Chong Hsin Wong v. Life Insurance Corporation of India
2015-12-22
DIPANKAR DATTA
body2015
DigiLaw.ai
JUDGMENT : 1. The petitioner claims that he is a tenant in respect of flats 2, 3 and 4, East India Building, No.8, Madan Street, Kolkata – 700 072 (hereafter the flats); that, by separate indentures executed by and between the petitioner and the Corporation, lease was granted in respect of the flats at varying monthly rental (the aggregate monthly rent being Rs.3,700/-); that, all three leases were effective for 5 (five) years from November 1, 1992 and upon expiry thereof, the petitioner had opted for renewal; that, the Corporation kept putting off renewal of lease in favour of the petitioner although he continued to pay lease rent at the existing rate; that, by a letter dated April 18/19, 2002, the Corporation proposed increase of rent to Rs.6,900/- a month from November 1, 1997 with periodic revision at the end of 5 (five) years at not less than 35% of the existing rent; that, upon a writ petition presented by the petitioner being disposed of with a direction upon the Corporation to give him a hearing, an order dated August 8, 2003 was passed by an officer of the Corporation directing payment of rent @ 8/- per sq.ft.; that, such order is under challenge in a writ petition, pending since 2003; that, by a further letter dated September 19, 2007, the Corporation sought to revise the rent asking for payment @ 5/- per sq.ft. from April, 2002 till March, 2005 and @ 6.50/- per sq.ft.
from April, 2002 till March, 2005 and @ 6.50/- per sq.ft. + municipal tax from April, 2005 till March 2010; that, by another letter dated September 24, 2007, the Corporation informed the petitioner that he was in default in payment of rent of Rs.5,31,000/- and a request was made to pay such amount with interest to facilitate regularisation of tenancy; that the petitioner was compelled to pay Rs.3,00,000/- under threat and also had to give an undertaking to pay the balance amount within a fortnight; that, admittedly, the petitioner failed to arrange for the balance amount; that, coming to learn of a writ petition filed in the Bombay High Court by the All India L.I.C. Tenant Action Committee wherein arbitrary increase of rent and violation of guidelines issued by the Ministry of Urban Development regarding eviction of tenants are under challenge, the petitioner was advised and in fact wrote a letter dated February 12, 2008 requesting the Corporation to accept rent @ Rs.6,900/-and to refund excess payment made by him; that, though the Corporation did not respond, the petitioner has been paying rent @ Rs.6,900/- per month by cheque and the same is duly being accepted; and that, by a notice dated March 27, 2015, the Corporation determined the tenancy in respect of the said flats on the expiry of April 30, 2015 and asked the petitioner to quit, vacate and deliver peaceful possession thereof. 2. Anticipating initiation of proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereafter the Act), the petitioner presented this writ petition dated May 8, 2015 on diverse grounds. Mandamus has been claimed on the respondents to cancel, rescind and withdraw any proceedings for his eviction from the said flats and to quash the notice determining tenancy. 3. A supplementary affidavit dated August 27, 2015 has been filed, seeking to bring on record notices dated August 4/8, 2015 issued under sections 4 and 7 of the Act by the estate officer. 4. The oral submissions of Mr. Basu, learned counsel for the petitioner have been heard. He also filed a written note of arguments, which has been taken on record and perused. 5. Mr. Basu contended that the Act was brought into force with a specific object, i.e. to secure eviction of recalcitrant unauthorised occupants from public premises through summary proceedings.
4. The oral submissions of Mr. Basu, learned counsel for the petitioner have been heard. He also filed a written note of arguments, which has been taken on record and perused. 5. Mr. Basu contended that the Act was brought into force with a specific object, i.e. to secure eviction of recalcitrant unauthorised occupants from public premises through summary proceedings. However, it was never intended to be applied as a mode of oppression. While urging that initiation of proceedings under the Act against the petitioner is illegal and in abuse of power, Mr. Basu relied on the guidelines issued by the Central Government and several decisions of the Supreme Court. The thrust has been to draw a distinction between poor tenants like the petitioner and totally unauthorised occupants of public premises, like public servants who despite retirement from service continue to occupy quarters that had been allotted to them as incident of service, or those who are found to have sublet public premises without permission, or those affluent tenants who despite determination of tenancy, refuse to vacate and continue to remain in unauthorised occupation. According to him, the petitioner is entitled to protection under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1997 and any move to evict him without taking recourse to such law would be indefensible. It was, accordingly, prayed that the proceedings initiated against the petitioner be quashed. 6. I did not consider it necessary to call upon the respondents to answer. 7. As on date the writ petition was presented, proceedings under the Act against the petitioner had not seen the light of the day. The writ petition had been presented to prevent threatened injury. Since the writ petition had not been taken up for consideration prior to September 30, 2015, the estate officer (who is not even a party to the writ petition) did not lack authority to issue the notices during its pendency. Now that the notices have been issued under the Act and the proceeding is at a nascent stage, and bearing in mind the fact that the petitioner would have fullest opportunity to place his version before the estate officer for his consideration, it would not be prudent to entertain the writ petition at this stage. I am reminded of the caution sounded by the Supreme Court in its decision in Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 440 .
I am reminded of the caution sounded by the Supreme Court in its decision in Special Director v. Mohd. Ghulam Ghouse, reported in (2004) 3 SCC 440 . It reads: “5. This Court in a large number of cases has deprecated the practice of the High Courts entertaining writ petitions questioning legality of the show-cause notices stalling enquiries as proposed and retarding investigative process to find actual facts with the participation and in the presence of the parties. Unless the High Court is satisfied that the show-cause notice was totally non est in the eye of the law for absolute want of jurisdiction of the authority to even investigate into facts, writ petitions should not be entertained for the mere asking and as a matter of routine, and the writ petitioner should invariably be directed to respond to the show-cause notice and take all stands highlighted in the writ petition. Whether the show-cause notice was founded on any legal premises, is a jurisdictional issue which can even be urged by the recipient of the notice and such issues also can be adjudicated by the authority issuing the very notice initially, before the aggrieved could approach the court. Further, when the court passes an interim order it should be careful to see that the statutory functionaries specially and specifically constituted for the purpose are not denuded of powers and authority to initially decide the matter and ensure that ultimate relief which may or may not be finally granted in the writ petition is not accorded to the writ petitioner even at the threshold by the interim protection granted.” (emphasis added) 8. It is not a case where the notices issued by the estate officer can be branded non est for absolute want of jurisdiction. That the Corporation has not been reasonable in its dealing with the petitioner is not an issue that ought to be considered now. Such issue ought to be raised before the estate officer for his consideration. The writ petition seems to me to be premature, being based on a threat perception which is not real. 9. For the foregoing reason, this writ petition stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 10. All points urged in this writ petition are left open for being urged by the petitioner before the estate officer for a decision by him in accordance with law.
9. For the foregoing reason, this writ petition stands dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs. 10. All points urged in this writ petition are left open for being urged by the petitioner before the estate officer for a decision by him in accordance with law. Urgent photostat copy of this judgment and order, if applied for, be furnished to the applicant at an early date. Later: Mr. Basu, learned advocate for the petitioner prays for stay of operation of the order. The same is considered and refused.