JUDGMENT : Hon’ble Sudhanshu Dhulia, J. 1. The rather chequered history of the above case before this Court is as follows. 2. There is a land at Village - Malakhpur Latifpur, Pargana 7 Tahsil Roorkee, District Haridwar, on which rights are being claimed by the present petitioners on the basis of certain sale deed as well as on the basis of their adverse possession. The private respondent nos. 1 to 11 also claim rights on the said property, primarily on the basis of adverse possession. Remaining respondent Nos. 12, 13 and 14, who are the Nagar Palika, Roorkee, State of Uttarakhand and Union of India, respectively also claim it to be “Nazul” property and Government land, respectively. Their claims and counterclaims by the rival parties have given rise to multiple litigations. A reference of these cases would be given in the paragraphs that follow. 3. The land in dispute is Khasra No.254/2, 255/2, 256/2, having an area of 0.389 hectares, 0.422 hectares and 0.374 hectares, respectively totaling to 1.185 hectares lying in Khewat No. 9, Muhal Ganga Ram, Village Malakhpur Latifpur, Pargana 7, Tahsil – Roorkee, District Haridwar. 4. According to the petitioners, they are and earlier their predecessors were, in possession of the said land w.e.f. 16.05.1961 when, according to the petitioners, the alleged tenants of the said land, namely, Wahidan and Meeru executed a registered deed of tenancy in favour of the predecessors of the petitioners, by which possession was granted to them on the land in dispute. Therefore, since 1961, they are in possession on the said land on the strength of the lease deed dated 16.05.1961. 5. The petitioners claim their initial possession on the land on the basis of a document executed in their favour by one Wahidan and Meeru, but then states in paragraph 4 of the writ petition that the land in question was principally vested with one Mr. Alfred Godfray Powell, who by virtue of a sale deed dated 29.02.1868 sold the said property to one Mr. James Henry Powell. The land subsequently devolved on one Mr. William Augustan Powell, who in turn, sold the land vide sale deed dated 29.03.1898 to a society, known as “Propagation of Gospel”, later known as “S.P.G. Mission”. 6. Alfred Godfray Powell, who by virtue of a sale deed dated 29.02.1868 sold the said property to one Mr. James Henry Powell. The land subsequently devolved on one Mr. William Augustan Powell, who in turn, sold the land vide sale deed dated 29.03.1898 to a society, known as “Propagation of Gospel”, later known as “S.P.G. Mission”. 6. The petitioners then state that Wahidan and Meeru (from whom earlier they had taken possession of the land by way of a deed, as referred earlier) were in fact the tenants of S.P.G. Mission. The S.P.G. Mission has now a new name, i.e. “Lucknow Diocese”. The petitioners then state that since the erstwhile S.P.G. Mission (now “Lucknow Diocese”) wanted to disturb the possession of Mr. Aman Ullah, who was the predecessor of the petitioners and had filed a suit being Suit No. 279 of 1966 against the predecessors of the petitioners, which was dismissed by the trial court. No further details, other than this, have been given regarding this aspect by the petitioners. 7. The petitioners then state that having failed in the civil suit, the S.P.G. Mission thereafter initiated proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. which also ultimately resulted in favour of the petitioners by virtue of an order dated 30.03.1967. It is therefore contended that the S.P.G. Mission (now the “Lucknow Diocese”) having failed in the above proceedings mentioned above, ultimately resolved to sell the said property in dispute to the predecessor of the petitioners i.e. Mr. Aman Ullah. Consequently, the S.P.G. Mission, by virtue of a sale deed dated 30.06.1970 sold that property to the petitioners’ predecessors, named as above and since then the petitioners are also the owner of the property. 8. Having stated the above facts, the petitioners thereafter state that even though they were not only in possession of the property, but also now had title over it by virtue of the sale deed referred above, yet the predecessors of the respondents, namely, Wahidan and Meeru were also staking their claim on the said property and as such the predecessors of the petitioners were constrained to file a suit being Revenue Suit No. 47 of 1973, Aman Ullah Vs. Wahidan. This suit was filed before the Revenue Authorities under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamidari Abolition and Land Revenue Act (from hereinafter referred to as “Zamidari Abolition Act”). In short, the said suit was for declaration. Wahidan. This suit was filed before the Revenue Authorities under Section 229-B of the U.P. Zamidari Abolition and Land Revenue Act (from hereinafter referred to as “Zamidari Abolition Act”). In short, the said suit was for declaration. The suit was decreed ex-parte on 26.03.1974. Consequently, an application by the said defendants, namely, Wahidan and Meeru (predecessors of the private respondents) under Order 9 Rule 13 of C.P.C. was also rejected. Against the said rejection of the application under Order 9 Rule 13 of C.P.C., private respondents filed an appeal being First Appeal No. 4 of 1979 which was allowed vide order dated 26.02.1982 and the matter was remanded back to the trial court. Aggrieved, the petitioners filed a second appeal before the Board of Revenue, Allahabad, which was dismissed vide judgment and order dated 13.01.1993. 9. After the dismissal of the second appeal by the Board of Revenue, Allahabad, the matter had to be adjudicated afresh under Section 229-B of Zamindari Abolition Act. All the same, the petitioners instead moved an application before the trial court stating that they had instituted the case by mistake under Section 229-B of Zamindari Abolition Act as the land in question is in fact outside the purview of Zamindari Abolition Act and, therefore, sought permission to withdraw the said suit and sought permission to institute a fresh suit under Section 59 read with Section 61 of U.P. Tenancy Act. 10. The trial court referred the matter to the Board of Revenue and according to the petitioners the permission was granted and thereafter a fresh suit being suit no. 13 of 1995 was filed under Section 59 read with 61 of U.P. Tenancy Act (from hereinafter referred as “the Tenancy Act”), which was subsequently numbered as Suit No. 29 of 1997 and transferred to the Court of Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Haridwar, when it was re-numbered as Suit No. 52 of 2003. 11. At this juncture it may be stated that a suit under Section 59 of the Tenancy Act is again for declaration and under Section 61 is for a declaration as a particular class of tenant. 12. In the said suit the Written Statement was filed by the respondents. 13. Meanwhile the erstwhile State of U.P. as well as Municipal Board, Roorkee had filed a civil suit being Civil Suit No. 98 of 1985, in which the present petitioners were the defendants. 12. In the said suit the Written Statement was filed by the respondents. 13. Meanwhile the erstwhile State of U.P. as well as Municipal Board, Roorkee had filed a civil suit being Civil Suit No. 98 of 1985, in which the present petitioners were the defendants. The plaintiff claimed the following reliefs:- (a) that the sale deed executed on 30.06.1970 between the SPG Mission and petitioners be cancelled. (b) the second relief sought in the above case was that the petitioner be directed to return the amount which they had received as compensation by the State Government, under the Land Acquisition proceedings. (c) the third relief was that, no further compensation be given to the petitioner. (d) the fourth relief was that the petitioner be restrained from transferring the property in dispute or be restrained from creating any third party interest therein. 14. The said suit was dismissed by the trial court on 18.04.1993, against which an appeal was filed by the State which was till recently pending, but as this Court has just been informed during the course of argument, that their appeal has recently been dismissed for non-prosecution. No further details on this have been furnished before this Court. 15. There are some other litigations meanwhile regarding the said property on which certain orders have also been passed by various court below, but it would not be necessary to mention these cases or the orders passed therein, as in view of this Court that would not be relevant for the present purposes. 16. Meanwhile, the civil suit no. 52 of 2003 was heard by the trial court, which is the Court of Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Haridwar. The entire evidence produced by the plaintiffs as well as the defendants were examined. As many as 20 issues were framed, which were discussed by and large separately on which a finding has been given. 16. Meanwhile, the civil suit no. 52 of 2003 was heard by the trial court, which is the Court of Assistant Collector, 1st Class, Haridwar. The entire evidence produced by the plaintiffs as well as the defendants were examined. As many as 20 issues were framed, which were discussed by and large separately on which a finding has been given. Ultimately the suit was dismissed as the trial court came to the conclusion that the petitioner has not been able to show that his possession on the property was continuous or adverse for all these years i.e. since 1961, and further that the rights claimed by him on the basis of the sale deed dated 30.06.1970 are also not proved as he has not been able to establish that the property or the land in question is the same property which is subject matter of sale deed dated 30.06.1970. 17. Aggrieved the plaintiffs filed an appeal before the learned Commissioner, Garhwal Division, Dehradun which was also dismissed vide order dated 20th September, 2006. Thereafter, their second appeal before the Chief Revenue Commissioner, Uttarakhand was also dismissed by a judgment and order dated 30.11.2009. Hence aggrieved, the petitioners have filed the present writ petition. 18. This Court has heard the learned counsel for the petitioners Mr. Sharad Sharma, learned Senior Advocate, Mr. M.S. Tyagi, learned counsel for the private respondents, learned counsel for the State of Uttarakhand as well as the learned counsel for the Union of India at considerable length on various dates. 19. Earlier while admitting the present writ petition, directions were given both the parties to maintain status quo, vide order dated 25.01.2010. 20. The learned counsels have also filed before this Court a detailed copy of the written submissions. This Court has also perused these written submissions as well as the entire documents on record, including the petition and its reply. 21. This Court has to exercise its jurisdiction in the present matter under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which is a supervisory in nature. This Court is not hearing this matter as a regular appellate court. As also referred above, the judgments of the trial court as well as the second appellate court are in detail. 21. This Court has to exercise its jurisdiction in the present matter under Article 227 of the Constitution of India which is a supervisory in nature. This Court is not hearing this matter as a regular appellate court. As also referred above, the judgments of the trial court as well as the second appellate court are in detail. The trial court has considered each and every submission of the plaintiffs/petitioners and has come to the conclusion that the suit cannot be decreed as the plaintiffs have not been able to establish his case nor can he claim any right on the property on the basis of sale deed. It is also necessary to state that the petitioners claim to have purchased the property from the S.P.G. Mission. It is an admitted fact that the name of S.P.G. Mission never exists in the revenue records. The name of the petitioners exists in the revenue records in “Category 20[There are various categories of agricultural land. These categories have been given in the U.P. Land Record Manual.],” which would mean “an occupier of land without the consent of the persons entered in Column 5 of the “Khasra,”. The private respondents too have a weak right, as they are only recorded in “Category 10,” which means “non occupancy tenants”. In the revenue records, as the owner of the land is shown to be “Kesar-e-Hind”, which would mean the State. 22. The jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226/227 of the Constitution of India is a limited jurisdiction. The court cannot reevaluate the evidence or alter any findings of fact. These limitations of the High Court have been explained and reiterated by the Hon’ble Apex Court from time to time and there are a plethora of decisions on this aspect. The Court would refer to some of these decisions. 23. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in Trimbak Gangadhar Telang and another v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide and others, AIR 1977 SC 1222 , in paragraph 3 had to state on the discretionary power of the High Court under Article 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, which is as under:- “It is a well-settled rule of practice of this Court not to interfere with the exercise of discretionary power under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution merely because two views are possible on the facts of a case. It is also well established that it is only when an order of a Tribunal is violative of the fundamental basic principles of justice and fair play or where a patent or flagrant error in procedure or law has crept or where the order passed results in manifest injustice, that a court can justifiably intervene under Article 227 of the Constitution.” 24. Therefore, an interference is required only where an order of a Tribunal or a Court is violative of fundamental basic principles of justice and fair play or where a patent or flagrant error in procedure or law has been done or where there is a manifest injustice, which requires an interference under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. None of this can be seen from the three orders of the court below, under challenge before this Court. In fact the order of the trial court is a detail order touching all the aspects of the matter and the first appellate and second appellate courts have agreed to such findings, while giving their reasons as to why, as such, no interference is called for in the present matter. 25. This aspect has again been dealt with in rather detail as to “how far can the High Court in exercise of the power under the writ jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution interfere with the findings of facts by the appropriate authorities”, in the case of Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram, reported in AIR 1987 SC 117 . 26. Justice Sabyasachi Mukharji (as his Lordship then was), while setting aside the order of the High Court, which was passed in exercise of its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India had emphasized that the power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be used as cloak, as an “appeal in disguise”. 27. A writ of certiorari does not lie for rehearing of issues which are already settled by the court below. It was also an observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred case that courts more often than not transgress their power while exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the said decision Hon’ble Apex Court infact elaborated the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and stated as under:- “21. It was also an observation of the Hon’ble Apex Court in the above referred case that courts more often than not transgress their power while exercising its power under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. In the said decision Hon’ble Apex Court infact elaborated the scope of Article 227 of the Constitution of India, and stated as under:- “21. It is true that in exercise of jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution the High Court could go into the question of facts or look into the evidence if justice so requires it if there is any mis-direction in law or a view of fact taken in the teeth of preponderance of evidence. But the High Court should decline to exercise its jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution to look into the fact in the absence of clear and cut down reasons where the question depends upon the appreciation of evidence. The High Court also should not interfere with a finding within the jurisdiction of the inferior tribunal except where the findings were perverse and not based on any material evidence or its resulted in manifest of injustice.” 28. While referring to another judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court, which was the case of Babhutmal Raichand Oswal V. Laxmibai R. Tarte, AIR 1975 SC 1297 , the Hon’ble Apex Court further reiterated (in Chandavarkar Sita Ratna Rao v. Ashalata S. Guram) that the High Court could not in the guise of exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 convert itself into a Court of Appeal when the legislature has not conferred a right of appeal. “The High Court was not competent to correct errors of facts by examining the evidence and reappreciating.” 29. This Court has already noticed that the trial court as well as the first appellate and second appellate court have come to a conclusion that the petitioners/plaintiffs were neither in continuous or in adverse possession on the property, nor has it been established by the sale deed dated 30.06.1970 that the property in question is the same and further in the revenue records, the name of the owner of the property has always been “Kesar-e-Hind”. The findings recorded, therefore, on the basis of such records cannot be called to be erroneous which may call for any interference. 30. The findings recorded, therefore, on the basis of such records cannot be called to be erroneous which may call for any interference. 30. The fact that civil suit filed by the State regarding the same property has been dismissed (though an appeal has been filed, which has presently been dismissed for non-prosecution) will also not help the case of the petitioners before this Court, as in the said case the relief sought by the plaintiffs was not for declaration of the ownership but was only for injunction and cancellation of the sale deed. In order to establish his rights on the property in question, a very heavy burden lay on the plaintiffs/petitioners. There is a categorical finding of the three courts below that the petitioners have not been able to discharge their burden. This Court does not find any anomaly in the findings of the Courts below on this aspect. The supervisory jurisdiction of this Court in this matter as already referred is extremely limited. 31. In view of the above discussion, the writ petition is hereby dismissed. 32. Having made the aforesaid determination, it would be in the fitness of things that the Collector, Haridwar should take the consequential action in accordance with law. The First Appeal No.16 of 1998, which has been dismissed for non prosecution vide order dated 05.07.2013, the Collector may also take a decision, in case he so desires to move a proper application for recalling the order of dismissal of the appeal which was dismissed for non prosecution during the pendency of the present writ petition before this Court, and which is pending in District Court Haridwar, mention of which has been made in paragraph 14, above. 33. No order as to costs. 34. The Registrar General of this Court is hereby directed to furnish a certified copy of this order to the Collector/District Magistrate, Haridwar for onward compliance.