, would compete in the inter se merit, resulting in discrimination against students such as the petitioner, who have studied from the Gujarat Board, as the marks obtained by students in other Boards may be higher than the marks obtained by the students of the Gujarat Board. Though the students of the Gujarat Board are capable and meritorious, they are unable to obtain a higher percentage, therefore, it is necessary to apply the Rule of prorata distribution of seats as per Rule 10 to the admission process for the NRI Dependant Quota. 5. Referring to Rule 10 of the Rules, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that this Rule stipulates that for the purpose of admission, the available seats shall be distributed between students of Gujarat Board and other Boards on prorata basis taking into consideration the number of students passed from the Gujarat Board, Central Boards and the Council of Indian School Certificate Examinations, New Delhi, in the relative academic year. Learned counsel for the petitioner has emphatically submitted that the reference to Central Boards is in the plural, which means that there are more than one Central Board. It is submitted that the placement of Rule 10 is after Rule 7(1)A, concerning Government Quota, 7(1)B concerning Management Quota and Rule 7(1)C concerning NRI Quota, meaning thereby that Rule 10 is applicable to admissions to the NRI Quota which are governed by Rule 7(1)(C)(4). It would mean that Rule 10 would apply to the Management Seats and NRI Seats, equally. It would mean that Rule 10 would apply to the Management Seats and NRI Seats, equally. The learned counsel for the petitioner further submits that in the present case, the respondents have distributed the seats on prorata basis only with regard to Government seats and the prorata rule has not been applied to the NRI or NRI Dependent Seats, which has resulted in discrimination to the petitioner and similarly situated candidates. 6. Regarding the logic behind the prorata distribution rule, the learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that if the percentage of students passing from different Boards is considered at par, it would lead to disadvantage to some students and undue benefit to others. Therefore, by way of the prorata rule, rationalisation of marks has been done so that the seats could be distributed in proportion to a number of students from a particular Board. There is no reason why this Rule should not be applied to the NRI and NRI Dependant Quota, as well. Non applicability of Rule of prorata distribution of seats to the NRI Dependent Quota has resulted in illegality and arbitrariness which would work to the detriment of the petitioner. 7. Clarifying the challenge made to Rule 7(1)C(4) of the Rules, it is submitted that the entire Rule is not under challenge in the petition but only the opening portion of the Rule, where it is provided that admission to NRI seats would be given on the basis of inter se merit of the candidates by considering the total theory marks obtained in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Biology, has been challenged and not the rest of Rule 7(1)C(4). While preparing the inter se merit list, students from all Boards who have applied for admission under the NRI Dependant category would be considered to the detriment of the petitioner. To consider the students from all Boards as a class would not be rational as the marking and examination system of different Boards is different. 8. Regarding the maintainability of the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the concerned colleges where the petitioner has applied for admission have not been made party-respondents to the petition as respondent No.2 – Admission Committee for Professional Medical Education Courses (“the Admission Committee” for short) is already a party. 8. Regarding the maintainability of the petitioner, learned counsel for the petitioner has submitted that the concerned colleges where the petitioner has applied for admission have not been made party-respondents to the petition as respondent No.2 – Admission Committee for Professional Medical Education Courses (“the Admission Committee” for short) is already a party. Respondent No.2 – Admission Committee has an important role to play, as can be seen from Rule 7(1)C(4)(iv) and 7(1)C(5) of the Rules. When the Admission Committee, which is a supervisory body, has been made party, there is no requirement of making individual colleges as party-respondents. 9. In support of the submission that Rule 10 would be applicable to admissions to the NRI Dependent Seats, it is submitted that the legislature has not expressly excluded such category from the said Rule. Reference is made by the learned counsel for the petitioner to a judgment of this Court in the case of B.Premanand And Others v. Mohan Koikal And Others – (2011) 4 SCC 266 , wherein, the Supreme Court has held as below: “8. In M/s. Hiralal Ratanlal vs. State of U.P., AIR 1973 SC 1034 , this Court observed: "22. ......In construing a statutory provision, the first and foremost rule of construction is the literal construction. All that the Court has to see at the very outset is what does the provision say. If the provision is unambiguous and if from the provision the legislative intent is clear, the court need not call into aid the other rules of construction of statutes. The other rules of construction are called into aid only when the legislative intent is not clear." (AIR p.1035) 9. It may be mentioned in this connection that the first and foremost principle of interpretation of a statute in every system of interpretation is the literal rule of interpretation. The other rules of interpretation e.g. the mischief rule, purposive interpretation etc. can only be resorted to when the plain words of a statute are ambiguous or lead to no intelligible results or if read literally would nullify the very object of the statute. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide Swedish Match AB vs. SEBI, AIR 2004 SC 4219 . ... ... ... 23. Where the words of a statute are absolutely clear and unambiguous, recourse cannot be had to the principles of interpretation other than the literal rule, vide Swedish Match AB vs. SEBI, AIR 2004 SC 4219 . ... ... ... 23. In Gurudevdatta VKSSS Maryadit vs. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2001 SC 1980 , this Court observed : (SCC pp.55253, para 26) "26. ...It is a cardinal principle of interpretation of statute that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and construed according to their grammatical meaning, unless such construction leads to some absurdity or unless there is something in the context or in the object of the statute to suggest to the contrary. The golden rule is that the words of a statute must prima facie be given their ordinary meaning. It is yet another rule of construction that when the words of the statute are clear, plain and unambiguous, then the courts are bound to give effect to that meaning, irrespective of the consequences. It is said that the words themselves best declare the intention of the lawgiver. The courts have adhered to the principle that efforts should be made to give meaning to each and every word used by the legislature and it is not a sound principle of construction to brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surpluses, if they can have a proper application in circumstances conceivable within the contemplation of the statute". 10. Relying upon the above judgment, Mr. Asthavadi has contended that Rule 10 is clear and unambiguous and deserves to be interpreted as it is. Taking the Rule as it is, it does not emerge from the said Rule that its applicability is restricted only to the Government quota and it does not apply to the NRI Dependant Quota. 11. On the basis of the above submissions, it is urged that the petition be allowed. 12. The petition has been strongly opposed by Ms.Sangeeta Vishen, learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for the respondents. 13. A preliminary objection has been raised that the petition suffers from the vice of non-joinder of necessary parties, namely, the colleges where the petitioner has applied for admission. 12. The petition has been strongly opposed by Ms.Sangeeta Vishen, learned Assistant Government Pleader, appearing for the respondents. 13. A preliminary objection has been raised that the petition suffers from the vice of non-joinder of necessary parties, namely, the colleges where the petitioner has applied for admission. It is submitted by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the said colleges are necessary parties as, if the contentions of the petitioner are accepted and Rule 7(1)C(4) is set aside, it would lead to disastrous consequences as the said Rule has already been implemented and operated by the concerned institutions and admissions have been granted to students. Both the students and the institutions would be adversely affected. 14. On merits, it is submitted that Rule 10, which provides for distribution of seats between the students of the Gujarat Board and other Boards mentioned in the said Rule on prorata basis, is not applicable to the NRI and NRI Dependent seats for the reason that both the Apex Court and a Division Bench of this Court have observed that the NRI category is a homogeneous group and further classification in the said group is not permissible. 15. In support of the above contention, reliance has been placed upon P.A.Inamdar And others v. State of Maharashtra And Others – (2005)6 SCC 537 , and judgment dated 07.09.2015 passed by the Division Bench in the case of Kolasani Sai Yashwanth Reddy v. State of Gujarat And Others – Special Civil Application No.l0635 of 2015. 16. The relevant extract relied upon by the learned Assistant Government Pleader in P.A.Inamdar And others v. State of Maharashtra And Others (supra) is reproduced hereinbelow: “131. Here itself we are inclined to deal with the question as to seats allocated for Non-Resident Indians (’NRI’, for short) or NRI seats. It is common knowledge that some of the institutions grant admissions to certain number of students under such quota by charging a higher amount of fee. In fact, the term ’NRI’ in relation to admissions is a misnomer. By and large, we have noticed in cases after cases coming to this Court, neither the students who get admissions under this category nor their parents are NRIs. In effect and reality, under this category, less meritorious students, but who can afford to bring more money, get admission. In fact, the term ’NRI’ in relation to admissions is a misnomer. By and large, we have noticed in cases after cases coming to this Court, neither the students who get admissions under this category nor their parents are NRIs. In effect and reality, under this category, less meritorious students, but who can afford to bring more money, get admission. During the course of hearing, it was pointed out that a limited number of such seats should be made available as the money brought by such students admitted against NRI quota enables the educational institutions to strengthen its level of education and also to enlarge its educational activities. It was also pointed out that people of Indian origin, who have migrated to other countries, have a desire to bring back their children to their own country as they not only get education but also get reunited with Indian cultural ethos by virtue of being here. They also wish the money which they would be spending elsewhere on education of their children should rather reach their own motherland. A limited reservation of such seats, not exceeding 15%, in our opinion, may be made available to NRIs depending on the discretion of the management subject to two conditions. First, such seats should be utilized bona fide by the NRIs only and for their children or wards. Secondly, within this quota, the merit should not be given a complete goby. The amount of money, in whatever form collected from such NRIs, should be utilized for benefiting students such as from economically weaker sections of the society, whom, on well defined criteria, the educational institution may admit on subsidized payment of their fee. To prevent misutilisation of such quota or any malpractice referable to NRI quota seats, suitable legislation or regulation needs to be framed. So long as the State does not do it, it will be for the Committees constituted pursuant to direction in Islamic Academy to regulate.“ (emphasis supplied) 17. On the basis of the above observations, it is strenuously submitted by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that, while making admissions to the NRI category, merit cannot be ignored. It is submitted that Rule 7(1)C(4) of the Rules is a self-contained code which applies to the entire procedure for admission to the NRI and NRI Dependent Seats. On the basis of the above observations, it is strenuously submitted by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that, while making admissions to the NRI category, merit cannot be ignored. It is submitted that Rule 7(1)C(4) of the Rules is a self-contained code which applies to the entire procedure for admission to the NRI and NRI Dependent Seats. The said Rule clearly provides for inter se merit on the basis of the merit list of the candidates, by considering the total theory marks obtained in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Biology in the manner prescribed. It is submitted that if, as claimed by the petitioner, Rule 10 is made applicable to NRI seats, it would result in the erosion of merit and would render the entire Rule 7(1)C(4) unworkable. It is reiterated that Rule 10 would not apply to NRI seats, which are governed by Rule 7(1)4(C), but would apply only to Government seats. 18. The learned Assistant Government Pleader has referred extensively to the judgment of the Division Bench in B.Premanand And Others v. Mohan Koikal And Others (supra) wherein Rule 7(1)C(4) came for consideration, though for a different purpose. The petitioner therein had challenged the restriction element of `domicile’ that was present in the said Rule. The Division Bench struck down the element of `domicile’ and, while doing so, held as below: “20. The admissions to the Professional Medical Educational Courses in the category of N.R.I. shall be governed under the present Rules including Rule 7(1)C(4) except the part of it struck down and declared ultra vires as above. The respondents are directed to commence and complete the admission process in light of the aforesaid declarations and directions, without delaying the Academic Year.” 19. It is submitted that the Division Bench has held that the admission to the Professional Medical Educational Courses in the category of NRI which would include NRI Dependent Quota would be governed under Rule 7(1)C(4) (except for that part which has been struck down). According to the learned Assistant Government Pleader, this would show that Rule 10 has no applicability, insofar as the admission of the petitioner to the NRI Dependent Quota is concerned, which is governed by Rule 7(1)C(4). 20. It is strongly argued by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the petitioner has not indicated even a single ground in the petition to justify his prayer for setting aside Rule 7(1)C(4). 20. It is strongly argued by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the petitioner has not indicated even a single ground in the petition to justify his prayer for setting aside Rule 7(1)C(4). Merely by saying that the said Rule should be struck down does not mean that the Court would consider doing so, without any legal or valid grounds. The only ground that can be discerned in the petition is GroundH, wherein the petitioner has stated that students from different Boards ought to be excluded from the inter se merit of NRI students as per Rule 7(1)C(4) as this Rule is detrimental to the students from Gujarat Board who secure lesser marks but may be more meritorious. It is submitted that this contention of the petitioner would result in giving a gobye to merit, which is not permissible in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in P.A.Inamdar’s case, as also that of the Division Bench referred to above, in addition to rendering the said Rule totally unworkable. 21. On the strength of the above submissions, the learned Assistant Government Pleader has prayed for the rejection of the petition. 22. By making submissions in rejoinder, learned counsel for the petitioner has referred to Paragraph6 of the affidavit-in-reply filed on behalf of the State Government and has clarified that it is not true that the petitioner is claiming that merit should be ignored. The petitioner is only stating that his merit for admission to the NRI Dependant category should be considered visavis students of the Gujarat Board only and not of other Boards. Distinguishing the judgment of the Division Bench, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the said judgment is not applicable to the facts of the present case as it was rendered on the issue of domicile, which is not in issue in this petition. 23. This Court has heard learned counsel for the respective parties at length, perused the averments made in the petition and other documents on record. 24. Before discussing and dealing with the respective submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respective parties, the Court considers it appropriate to address the preliminary objection raised by the learned Assistant Government Pleader. 25. The cause-title of the petition reveals that only two respondents have been impleaded. 24. Before discussing and dealing with the respective submissions advanced by learned counsel for the respective parties, the Court considers it appropriate to address the preliminary objection raised by the learned Assistant Government Pleader. 25. The cause-title of the petition reveals that only two respondents have been impleaded. The first respondent is the State of Gujarat and the second respondent is the Chairman of the Admission Committee for Professional Medical Educational Courses. The respective colleges in which the petitioner had sought admission (seven in number) have not been made party-respondents. According to the learned counsel for the petitioner, the said colleges are not necessary parties as respondent No.2 – Admission Committee, which is the supervisory body for admission to all institutions, has been impleaded. On the other hand, the learned Assistant Government Pleader has submitted that as per Rule 7(1)C, it is the college or the institution that is supposed to publish an advertisement in two English and two Gujarati leading newspapers for the purpose of inviting applications from eligible candidates for admission to the Professional Medical Educational Courses on the Non-Resident Indian seats. It is further submitted by the learned Assistant Government Pleader that the issue of application forms and other details of fees, eligibility criteria and number of seats available for admission in the NRI quota has to be dealt with by the respective institutions and not by the Admission Committee. Further, the admission process is now already over and the students have been admitted to the respective colleges. If the petitioner succeeds, not only would the newly-admitted students be affected adversely, but also the respective institutions and colleges. 26. A perusal of Rule 7(1)C of the Rules does indicate that the process of issuing advertisements in newspapers and inviting applications from the eligible candidates is to be carried out by the respective colleges and institutions. All other consequential matters such as issue of application forms, fees, the last date for submission of application forms, details of fees to be paid, the eligibility criteria and number of seats available for admission to the NRI seats is also to be dealt with by the concerned colleges or institutions and not by the Admission Committee. All other consequential matters such as issue of application forms, fees, the last date for submission of application forms, details of fees to be paid, the eligibility criteria and number of seats available for admission to the NRI seats is also to be dealt with by the concerned colleges or institutions and not by the Admission Committee. The only role to be played by respondent No.2 – Admission Committee as per Rule 7(1)C(4)(iv) and (5) is to supervise, monitor and coordinate the counselling of NRI seats in various disciplines and fix the date and venue for the purpose of counselling of such seats. It has been pointed out by the learned Assistant Government Pleader and not denied by the learned counsel for the petitioner that the admission process to the Professional Medical Educational Courses on the NRI Dependent Seats, the category to which the petitioner belongs, is over. As per the directions of the Supreme Court as well as the requirement of the Rules, this process is to be completed by 30th September, each year. Today, therefore, is the last date for the admission process. If the entire process is to be completed by today and admissions given to the eligible candidates, it cannot be said that the preliminary objection taken by the learned Assistant Government Pleader is without force. The petitioner ought to have impleaded the respective colleges /institutions as party-respondents, as a favourable decision of the petition would have had an adverse effect on the students who have already been admitted, as well as upon the respective colleges /institutions. In fact, the result would have been so disastrous that it would mean that the entire process carried out so far would be set at naught. In the view of this Court, therefore, the petition suffers from the vice of non-joinder of necessary parties and cannot succeed on this preliminary ground. 27. On merits, the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner essentially focus upon the applicability of Rule 10 to the admission process of the NRI Dependent seats, as envisaged in Rule 7(1)C(4) of the Rules. 27. On merits, the submissions advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner essentially focus upon the applicability of Rule 10 to the admission process of the NRI Dependent seats, as envisaged in Rule 7(1)C(4) of the Rules. The main contention raised by the learned advocate for the petitioner is that a plain reading of Rule 10 goes to show that it pertains to “the available seats” and refers to seats which shall be distributed between students of Gujarat Board and other Board on prorata basis, taking into consideration the number of students passed from the Gujarat Board, Central Boards and the Council of Indian School Certificate Examinations, New Delhi, in the relative academic year. According to the petitioner, this Rule does not restrict itself only to Government seats, as has been submitted by the respondents. The emphasis on behalf of the petitioner is that Rule 10 ought to be read in literal manner, as stated by the Supreme Court in B.Premanand And Others v. Mohan Koikal And Others (supra). 28. There can be no doubt regarding the proposition of law that while considering a statutory provision, the first and foremost rule is the rule of literal construction and other forms of interpretation can only be resorted to if the plain words of a statute are ambiguous, lead to unintelligible results or, if read literally, would nullify the object of the statute. 29. At first blush, the submission advanced by the learned counsel for the petitioner, to the effect that Rule 10 regarding prorata distribution of seats between the Gujarat Board and other Boards is not restricted to only Government seats, appears to be deceptively attractive. To examine this submission, the Court would first have to decide whether Rule 10 is applicable to admissions to Professional Medical Educational Courses in the NRI Dependent Quota, or not. Only if it is found to be applicable would the question of the interpretation of the Rule arise. If Rule 10 is not found to be applicable, then interpretation of this Rule would be an exercise in futility. 30. The relevant Rule governing admissions to the Professional Medical Educational Courses in the NRI and NRI Dependent quota is Rule 7(1)C(4). As it is important in the context of the present case, it is reproduced hereinbelow: “7(1)C(4). If Rule 10 is not found to be applicable, then interpretation of this Rule would be an exercise in futility. 30. The relevant Rule governing admissions to the Professional Medical Educational Courses in the NRI and NRI Dependent quota is Rule 7(1)C(4). As it is important in the context of the present case, it is reproduced hereinbelow: “7(1)C(4). Admission on the Nonresident Indian seats shall be given by the management of the respective Professional Medical Educational College or Institution on the basis of interse merit list of the candidates (total theory marks obtained in Physics, Chemistry and Biology subject only), who have applied for admission against the Non-Resident Indian seats in the following manner, namely: (i) The candidate who is Non-Resident Indian as also the candidate whose parents and in the absence of his/her parents, his/her legal guardian who is Non-Resident Indian, shall be offered the Non-Resident Indian seats in the first instance, and thereafter, the Non-Resident Indian seats, if remains vacant, shall be offered to the candidate who is dependent of NRI in merit list. The candidate/ parents who are domicile of Gujarat State falling under merit list shown against item (a) below shall be considered first and thereafter candidates falling in the merit lists shown against items (b), (c) and (d) shall be considered respectively. Merit list shall be prepared and operated in the following order: (a) Merit list of Genuine NRI who are domicile of Gujarat (b) Merit list of Genuine NRI who are not domicile of Gujarat (c) Merit list of dependent NRI who are domicile of Gujarat (d) Merit list of dependent NRI who are not domicile of Gujarat. (ii) The candidate whose guardian is Non-Resident Indian shall have to produce necessary proof to the satisfaction of the concerned College or Institution establishing that in the absence of his/her parents, the concerned person has been legally appointed as his/her guardian; and (iii) The candidate who is dependent of Non-Resident Indian shall have to produce necessary proof in support thereof to the satisfaction of the concerned College or Institution. (iv) The Admission Committee shall supervise, monitor and coordinate the counseling of NRI Seats in various disciplines.” 31. (iv) The Admission Committee shall supervise, monitor and coordinate the counseling of NRI Seats in various disciplines.” 31. This Rule clearly stipulates that admission to Non Resident Indian seats shall be given by the management of the respective Professional Medical Educational College or Institution on the basis of inter se merit list of candidates by considering the total theory marks obtained in the subjects of Physics, Chemistry and Biology. Merit is, therefore the primary consideration for admission. The manner in which admission is to be granted is indicated thereafter. 32. It may be stated that by the operation of the judgment of the Division Bench in Kolasani Sai Yashwanth Reddy v. State of Gujarat And Others – Special Civil Application No.l0635 of 2015, only two categories in the NRI quota now remain, which are the genuine NRI and dependent NRI categories. As noticed earlier, the mode and manner of granting admission is by inter se merit. There can be no compromise in that sphere. Rule 7(1)C(4) contemplates that the inter se merit of all candidates, irrespective of which Board they have passed out from, is to be considered; Meaning thereby, that there is no prorata distribution of seats as per Rule 10 between the Gujarat Board and the other Boards insofar as admission under Rule 7(1)C(4) is concerned. Rule 7(1)C is a complete code by itself, which governs the process of admission to NRI seats from the inception to the conclusion. An attempt to introducing the system of prorata distribution in the said admission process governed by Rule 7(1)C(4) would mean reading into it something that is not meant to be there, in the first place. It would amount to legislating by this Court, which is not permissible. A, a careful reading of Rule 7(1)C(4) makes it clear that it is not dependent on Rule 10 in any manner. The provisions of Rule 10, therefore, cannot be imported or read into the said rule. 33. In H.S.Vankani And Others v. State of Gujarat And Others – (2010)4 SCC 301 , the Supreme Court has held as below: “43. It is a well-known Rule of construction that the provisions of a statute must be construed so as to give them a sensible meaning. 33. In H.S.Vankani And Others v. State of Gujarat And Others – (2010)4 SCC 301 , the Supreme Court has held as below: “43. It is a well-known Rule of construction that the provisions of a statute must be construed so as to give them a sensible meaning. The legislature expects the court to observe the maxim ut res magis valeat quam pereat (it is better for a thing to have effect than to be made void). Principle also means that if the obvious intention of the statute gives rise to obstacles in implementation, the court must do its best to find ways of overcoming those obstacles, so as to avoid absurd results. It is a wellsettled principle of interpretation of statutes that a construction should not be put on a statutory provision which would lead to manifest absurdity, futility, palpable injustice and absurd inconvenience or anomaly. 44. In this connection reference may be made to the judgment in R. (Edition First Power Ltd.) v. Central Valuation Officer and another (2003) 4 ALL ER 209 wherein Lord Millett said (ALL ER pp.11617: "116. ...The courts will presume that Parliament did not intend a statute to have consequences which are objectionable or undesirable; or absurd; or unworkable or impracticable; or merely inconvenient; or anomalous or illogical; or futile or pointless. 117. But the strength of these presumptions depends on the degree to which a particular construction produces an unreasonable result. The more unreasonable a result, the less likely it is that Parliament intended it....." 45. Reference may also be made in the Judgment in Andhra Bank v. B. Satyanarayana (2004) 2 SCC, 657, wherein this Court has held (SCC p.662, para 14): "14. A machinery provision, it is trite, must be construed in such a manner so as to make it workable having regard to the doctrine " ut res magis valeat quam pereat ". 46. In Tinsukhia Electric Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam (1989) 3 SCC 709 , this Court held as follows (SCC p.754, para 118): "118. The courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of a statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle "ut res magis valeat quam pereat". Ltd. v. State of Assam (1989) 3 SCC 709 , this Court held as follows (SCC p.754, para 118): "118. The courts strongly lean against any construction which tends to reduce a statute to futility. The provision of a statute must be so construed as to make it effective and operative, on the principle "ut res magis valeat quam pereat". It is, no doubt, true that if a statute is absolutely vague and its language wholly intractable and absolutely meaningless, the statute could be declared void for vagueness. This is not in judicial review by testing the law for arbitrariness or unreasonableness under Article 14; but what a court of construction, dealing with the language of a statute, does in order to ascertain from, and accord to, the statute the meaning and purpose which the legislature intended for it." 47. Reference may also be made to the decision in Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India (1971) 1 SCC 85 , Union of India v. B.S. Agarwal (1997) 8 SCC 89 , and Paradise Printers v. UT of Chandigarh (1988) 1 SCC 440 . 48. The above legal principles clearly indicate that the courts have to avoid a construction of an enactment that leads to an unworkable, inconsistent or impracticable results, since such a situation is unlikely to have been envisaged by the rulemaking authority. rulemaking authority also expects rule framed by it to be made workable and never visualises absurd results. The decision taken by the government in deputing the non-graduates (1979-81 batch) to a two-year training course and graduates (1980-81 batch) to a one-year training is in due compliance with Rule 10 of 1969 Rules and Rule 18 of 1974 Rules and the seniority of the both batches has been rightly settled vide Orders dated 12.10.1982 and 5.3.1987 and the Government has committed an error in unsettling the seniority under its proceedings dated 29.9.1993.” 34. The above principles of law enunciated by the Supreme Court would be squarely applicable to the present case. If the contention of the petitioner is accepted and the provisions of Rule 10 are read into Rule 7(1)C(4), it would result in rendering Rule 7(1)C(4) nugatory and otiose. It would also result in obliterating the element of merit in the admission process to the genuine NRI and NRI Dependent seats, which could never have been the intention of the legislature. It would also result in obliterating the element of merit in the admission process to the genuine NRI and NRI Dependent seats, which could never have been the intention of the legislature. Such an interpretation would militate against all canons of law and against the principles of law laid down by the Apex Court in P.A.Inamdar’s case. 35. The attempt on the part of the petitioner appears to be to introduce the Rule of domicile through Rule 10 in the NRI Dependent seats through the backdoor, even though it has already been struck down by the Division Bench of this Court in Kolasani Sai Yashwanth Reddy v. State of Gujarat And Others – Special Civil Application No.l0635 of 2015. 36. This is made clear from a perusal of Ground-H in the memorandum of the petition, where the petitioner has stated that students from other Boards obtain higher marks than the students of Gujarat Board, though the latter may be more meritorious. The petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate an issue that has been concluded by the Division Bench and attempt to revive the rule of domicile in a different guise. 37. It has been submitted on behalf of the petitioner that he is being discriminated against. How, and in what manner the petitioner has been subjected to the alleged discrimination has not been substantiated. Rule 7(1)C(4) applies equally to all candidates including the petitioner. No grounds have been made out in support of this submission, which carries no force. 38. To sum up, it is clear from the perusal of the Rules that admission to the Professional Medical Educational Courses in NRI Dependent Quota, to which the petitioner belongs, is governed solely by Rule 7(1)4(C) and Rule 10 has nothing to do with the said process. This Court is, therefore, not called upon to interpret Rule 10, simply because it is not applicable in the process of admission. 39. For the aforestated reasons, this Court is of the firm view that the petition does not deserve acceptance. The petition fails and is rejected. Rule is discharged. There shall be no orders as to costs.