JUDGMENT Hon’ble Ran Vijai Singh, J.—Heard Sri K.P.S. Yadav, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Standing Counsel appearing for the State-respondents and Sri H.N. Singh, learned counsel for respondent No. 3. 2. By means of this writ petition, the petitioner has prayed for issuing a writ of certiorari quashing the order dated 27.9.2012 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Jakhaniya, Ghazipur in Appeal Nos. nil of 2012, nil of 2012 and nil of 2012 (Asha Devi v. Mali) and order dated 19.2.2015 passed by the Additional Commissioner (IInd), Varanasi Division, Varanasi in Revision Nos. 4, 5 and 6 of 2012 (Asha Devi v. Mali). vide order dated 27.9.2012, the appeals filed by the petitioner against the judgment and order dated 29.12.2011 passed by the Naib Tehsildar in case Nos. 305/73/282, 304/42/251 and 306/43/286 (Mali v. Purshottam), have been rejected as barred by time, whereas by the subsequent order dated 16.2.2015, the revisions filed by the petitioner against the order dated 27.9.2012 have also been dismissed. 3. By the consent of learned counsel for the parties, the writ petition is being taken up for final disposal. 4. The facts giving rise to this case are that with respect to the land situated in three different villages, the respondent No. 3 filed three different cases, i.e., case Nos. 305/73/282, 304/42/251 and 306/43/286 (Mali v. Purshottam), under Section 34 of the U.P. Land Revenue Act, 1901 for mutating his name in the revenue record impleading the father of the petitioner on the basis of the registered will dated 5.4.2005. All the three cases were consolidated, as they were subject-matter of the same will, and ultimately, those cases were allowed with the direction to mutate the name of respondent No. 3 on the basis of the registered will deed. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, three different appeals, i.e., appeal Nos. nil of 2012, nil of 2012 and nil of 2012 (Asha Devi v. Mali), were filed before the Sub Divisional Officer, which were barred by three months and 12 days. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, three different appeals, i.e., appeal Nos. nil of 2012, nil of 2012 and nil of 2012 (Asha Devi v. Mali), were filed before the Sub Divisional Officer, which were barred by three months and 12 days. Alongwith the appeals, the petitioner had also filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for extending the period of limitation in filing the appeals on the ground that a transfer application was filed before the Sub Divisional Officer by the petitioner, in which records were summoned on 27.1.2011, but the records were not sent and on the alleged date when the order was passed, no hearing was done and the petitioner did not know about the judgment passed by the Naib Tehsildar on 29.12.201 prior to 31.3.2012. When the petitioner heard that the mutation applications have been allowed, it is thereafter, she came on 2.4.2012 at Tehsil and filed an application for obtaining the copy of the judgment. The Sub Divisional Officer has rejected the application of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner has not filed any evidence in support of her statement of fact. 5. The law relating to the condonation of delay has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Apex Court in numerous cases and ratio of those cases favours the disposal of the cases on merit instead of rejecting the same on the ground of delay and it is impressed that while considering the matter for condonation of delay, the Court should take liberal view. It has also been observed that if the delay is not mala fide, in that eventuality, if some inconvenience has been caused to the other side, that could be compensated by imposing some cost, instead of terminating the proceeding at the threshold. The reference may be given in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. It has also been observed that if the delay is not mala fide, in that eventuality, if some inconvenience has been caused to the other side, that could be compensated by imposing some cost, instead of terminating the proceeding at the threshold. The reference may be given in the case of Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and another v. Mst. Katiji and others, JT 1987 (1) SC 537 : 1987 (2) SCR 387 , Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition, Kerala v. K.V. Ayisumma, JT 1996 (7) SC 204, Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab, JT 1995 (7) SC 69 and N. Balakrishnan v. M. Krishnamurthy, JT 1998 (6) SC 242, Apanshu Mohan Lodh v. State of Tripura, (2004) 1 SCC 119 , State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan, 2008 (10) JT 179 , Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. v. Subrata Borah Chowlek, (2010) 262 ELT 3 and Jeet Narain and another v. Govind Prasad and others, (2010) 3 ADJ SC 470. 6. The Apex Court in the case of State of Bihar and others v. Kameshwar Singh and others, JT 2000 (5) 389, after considering various cases of the Apex Court on condonation of delay application has held as under: “Para 12................ The expression ‘sufficient cause’ should, therefore, be considered with pragmatism in justice-oriented process approach rather than the technical detention of sufficient case for explaining every day’s delay. The factors which are peculiar to and characteristic of the functioning of pragmatic approach in justice -oriented process. The Court should decide the matters on merits unless the case is hopelessly without merit. No separate standards to determine the cause laid by the State vis-a-vis private litigant could be laid to prove strict standards of sufficient cause.” 7. Further, the Apex Court in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswam v. Bhargavi Amma, (2008) 8 SCC 321 , has observed as under: “The words ‘sufficient cause for not making the application within the period of limitation’ should be understood and applied in a reasonable, pragmatic, practical and liberal manner, depending upon the facts and circumstances of the case, and the type of case. The words ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.” 8. The words ‘sufficient cause’ in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice, when the delay is not on account of any dilatory tactics, want of bona fides, deliberate inaction or negligence on the part of the appellant.” 8. Thus, while deciding such an application justice oriented approach is required to be adopted. Justice is the virtue, by which the society/Court/Tribunal gives to a man what is his due, opposed to injury or wrong. (Wharton’s Law Lexicon, 1976 Reprint Edn., p. 552). Justice is an act of rendering what is right and equitable towards one who has suffered a wrong. Therefore, while tempering the justice with mercy, the Court has to be very conscious that it has to do justice in exact conformity to some obligatory law for the reason that human actions are found to be just or unjust as they are in conformity with or in opposition to the law. In Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others, (2000) 7 SCC 296 , the Hon’ble Apex Court observed as under : “The words ‘justice’ and ‘injustice’, in our view,. are sometimes loosely used and have different meanings to different persons, particulartly to those arrayed on opposite sides..... Justice Cardozo said, ‘The Web is tangled and obscure, shot through with a multitude of shades and colours, the skeins irregular and broken. Many hues that seems to be simple, are found, any when analysed, to be complex and uncertain blend. Justice itself, which we are wont to appeal to as a test as well as an ideal, may mean different things to different minds and at different times. Attempts to objectify its standards or even to describe them, have never wholly succeeded.” (Selected Writings of Cardozo, pp 223-24; Fallon Publications, 1947).” 9. The above principle has been taken care of in numerous cases by the Hon’ble Apex Court thereafter. Reference may be given to Gangadeep Pratisthan Private Ltd. and others v. Messrs. Mechano and others, AIR 2005 SC 1958 and Jeet Narain and another v. Govind Prasad and others, 2010 (3) ADJ SC 470. 10. The above principle has been taken care of in numerous cases by the Hon’ble Apex Court thereafter. Reference may be given to Gangadeep Pratisthan Private Ltd. and others v. Messrs. Mechano and others, AIR 2005 SC 1958 and Jeet Narain and another v. Govind Prasad and others, 2010 (3) ADJ SC 470. 10. Here in this case, from the perusal of the narration of fact, it transpires that everything was not normal before the Court of Naib Tehsildar, as filing of transfer application by the applicant-petitioner and the summoning of record by the Sub Divisional Officer has not been denied anywhere and the Court below, while rejecting the applications, has not taken into consideration of the filing of the transfer application summoning the record, which favours the circumstances of delay in filing the appeal. The petitioner-appellant is an illiterate rustic villager residing in a remote locality of a village. She has to depend on the legal advice of the counsel and in such circumstances, when the villagers are surrounded by so many typical circumstances, delay of three months makes no difference and the matter should not have been thrown by the Court on the ground of delay by scuttling the matter on merit. 11. After considering the petitioner’s explanation furnished before the appellate Court, I am of the view that delay was sufficiently explained and the learned appellate Court has erred in rejecting the petitioner’s application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and revisional Court too has failed to exercise the jurisdiction vested for advancement of the cause of justice. 12. In the result, the writ petition succeeds and is allowed. The impugned orders dated 27.9.2012 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer, Jakhaniya, Ghazipur in Appeal Nos. nil of 2012, nil of 2012 and nil of 2012 (Asha Devi v. Mali) and 19.2.2015 passed by the Additional Commissioner (IInd), Varanasi Division, Varanasi in Revision Nos. 4, 5 and 6 of 2012 (Asha Devi v. Mali) are hereby quashed. The appellate Court is directed to decide the appeals expeditiously on merit in accordance with law. In case there is any application for interim protection before the appellate Court, the same may also be considered and decided by a reasoned order prior to the final decision in the appeals. ——————