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Madhya Pradesh High Court · body

2015 DIGILAW 984 (MP)

Joura Begam v. State of M. P.

2015-09-16

R.S.JHA, S.K.PALO

body2015
ORDER Jha, J. -- 1. This appeal has been filed by the appellant under section 2(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Uchcha Nyayalaya (Khand Nyayapeeth Ko Appeal) Adhiniyam, 2005, being aggrieved by order dated 9.2.2015 passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.2746/2014 as well as the order dated 9.2.2015, passed in Review Petition No.50/2015. 2. The learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the appellants have purchased the lands bearing survey No.422, area 0.056 hectares and survey No.423/3, area 0.500 hectares, situated in village Sewda, Tahsil and District Datia, by sale-deeds dated 21.12.2009 and 14.12.2011 from Neeraj Kumar and Kalka Prasad Dubey, resopectively. Admittedly, the land in question was the subject-matter of land acquisition proceedings and was acquired under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act. It is also undisputed that an award in respect of the lands in question was passed on 30.3.2009 against the original land owner. 3. As the land had been acquired for the purposes of construction of Datia-Sewda bye-pass road, therefore, when the authorities started taking action for constructions of the road, the appellants who are persons that have subsequently purchased the lands from the original owners, filed Writ Petition No.2746/2014 on the ground that the property in question that had been purchased by them after it had been released from acquisition by the authorities concerned by Annexure P-9, dated 24.3.2009 and, therefore, as the property was no longer subject-matter of the acquisition proceedings and as the appellants had purchased it therefore the respondent/authorities could not claim that the property had been acquired and in case they wanted to undertake construction of the road on the aforesaid property, they were required to take recourse to the proceedings for acquisition of land before taking any steps in that regard. 4. The learned counsel appearing for the appellants has clarified that the document dated 24.3.2009 is the document by which the land had been released and averment in this regard was made by the appellants in Writ Petition No.2746/2014 after the issue was taken up by the appellants in the review proceedings initiated by them after withdrawing Writ Appeal No.21/2015 filed by them. It is stated that as the appellants had purchased the land in question after the same was released on 24.3.2009, therefore, the learned Single Judge has grossly erred in appreciating the facts while dismissing the petition as well as the review petition filed by the appellants. 5. The learned counsel for the appellants, relying on the provisions of section 24(2) of The Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 2013"), submits that the land acquisition proceedings initiated by the authorities under the old Act had lapsed as compensation has not been paid and as possession is with the appellants and, therefore, no steps towards construction of the road can be taken by the authorities. The learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon the decisions of the Supreme Court rendered in the cases of Pune Municipal Corporation and another v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki and others [ (2014)3 SCC 183 , Union of India and others v. Shiv Raj and others [ (2014)6 SCC 564 ], Naresh Kumar v. State of Haryana and others [((2014)6 SCC 589], Bimla Devi and others v. State of Haryana and others [2014(4) MPLJ 507], Union of India v. Shiv Raj and others [2014(4) MPLJ 542], Sheela Jawarlal Nagori and another v. Kantilal Nathmal Baldota and others [ (2014)11 SCC 376 ], Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana and others [ AIR 2012 SC 468 ], Magnum Promoters Private Ltd. v. Union of India and others [ (2015)3 SCC 327 ], and Government of Andhra Pradesh and another v. Syed Akbar [ (2005)1 SCC 558 ], in support of his submissions. 6. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents, per contra, submits that the land acquisition proceedings in respect of the disputed land and other land was initiated by the authorities in the year 2007 pursuant to which an award was passed against the original land owners on 30.3.2009, a copy of which has been brought on record as Annexure R-2-3 in the writ petition. It is further stated that the initial compensation of more than Rs. One crore was deposited by the respondent/corporation in the year 2008 itself and thereafter, after passing of the award the compensation was also disbursed to the claimants. It is further stated that the initial compensation of more than Rs. One crore was deposited by the respondent/corporation in the year 2008 itself and thereafter, after passing of the award the compensation was also disbursed to the claimants. To establish the aforesaid contention the respondents had filed Annexure R-2-5 along with the return which is on record. It is stated that thereafter the respondent/authorities have already taken sanction for construction of the road, awarded a contract to the contractor in the year 2013 and the road has also been constructed except for the small portion of land which is disputed before this Court on account of the interim order passed by this Court in the writ petition. 7. It is stated that the appellants have no locus standi to challenge the execution proceedings as they are neither the owners nor were they parties to the acquisition proceedings. It is urged that the appellants had purchased the disputed lands after the acquisition proceedings was over and in such circumstances no right accrued to them pursuant to the alleged sale-deeds in their favour. It is submitted that as the original owner has not challenged the land acquisition proceedings and as the appellants were neither parties nor were they involved in the acquisition proceedings, therefore, challenge to the same made by them in the writ petition is totally misconceived. It is further stated that the reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on the provisions of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is also misplaced inasmuch as admittedly, the award in the instant case was passed on 30.3.2009 whereas the petition was filed by the petitioner-appellants in the year 2014 and on that date five years from the date of acquisition had not elapsed. In such circumstances, no relief under section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is available to the appellants. 8. The learned counsel appearing for the respondents further submits that the respondent/authorities had in fact taken over possession of the land after passing of the award and it was only thereafter that the proceedings for construction of the road were initiated. It is asserted that the appellants have subsequently taken over possession of the land and in such circumstances, they have no right to create any impediment or assail the action of the respondent/authorities. It is asserted that the appellants have subsequently taken over possession of the land and in such circumstances, they have no right to create any impediment or assail the action of the respondent/authorities. The learned counsel for the respondents had relied upon a decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Saraswati Devi (Dead) by LR v. Delhi Development Authority and others [ (2013)3 SCC 571 ]. 9. We have heard the learned counsel appearing for the parties and perused the record. It is observed that the arguments of the learned cousnel for the appellants to the effect that the appellants had purchased the land after the same was released from acquisition proceedings pursuant to the order dated 24.3.2009 is misconceived and misplaced. It is pertinent to note that this letter was issued by the Divisional Manager of the Corporation, who, in fact had no right or authority to relealse the land in question. Quite apart from the above this letter/order was issued on 24.3.2009 prior to the passing of the award by the acquisition authority on 30.3.2009. In view of the fact that the award was passed and the land was finally acquired on 30.3.2009 after issuance of the letter/order dated 24.3.2009 on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellants, it is clear that the aforesaid order/letter issued by the Division Manager lost all significance and could not in any case have been acted upon. It is also apparent that this release was not made by the Government by the competent authority in exercise of the powers under section 48 of the Land Acquisition Act and, therefore, had no legal status. 10. In view of the aforesaid admitted and undisputed facts it is clear that the land had already been acquired by the Government on passing of the award in the acquisition proceedings and, therefore, could not have been sold by the original owners to the appellants subsequently and in case they have done so and the appellants had purchased the land knowing all the aforesaid facts, no right or title accrues to them pursuant to the alleged sale-deeds. 11. 11. It is significant to note that none of the persons effected by the land acquisition proceedings have challenged the same and have in fact accepted the land acquisition proceedings and it is the appellants who are persons that have allegedly purchased the land from the erstwhile owners after acquisition of the land that have challenged the same by filing the present petition. 12. We are of the considered opinion that the appellants have no authority or right to challenge the acquisition proceedings as they had no existing right in the land in question on the date of acquisition and as no right in them has accrued even after the alleged sale which even otherwise, were executed by persons who had no right or title to the land on the date of execution of the sale-deed as the land has already been acquired and the award had also been passed and, therefore, did not confer any title upon the appellants. We find support from paragraph 47 of the decision rendered by the Supreme Court in the case of Saraswati Devi (supra), wherein the Supreme Court has held as under : "47. ... In the absence of any title in favour of the appellant or her husband on the date of acquisition, the challenge to such acquisition could not have been allowed by the Single Judge. The Division Bench rightly set aside the erroneous order of the Single Judge." 13. We are also of the constrained to observe that the reliance placed by the appellants on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the present case is also misconceived and misplaced. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellants reads as under : "24(2). We are also of the constrained to observe that the reliance placed by the appellants on the decisions of the Supreme Court in the present case is also misconceived and misplaced. Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 on which reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellants reads as under : "24(2). Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), in case of land acquisition proceedings initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (91 of 1894), where an award under the said section 11 has been made five years or more prior to the commecnement of this Act but the physical possession of the land has not been taken or the compensation has not been paid the said proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed and the appropriate Government, if it so chooses, shall initiate the proceedings of such land acquisition afresh in accordance with the provisions of this Act : Provided that where an award has been made and compensation in respect of a majority of land holdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act, shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Act." 14. The aforesaid provisions expressly provides that section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 would come into operation only in cases where the award under section 11 of 1894 of the Act has been made five years or more prior to the commencement of this Act. Admittedly, in the instant case the award was passed by the authority on 30.3.2009 and was therfore within five years of the date of coming into the commencement of the Act of 2013 on 1.1.2014 and in such circumstances the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act of 2013 has no applicability to the presence case. 15. It is further made clear that the issue about possession and disbursement of the compensation as mentioned in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 are relevant only in cases where the award has been passed prior to five years of the commencement of the Act. 15. It is further made clear that the issue about possession and disbursement of the compensation as mentioned in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 are relevant only in cases where the award has been passed prior to five years of the commencement of the Act. To put it differently, it is only in cases where the award has been passed prior to five years of the commencement of the Act that the issue of disbursement of compensation and possession would be relevant and in cases where the award has been passed within five years of the commencement of the Act, the issue of possession and compensation would be irrelevant and have no impact in view of the fact that the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 24 of the Act would not be applicable as is evident from the aforesaid clear stipulation and specification in the statutory provisions itself. 16. The reliance placed by the learned counsel for the appellants on the decisions of the Supreme Court is totally misconceived as in all the aforesaid decisions the award has been passed five years prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013 and it was in reference and in context to the aforesaid facts that the Supreme Court has laid down the law which has no applicability to the facts of this case. 17. There is yet another reason on the basis of which we are of the considered opinion that the appeal filed by the appellants deserves to be dismissed and the said reason is that the original owners from whom the land had been acquired have neither challenged the acquisition proceedings nor raised any issue under the provisions of the Act of 2013 nor have they ever raised any dispute in respect of possession or disbursement of compensation. The appellants who have come into picture subsequently by getting the sale-deeds executed in their favour after passing of the award cannot be permitted to assail the acquisition proceedings as they have no right or locus standi to do so. The appellants who have come into picture subsequently by getting the sale-deeds executed in their favour after passing of the award cannot be permitted to assail the acquisition proceedings as they have no right or locus standi to do so. We are constrained to say so because if we permit persons like the appellants to assail the acquisition proceedings on the strength of obtaining sale-deeds executed in their favour after passing of the award that would obstruct the entire proceedings of acquisition which is not the object of either the Act of 1894 or the subsequent Act of 2013. 18. From a perusal of the order passed by the learned Single Judge in Writ Petition No.2746/2014 and in Review Petition No.50/2015 it is clear and apparent that the learned Single Judge has addressed all these issues and has thereafter dismissed the petition as well as the review petition. The learned Single Judge has also taken mnote of the averments made by the respondents in paragraph 5 of the return wherein they have specifically stated that the possession of the land has been taken for the construction of the road which has also been completed except for a small portion of the land which is involved in the present petition. 19. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the contention of the appellants to the contrary regarding possession etc. is also misconceive. The appeal filed by the appellants being meritless is accordingly dismissed.