JUDGMENT Mansoor Ahmad Mir, J. This Letters Patent Appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 28.5.2007, passed by the learned Single Judge of this Court in CWP No. 1775 of 2002 titled Sanjeev Aggarwal versus Regional Manager S.B.I. and others, whereby the writ petition came to be dismissed, for short “the impugned judgment.” 2. The appellant has questioned the impugned judgment on the grounds taken in the memo of appeal. 3. In order to determine the controversy, it is necessary to give brief facts of the case which have given birth to the instant appeal. 4. It appears that appellant was appointed as Clerk-cum-Cashier by the bank-respondent No.1 herein in December, 1983, remained absent from duty and was treated to have voluntary retired from the service of the bank-respondent No.1 with effect from 7.8.1988. 5. A dispute was raised by the appellant and reference was made by the concerned authorities dated 4.12.1990, the details of which are given in the award made by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, dated 16.7.2002, hereinafter referred to as “the Tribunal”, for short,. The Tribunal entered into the reference. The appellant filed statement of claim wherein he has pleaded and averred that he fell sick in the month of August, 1988 and was constrained to go on leave, submitted the leave application alongwith medical certificates. Thereafter he was declared fit to resume duties by the doctor and accordingly on 25.3.1989, he was on his way to report duty but met with an accident and he informed the Branch Manager about the said accident and sent leave application, was advised by the doctor bed rest from 24.3.1989 to 4.6.1989. He submitted all the applications and documents alongwith leave application to the bank authorities and reported back on 5.6.1989 but he was not allowed by the bank to join duty and he was told that he has been treated as having voluntarily retired from the service in terms of the provisions of Bipartite Settlement and as per the rules occupying the field. 6. The bank authorities-management also filed counter to the statement of claim filed by the appellant, details of which are given in para 3 of the award. 7. 6. The bank authorities-management also filed counter to the statement of claim filed by the appellant, details of which are given in para 3 of the award. 7. The Tribunal, after examining the reference, pleadings and evidence adduced by both the parties mention of which is made in para 4 of the award, held that the action of the management was legal one and upheld the voluntary retirement of the appellant from the service w.e.f. 7.8.1988. 8. Feeling aggrieved, the appellant has questioned the impugned award by the medium of Civil Writ Petition No.1775 of 2002, which came to be dismissed vide impugned judgment dated 28.5.2007 referred to above. 9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. 10. Following questions arise for determination in this appeal. (i) Whether the order of the Bank-respondent No.1 treating the appellant as voluntary retired from the service of the bank w.e.f. 7.8.1988 in terms of the Bipartite settlement, is legally correct? (ii) Whether the bank-respondent No.1 had applied and complied with the mandate of the said Bipartite Settlement? (iii) Whether, without conducing an inquiry, the order of voluntary retirement can be said to be a legal and valid order, in the eyes of law? 11. In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to reproduce the relevant portion of clause XVI of the Memorandum of Settlement dated 17th September, 1984 between the Managements of 55 ‘A’ Class Banks as represented by the Indian Banks’ Association and their workmen as represented by the All India Bank Employees’ Association and the National Confederation of Bank Employees herein. “XVI.VOLUNTARY CESSATION OF EMPLOYMENT BY THE EMPLOYEES: In supersession of clause 2 of the Settlement dated 8th September, 1983 the following shall apply:- Where an employee has not submitted any application for leave and absents himself from work for a period of 90 or more consecutive days without or beyond any leave to his credit or absents himself for 90 or more consecutive days beyond the period of leave originally sanctioned or subsequently extended or where there is satisfactory evidence that he has taken up employment in India or the management is satisfied that he has not present intention of joining duties, the management may at any time thereafter give a notice to the employee’s last known address calling upon the employee to report for duty within 30 days of the notice, stating, inter alia, the grounds for the management coming to the conclusion that the employee has no intention of joining duties and furnishing necessary evidence, where available. Unless the employee reports for duty within 30 days or unless he gives an explanation for his absence satisfying the management that he has not taken up another employment or avocation and that he has no intention of not joining duties, the employee will be deemed to have voluntarily retired from the bank’s service on the expiry of the said notice. In the event of the employee submitting a satisfactory reply, he shall be permitted to report for duty thereafter within 30 days from the date of the expiry of the aforesaid notice without prejudice to the bank’s right to take any action under the law or rules of service……..” [Emphasis added] 12. The aforesaid clause of the Bipartite Settlement mandates how an employee of the bank can be said to have voluntary retired from the service and what is the procedure to be followed by the Bank authorities. 13. The aforesaid clause of the Bipartite Settlement mandates how an employee of the bank can be said to have voluntary retired from the service and what is the procedure to be followed by the Bank authorities. 13. The aforementioned clause of the Bipartite Settlement mandates that the management has to record satisfaction and has to come to the conclusion that the employee has no intention to join duties and if an employee fails to report for duty within 30 days of the receipt of the notice or fails to tender explanation for his absence satisfying the management that he has not taken any other employment and that he had no intention to join duty in that eventuality, the said employee shall be deemed to have been voluntary retired from service on the expiry of the said notice. Meaning thereby, that in all the cases, as given in clause XVI of the Bipartite Settlement, reproduced hereinabove, the management has to record satisfaction and come to the conclusion that the employee has no intention to join duty. 14. The Tribunal has not discussed the mandate of clause XVI of the Bipartite Settlement, referred to above, in the award and even it has not been discussed by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment. It is apt to reproduce para 5 of the award herein: “5. I have heard the representatives of the parties and have also gone through the evidence and record of the case. The learned counsel for the applicant has argued that the bank has not conducted any enquiry against the applicant regarding his absence and wrongly treated him as voluntarily abandoned the services of the bank. The action of the bank is in clear violation of the principle of natural justice. The counsel for the workman has further argued that the management has not given any notice of one month or pay in lieu thereof and nor any retrenchment compensation was paid by the bank to the applicant at the time of termination of service and as such non compliance of the mandatory provisions of Section 25-F, it amounts to termination. For his arguments, he has relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uptron India Ltd. Vs. Shammi Bhan reported in AIR 1998 SC page 1681. For his arguments, he has relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Uptron India Ltd. Vs. Shammi Bhan reported in AIR 1998 SC page 1681. On the other hand learned counsel for the management has argued that the applicant himself chose not to join the bank and remained unauthorisidely absent from the bank. As the workman himself remained absent from 8.8.1989 to 25.3.1989, he chose to send the leave application alongwith medical certificate to the bank only on 5.5.1989, i.e., much after when he was treated by the bank as voluntarily retired from the service. I have gone through the documents prescription slip Ext. M2, medical certificate dated 25.3.1989 Ext. M2/1 and medical certificate Ext. M3 which is dated 10.4.1989. The applicant also relied on the postal receipt which is apparently dated 3.5.1989 bearing Ambala stamp, meaning thereby that the letter itself was posted from Ambala on 3.5.1989 and reached the Branch manager Taruwala on 5.5.1989. Thus, it is amply clear that the applicant after receiving the letter from the bank retiring him voluntarily from the service of the bank w.e.f. 8.8.1988 he got prepared the medical certificate in the back date and just to cover the period he sent the letter which was received by the bank on 5.5.1989. The representative of the management also relied on the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in the case of Syndicate Bank vs. The General Secretary Syndicate Bank Staff Association and another reported in RSJ 2000 (2) in which it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the order passed by the bank after expiry of notice that he had voluntarily retired from the service of the bank, there is no necessity for the bank to hold enquiry as the workman himself defaulted and did not report for the duty within the prescribed period required under the Bipartite Settlement. It is admitted position that the bank had issued letters to the workman on the address which is correct and it is presumed that these letters were issued at the correct address of the applicant and received by him and he himself chose not to attend the duties of the bank. It is admitted position that the bank had issued letters to the workman on the address which is correct and it is presumed that these letters were issued at the correct address of the applicant and received by him and he himself chose not to attend the duties of the bank. Thus relying on the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the syndicate Bank’s case, it is held that the bank is not under any obligation to hold departmental enquiry against the workman and there was no necessity for the bank to comply with the provisions of section 25-F of the I.D. Act 1947.” 15. While going through the reasons given in para 5 of the award, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that the Tribunal has held that the appellant has abandoned his service voluntarily thus, the action of the management treating the appellant to have voluntary retired, is in accordance with law but, it has not discussed clause XVI, supra, which deals with voluntary retirement of an employee from service. 16. Even the learned Single Judge has not discussed this aspect in the impugned judgment, as stated supra, but what the learned Single Judge has recorded in the impugned judgment is that the Tribunal has discussed in details that there was no need to conduct enquiry and it is not the case of violation of principles of natural justice. The learned Single Judge has not discussed the aspect whether the bank authorities had followed the mandate of clause XVI of the Bipartite Settlement. 17. Mr. Anand Sharma, learned counsel for respondent No.1 was asked to show whether there is any proof on the record to the effect that the management has recorded the satisfaction? He had sought adjournment on 2.7.2015. He produced the copies of documents, i.e., notices and they were taken on record, commencing from pages 331 to 335 of the paper-book, which form part of the LPA. He has also produced the copy of Memorandum of Settlement which starts from page 282. The relevant portion is at page 293 which has been reproduced hereinabove. 18. While going through the notices, it is nowhere recorded in the notices that on 26.10.1988, 23.1.1989, 22.4.1989 and 9.5.1988, the bank authorities have recorded its satisfaction. 19. He has also produced the copy of Memorandum of Settlement which starts from page 282. The relevant portion is at page 293 which has been reproduced hereinabove. 18. While going through the notices, it is nowhere recorded in the notices that on 26.10.1988, 23.1.1989, 22.4.1989 and 9.5.1988, the bank authorities have recorded its satisfaction. 19. As discussed hereinabove, the bank-respondent No.1 had to follow the procedure showing the door to the employee in terms of clause XVI referred to supra. It was mandatory on the part of the management to record satisfaction that the employee is absent, he has no intention to resume duty, has taken some other job and in the notices, it was to be conveyed to him that all these conditions have been satisfied. Thereafter, if he fails to offer explanation, in that eventuality, it can be said that he is deemed to have been retired voluntary from service from the effective date. But that is not the case here at all. 20. Admittedly, the management has not conducted any enquiry, in order to hold that he has been willfully absent from duty which, in normal course or cases, other departments do. 21. The apex Court in Syndicate Bank versus General Secretary, Syndicate Bank Staff Association and another reported in (2000) 5 SCC 65 had discussed the principles how an employee can be said to have voluntarily retired from the service. It is apt to reproduce paras 15 and 18 of the said judgment herein. “15. In the present case action was taken by the Bank under Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement. It is not disputed that Dayananda absented himself from the work for a period of 90 or more consecutive days. It was thereafter that the Bank served a notice on him calling upon to report for duty within 30 days of the notice stating therein the grounds for the Bank to come to the conclusion that Dayananda had no intention of joining duties. Dayayanda did not respond to the notice at all. On the expiry of the notice period Bank passed orders that Dayananda had voluntarily retired from the service of the Bank. 16-17….. ….. ….. ….. 18. The Bank has followed the requirements of Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement. It rightly held that Dayananda has voluntarily retired from the service of the Bank. On the expiry of the notice period Bank passed orders that Dayananda had voluntarily retired from the service of the Bank. 16-17….. ….. ….. ….. 18. The Bank has followed the requirements of Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement. It rightly held that Dayananda has voluntarily retired from the service of the Bank. Under these circumstances it was not necessary for the Bank to hold any inquiry before passing the order. An inquiry would have been necessary if Dayananda had submitted his explanation which was not acceptable to the Bank or contended that he did report for duty but was not allowed to join by the Bank. Nothing of the like has happened here. Assuming for a moment that inquiry was necessitated, evidence led before the Tribunal clearly showed that notice was given to Dayananda and it is he who defaulted and offered no explanation of his absence from duty and did not report for duty within 30 days of the notice as required in Clause 16 of the Bipartite Settlement.” 22. The ratio laid down in para 15 of the judgment supra, squarely covers the facts as projected in the present case. 23. The apex Court in another case titled Viveka Nand Sethi versus Chairman, J& K Bank Ltd. And others reported in (2005) 5 SCC 337 has also laid down the same principles. It is apt to reproduce para 14 of the judgment herein. “14. What fell for consideration before the industrial Tribunal was the interpretation and/or applicability of the said Settlement. The Industrial Tribunal committed an error of record insofar as it proceeded on the basis that the said Settlement had not been proved. The Settlement being an admitted document should have been considered in its proper perspective by the Industrial Tribunal. Clause (2) of the said Settlement is a complete code by itself. It lays down a complete machinery as to how and in what manner the employer can arrive at a satisfaction that the workman has no intention to join his duties. A bare perusal of the said Settlement clearly shows that it is for the employee concerned to submit a proper application for leave. It is not in dispute that after the period of leave came to an end in June 1983, the workman did not report back for duties. A bare perusal of the said Settlement clearly shows that it is for the employee concerned to submit a proper application for leave. It is not in dispute that after the period of leave came to an end in June 1983, the workman did not report back for duties. He also did not submit any application for grant of further leave on medical ground or otherwise. It is in that situation the memorandum dated 2.11.1983 was issued and he was asked to joint his duties. It is furthermore not in dispute that despite receipt of the said memorandum, the workman did not join duties pursuant whereto he was served with a notice to show cause dated 31.12.1982. He was required to resume his duties by 15.1.1984. The bank received a telegram on 17.1.1984 and only about a month thereafter he filed an application for grant of leave on medical ground. It is not the case of the workman that any leave on medical ground or otherwise was due to him. Opportunities after opportunities indisputably had been granted to the workman to explain his position but he chose not to do so except filing applications for grant of medical leave and that too without annexing proper medical certificates.” 24. The apex Court in case titled Vijay S. Sathaye versus Indian Airlines Limited and others reported in (2013) 10 SCC 253 , also laid down the similar principles of law. It is profitable to reproduce para 15 of the said judgment herein. “15. In Buckingham and Carnatic Co. Ltd. v. Venkatiah & Anr., 1964 AIR(SC) 1272 while dealing with a similar case, this Court observed : "Abandonment or relinquishment of service is always a question of intention, and normally, such an intention cannot be attributed to an employee without adequate evidence in that behalf." A similar view has been reiterated in G.T. Lad & Ors. v. Chemicals and Fibres India Ltd., 1979 AIR(SC) 582.” 25. Having said so, the Tribunal has fallen in an error in not deciding the reference in its right perspective and has failed to decide the reference in terms of Clause XVI of the Bipartite Settlement, referred to supra. 26. v. Chemicals and Fibres India Ltd., 1979 AIR(SC) 582.” 25. Having said so, the Tribunal has fallen in an error in not deciding the reference in its right perspective and has failed to decide the reference in terms of Clause XVI of the Bipartite Settlement, referred to supra. 26. In view of the foregoing discussion and applying the ratio laid down in the judgments of the Supreme Court referred to above, the impugned judgment needs to be set aside and the award needs to be quashed with direction to the Tribunal to decide the matter afresh. 27. As a corollary, the impugned judgment is set aside and the award made by the Tribunal is quashed. The Tribunal is directed to decide the matter afresh within two months from 1.8.2015. Parties are directed to appear before the Tribunal on 1st August, 2015. 28. The questions are answered accordingly and the appeal is disposed of, alongwith pending applications if any.