JUDGMENT : Tarlok Singh Chauhan, J. This petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Article 227 of the Constitution of India is directed against the summoning order passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate, Ist Class, Chamba. 2. Shorn of all unnecessary details, the case of the petitioner is that it is arraigned as an accused in complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (for short “Act”), though no notice as mandatorily required under the Act been served upon it. 3. Therefore, the short question which arises for determination is as to whether in absence of notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act to the petitioner, can the complaint be maintained? I have heard learned counsel for the parties and have gone through the records of the case. 4. Section 138 of the Act was enacted to penalize those unscrupulous persons who purported to establish their liability by issuing cheques without really intending to do so. To make the provisions contained in Chapter XVII of the Act to more effective, some more sections were inserted in the Chapter and some amendments in the existing provision were also made. 5. Section 138 of the Act reads thus:- “138. To make the provisions contained in Chapter XVII of the Act to more effective, some more sections were inserted in the Chapter and some amendments in the existing provision were also made. 5. Section 138 of the Act reads thus:- “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account.---- Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provisions of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.” 5. The condition pertaining to the notice to be given to the drawer have been formulated and incorporated in clause (b) to (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the “Act”. The condition pertaining to the notice to be given to the drawer have been formulated and incorporated in clause (b) to (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the “Act”. On the part of payee, he has to make a demand by “giving a notice” in writing to the drawer of the cheque within a period of thirty days from the date of receipt of information from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid. In clause (c), the drawer is given fifteen days time from the date of receipt of notice to make the payment and only after he fails to make payment, a complaint may be filed against him. 6. The words in clause (b) to proviso of Section 138 of the “Act” show that the payee has the statutory obligation to ‘make a demand’ by giving notice. The thrust in the clause is on the need to “make a demand”. It is only the mode for making such demand which the legislature has prescribed. Once it is dispatched, his part is over and the next depends what the sendee does. 7. Thus it is absolutely clear that making of a demand by giving a notice is sina-qua-non and it is only thereafter that the complainant can be maintained, that too after it is proved that the notice of such demand was served or deemed to have been served upon the sendee. 8. The learned counsel for the respondent would however argue that since a notice had been issued to one Vijay Kumar, who is none other than the incharge and authorized signatory of the petitioner, therefore, there was sufficient compliance of the provisions of the Act. 9. I am afraid that this contention cannot be accepted for the simple reason that there is a distinction between a natural and jurist person and issuance of notice upon the natural person would not ipso facto notice upon the jurist person. 10. Offences by the company has been separately dealt with under Section 141 of the “Act”, which essentially means that the offences committed by the company is different from the once which have been committed by its employees. 10. Offences by the company has been separately dealt with under Section 141 of the “Act”, which essentially means that the offences committed by the company is different from the once which have been committed by its employees. In such situation the company is deemed to be the principal offender and the remaining persons are made offenders by virtue of legal fiction created by the legislature as per the Section, hence the actual offence should have been committed by the company. If that was so, then the notice as mandatorily required under Section 138 ought to have been served upon the company, but in the instant case undisputedly the notice has been served only upon its incharge and authorized signatory Sh. Vijay Kumar. 11. Thus from the aforesaid discussion, it can safely be concluded that the learned trial Magistrate has failed to take into consideration this distinction, which vitiate the entire proceedings as the Company can only be tried, in case there is a notice served upon it, that too after satisfying the provisions of Section 141 (1) of the Act, but the Company in no event can be prosecuted in absence of a legal and valid notice to this effect as envisaged under the Act. Having said so, I find merit in this petition. Therefore, the proceedings initiated by the learned Magistrate on the basis of complaint case under NIA Act No. 789 of 2013, titled as Smt. Pushpa Bhanot Vs. M/s Century Vision Organic Farms Private Limited is quashed for want of legal and valid notice and accordingly set aside.