JUDGMENT : Ali Mohd. Magrey, J.:- 1. This petition under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. has been preferred to set aside the order dated 11.05.2010 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, in objections filed by the petitioner to the maintainability of the complaint under Section 138 read with Section 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 pending against him and the order dated 18.07.2012 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, in the Criminal Revision Petition filed by the petitioner-accused against the aforesaid trial court order. The aforesaid complaint was originally filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kathua, by the complainant on 29.04.2008, The learned Magistrate took cognizance and ordered issuance of process. Pursuant thereto, the petitioner-accused caused appearance before the trial Magistrate on 20.05.2008 and furnished bail bonds and personal bonds. The case was adjourned to 08.07.2008 for recording the statement of accused under Section 242 Cr.P.C. On the subsequent dates the petitioner-accused absented from the proceedings, probably on account of some disturbances in the area. 2. Meanwhile, he filed a 561-A Cr.P.C. Petition No. 114/2008 before this Court seeking quashing of the complaint and the cognizance order passed by the learned Magistrate. Pursuant to order dated 14.08.2008 passed in that petition, the proceedings in complaint were stayed. Concomitant therewith, the petitioner also filed Criminal Transfer Application No. 28/2008 seeking transfer of the criminal complaint from the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kathua, to a court of competent jurisdiction at Srinagar on the ground of ailment of his mother and disturbance at Kathua. 3. The aforesaid two petitions were heard together and were dismissed by order dated 25.05.2009 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court. While deciding the 561-A Cr.P.C. petition, the Court in paragraph 19 of the judgment, adverting to the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner-accused, observed as under: "19. 3. The aforesaid two petitions were heard together and were dismissed by order dated 25.05.2009 passed by a Coordinate Bench of this Court. While deciding the 561-A Cr.P.C. petition, the Court in paragraph 19 of the judgment, adverting to the submissions of the learned counsel for the petitioner-accused, observed as under: "19. Petitioner has every right to justify his action of issuing the instructions to his Banker to stop the payment of 'Security Cheque' i.e. he can project: (i) There was no legally enforceable debt; (ii) He had sufficient funds in his account but payment was stopped for reasons of no liability to pay; (iii) To show that the instruction for stoppage was issued as the amount of the 'Security Cheque' would exceed limit of debt if at all found enforceable" The aforesaid observations were made by the Court in light of the judgment of the Supreme Court in M.M.T.C. Ltd. v. M/s. Medchi Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd., (2002) 1 SCC 234 , the relevant portion whereof was quoted in paragraph 20 of the judgment, which is reproduced hereunder: "20. In my view I am fortified by the judgment captioned M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Another v. M/s. Medchi Chemicals and Pharma (P) Ltd. and Another reported in (2002) 1 SCC 234 . It shall be quite apt to quote para No. 19 of the judgment. 19. Just such a contention has been negative by this Court in the case of Modi Cements Ltd. v. Kuchil Kumar Nandi. It has been held that even though the cheque is dishonoured by reason of 'stop-payment' instruction an offence under Section 138 could still be made out. It is held that the presumption under Section 139 is attracted in such a case also. The authority shows that even when the cheque is dishonoured by reason of stop-payment instructions by virtue of Section 139 the court has to presume that the cheque was received by the holder for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or liability. Of course, this is a rebut table presumption. The accused can thus show that 'stop-payment' instructions were not issued because of insufficiency or paucity of funds. Of course, this is a rebut table presumption. The accused can thus show that 'stop-payment' instructions were not issued because of insufficiency or paucity of funds. If the accused shows that in his account there were sufficient funds to clear the amount of the cheque at the time of presentation of the cheque for encashment at the drawer bank and that the stop-payment notice had been issued because of other valid causes including that there was no existing debt or liability at the time of presentation of cheque for encashment, then offence under Section 138 would not be made out. The important thing is that the burden of so proving would be on the accused. Thus a court cannot quash a complaint on this ground." 4. As regards the Criminal Transfer Application No. 28/2008, the Court ordered that the second ground taken therein was no more available as the situation had been restored to normalcy. As regards the first ground pleaded for transfer of the complaint, the Court ordered that the petitioner could seek exemption from his personal appearance before the trial court and directed that the trial court, on the motion being filed on behalf of the petitioner for dispensing with his personal attendance, shall consider the same and pass appropriate orders in case his engaged counsel appears on every date of hearing and subject to the condition that the petitioner will remain present on such hearing wherein personal appearance shall (not) be dispensable for progress of the case; otherwise mere presence on the dates of hearing can be taken care of by the presence of the engaged counsel. 5. After dismissal of his aforesaid 561-A Cr.P.C. petition and the criminal transfer application, the petitioner-accused, on 31.08.2009, filed objections against the maintainability of the complaint. However, immediately thereafter, the petitioner-accused filed another criminal transfer application, bearing No. 33/2009, before this Court seeking transfer of the complaint from Kathua to Srinagar on the ground that, in view of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in M/s. Harman Electronics (P) Ltd. v. M/s. National Panasonic India Ltd., AIR 2009 SC 1168 , the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kathua lacked jurisdiction. The said transfer petition was decided and disposed of by order dated 24.12.2009 in the following manner: "Coming to the question as to whether the case is required to be transferred or not, both the parities showed their willingness to have the matter transferred to any Court at Jammu, in case the question of jurisdiction cannot be addressed by this Court. Since I am not entering into the question as to whether the Court at Kathua has the jurisdiction or not, it would be proper to transfer the case from the file of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Kathua to the court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu. The record be accordingly transmitted to learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, where the parties are directed to appear on 03.02.2010." The criminal complaint, which was originally filed before the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kathua, was, thus, transferred to the file of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, with the consent of the learned counsel for the parties. 6. The objections filed by the petitioner-accused to the maintainability of the complaint were finally heard by the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, and decided by order dated 11.05.2010 holding, inter alia, as under: "A perusal of the order of the Hon'ble High Court in the petition of accused under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. clearly reveals that all these points were raised and have been specifically dealt and turned down by the Hon'ble High Court. In the given circumstances and after the dismissal of the pleas by the Hon'ble High Court, this court can't entertain such a plea being a subordinate court. The argument of the LC for the accused that accused has been left free to raise all these factual objections during the trial and that by trial it is meant that these are to be considered before proceeding further is an argument in air having no legal basis. Rather, it is a plain attempt to gain more time and thus, causing delay in the disposal of the complaint. The judgments cited by him have no relevance at this stage of the proceedings. Rather, it is a plain attempt to gain more time and thus, causing delay in the disposal of the complaint. The judgments cited by him have no relevance at this stage of the proceedings. Moreover, the procedure for filing objections to the complaint and then counter objections is wholly alien to the trial of the criminal complaint and as such don't warrant any adjudication at this stage." A perusal of the penultimate paragraph of the aforesaid order passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate also reveals that the accusations against the accused were read over and explained to the accused and he prayed for allowing him to consult his counsel stationed at Srinagar. He was allowed to do so telephonically, but did not turn up thereafter before the Court. Consequently, the case was adjourned and non-bailable warrants were ordered to be issued against him. 7. The petitioner-accused, thereafter, challenged the aforesaid order dated 11.05.2010 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, before the Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, in Revision Petition No. 09/2010. The learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, dismissed the same by order dated 18.07.2012, holding that the order impugned was a reasoned order and did not cause any miscarriage of justice. 8. As said above, the petitioner-accused has challenged the aforesaid two orders dated 11.05.2010 and 18.07.2012 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, respectively, in the present petition under Section 561-A Cr.P.C. 9. I have heard learned counsel for the parties, perused the original record and considered the matter. 10. During the course of hearing, learned counsel on both sides referred to the relevant facts on the basis of which the complaint in question is founded. It may be observed that principally this petition was filed challenging the orders passed by the trial court and the revisional court, but, since during the pendency of this petition before this Court, the Supreme Court has revisited its earlier decisions on the point of a Magistrate's territorial jurisdiction concerning criminal complaints filed under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for short, the Act), the learned counsel on both sides have referred to the relevant judgments and advanced their respective arguments concerning that aspect of the matter as well. I will first deal with the impugned orders. 11. I will first deal with the impugned orders. 11. It is seen that the first 561-A petition was filed by the petitioner-accused challenging the complaint on the ground that on facts no offence was made out and, therefore, the same was liable to be quashed together with the cognizance order passed by the trial Magistrate. His first contention before the Court was that the cheque in question was by way of security and that there was no liability to be discharged. On this aspect of the matter, the Court held that whether there was legally enforceable debt is a fact to be proved by the respondents and open to be disputed by the petitioner. The second contention that the security cheque could not be presented for encashment was held to be not tenable. As regards the third contention that the complaint had been lodged only after the petitioner had filed a civil suit, the Court found that the suit had been filed during the notice period issued by the complainant, therefore, the pendence of the suit would not disturb the proceedings in the complaint under Section 138 of the Act. The fourth ground taken was that since the liability was far less than the security cheque, therefore, the same could not be presented for encashment. In this regard the Court held that the point would need trial; nothing would prevent the petitioner from projecting before the Magistrate that no debt was legally enforceable and that it was for the Magistrate during the trial to decide the same. The fifth ground taken was that the notice had been issued by an incompetent person. This ground was turned down on facts. The judgments cited at the Bar were duly considered and what was observed in paragraph 19 of the judgment, quoted hereinabove, was based on the ratio of those judgments. 12. It thus transpires that all the grounds taken in the petition were duly considered by the Court. The observation of the Court in paragraph 19 of the judgment that the petitioner had every right to justify his action of issuing the instructions to his Banker to stop the payment of security cheque on the grounds mentioned therein meant that he could take these grounds at the trial. The observation of the Court in paragraph 19 of the judgment that the petitioner had every right to justify his action of issuing the instructions to his Banker to stop the payment of security cheque on the grounds mentioned therein meant that he could take these grounds at the trial. As to when does the trial commence, was considered by a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Hardeep Singh v. State of Punjab, (2014) 3 SCC 92 , wherein their Lordships, after considering its numerous earlier judgments on the point, in paragraph 35 of the judgment held as under: "...[T] he law can be summarised to the effect that as 'trial' means determination of issues adjudging the guilt or the innocence of a person, the person has to be aware of what is the case against him and it is only at the stage of framing of the charges that the court informs him of the same, the 'trial' commences only on charges being framed. Thus, we do not approve the view taken by the courts that in a criminal case, trial commences on cognizance being taken." As regards the summons cases, their Lordships relied with approval upon the earlier judgment in Common Cause, A Reregistered Society through its Director v. Union of India, AIR 1997 SC 1539 , wherein it had been laid down as under: "In cases of trial of summons cases by Magistrates the trials would be considered to have commenced when the accused who appears or is brought before the Magistrate is asked under Section 251 (which corresponds to Section 242 of our Code of Criminal Procedure) whether he pleads guilty or has any defence to make". In light of the above position of law, the observation of the Court made in paragraph 19 of the judgment dated 25.05.2009 clearly meant that the petitioner-accused would be free to project the specified grounds in defence after he would be asked under Section 242 of the Code whether he pleaded guilty or had any defence to make. 13. However, as is seen from the above narration of the facts, the petitioner-accused has never allowed the case to reach that stage and, in fact, records bear testimony that on 11.05.2010 he had mischievously left the Magistrate's Court when the accusations had been read over and explained to him. 13. However, as is seen from the above narration of the facts, the petitioner-accused has never allowed the case to reach that stage and, in fact, records bear testimony that on 11.05.2010 he had mischievously left the Magistrate's Court when the accusations had been read over and explained to him. The observation of the Court did not mean that the petitioner-accused was permitted to file an application styling it to be objections to the complaint and seek a decision thereon before he would be called upon to enter upon his defence. The learned trial court has rightly held that such a course was wholly alien to the Code of Criminal Procedure. 14. It may be observed here that in K.M. Mathdew v. State of Kerala, AIR 1992 SC 2206 , a two Judges' Bench of the Supreme Court had laid down that "it is open to the accused to plead before the Magistrate that the process against him ought not to have been issued. The Magistrate may drop the proceedings, if he is satisfied on reconsideration of the complaint that there was no offence for which the accused could be tried. It is his judicial discretion. No specific provision is required for the Magistrate to drop the proceedings or rescind the process. The order issuing the process is an interim order and not a judgment. It can be varied or recalled. The fact that the process has already been issued is no bar to drop the proceedings if the complaint on the very face of it does not disclose any offence against the accused'. However, in a subsequent decision by a larger Bench in Adalat Parsad v. Rooplal Jindal, 2004 AIR SCW 5174, it was held that the view in Mathew's case (supra) does not lay down the correct law. In paragraph 16 of the judgment, their Lordships held as under: "Therefore, in our opinion the observation of this court in the case of Mathew (supra) that for recalling an order of issuance of process erroneously no specific provision of law is required would run counter to the scheme of the Code which has not provided for review and prohibits interference at interlocutory stages. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the view of this court in Mathew's case (supra) that no specific provision is required for recalling an erroneous order, amounting to one without jurisdiction, does not lay down the correct law." Question at this stage of the proceedings would not be whether there was any truth in the allegations made, but the question would be whether on the basis of the allegations a cognizable offence has been alleged to have been committed." 15. In a subsequent ease, namely, Subramanium Sethuraman v. State of Maharashtra, 2004 AIR SCW 5325, a contention was raised that the principles laid down in Adalat Prasad's case may require reconsideration because in that ease the Supreme Court had proceeded on the basis as it was a summons case, but in reality it was a warrant case covered by Chapter XXIX of the Code. The contention was repelled by observing as under: "..[T]he Larger Bench of this Court in Adalat Prasad's case did not accept the correctness of the law laid down by this court in K.M. Mathew's case. Therefore, reliance on K.M. Mathew's case by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant cannot be accepted nor can the argument that Adalat Prasad's case requires reconsideration be accepted. 16. The law thus stands settled that on examination and consideration of the complaint and statements of witnesses, once cognizance is taken and process is issued, the Magistrate cannot recall the order of issuance of process, as the same would tantamount to review which the Code has not provided for. It is true that Section 253(2) Cr.P.C. provides that nothing in the Section shall be deemed to prevent a Magistrate from discharging the accused at any previous stage of the case, if, for reasons to be recorded by such Magistrate, he considers the charge to be groundless, but the words "at any stage of the case" as interpreted by this Court in Amrik Singh v. Ashok Kumar, 2006(II) SLJ 468 : 2010 (4) JKJ 270 [HC], has been held to mean a stage arrived after recording of some evidence. The relevant portion of the judgment in Amrik Singh v. Ashok Kumar (supra) is reproduced hereunder: "...[I]n my considered opinion the words 'at any stage of the case' can be and must be interpreted to mean a stage arrived after recording of some evidence. The relevant portion of the judgment in Amrik Singh v. Ashok Kumar (supra) is reproduced hereunder: "...[I]n my considered opinion the words 'at any stage of the case' can be and must be interpreted to mean a stage arrived after recording of some evidence. A Magistrate can consider the question of discharge of the accused only after recording some of the evidence of the complainant. For instance, if a complainant in his evidence admits such facts or brings on record such facts on the basis of which it can be said that charge against the accused is groundless or that there is legal bar to the continuation of the complaint then the Magistrate can truncate the proceedings and on the basis of evidence recorded he can record the order of discharge of the accused..." 17. In the present case, as mentioned above, the petitioner-accused made an application styling it as objections to the maintainability of the complaint and seeking dismissal thereof on the grounds which could be projected in defence at the trial. The learned trial court rightly held that the grounds taken did not warrant any adjudication at this stage. 18. Similarly, the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Jammu, in the revision petition filed by the petitioner-accused, holding that the order passed by the learned Magistrate did not cause any miscarriage of justice, does not call for any interference by this Court. 19. Now, coming to the issue of territorial jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, (2014) 9 SCC 129 has held that the general rule stipulated under Section 177 of Cr.P.C. applies to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Prosecution in such cases can, therefore, be launched against the drawer of the cheque only before the Court within whose jurisdiction the dishonour takes place except in situations where the offence of dishonour of the cheque punishable under Section 138 is committed along with other offences in a single transaction within the meaning of Section 220(1) read with Section 184 of the Code of Criminal Procedure or is covered by the provisions of Section 182(1) read with Sections 184 and 220 thereof. Holding so, the Supreme Court observed that "we are quite alive to the magnitude of the impact that the present decision shall have on possibly lakhs of cases pending in various Courts spanning across the country. The Supreme Court, in the aforesaid judgment, accordingly, laid down as under: "To clarify, regardless of whether evidence has been led before the Magistrate at the pre-summoning stage, either by affidavit or by oral statement, the Complaint will be maintainable only at the place where the cheque stands dishonoured. To obviate and eradicate any legal complications, the category of Complaint cases where proceedings have gone to the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond shall be deemed to have been transferred by us from the Court ordinarily possessing territorial jurisdiction, as now clarified, to the Court where it is presently pending. All other Complaints (obviously including those where the accused/respondent has not been properly served) shall be returned to the Complainant for filing in the proper Court, in consonance with our exposition of the law. If such Complaints are filed/re-filed within thirty days of their return, they shall be deemed to have been filed within the time prescribed by law, unless the initial or prior filing was itself time barred! 20. The Supreme Court reiterated the aforesaid view and decision in Vinay Kumar Shailendra v. Delhi High Court Legal Services Committee, (2014) 10 SCC 708 , observing, inter alia, that what is important is whether the drawee bank which dishonoured the cheque is situate within the jurisdiction of the court taking cognizance. 21. In the instant case, the cheque in question, bearing No. 19456018 dated 17.09.2007 for a sum of Rs. 73,35,000.00, was admittedly drawn on the Jammu and Kashmir Bank Ltd., Rawalpora, District Budgam, Kashmir. However, the complaint was filed by the respondent in District Kathua in Jammu. The contention of the petitioner is that in terms of the law laid down by the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra, the complaint could be filed only in District Budgam, not elsewhere and, therefore, the same is required to be transferred to the competent court of jurisdiction in District Budgam or Srinagar. 22. The argument put forth by the learned senior counsel at first blush appears to be sound and in tune with the law holding the field. 22. The argument put forth by the learned senior counsel at first blush appears to be sound and in tune with the law holding the field. But the fact is that the complaint in the instant case, which was originally filed before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kathua, is presently pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, to which Court it was transferred pursuant to order dated 24.12.2009 passed by this Court on the Criminal Transfer Petition No. 33/2009 filed by the petitioner. The said order dated 24.12.2009 was passed by the Court on the willingness and consent expressed by the learned counsel for the parties therein. Presently, the complaint is, thus, not pending before the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Kathua. The real question that, therefore, arises is: once the complaint has been transferred by the High Court at the asking of the petitioner-accused to a Magistrate at a neutral venue, whether it can be said that the transferee court lacks the territorial jurisdiction to try the complaint? And, consequently, whether such complaint would be covered by the direction given by the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (supra)? 23. It be seen that in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (supra) the Supreme Court has held that the general rule stipulated under Section 177 of Cr.P.C. applies to cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Section 177 Cr.P.C. provides that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into and tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it was committed. However, in terms of Section 526 of the Code, the High Court has been vested with the power to transfer a case from one criminal court subordinate to it to another criminal court of equal or superior jurisdiction. This power can be exercised by the High Court whenever it is made to appear to it that the grounds as enumerated in Section 526(1)(a to e) exist, either on the report of the lower court or on an application of a party interested or on its own initiative. This power can be exercised by the High Court whenever it is made to appear to it that the grounds as enumerated in Section 526(1)(a to e) exist, either on the report of the lower court or on an application of a party interested or on its own initiative. Once a criminal case is transferred by the High Court in exercise of the aforesaid power, the transferee court would get the territorial jurisdiction to try the case and the offence in the same manner as the competent court within whose jurisdiction the offence had been committed would have the jurisdiction to try the case in terms of Section 177 Cr.P.C. It may also be relevant to state here that long back, the Supreme Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal, AIR 1961 SC 1589 , has held as under: "Jurisdiction of Courts is of two kinds. One type of jurisdiction deals with respect to the power of the Courts to try particular kind of offences. That is a jurisdiction which goes to the root of the matter and if a Court not empowered to try a particular offence does try it, the entire trial is void. The other jurisdiction is what may be called territorial jurisdiction. Similar importance is not attached to it. This is clear from the provisions of ss. 178, 188, 197(2) and 531, Criminal Procedure Code. Section 531 provides that: No finding, sentence or order of any Criminal Court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the inquiry, trial or other proceeding in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong sessions division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice.' The reason for such a difference in the result of a case being tried by a Court not competent to try the offence and by a Court competent to try the offence, but having no territorial jurisdiction over the area where the offence was committed is understandable. The power to try offences is conferred on all Courts according to the view the Legislature holds with respect to the capability and responsibility of those Courts. The higher the capability and the sense of responsibility, the larger is the jurisdiction of those Courts over the various offences. The power to try offences is conferred on all Courts according to the view the Legislature holds with respect to the capability and responsibility of those Courts. The higher the capability and the sense of responsibility, the larger is the jurisdiction of those Courts over the various offences. Territorial jurisdiction is provided just as a matter of convenience, keeping in mind the administrative point of view with respect to the work of a particular court, the convenience of the accused who will have to meet the charge levelled against him and the convenience of the witnesses who have to appear before the Court. It is, therefore, that it is provided in s. 177 that an offence would ordinarily be tried by a Court within the local limits of whose jurisdiction it is committed." (Underlining supplied) Once the case is transferred to a court at the instance of the accused himself, he cannot claim inconvenience, and the case having been transferred by the High Court in terms of its power under Section 526 Cr.P.C., on the asking of the accused himself, he cannot be allowed to turn around subsequently and raise the jurisdictional issue of the transferee court, which otherwise would be unfounded and not tenable in law. It cannot, therefore, be said that, in the instant case, the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Jammu, lacks territorial jurisdiction to try the complaint in question. 24. Coming to the second question, whether the complaint would be covered by the direction given by the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod v. State of Maharashtra (supra), that complaints which have not gone to the stage of Section 145(2) or beyond shall be returned to the complainant, it needs to be borne in mind that the aforesaid direction was passed in context of the law laid down by the Supreme Court that the jurisdiction of the Court to try the complaint will be determined by reference to the place where the cheque is dishonoured, i.e., where the offence under Section 138 of the Act is committed, and that the offence is committed no sooner a cheque drawn by the accused on an account being maintained by him in a bank for discharge of debt/liability is returned unpaid for insufficiency of funds or for the reason that the amount exceeds the arrangement made with the bank. Since the court to which the instant complaint has been transferred by this Court in exercise of its power under Section 526 Cr.P.C. equally assumes the territorial jurisdiction to try the case notwithstanding the fact that the offence is not committed within its territorial jurisdiction, it would not be covered by the direction in reference given by the Supreme Court. 25. During the course of arguments, the learned senior counsel for the petitioner also attempted to make the very same submissions as had been dealt with by the Court in the earlier 561-A Cr.P.C. petition filed by the petitioner, as narrated earlier. Since the Court has already considered those points while deciding the earlier petition, the petitioner cannot be allowed to re-agitate the same before this Court. 26. Mr. Kapil Puri, learned counsel for the respondent, during the course of arguments submitted that the complaint had already reached the stage of Section 145(2) of the Act. This Court had not called for the records from the trial court. However, in view of the aforesaid submission made by the learned counsel, this Court, after hearing the matter, summoned the records in terms of order dated 26.02.2015, and perused the same. Perusal thereof reveals a sad state of affairs that it has not crossed the stage of Section 242 Cr.P.C. so much so, on 11.05.2010, when the accusations were read over and explained to the petitioner-accused, he left the court on the pretext of consulting his counsel and did not turn up before the court. In any case, the complaint has not reached the stage of Section 145(2) of the Act. 27. Mr. Puri also raised the issue that this petition was not maintainable on the ground that in terms of Order No. 1/HCJ/96 dated 22.08.1996 issued by the Chief Justice, all petitions/appeals pertaining to the province of Jammu could be filed only in Jammu Wing. I have perused the aforesaid order. It contains a proviso to the effect that if it is not practicable to file a petition pertaining to the particular wing at that wing, it may be filed at the other wing with the leave of the Chief Justice or, in his absence, of the Senior Judge available at the Headquarters. I have perused the aforesaid order. It contains a proviso to the effect that if it is not practicable to file a petition pertaining to the particular wing at that wing, it may be filed at the other wing with the leave of the Chief Justice or, in his absence, of the Senior Judge available at the Headquarters. Perusal of the record of the petition reveals that before filing the present petition, the petitioner had made a motion before Hon'ble the Chief Justice on 08.08.2012 which was allowed by the Lord Chief Justice after obtaining a report from the Registry, by order of even date passed separately on the note of the Registrar Judicial. The submission of the counsel is noted only to be rejected. 28. No other substantial point relevant to the decision of this petition was raised by the counsel appearing for the parties. 29. For the aforesaid reasons, this petition is dismissed alongwith the connected miscellaneous petition. Interim direction, if any, subsisting shall stand vacated. 30. As mentioned earlier, the complaint in question has been filed on 29.04.2008. Since then almost six years have passed by now, unfortunately, the complaint continues to be at its initial stage. One is anguished to notice the state of affairs which, of course, is not attributable to the trial court. The fault lies elsewhere. Therefore, it is a fit case where it needs to be mentioned in clear terms that let the delaying tactics be given a quietus and let the trial start so that the case is brought to its logical end. 31. The Registry is directed to send down the trial court records forthwith through whatever speedy mode he may think fit. 32. The petitioner-accused is directed to present himself before the trial court on 23.03.2015. The trial court shall complete the process in terms of Section 242 Cr.P.C. on 23.03.2015 itself, proceed with the matter thereafter and make efforts to decide the case as expeditiously as possible. If the petitioner-accused does not appear before the trial court on 23.03.2015, the trial court shall take all coercive measures available to it under law to procure his attendance. It is provided that in case the date fixed hereinabove happens to be a close day/holiday for any unforeseen reason, the petitioner-accused shall present himself before the trial court on the next available working day of the court.