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2015 DIGILAW 992 (RAJ)

Tulsi Das alias Tola Ram v. Virendra Singh

2015-05-05

BANWARI LAL SHARMA, SUNIL AMBWANI

body2015
JUDGMENT : We have heard learned counsel for the parties. 2. This intra court appeal arises out of the judgment of learned Single Judge dated 20.2.2013 in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.388/2009 by which he had dismissed the writ petition confirming the concurrent findings, recorded by the Rent Tribunal regarding the bona-fide need of the landlord as well as the grounds taken in the Rent Appellate Tribunal, and in the writ petition that Shri Virendra Singh, after the death of his mother, ceased to be the landlord and was not competent to continue with the proceedings for eviction. Learned Single Judge after dismissing the writ petition allowed six months' time to the tenant to vacate the shop, subject to the condition of payment of rent and filing an affidavit of undertaking, detailed in the concluding paragraph of the judgment. 3. The proceedings for eviction of the appellant on bonafide need were initiated by Shri Virendra Singh, who had executed the rent agreement vide rent note and was realising the rent of the shop for last twenty years. The trial court decreed the suit for eviction on the ground of bonafide need. 4. During the pendency of the appeal, on the death of Smt. Sobhagyamani, mother of Shri Virendra Singh and Shri Arun Singh on 5.9.2007, an application was made by the appellant tenant that on her death, she has left behind a Will by which she has bequeathed the suit shop to younger son Shri Arun Singh and, thus, Shri Virendra Singh has no right to continue with the eviction proceedings. It is submitted that the application was not disposed and was kept pending and that neither the Rent Appellate Tribunal nor the learned Single Judge has decided the question of maintainability of the proceedings on the death of original owner. The order of eviction has been sustained on an application filed by son of the land lady, who was no longer the owner or the landlord of the shop in dispute. 5. The order of eviction has been sustained on an application filed by son of the land lady, who was no longer the owner or the landlord of the shop in dispute. 5. Reliance has been placed by the learned counsel for the appellant on the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Municipal Board, Kishangarh v. Chand Mal and Col, (1999) 9 SCC 198 , Shipping Corporation of India Ltd. v. Machado Brothers, (2004) 11 SCC 168 and Sheshambal v. Chelur Corporation (2010) 3 SCC 470 in support of the submissions that if on account of subsequent developments, the landlord ceases to have a right to sue or that bonafide need has been satisfied, the court can take such subsequent developments into consideration. 6. Learned counsel for the respondent-landlord submits that the issue was decided as issue No.5 by the Rent Appellate Tribunal. It was held that Shri Virendra Singh had brought the application for eviction as a "Khaas Mukhtiyaar" of Smt.Sobhagyamani and that the rent note executed by Shri Virendra Singh in favour of the tenant was admitted. All the rent receipts exhibited on record were executed by Shri Virendra Singh, who had also deposed that he is the owner of the shop and his mother has given the permission to file the suit. The stand taken by Shri Virendra Singh regarding the permission given by his mother to collect the rent and to file the suit was supported by his brother Shri Arun Singh. The Rent Appellate Tribunal further held that Shri Arun Singh in whose favour the shop was alleged to be decreed, had admitted that he had allowed his brother to file and to continue the proceedings of the suit for eviction and that his mother during her lifetime had also given permission to Shri Virendra Singh to file the suit. 7. We see no reason as to why Shri Virendra Singh will not fall within the definition of 'landlord' as provided under the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001. The 'landlord' has been defined under the Act to be a person, who is entitled to receive the rent and, thus, the person who has received the rent on behalf of the landlord is a person, who will fall within the definition of 'landlord' and is entitled to file a civil suit. The 'landlord' has been defined under the Act to be a person, who is entitled to receive the rent and, thus, the person who has received the rent on behalf of the landlord is a person, who will fall within the definition of 'landlord' and is entitled to file a civil suit. An express authority was given by Shri Arun Singh after the death of their mother to allow his brother Shri Virendra Singh to continue with the proceedings. 8. It is admitted that Shri Arun Singh had not given any notice to the tenant nor denied the authority of Shri Virendra Singh to claim rent or to continue with the proceedings. Infact, Shri Arun Singh had supported the eviction proceedings and also filed an affidavit in support of the eviction proceedings instituted by his brother. 9. The 'landlord' is defined under Section 2(c) of the Rajasthan Rent Control Act, 2001 as follows: "2. Definitions.- In this Act, unless subject or context otherwise requires,- (c) "landlord" means any person who for the time being is receiving or is entitled to receive the rent of any premises, whether on his own account or as an agent, trustee, guardian or receiver for any other person, or who would so receive or be entitled to receive the rent, if the premises were let to a tenant." 10. Shri Virendra Singh was receiving the rent on behalf of her mother. The rent note and the rent receipts issued by him, were admitted by the tenant. On the death of the mother, the shop in dispute had fallen under her Will to the share of Shri Arun Singh, the younger brother, who had authorised Shri Virendra Singh to continue with the proceedings of eviction. Shri Virendra Singh had express authority to continue with the proceedings. Shri Arun Singh had never claimed the rent, nor had given any notice to the tenant to claim rent, which may show that he was not in agreement with the proceedings of eviction. 11. The decisions, cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, are only to the effect that the subsequent developments can be taken into consideration in the proceedings of eviction on the ground of bonafide need. 11. The decisions, cited by the learned counsel for the appellant, are only to the effect that the subsequent developments can be taken into consideration in the proceedings of eviction on the ground of bonafide need. The proposition however does not help the appellant, inasmuch as he has not been able to demonstrate that on the death of his mother, Shri Virendra Singh did not have a right to continue with the proceedings for eviction as a landlord of the suit shop under the old Act as well as under the definition of 'landlord' in the new Act. 12. The findings arrived-at by the Rent Tribunal with regard to bonafide need have been concurrently affirmed by the Rent Appellate Tribunal as also the learned Single Judge. We do not find any good ground to interfere with these findings in the intra court appeal. 13. In the end, learned counsel for the appellant has prayed for grant of some time to vacate the premises. Sub-section (8) of Section 15 of the Act of 2001 provides that the certificate issued under sub-section (7) for eviction by the Rent Tribunal, shall not be executed in case the premises were let out for commercial purpose for a period of six months from the date of the decision. In this case, the premises were let out for commercial use. The certificate was thus not executable for a period of six months from the date of decision. The judgment of the Rent Tribunal was rendered on 2.2.2007. The Rent Appellate Tribunal decided the matter on 27.11.2008 and that learned Single Judge while dismissing the writ petition on 20.2.2013, allowed six months' time to the appellant to vacate the premises. It is now more than ten years since the proceedings for eviction were initiated on the ground of bonafide need. The appellant has already exhausted the period of relaxation given to him under sub-section (8) of Section 15 of the Act of 2001 to vacate the premises from the date of order of the Rent Tribunal. It is now more than ten years since the proceedings for eviction were initiated on the ground of bonafide need. The appellant has already exhausted the period of relaxation given to him under sub-section (8) of Section 15 of the Act of 2001 to vacate the premises from the date of order of the Rent Tribunal. Having received the statutory benefit and thereafter again six months' time allowed by the learned Single Judge and a further period of seven years in unsuccessfully challenging the orders of eviction in writ proceedings and intra court appeal, it is not appropriate for this court to grant any further time in exercise of the powers under Articles 226 of the Constitution of India. The Special Appeal is dismissed. Appeal Dismissed.