Order By way of the instant writ petition, the petitioner has approached this Court assailing the legality and validity of the order (Annex.P/5) dated 20.9.2001, whereby the petitioner was placed under suspension on the ground of a prosecution sanction having been accorded against him for the offence under Section 13(1)(e)(ii) of the Prevention of Corruption Act as well as for quashing and declaring illegal, the circular dated 10.8.2001 issued by the State Government, whereby mandatory directions were issued to the concerned departmental heads for placing under suspension such employees, who were trapped red-handed while accepting bribe or against whom prosecution sanction is accorded for the offences of corruption, dowry death, murder, rape or other offences of moral turpitude and further not to reinstate such employees, till the matter is pending before the competent court and the employee is acquitted. Further, prayer has been made in the writ petition for granting annual grade increments and selection grade to the petitioner from the date of accrual. Shri Ankur Mathur, learned counsel representing the petitioner, at the outset stated that during the intervening period, while the instant writ petition was pending, various reliefs prayed for, have already been extended to the petitioner and he has already superannuated and thus, only an academic question survives in the instant writ petition regarding the legality and validity of the State Government’s circular dated 10.8.2001. Learned counsel submitted that the notification (Annex.4), whereby a mandate has been issued to the departmental heads for placing the delinquents faced with the situations described in the circular under suspension, is grossly illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional as the same encroaches upon the discretion conferred upon the appropriate authority under the statutory rules. Thus, he submitted that the circular deserves to be quashed and struck down. Learned counsel for the petitioner urged that this Court considered the effect of an order of suspension in the case of Shaukat Ali Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 1992 WLR (S) Raj. 855 and held that though technically and legally, suspension is not a punishment but in ground reality, it is worse than a punishment. It results in the humiliation of an employee not only before the members of the family but also in the eyes of the world at large. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 1992 WLR (S) Raj. 855 and held that though technically and legally, suspension is not a punishment but in ground reality, it is worse than a punishment. It results in the humiliation of an employee not only before the members of the family but also in the eyes of the world at large. On the strength of the aforesaid observations made in Shaukat Ali’s case, learned counsel urged that the discretion conferred upon the disciplinary authority to place the employee under suspension as per Rule 13 of the CCA Rules should not be fettered by administrative circulars as it amounts to taking away discretionary powers conferred by a statute. He relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Indra Sawhney Vs. Union of India reported in 1992 Supp(3) SCC 217 and urged that executive instructions can be issued when there exists no statutory legislation on the subject and also to supplement the existing statutory provisions when those provisions are silent. He also relied upon the judgment rendered by Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Uday Pratap Singh Vs. State of Bihar reported in 1994 Supp(3) SCC 451 and urged that statutory rules cannot be whittled down by an executive order. Laying stress upon Article 162 of the Constitution of India, he submitted that the executive power of the State extends to the matters with respect to which, the State legislature has powers to make law. Once a law occupies a field, it will not be open to the State Government in exercise of its power under Article 162 of the Constitution of India to prescribe in the same field through an executive order. In support of this contention, he relied upon certain observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of P.H. Paul Manoj Pandian Vs. P.Veldurai reported in (2011)5 SCC 214 . He also relied upon the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation Vs. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society reported in (2013)5 SCC 427 and urged that executive instructions, which have no statutory force, cannot override the statutory law. As per him, any notice, circular, guidelines etc. which run contrary to the statutory laws cannot be enforced. Subhash Sindhi Cooperative Housing Society reported in (2013)5 SCC 427 and urged that executive instructions, which have no statutory force, cannot override the statutory law. As per him, any notice, circular, guidelines etc. which run contrary to the statutory laws cannot be enforced. Relying upon the observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of State of Rajasthan & Ors. Vs. Jagdish Narain Chaturvedi reported in (2009)12 SCC-49, he urged that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the said case in no unequivocal terms held that no party can even be permitted to raise an issue that executive instructions can override the statutory rules. He further relied upon certain observations made by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Mannalal Jain Vs. State of Assam reported in AIR 1962 SC 386 and urged that the impugned circular deserves to be quashed. Referring to the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Poonam Verma Vs. DDA reported in (2007)13 SCC 154 , he contended that guidelines cannot partake the character of a statute. Such guidelines, in absence of the statutory backdrop are advisory in nature. He submitted that the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforesaid case held that the guidelines by their very nature do not fall into the category of legislation- direct, subordinate or ancillary. They have only an advisory role to play and nonadherence to or deviation from them is necessarily and implicitly permissible if the circumstances of any particular fact or law situation warrants the same. Thus, he urged that the guidelines issued by the State by way of the circular (Annex.P/4) dated 10.8.2001, whereby a mandate has been imposed on the discretion available to the competent authority under Rule 13 of the CCA Rules should be quashed as being unconstitutional. Per contra, Dr. PS Bhati, learned AAG with Shri Sajjan Singh, learned counsel and Shri SM Toshniwal, learned AGC representing the respondents, urged that the circular dated 10.8.2001 has been issued bonafide in an endeavour to fill in the void left in the rules, inasmuch as, the rules do not cover the specific situations to deal with the cases of employees facing charges for serious offences. As such, the circular was issued merely as an advisory to the departmental heads for dealing with the cases of employees against whom serious offences are registered. As such, the circular was issued merely as an advisory to the departmental heads for dealing with the cases of employees against whom serious offences are registered. They submitted that if government employees against whom, offences under the Prevention of Corruption Act, murder, rape or dowry death are registered, are allowed to continue functioning on public posts, then the very faith of the public in the official decorum would be shaken. Thus, they submitted that by way of abandon precaution, the guidelines were issued through the circular so that a uniform practice could be adopted all over the State in the matters pertaining to suspension of such delinquent officers. They, therefore, prayed that no interference is called for in the matter and the writ petition should be dismissed. Heard and considered the arguments advanced at the bar. Perused the material available on record. Rule 13 of the Rajasthan Civil Services (Classification, Control & Appeal) Rules, 1958, which provides for the powers of suspension reads as below: “13. Suspension.– (1) The Appointing Authority or any authority to which it is subordinate or any other authority empowered by the Government in that behalf may place a Government servant under suspension. (a) Where a disciplinary proceedings against him is contemplated or is pending, or (b) Where a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial: Provided that where the order of suspension is made by an authority lower than the Appointing Authority, such authority shall forthwith report to the Appointing Authority the circumstances in which the order was made. (2) A Government Servant who is detained in custody, whether on a criminal charge or otherwise, for a period exceeding forty–eight hours shall be deemed to have been suspended with effect from the date of detention, by an order of the Authority competent to place a Government Servant under suspension under sub–rule (1) and shall remain under suspension until further orders. (3) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from Service imposed upon a Government Servant under suspension is set aside in appeal or on review under these rules and the case is remitted for further inquiry or action or with any other directions, the order of his suspension shall be deemed to have continue in force on and from the date of the original order of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall remain in force until further orders. (4) Where a penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service imposed upon a Government Servant is set aside or declared or rendered void in consequence or by a decision of a Court of Law and the disciplinary authority, on a consideration of the circumstances of the case, decides to hold a further inquiry against him on allegations in which the penalty of dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement was originally imposed, the Government Servant shall be deemed to have been placed under suspension by the Appointing Authority from the date of the original order dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement and shall continue to remain under suspension until further orders. (5) Any order of suspension made or deemed to have been made under this rule may at any time be revoked by the authority which made or is deemed to have made the order or by any authority to which that authority is subordinate.” The language of the circular dated 10.8.2001 which is under challenge needs to be examined minutely for assessing the sustainability of the challenge made thereto. The circular dated 10.8.2001 is reproduced herein-below for the sake of convenience:- jktLFkku ljdkj] dkfeZd ¼d&3½ foHkkx dzekad % i-2¼157½ dkfeZd@d&3@97 t;iqj fnukad % 10-8-2001 leLr izeq[k ‘kklu lfpo@’kklu lfpo@fof’k”V ‘kklu lfpo] leLr lEHkkxh; vk;qDr ,oa leLr foHkkxk/;{k ¼ftyk dyDVlZ lfgr½ ifji= fo”k; %& yksd lsodksa ds vijkf/kd izdj.kksa esa fuyEcu ,oa fuyEcu cgkyh ds laca/k esa funsZ’kA iz’kklfud lq/kkj foHkkx dh vkKk la[;k i-6¼23½iz-lq-@vuq- 3@93] fnukad 16-6-1993 ,oa vkKk la[;k i-6¼18½iz-lq-@vuq&3@99 fnukad 19-4-1999 }kjk v/khuLFk lsok] ea=kyf;d lsok ,oa prqFkZ Js.kh deZpkjh lsok laoxZ ds deZpkfj;ksa ds fuyEcu ds izdj.k ,oa os izdj.k ftuesa vkjksi i= tkjh ugha gq, gksa] dk iqufoZyksdu djus] fuyfEcr j[kus ;k cgky djus laca/kh fu.kZ; ysus gsrq lacaf/kr iz’kklfud foHkkx ds ea=h egksn; dh v/;{krk esa ,d lfefr dk xBu fd;k x;k gSA mijksDr vkKkvksa ds laca/k esa dqN foHkkxksa }kjk ;g Li”Vhdj.k pkgk tk jgk gS fd ftu deZpkfj;ksa ds fo:) Hkz”Vkpkj laca/kh izdj.kksa esa vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr tkjh dh tk pqdh gS ,oa izdj.k U;k;ky; esa yfEcr gS] mUgsa lfefr ds le{k iqufoZyksdu gsrq izLrqr dj cgky fd;k tk ldrk gS vFkok ughaA bl laca/k esa fLFkfr fuEu izdkj Li”V dh tkrh gS%& 1- bl foHkkx ds vkns’k dzekad i-2¼31½dkfeZd@d&3@96 fnukad 14-12-2000 }kjk ;g Li”V funsZ’k izlkfjr fd;s x;s gSa fd ;fn dksbZ yksd lsod Hkz”Vkpkj fujks/kd C;wjks }kjk fj’or ysrs gq, jaxs gkFkksa fxjrkj fd;k tkos rks lacaf/kr yksd lsod dks fcuk fdlh viokn ds rqjUr fuyfEcr fd;k tkosA bl izdkj ds izdj.kksa esa fuyfEcr yksd lsod dks rc rd cgky ugha fd;k tkuk pkfg, tc rd fd U;k;ky; }kjk mls nks”k eqDr u dj fn;k tkosA 2- mijksDr fcUnq la[;k 1 esa of.kZr ekeyksa ds vykok Hkz”Vkpkj ls lacaf/kr leLr izdj.kksa esa vfHk;kstu Lohd`fr iznku djus ds lkFk&lkFk lEcfU/kr yksd lsod dks fuyfEcr fd;k tkuk vfuok;Z gksxk] ;fn lacaf/kr yksd lsod dks iwoZ esa gh fuyfEcr u dj fn;k x;k gksA bl izdkj ds izdj.kksa esa lacaf/kr yksd lsodksa dks rc rd fuyEcu ls cgky ugha fd;k tkuk gS tc rd fd izdj.k U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu gSA 3- gR;k] ngst e`R;q] cykRdkj tSls t?kU; vijk/kksa ,oa uSfrd v{kerk ls lacaf/kr izdj.kksa esa ;fn iqfyl }kjk l{ke U;k;ky; esa pkyku izLrqr dj fn;k tkrk gS rks lacaf/kr yksd lsod dks rqjUr fuyfEcr djuk vfuok;Z gksxkA bl izdkj ds izdj.kksa esa lacaf/kr yksd lsodksa dks rc rd fuyEcu ls cgky ugha fd;k tk;sxk tc rd fd lacaf/kr yksd lsod dks U;k;ky; }kjk nks”k eqDr u dj fn;k tkosA bl lEcU/k esa ;g Hkh Li”V fd;k tkrk gS fd ;fn izFke U;k;ky; }kjk fdlh yksd lsod dks nks”k eqDr dj fn;k tkrk gS rks ,sls yksd lsod dks lk/kkj.kr% fuyEcu ls cgky dj fn;k tkuk pkfg,] pkgs jkT; ljdkj us ,sls izdj.kksa esa U;k;ky; ds vkns’k ds fo:) vihy nk;j Hkh dj nh gksA lgh@& ‘kklu lfpoA** From a bare look at the language of the circular, it is evident that the circular tends to issue a mandate to the competent authority that, in the three situations stipulated therein, the public servant concerned has to be placed under suspension without fail and the suspension is to be continued till the matter is pending in the court and such public servant is not acquitted. The circular thus, conveys a mandate of almost automatic suspension in the situations stipulated therein. Rule 13 stipulates only one situation wherein, the suspension is automatic. Such action is prescribed where a government servant is detained in custody whether on a criminal charge or otherwise for a period exceeding 48 hours. Thus, plainly seen, the language of Rule 13 in entirety, does not contemplate automatic suspension of a government servant, save for the situation stipulated in Rule 13(2), which deals with suspension pursuant to custody beyond 48 hours. As the statutory provision does not provide for any automatic suspension upon the employee being trapped red-handed, sanction being granted to prosecute him for the offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act or a criminal case for the offences involving murder, rape, dowry death etc. being registered against him, such a mandate obviously cannot be imposed through an administrative circular The issuance of such a circular would amount to a direct encroachment upon the powers of suspension conferred upon the appropriate authority by the statute i.e. Rule 13 of the CCA Rules. Rule 13 provides that in appropriate situation, where a disciplinary proceeding is contemplated or pending against a government servant or a criminal case is under investigation or pending trial against such government servant, then he may be placed under suspension. Thus, the rule gives a discretion to the appropriate authority, who may in its discretion decide whether or not to place a government servant under suspension. On the other hand, the plain language of the circular imposes a mandate upon the appropriate authority for taking such a decision. Evidently and apparently, the language of the circular runs totally contrary to the letter and spirit of the statutory rule and directly encroaches upon the discretionary power of the appropriate authority. The import of the very same circular vis-à-vis the CCA Rules was examined in detail by this Court in the case of Samrath Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2010(1) WLC 562 and the court held as below: “8. The import of the very same circular vis-à-vis the CCA Rules was examined in detail by this Court in the case of Samrath Singh Vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors. reported in 2010(1) WLC 562 and the court held as below: “8. Precisely the issue deserves consideration in the instant matter is that whether the competent authority under Rule 13 of the Rules of 1958 is mandatorily required to place a government servant under suspension on lodging a case for the offences punishable under Prevention of Corruption Act or the competent authority is required to apply its mind objectively before taking any such action? 9. In general sense suspension means, a temporary deprivation of the employee's functions or right to discharge his duties, but that does not amount to lower down or reduction of his rank or status. Such employee, though continuous to be in employment but he is not permitted to work and is paid only a subsistence allowance which is less than salary and other admissible allowances for which he would have been entitled in normal course. The suspension is an interlocutory disciplinary measure to ensure free and fair conduct of the inquiry or the prosecution, as the case may be. It would be appropriate to place a person under suspension if, (i) his continuance to the office is likely to prejudice inquiry, investigation or trial; or (ii) where his continuance in office is likely to seriously subvert discipline in the office concerned; (iii) where his continuance in the office will be against the wider public interest; (iv) where a prima facie case is found to initiate criminal/departmental proceedings which are likely to lead to his conviction and/or dismissal, removal or compulsory retirement from service; or (v) where he is suspected to have engaged himself in activities prejudicial to the interest of the security of the State. 14. It is pertinent to note here that the circular in question at the one hand restricts discretion of the competent authority as given under Rule 13 to place an incumbent under suspension and at the same time also snatches away the power of the competent authority to revoke such suspension as prescribed under Rule 13(5) of the Rules of 1958. It is pertinent to note here that the circular in question at the one hand restricts discretion of the competent authority as given under Rule 13 to place an incumbent under suspension and at the same time also snatches away the power of the competent authority to revoke such suspension as prescribed under Rule 13(5) of the Rules of 1958. True it is, suspension of a civil servant is an administrative action and the government is having ample power to provide necessary guidelines to the competent authorities for exercising powers as per Rule 13, but at the same time it is also well settled that the administrative instructions can always be given to fill up the unoccupied field, however, such instructions in no way encroach the space already under occupation of an statute. In the present case the circular dated 10.8.2001 nowhere provides instructions to the competent authority as to how powers under Rule 13 are required to be exercised, but it imposes mandate upon the discretion of the competent authority. Such imposition of a mandate over statutory discretion is not permissible under administrative jurisprudence. The State Government would have been right in providing guidelines or a mode to exercise discretion under Rule 13 of the Rules of 1958. The State Government could have given instances and instructions to the competent authority to exercise its discretion to place an incumbent under suspension in particular circumstances but not an order to place government servant under suspension mandatorily in specific cases. It is for the competent authority to examine facts of each and every case and to settle desirability to place an incumbent under suspension by applying objective discretion. The suspension of an employee, looking to the facts and circumstances of the case may be desired urgently or on emergent basis but in those circumstances also the competent authority must record its satisfaction for exercising powers under Rule 13. If such satisfaction is not recorded and suspension is made merely on basis of the instructions given in circulars or merely by a word of mouth or by slip of pen, then that is nothing but colourable exercise of power. In the present case it is nowhere said by the respondents that before placing the petitioner under suspension the desirability to do so was objectively considered. In the present case it is nowhere said by the respondents that before placing the petitioner under suspension the desirability to do so was objectively considered. It is specific case of the competent authority that he placed the petitioner under suspension as per instructions of the Government of Rajasthan.” Thus, seen in light of the above observations, this Court is of the opinion that the exercise which learned counsel has undertaken in the instant writ petition was not at all warranted in view of the settled position of law as propounded by this Court in Samrath Singh’s case (supra). The Hon’ble Single Bench of this Court has already concluded that language of the circular to the extent it tends to encroach upon the discretion conferred upon the appropriate authority in the matters of suspension is illegal. The Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the issue of right to suspend an employee in the case of Capt. M. Paul Anthony Vs. Bharat Gold Mines Ltd. reported in (1999)3 SCC 679 and held that the exercise of the right to suspend an employee should appear to be justified on the facts of the particular case. In the case of Ashok Gaur Vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr. reported in RLR 1987(2) 63 this Court held that while exercising the power under Rule 13, the appointing authority must apply its mind and see whether it would be in the interest of the government or in the interest of the public at large to place the government servant under suspension. In the case of Dr. B.M. Bohra Vs. State of Rajasthan reported in RLR 1991(1) 383, this Court held as below: “Para 32. It is no doubt true that the public employer including the Government has a right to suspend its employee at any time in contemplation or during the pendency of inquiry or during investigation or trial of criminal case, in which an employee is involved. But such power of suspension has to be exercised sparingly and after due care. It is necessary that the competitive (sic competent) authority must objectively apply its mind to the nature of the allegation made against the employee, its gravity and seriousness, the record of the Government servant and the likely impact on service or the public interest of the alleged act of delinquency of the employee. The power of suspension cannot be exercised as a matter of course. The power of suspension cannot be exercised as a matter of course. No unfettered discretion is vested with the competent authority to pass order of suspension of an employee according to its sweet will, whim and fancy. The suspension of an employee results in serious adverse consequences to him because his image is shattered in the eye of public and the society in which he moves. Not only he but his whole family has to bear the brunt and the entire family is looked with contempt by the fellow employees and the members of the society. It is, therefore, necessary that this power of suspension must be exercised after thorough consideration of the matter from different angles.” The aforesaid view is fortified from the plain language of Rule 13 of the CCA Rules. In the cases of Indra Sawhney and Uday Pratap Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that executive circulars or instructions cannot be utilized to whittle down the provisions of the statutory rules. The same view was reiterated in the case of P.H. Paul Manoj Pandian (supra) after examining the import of the State’s executive powers under Article 162 of the Constitution of India. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Rajasthan State Industrial Development & Investment Corporation (supra) went to the extent of propounding that executive instructions, which have no statutory force cannot override the law and any notice, circular, guideline etc. which run contrary to the statutory laws cannot be enforced. Thus, this Court has no hesitation in holding that the circular dated 10.8.2001, whereby an arthritic and unyielding condition has been imposed upon the departmental heads for mandatorily placing the government servants covered by the situations No.1, 2 and 3 prescribed in the circular, under suspension upon the occurrence of the event described therein is absolutely bad in the eye of law. Accordingly, while allowing the writ petition, it is hereby directed that the circular dated 10.8.2001 shall henceforth be treated to be nothing further than in the nature of guideline and of advisory nature to the departmental heads in the matters pertaining to suspension of government servants in any of the situations stipulated therein. No order as to costs.