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Himachal Pradesh High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 967 (HP)

Chain Ram v. State of Himachal Pradesh

2015-07-29

P.S.RANA, SANJAY KAROL

body2015
JUDGMENT : Sanjay Karol, J. In these appeals filed under the provisions of Section 374 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, appellant/convict has assailed the very same impugned judgment dated 25.3.2011, passed by learned Addl. Sessions Judge, Fast Track Court, Shimla, H.P., in Sessions Trial No. 13-S/7 of 2010, titled as State of Himachal Pradesh vs. Chain Ram, whereby he stands convicted of the offence punishable under the provisions of Section 376 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for a period of ten years and pay fine of Rs.10,000/- and in default thereof, further undergo imprisonment for a period of one year. 2. It is the case of prosecution that accused Chain Ram was married to Bhagpati through whom prosecutrix (PW-1) was born. During the subsistence of the first marriage accused married Rattu Devi and started residing with her in village Hiranh, Tehsil Chopal, Distt. Shimla, H.P. However, prosecutrix continued to reside with her real brother Atma Ram, bhabhi Reena Devi and mother who is not mentally stable, in village Khoni, Tehsil Jubbal, Distt. Shimla, H.P. On 2nd March, 2010, prosecutrix was taken by the accused to village Hiranh where twice he subjected her to sexual assault, which fact she disclosed to her friend Kaushalya Devi (PW-4) as also relative Kewal Ram (PW-3) and his wife Mathru Devi. When confronted, accused denied having committed any such act. Kewal Ram took the prosecutrix to Police Station, Nerwa, where on the basis of her statement, F.I.R. No. 15/2010, dated 7.3.2010 (Ext. P-C) was registered against the accused, under the provisions of Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code. SI-SHO Sohan Lal (PW-7) got the prosecutrix medically examined from Dr. Mamta Mahajan (PW-8) who issued MLC (Ext. PW- 8/A). The radiological age of the prosecutrix was also got determined from Dr. Susheel Pundir (PW-5). As per the medical opinion, prosecutrix was below 16 years of age and possibility of sexual assault could not be ruled out. Laceration was noticed on her private parts. The accused was also got medically examined. SI-Sohan Lal who conducted the necessary investigation, collected the incriminating material/articles; recorded statements of relevant witnesses. Scientific evidence was also collected. Investigation revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime. Hence, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Laceration was noticed on her private parts. The accused was also got medically examined. SI-Sohan Lal who conducted the necessary investigation, collected the incriminating material/articles; recorded statements of relevant witnesses. Scientific evidence was also collected. Investigation revealed complicity of the accused in the alleged crime. Hence, challan was presented in the Court for trial. 3. Accused was charged for having committed offences punishable under the provisions of Sections 376 and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, to which he did not plead guilty and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove its case, in all, prosecution examined as many as eight witnesses and statement of the accused under Section 313 Cr.P.C. was also recorded, in which he took up the following defence: “I am innocent. I have not done anything wrong. Mangat Ram and Kewal Ram wanted to oust me from that village.” Accused examined one official witness (DW-1) in his defence. 5. Appreciating the material on record, including the testimonies of the witnesses, trial Court convicted the accused for having committed an offence punishable under the provisions of Section 376 IPC and sentenced him as aforesaid. Hence, the present appeal. 6. We have heard Ms. Salochana Kaundal and Ms. Seema Sood, learned counsel, on behalf of the appellant as also Mr. Ashok Chaudhary and Mr. V. S. Chauhan, learned Addl. Advocate Generals and Mr. J. S. Guleria, learned Asstt. A.G., on behalf of the State. We have also minutely examined the testimonies of the witnesses and other documentary evidence so placed on record by the prosecution. Having done so, we are of the considered view that no case for interference is made out at all. We find the findings returned by the trial Court to be based on complete, correct and proper appreciation of evidence (documentary and ocular) so placed on record. There is neither any illegality/infirmity nor any perversity with the same, resulting into miscarriage of justice. Prosecution has been able to prove its case, beyond reasonable doubt. 7. Relationship of the prosecutrix with the accused and the fact that she was residing at village Khoni, Tehsil Jubbal with her brother Atma Ram, bhabhi Reena Devi and mother Smt. Bhagpati is not disputed. Solemnization of second marriage with Rattu Devi, resident of village Hiranh, tehsil Chopal, is also an undisputed, in fact, admitted fact. Undisputedly accused is staying with Rattu Devi at village Hiranh. Solemnization of second marriage with Rattu Devi, resident of village Hiranh, tehsil Chopal, is also an undisputed, in fact, admitted fact. Undisputedly accused is staying with Rattu Devi at village Hiranh. Prosecutrix was studying in a school at village Khoni and that accused had taken her to village Hiranh, is also admitted. 8. The Apex Court in State of Punjab versus Gurmit Singh and others, (1996) 2 SCC 384 has held that:- “……The Courts must, while evaluating evidence, remain alive to the fact that in a case of rape, no self-respecting woman would come forward in a Court just to make a humiliating statement against her honour such as is involved in the commission of rape on her. In cases involving sexual molestation, supposed considerations which have no material effect on the veracity of the prosecution case or even discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix should not, unless the discrepancies are such which are of fatal nature, be allowed to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case. The inherent bashfulness of the females and the tendency to conceal outrage of sexual aggression are factors which the Courts should not overlook. The testimony of the victim in such cases is vital and unless there are compelling reasons which necessitate looking for corroboration of her statement, the Courts should find no difficulty to act on the testimony of a victim of sexual assault alone to convict an accused where her testimony inspires confidence and is found to be reliable. Seeking corroboration of her statement before relying upon the same, as a rule, in such cases amounts to adding insult to injury. Why should the evidence of a girl or a woman who complains of rape or sexual molestation, be viewed with doubt, disbelief or suspicion ? “21. Of late, crime against women in general and rape in particular is on the increase. It is an irony that while we are celebrating women's rights in all spheres, we show little or no concern for her honour. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. It is a sad reflection on the attitude of indifference of the society towards the violation of human dignity of the victims of sex crimes. We must remember that a rapist not only violates the victim's privacy and personal integrity, but inevitably causes serious psychological as well as physical harm in the process. Rape is not merely a physical assault - it is often destructive of the whole personality of the victim. A murderer destroys the physical body of his victim, a rapist degrades the very soul of the helpless female. The Court, therefore, shoulder a great responsibility while trying an accused on charges of rape. They must deal with such cases with utmost sensitivity. The Courts should examine the broader probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor contradictions or insignificant discrepancies in the statement of the prosecutrix, which are not of a fatal nature, to throw out an otherwise reliable prosecution case.” … … (Emphasis supplied) The apex Court reiterated such view in Siriya @ Shri Lal vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2008) 8 SCC 72 . 9. That on the date of commission of the alleged offence i.e. 2nd and 3rd March, 2010, prosecution was more than 16 years of age, stands established from the birth certificate (Ext. PZ), issued under the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 and the relevant Rules framed there under, wherein her date of birth is recorded as 28.9.1993. The dental age of the prosecutrix has been opined to be between 12 to 16 years and her radiological age, as per the version of Dr. Susheel Pundir (PW-5) is between 13 to 15 years. The benefit of doubt, in the given facts and circumstances, with regard to variation of age, has to be given to the accused in view of birth certificate (Ext. PZ). We may clarify that even before us, the fact that prosecutrix was minor was not argued. 10. We now proceed to examine the medical evidence on record. Request (Ext. PW-6/A) for medical examination of the prosecutrix, so forwarded by SI-Sohan Lal through Lady Constable Shamim (PW-6), was presented before Dr. Mamta Mahajan (PW-8) who was posted as a Senior Resident at the Kamla Nehru Hospital, Shimla. The said Doctor examined the prosecutrix and issued MLC (Ext. PW-8/A). She opined that the introitus admitted two fingers with difficulty. Request (Ext. PW-6/A) for medical examination of the prosecutrix, so forwarded by SI-Sohan Lal through Lady Constable Shamim (PW-6), was presented before Dr. Mamta Mahajan (PW-8) who was posted as a Senior Resident at the Kamla Nehru Hospital, Shimla. The said Doctor examined the prosecutrix and issued MLC (Ext. PW-8/A). She opined that the introitus admitted two fingers with difficulty. However possibility of sexual assault could not be ruled out. No external injury was observed. On local examination hymen was found to be absent and on the posterior wall of introitus, 5 c.m. sized laceration was noticed. Suggestion put by the accused, of the laceration having been caused on account of itching/unhygienic conditions does not, in any manner, render the medical opinion to be doubtful, false or incorrect. Thus by way of corroborative evidence, possibility of prosecutrix being subjected to rape cannot be said to have been ruled out. 11. The question which still remains to be examined and which is crucial in the instant case, is as to whether testimony of the prosecutrix, who was declared hostile, can still be relied upon to uphold the conviction of the accused or not? Is it that prosecutrix was under some pressure at the time of reporting the crime? Was such report false? Is it that co-villagers and particularly Kewal Ram (PW-3) had wanted the accused to be falsely implicated or is it that subsequently prosecutrix was influenced by the family to falsely depose, favouring her father, but while doing so, she actually narrated the truth in the court? 12. For examining these questions, let us first highlight the sequence of events which took place prior to the registration of the First Information Report. In this regard we have carefully examined the testimonies of the relevant prosecution witnesses i.e. the prosecutrix (PW-1), Ashish Kohali (PW-2), Kewal Ram (PW-3) and Kaushalya Devi (PW-4). 13. According to Kewal Ram, on 5.3.2010 prosecutrix came weeping to his house. His wife Mathru was also present there. Prosecutrix disclosed that her father had beaten her. In the meantime, Kaushalya Devi (PW-4) who also came, informed that earlier during the day, prosecutrix had told her that her father had raped her. At that time prosecutrix also informed Mathru and Kaushalya Devi that that during the nights of 2nd and 3rd March, 2010, her father had raped her. Prosecutrix disclosed that her father had beaten her. In the meantime, Kaushalya Devi (PW-4) who also came, informed that earlier during the day, prosecutrix had told her that her father had raped her. At that time prosecutrix also informed Mathru and Kaushalya Devi that that during the nights of 2nd and 3rd March, 2010, her father had raped her. Witness further states that on 5.3.2010 and 6.3.2010, prosecutrix stayed with him in his house. On 6.3.2010 he tried to make inquires from the accused but he was not available. On 7.3.2010 when he confronted the accused, the incident was denied. 14. Version of this witness stands corroborated by Kaushalya Devi (PW-4) according to whom, earlier during the day prosecutrix had also disclosed to her about the incident. Uncontrovertedly it has come on record that prosecutrix and Kaushalya Devi are friends. Witnesses have denied any animosity between them and the accused. 15. Thus far, we find the witnesses to have deposed clearly and their depositions to be consistent, their version to be believable and the witnesses reliable. 16. We find the version of the prosecutrix, who upon being declared hostile was cross examined by the Public Prosecutor, to be in line with the version so narrated by the aforesaid witnesses. 17. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Yomeshbhai Pranshankar Bhatt vs. State of Gujarat, (2011) 6 SCC 312 have held that evidence of hostile witness may contain elements of truth and should not be entirely discarded. Their Lordships have held as under: “22. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted the doctor had not given his written opinion that the deceased was fit enough to give her statement. Though orally, the doctor said so. Relying on this part of the evidence especially the evidence of the husband of the deceased, the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that even though the husband may have been declared hostile, the law relating to appreciation of evidence of hostile witnesses is not to completely discard the evidence given by them. This Court has held that even the evidence given by hostile witness may contain elements of truth. 23. This Court has held in State of U.P. vs. Chetram and others, AIR 1989 SC 1543 , that merely because the witnesses have been declared hostile the entire evidence should not be brushed aside. [See para 13 at page 1548]. This Court has held that even the evidence given by hostile witness may contain elements of truth. 23. This Court has held in State of U.P. vs. Chetram and others, AIR 1989 SC 1543 , that merely because the witnesses have been declared hostile the entire evidence should not be brushed aside. [See para 13 at page 1548]. Similar view has been expressed by three-judge Bench of this Court in Khujji alias Surendra Tiwari vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, [ AIR 1991 SC 1853 ]. At para 6, page 1857 of the report this Court speaking through Justice Ahmadi, as His Lordship then was, after referring to various judgments of this Court laid down that just because the witness turned hostile his entire evidence should not be washed out.” 18. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Bhajju alias Karan Singh vs. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 4 SCC 327 have held that evidence of hostile witnesses can also be relied upon by the prosecution to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version of the incident. Their Lordships have held as under: “36. It is settled law that the evidence of hostile witnesses can also be relied upon by the prosecution to the extent to which it supports the prosecution version of the incident. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as washed off the records, it remains admissible in trial and there is no legal bar to base the conviction of the accused upon such testimony, if corroborated by other reliable evidence. Section 154 of the Act enables the Court, in its discretion, to permit the person, who calls a witness, to put any question to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party. 37. The view that the evidence of the witness who has been called and cross-examined by the party with the leave of the court, cannot be believed or disbelieved in part and has to be excluded altogether, is not the correct exposition of law. The Courts may rely upon so much of the testimony which supports the case of the prosecution and is corroborated by other evidence. It is also now a settled cannon of criminal jurisprudence that the part which has been allowed to be cross-examined can also be relied upon by the prosecution. The Courts may rely upon so much of the testimony which supports the case of the prosecution and is corroborated by other evidence. It is also now a settled cannon of criminal jurisprudence that the part which has been allowed to be cross-examined can also be relied upon by the prosecution. These principles have been encompassed in the judgments of this Court in the cases: (a) Koli Lakhmanbhai Chanabhai v. State of Gujarat (1999) 8 SCC 624 (b) Prithi v. State of Haryana (2010) 8 SCC 536 (c) Sidhartha Vashisht @ Manu Sharma v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2010) 6 SCC 1 (d) Ramkrushna v. State of Maharashtra (2007) 13 SCC 525 ” 19. Their Lordships of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Ramesh Harijan vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2012) 5 SCC 777 have again reiterated that any portion of evidence consistent with case of prosecution or defence can be relied upon. Their Lordships have further held that seizure/recovery witnesses though turning hostile, but admitting their signatures/thumb impressions on recovery memo, they could be relied on by prosecution. Their Lordships have held as under: “23. It is a settled legal proposition that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross examine him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent that their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny thereof. (Vide: Bhagwan Singh v. The State of Haryana, AIR 1976 SC 202 ; Rabindra Kumar Dey v. State of Orissa, AIR 1977 SC 170 ; Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, AIR 1979 SC 1848 ; and Khujji @ Surendra Tiwari v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1991 SC 1853 ). 24. In State of U.P. v. Ramesh Prasad Misra & Anr., AIR 1996 SC 2766 , this Court held that evidence of a hostile witness would not be totally rejected if spoken in favour of the prosecution or the accused but required to be subjected to close scrutiny and that portion of the evidence which is consistent with the case of the prosecution or defence can be relied upon. A similar view has been reiterated by this Court in Balu Sonba Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2002) 7 SCC 543 ; Gagan Kanojia & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (2006) 13 SCC 516; Radha Mohan Singh @ Lal Saheb & Ors. v. State of U.P., AIR 2006 SC 951 ; Sarvesh Narain Shukla v. Daroga Singh & Ors., AIR 2008 SC 320 ; and Subbu Singh v. State by Public Prosecutor, (2009) 6 SCC 462 . Thus, the law can be summarised to the effect that the evidence of a hostile witness cannot be discarded as a whole, and relevant parts thereof which are admissible in law, can be used by the prosecution or the defence. (See also: C. Muniappan & Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2010 SC 3718; and Himanshu @ Chintu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2011) 2 SCC 36 )” 20. In this backdrop, we proceed to examine the testimony of the prosecutrix. 21. Initially prosecutrix deposed that on the dates of the alleged incident she spent the night with her father and mother. None opened her clothes. Also nothing happened with her. At this point in time, she was declared hostile and cross examined by the Public Prosecutor. She revealed nothing to either Kewal Ram or Kaushalya. Also there is enmity between her father and Kewal Ram. Version thus far, is not in support of the prosecution case or her earlier version. But later part of her testimony is different. She admits that the day following the incident, she went to the house of Kewal Ram. This was despite such animosity and her father telling her not to go there. But then why is it that she went there? she is silent. Crucially even in Court, she does not disclose having been tutored by anyone, much less, Kewal Ram or Kaushalya Devi of falsely implicating or deposing against her father. We find that from the subsequent part of her testimony, the truth has emerged. She admits having visited Police Station, Nerwa alongwith Kewal Ram and reported the matter to the police. She does not refer exercise of any undue influence or coercion. No doubt she refers Kewal Ram having forcibly taken her to the police station but categorically does not state that he asked her to file a false complaint. She admits having visited Police Station, Nerwa alongwith Kewal Ram and reported the matter to the police. She does not refer exercise of any undue influence or coercion. No doubt she refers Kewal Ram having forcibly taken her to the police station but categorically does not state that he asked her to file a false complaint. She appears to be an intelligent witness and has never failed in her class. Unequivocally she admits her signatures on statement (Ext.PA) so recorded by the Sub Divisional Magistrate (U), Shimla as also F.I.R. (Ext. PC). Version so narrated therein, only corroborates the version of the independent witnesses. She admits that “The police recorded the same, which I told them and then I signed the same.” She admits to have slept in the house of Kewal Ram in the night of 5.3.2010. Also that on 7.3.2010 when Kewal Ram, Mathru, Atma Ram and Ganga Ram had collected, her father had intimidated them. Though initially she denies having informed Kewal Ram, Mathru and Kaushalya of being raped by her father on the 2nd & 3rd March, 2010, but later on admitted having informed the police, the SDM and the Medical Officer of the fact that during the nights of 2nd & 3rd March, 2010, she had been subjected to rape by her father. Quite apparently she had left the house of her brother only on the asking of her father. 22. It has also come on record that with the registration of the F.I.R. (Ex. PC) statement of the prosecutrix was recorded before Sh. Ashish Kohali (PW-2), the Sub Divisional Magistrate (U) Shimla. This witness categorically and uncontrovertedly states that such statement (Ext. PA) was recorded by him on 8.3.2010. Version so disclosed by the prosecutrix was reduced into writing. Only after contents thereof were read over and explained to the prosecutrix, did she sign the statement, which was endorsed by him. Crucially witness admits to have read over the statement (Ext.PA), which was voluntarily signed. We notice that prosecutrix can sign in English. Significantly neither Kewal Ram nor Kaushalya were present at the time when such statement was recorded. At that time she never expressed any threat or force allegedly exercised by Kewal Ram, as she wants the court to believe, by deposing that Kewal Ram had forcibly taken her to Police Station Nerwa for lodging the F.I.R. 23. Significantly neither Kewal Ram nor Kaushalya were present at the time when such statement was recorded. At that time she never expressed any threat or force allegedly exercised by Kewal Ram, as she wants the court to believe, by deposing that Kewal Ram had forcibly taken her to Police Station Nerwa for lodging the F.I.R. 23. Testimony of this witness, to a large extent, establishes the prosecution case, beyond reasonable doubt. Her version, despite being a hostile witness, to the extent it implicates the accused, can be relied upon. That part of her testimony is fully inspiring in confidence. It cannot be said that the witness is wholly unreliable or unbelievable and her testimony not worthy of credence. 24. For sustenance, prosecutrix is dependent upon her relations and particularly brother Atma Ram, who, as has emerged through the testimony of Amit Sharma (DW-1), had visited the accused at Sub Jail, Kaithu on 21.12.2010. Significantly, in court, testimony of the prosecutrix was recorded the following day i.e. on 22.12.2010 and she came to the Court with her brother and bhabhi whom she not only loves but also works on their advice. Though there is nothing on record to establish such fact, but she admits to have visited the jail to see her father. It has also come in her testimony that just before her deposition, outside the court, her brother and bhabi had met the accused. We may also observe that prosecutrix was confronted with her earlier statement (Ext. PW 7/E) narrating her father’s illegal conduct and behaviour. 25. It has come on record that mother of the prosecutrix is mentally not stable. Quite evidently, though unsuccessfully, but for obvious reasons and out of compulsion, she tried not to support the prosecution with the only object of saving her father. 26. We may observe that prosecutrix got almost identical version recorded not once but thrice and each time with different authorities at different places and time. Firstly it was recorded by the S.H.O. on 7.3.2010. Second time she disclosed and got the factum of sexual assault recorded in her MLC on 8.3.2010 to the effect that “According to the victim she stays in Khoni, Jubbal from where her father took her to Hirah, Tehsil Tikri and was sexually assaulted on 2/3/2010 and 3/3/2010. She narrated everything to the villagers on 5th /3 and subsequently lodged on 7/3/2010. She narrated everything to the villagers on 5th /3 and subsequently lodged on 7/3/2010. She was beaten by her father and asked not to narrate anything. Since the incident took place, she has changed her clothes and took bath. She has washed the clothes she had worn at time of assault.” Noticeably she signed the MLC in English language and never disputed contents thereof. Kewal Ram was not present, hence there was no question of exercising any undue influence at that time. Third time it was before the Sub Divisional Magistrate (U), Shimla (Ext. PA). A common thread runs through all these statements, which stands duly proved on record, indicating involvement of the accused in the alleged crime. Such statements were made without any delay, ruling out any possibility of improvement, deliberation or tutoring. 27. Crucially prosecutrix does not deny having made such statements. No reasonable explanation or justifiable cause, resiling from her version, is forthcoming. She is a helpless and hapless child. Her mother, who would have supported her, in such a situation, is mentally unstable. Other than her brother and bhabhi, she has none to fall back upon. So, she had no alternative, but to accede to their demand, resile from the allegations and swallow the insult, she suffered at the hands of her own father. She was just 16 years of age at the time of commission of crime. 28. At this juncture we deem it appropriate to deal with the statement of law on the point. 29. In Rameshwar v. The State of Rajasthan, AIR 1952 SC 54 , the Supreme Court has held that previous statement of the raped girl to her mother, immediately after the occurrence, is not only admissible and relevant as to her conduct, but also constitutes corroboration of her statement under the provisions of section 157 of the Evidence Act. In order to come to the aforesaid conclusions, illustration (j) to section 8 of the Evidence Act was relied upon. In that case, the victim, named Purni, was 7/8 years old. She was not administered oath, but was held to be competent witness and, therefore, duly examined and believed. 30. It is also a settled position of law that victim of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. She was not administered oath, but was held to be competent witness and, therefore, duly examined and believed. 30. It is also a settled position of law that victim of a sex offence cannot be put on par with an accomplice. She is in fact a victim of the crime. If for some reason Court is hesitant to place implicit reliance on the testimony of the victim it may look for evidence which may lend assurance to her testimony short of corroboration required in the case of an accomplice. The nature of evidence required to lend assurance to the testimony of the victim must necessarily depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. If the totality of the circumstances appearing on the record of the case disclose that victim does not have a strong motive to falsely involve the person charged, Court should ordinarily have no hesitation in accepting her evidence. [State of Maharashtra versus Chandraprakash Kewalchand Jain, (1990) 1 SCC 550 and O. M. Baby (dead) by Legal Representative vs. State of Kerala, 2012 (11) SCC 362 ]. 31. In State of M.P. v. Dharkole alias Govind Singh and others, (2004) 13 SCC 308 the Apex Court has held that:- “9. …Eye witnesses' account would require a careful independent assessment and evaluation for their credibility which should not be adversely prejudged making any other evidence, including medical evidence, as the sole touchstone for the test of such credibility. The evidence must be tested for its inherent consistency and the inherent probability of the story; consistency with the account of other witnesses held to be credit-worthy; consistency with the undisputed facts; the 'credit' of the witnesses; their performance in the witness-box; their power of observation etc. Then the probative value of such evidence becomes eligible to be put into the scales for a cumulative evaluation.” “10. A person has, no doubt, a profound right not to be convicted of an offence which is not established by the evidential standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt. Though this standard is a higher standard, there is, however, no absolute standard. What degree of probability amounts to 'proof' is an exercise particular to each case? "The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. What degree of probability amounts to 'proof' is an exercise particular to each case? "The simple multiplication rule does not apply if the separate pieces of evidence are dependent. Two events are dependent when they tend to occur together, and the evidence of such events may also be said to be dependent. In a criminal case, different pieces of evidence directed to establishing that the defendant did the prohibited act with the specified state of mind are generally dependent. A junior may feel doubt whether to credit an alleged confession, and doubt whether to infer guilt from the fact that the defendant fled from justice. But since it is generally guilty rather than innocent people who make confessions and guilty rather than innocent people who run away, the two doubts are not to be multiplied together. The one piece of evidence may confirm the other." “11. Doubts would be called reasonable if they are free from a zest for abstract speculation. Law cannot afford any favourite other than truth. To constitute reasonable doubt, it must be free from an over emotional response. Doubts must be actual and substantial doubts as to the guilt of the accused persons arising from the evidence, or from the lack of it, as opposed to mere vague apprehensions. A reasonable doubt is not an imaginary, trivial or a merely possible doubt; but a fair doubt based upon reason and commonsense. It must grow out of the evidence in the case.” [Emphasis supplied]. 32. The aforesaid ratio is squarely applicable to the instant facts. 33. In view of the aforesaid discussions, we are of the considered view that prosecutrix truthfully disclosed the incident, without any threat, pressure or coercion from any quarter, much less Kewal Ram, to the neighbours, police, the Doctor and/or the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Shimla. Such disclosure was voluntary. Kewal Ram accompanied her to the police station which is at a distant place where, in a hilly terrain like Himachal Pradesh, it takes time to travel. From Chopal she was brought to Shimla by the police and at that time she was certainly not under the influence of Kewal Ram. 34. We may also observe that the accused has not been able to probablize the defence so taken by him. 35. From Chopal she was brought to Shimla by the police and at that time she was certainly not under the influence of Kewal Ram. 34. We may also observe that the accused has not been able to probablize the defence so taken by him. 35. In State of Punjab versus Jagir Singh (1974) 3 SCC 277 the apex Court held that:- "A criminal trial is not like a fairy tale wherein one is free to give fight to one's imagination and fantasy. It concerns itself with the question as to whether the accused arraigned at the trial is guilty of the crime with which he is charged. Crime is an event in real life and is the product of interplay of different human emotions. In arriving at the conclusion about the guilt of the accused charged with the commission of a crime, the Court has to judge the evidence by the yardstick of probabilities, its intrinsic worth and the animus of witnesses. Every case in the final analysis would have to depend upon its own facts. Although the benefit of every reasonable doubt should be given to the accused, the Courts should not at the same time reject evidence which is ex facie trustworthy on grounds which are fanciful or in the nature of conjectures." (Emphasis supplied) 36. The Apex Court in State of Rajasthan versus N.K. THE ACCUSED (2000) 5 SCC 30 has held that:- “… …It is true that the golden thread which runs throughout the cobweb of criminal jurisprudence as administered in India is that nine guilty may escape but one innocent should not suffer. But at the same time no guilty should escape unpunished once the guilt has been proved to hilt. An unmerited acquittal does no good to the society. If the prosecution has succeeded in making out a convincing case for recording a finding as to the accused being guilty, the Court should not lean in favour of acquittal by giving weight to irrelevant or insignificant circumstances or by resorting to technicalities or by assuming doubts and giving benefit thereof where none exists. A doubt, as understood in criminal jurisprudence, has to be a reasonable doubt and not an excuse for finding in favour of acquittal. An unmerited acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on prowl for easy prey, more so when the victims of crime are helpless females. A doubt, as understood in criminal jurisprudence, has to be a reasonable doubt and not an excuse for finding in favour of acquittal. An unmerited acquittal encourages wolves in the society being on prowl for easy prey, more so when the victims of crime are helpless females. It is the spurt in the number of unmerited acquittals recorded by criminal Courts which gives rise to the demand for death sentence to the rapists. The Courts have to display a greater sense of responsibility and to be more sensitive while dealing with charges of sexual assault on women.” (Emphasis supplied). 37. From the material placed on record, it stands established by the prosecution witnesses that the accused is guilty of having committed the offence charged for. There is sufficient, convincing, cogent and reliable evidence on record to this effect. The circumstances stand conclusively proved by unbroken chain of unimpeachable testimony of the prosecution witnesses. The guilt of the accused stands proved beyond reasonable doubt to the hilt. The chain of events stand conclusively established and lead only to one conclusion, i.e. guilt of the accused. Circumstances when cumulatively considered fully establish completion of chain of events, indicating the guilt of the accused and no other hypothesis other than the same. It cannot be said that accused is innocent or not guilty or that he has been falsely implicated or that his defence is probable or that the evidence led by the prosecution is inconsistent, unreliable, untrustworthy and unbelievable. 38. Thus, from the material placed on record, it stands established by the prosecution, beyond reasonable doubt, by leading clear, cogent, convincing and reliable piece of evidence, that accused committed rape on the prosecutrix. 39. For all the aforesaid reasons, there is no reason to interfere with the judgment passed by the trial Court. The Court has fully appreciated the evidence placed on record by the parties. There is no illegality, irregularity, perversity in correct and/or in complete appreciation of the material so placed on record by the parties. Findings of conviction cannot be said to be erroneous or perverse. Hence, the appeals are dismissed. Appeals stand disposed of, so also pending application(s), if any. Records of the Court below be immediately sent back.