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2015 DIGILAW 969 (RAJ)

Radhey Shyam v. The Rent Tribunal, Bikaner

2015-05-01

ARUN BHANSALI

body2015
JUDGMENT 1. - An application has been filed by the petitioners seeking modification/clarification of the order dated 24.04.2015 passed by this Court. 2. The petitioners had filed S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.5901/2014 against judgment and recovery certificate dated 03.08.2013 passed by the Rent Tribunal, Bikaner and judgment and recovery certificate dated 16.07.2014 passed by the Appellate Rent Tribunal, Bikaner.After hearing the parties, the writ petition was dismissed by this Court vide order dated 24.04.2015. 3. In the present misc. application, the petitioners based on provisions of Section 15(8) of the Rent Control Act, 2001 ('the Act') has submitted that in view of the provisions while dismissing the petition, the Court was required to grant six months' time to the petitioners for vacating the suit premises and as no time has been granted while dismissing the writ petition, the respondents were seeking to execute the recovery certificate and, therefore, a reasonable time may be granted to the petitioners to vacate the suit premises and/or at least six months period may be granted. 4. I have considered the plea raised in the misc. application and the submissions made by learned counsel for the petitioners. 5. This Court in Purshottam & Anr. v. The Appellate Rent Tribunal, Sikar & Ors.: 2015(1) RLW 201 , while considering the provisions of Section 13(9) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950, distinguished judgment of this Court in Zaffar Hussain & Ors. v. Gurcharan Lal Bhatia & Ors.: 1996(1) RLW 525 and based on provisions of Section 15(8) of the Act came to the following conclusion:- "Those observations in the judgment of this Court in Zaffar Hussain supra shall have to be understood in the light of the facts of that case as observed by the learned Single Judge in the aforesaid judgment in the beginning of para 9 that "indisputably, the provisions of Civil Procedure Code are made applicable to a decree for eviction of a tenant passed on the ground specified in sub-section (1) of Section 13 of the Act of 1950". Ratio of the aforesaid judgment cannot be applied to the facts of the present case because in the first place, Section 15 contains the procedure applicable to the petition for eviction sought on the ground contained in Section 9(1) and not to an appeal preferred against the final judgment passed by the Rent Tribunal. Ratio of the aforesaid judgment cannot be applied to the facts of the present case because in the first place, Section 15 contains the procedure applicable to the petition for eviction sought on the ground contained in Section 9(1) and not to an appeal preferred against the final judgment passed by the Rent Tribunal. Moreover, sub-Section (7) of Section 15 refers to recovery certificate issued by the Rent Tribunal consequent upon acceptance of the petition for eviction, which cannot be raised to the level of a decree. Thirdly, Rent Tribunal is not a civil court, it is a Tribunal where summary procedure has been made applicable for expeditious disposal of petition for eviction. Fourthly, provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure have deliberately been excluded in proceedings under the said Act as would be evident from Section 21, except for certain specified purposes however with a rider that in the conduct of its proceedings, the Rent Tribunal/Appellate Rent Tribunal would be guided by the principles of natural justice. For all these reasons therefore, even if judgment of the Rent Tribunal is accepted to have merged with that of the Appellate Rent Tribunal for limited purpose of deciding finality of the first judgment, restriction created for inexecutabilty of the recovery certificate by sub-Section (8) of Section 15 cannot continue to be extended for three months after the date of decision of the Appellate Rent Tribunal on the analogy of doctrine of merger. This is because if the legislature intended to extend such restriction to continue until three months after decision of the appeal, it would have certainly indicated so in the provision dealing with the procedure of disposal of appeal, which has been separately provided in Section 19 or in Section 20, which deal with the provisions relating to execution of the orders passed by the Rent Tribunal." 6. In view of the law laid down by this Court in the case of Purshottam (supra), it cannot be said that the provisions of Section 15(8) of the Act has any applicability to the present case. 7. Besides the above, once the order has been passed by this Court dismissing the petition and not granting any additional time to vacate the suit premises, the present application after passing of the order, is apparently not maintainable. 8. 7. Besides the above, once the order has been passed by this Court dismissing the petition and not granting any additional time to vacate the suit premises, the present application after passing of the order, is apparently not maintainable. 8. In view of the above, no case is made out, the application is devoid of any substance, the same is, therefore, dismissed.Application dismissed. *******