JUDGMENT : V.M. Pancholi, J. 1. This appeal is filed under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the judgment dated 11.1.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 19707 of 2015, whereby the learned Single Judge dismissed the petition filed by the appellant-petitioner and thereby not interfered with the order of detention dated 23.10.2015 passed by the detaining authority. 2. Heard learned advocate for the appellant and learned Assistant Government Pleader for the respondent-State. 3. Learned advocate for the appellant submitted that the petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India came to be filed by the appellant-petitioner against the order of detention dated 23.10.2015 passed by the respondent-detaining authority in exercise of powers conferred under Section 3(1) of the Gujarat Prevention of Anti Social Activities Act, 1985 (for short the Act) by detaining the detenue as a "dangerous person" as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act. 4. Learned advocate for the appellant referred to the impugned order of detention passed by the detaining authority and submitted that four different FIRs came to be filed against the appellant, details of which are given at page 18 of the compilation. Learned advocate referred to the said details and submitted that the appellant was arrested on 1.10.2015 in connection with FIR registered under Section25(1)(b)(a) of the Arms Act and it is alleged that one country made revolver was found from the possession of the appellant-detenue. It is alleged in the said FIR that other accused were also arrested out of which accused No. 1-Shaileshkumar Ramkripal Kori was found in possession of country made revolver. It is submitted that immediately after the arrest of the petitioner-detenue in connection with the said FIR, he was implicated in three other FIRs filed under Section 379 of Indian Penal Code and was shown to be arrested on 3.10.2015, 5.10.2015 and 5.10.2015 respectively in the other three FIRs. Thus, it is alleged that the appellant-detenue was implicated in three undetected cases of theft of Hero Honda motor cycles and immediately thereafter the impugned order of detention came to be passed by the detaining authority on 23.10.2015 alleging that the appellant is a dangerous person. 5. Thus, it is alleged that the appellant-detenue was implicated in three undetected cases of theft of Hero Honda motor cycles and immediately thereafter the impugned order of detention came to be passed by the detaining authority on 23.10.2015 alleging that the appellant is a dangerous person. 5. It is further contended that except the registration of the aforesaid FIRs, no other relevant or cogent material is available on record connecting the alleged anti social activities of the detention with breach of public order. Learned advocate submitted that the aforesaid registration of FIR under Section 379 of Indian Penal Code cannot be said to be breach of public order but it can be said to be breach of law and order and therefore detaining authority ought not to have passed the impugned order. He further contended that the learned Single Judge has not properly appreciated the aforesaid important aspects of the matter and passed the impugned order on the basis of the presumptions and assumptions and therefore the said order be quashed and set aside. 6. Learned advocate for the appellant further submitted that against the co-accused in the FIR being C.R. No. II-3102 of 2015 registered with DCB police station under the Arms Act, the order of detention also came to be passed by the detaining authority on the ground that he was found in possession of the country made revolver. Learned advocate submitted that the co-detenue Shaileshkumar Ramkripal Kori filed Special Civil Application No. 1658 of 2016 before this Court and this Court, vide order dated 4.5.2016, quashed and set aside the order of detention and therefore this Court may quash and set aside the order of detention in the case of the appellant also. 7. Learned AGP for the respondent-State supported the detention order passed by the authority and submitted that the detenue is a "dangerous person" and sufficient material and evidence was found during the course of investigation, which was also supplied to the detenue, indicating that the detenue is in habit of indulging into activities as defined under Section 2(c) of the Act and considering the facts of the case, the detaining authority has rightly passed the order of detention and therefore the learned Single Judge has rightly confirmed the order of detention by rejecting the petition filed by the appellant. Learned AGP has not disputed the aspect of release of co-detenue Shaileshkumar Ramkripal Kori. 8. Learned AGP has not disputed the aspect of release of co-detenue Shaileshkumar Ramkripal Kori. 8. Learned advocate for the detenue, placing reliance on the decisions reported in the cases of (i) Ranubhai Bhikhabhai Bharwad (Vekaria) v. State of Gujarat, reported in 2000 (3) GLR 2696 ; (ii) Ashokbhai Jivraj @Jivabhai Solanki v. Police Commissioner, Surat, reported in 2000(1) GLH 393 ; and (iii) Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh v. M.M. Mehta, reported in (1995) 3 SCC 237 , submitted that the case on hand is squarely covered by the ratio laid down in the aforesaid decisions. Learned counsel for the detenue further submits that it is not possible to hold in the facts of the present case that the activities of the detenue with reference to the criminal case/s had affected even tempo of the society, posing a threat to the very existence of the normal and routine life of the people at large or that on the basis of the criminal case/s, the detenue had put the entire social apparatus in disorder, making it difficult for whole system to exist as a system governed by the rule of law by disturbing public order. 9. Section 2(c) of the Act defines the term "dangerous person" as under:-- "2(c). "dangerous person" means a person, who either by himself or as a member or leader of a gang, habitually commits, or attempts to commit or abets the commission of any of the offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XV11 of the Indian Penal Code (GLV of 1860) or any of the offences punishable under Chapter V of the Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959)." 10. The order of detention is passed on the basis of what has come to be known as the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority such subjective satisfaction has to be arrived at on two points. Firstly, on the veracity of facts imputed to the person to be detained and secondly, on the prognostication of the detaining authority that the person concerned is likely to indulge again in the same kind of notorious activities. Whereas, normal laws are primarily concerned with the act of commission of the offence, the detention laws are concerned with character of the person who has committed or is likely to commit an offence. Whereas, normal laws are primarily concerned with the act of commission of the offence, the detention laws are concerned with character of the person who has committed or is likely to commit an offence. The detaining authority has, therefore, to be satisfied that the person sought to be detained is of such a type that he will continue to violate the laws of the land if he is not preventively detained. So, the commission of infraction of law, not done in an organized or systematic manner, may not be sufficient for the detaining authority to justifiably come to the conclusion that there is no alternate but to preventively detain the appellant. 11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and considering the facts and circumstances of the case, it appears that the subjective satisfaction arrived at by the detaining authority cannot be said to be legal, valid and in accordance with law inasmuch as the offences alleged in the FIR/s cannot have any bearing on the public order since the law of the land i.e. Indian Penal Code and other relevant penal laws are sufficient enough to take care of the situation and that the allegations as have been levelled against the detenue cannot be said to be germane for the purpose of bringing the detenue as a "dangerous person" within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act and, unless and until the material is there to make out a case that the person concerned has become a threat and a menace to the society so as to disturb the whole tempo of the society and that the whole social apparatus is in peril disturbing public order at the instance of such person, it cannot be said that the detenue is a dangerous person within the meaning of Section 2(c) of the Act. Except general statement, there is no material on record which shows that the detenue is acting in such a manner which is dangerous to the public order. Except general statement, there is no material on record which shows that the detenue is acting in such a manner which is dangerous to the public order. In view of the ratio laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of (i) Ranubhai Bhikhabhai Bharwad (Vekaria)(supra); (ii) Ashokbhai Jivraj @Jivabhai Solanki (supra); and (iii) Mustakmiya Jabbarmiya Shaikh (supra), the Court is of the opinion that the activities of the detenue cannot be said to be dangerous to the maintenance of public order and at the most fall under the maintenance of "law and order." In this connection, it will be fruitful to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Pushker Mukherjee v. State of West Bengal [ AIR 1970 SC 852 ], where the distinction between 'law and order' and 'public order' has been clearly laid down. The Court observed as follows: "Does the expression "public order" take in every kind of infraction of order or only some categories thereof? It is manifest that every act of assault or injury to specific persons does not lead to public disorder. When two people quarrel and fight and assault each other inside a house or in a street, it may be said that there is disorder but not public disorder. Such cases are dealt with under the powers vested in the executive authorities under the provisions of ordinary criminal law but the culprits cannot be detained on the ground that they were disturbing public order. The contravention of any law always affects order but before it can be said to affect public order, it must affect the community or the public at large. In this connection we must draw a line of demarcation between serious and aggravated forms of disorder which directly affect the community or injure the public interest and the relatively minor breaches of peace of a purely local significance which primarily injure specific individuals and only in a secondary sense public interest. A mere disturbance of law and order leading to disorder is thus not necessarily sufficient for action under the Preventive Detention Act but a disturbance which will affect public order comes within the scope of the Act." 12. No doubt, neither the possibility of launching of a criminal proceedings nor pendency of any criminal proceedings is an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. No doubt, neither the possibility of launching of a criminal proceedings nor pendency of any criminal proceedings is an absolute bar to an order of preventive detention. But, failure of the detaining authority to consider the possibility of either launching or pendency of criminal proceedings may, in the circumstances of a case, lead to the conclusions that the detaining authority has not applied its mind to the vital question whether it was necessary to make an order of preventive detention. Since there is an allegation that the order of detention is issued in a mechanical manner without keeping in mind whether it was necessary to make such an order when an ordinary criminal proceedings could well serve the purpose. The detaining authority must satisfy the court that the question too was borne in mind before the order of detention was made. In the case on hand, the detaining authority failed to satisfy the court that the detaining authority so bore the question in mind and, therefore, the court is justified in drawing the inference that there was no application of mind by detaining authority to the vital question whether it was necessary to preventively detain the detenue. It is also fruitful to refer to the decision of the Hon'ble Apex Court rendered in the case of Rekha v. State of Tamil Nadu through Secretary to Government and another reported in (2011)5 SCC 244 wherein, it is observed by the Hon'ble Apex Court that if a person is liable to be tried, or is actually being tried for a criminal offence but the ordinary criminal law will not be able to deal with the situation, then and only then, preventive detention be taken recourse to. 13. As a result of hearing and perusal of the record, it appears that the only material that was available with the detaining authority was the offences registered against the detenu and on that basis, it cannot be said that the activity of the detenu has become a threat to the maintenance of 'public order'. Mere involvement of the detenu in such activity may not amount to dangerous activity by the detenu and mere mention of them, unless supported by any evidence, cannot be said to be material germane for the purpose of arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the activity of the detenu is prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order'. Mere involvement of the detenu in such activity may not amount to dangerous activity by the detenu and mere mention of them, unless supported by any evidence, cannot be said to be material germane for the purpose of arriving at the subjective satisfaction that the activity of the detenu is prejudicial to the maintenance of 'public order'. For the sake of repetition, the commission of offence does not exhibit or disclose that the appellant is doing infraction of law in an organized or systematic manner so as to come to the conclusion that there is no alternate but to preventively detain the appellant. 14. In view of the above, we are inclined to allow this appeal because simplicitor registration of FIRs by itself cannot have any nexus with the breach of maintenance of public order and the authority can take recourse under the Indian Penal Code and no other relevant or cogent material exists for invoking powers under Section 3(1) of the Act. Further, co-detenue has been released by an order dated 4.5.2016 by learned Single Judge by quashing and setting aside the order of detention in the case of co-detenue of the present appellant. 15. In the result, the Letters Patent Appeal is allowed. The order dated 11.01.2016 passed by the learned Single Judge in Special Civil Application No. 19707 of 2015 is set aside and consequently, the order of detention dated 23.10.2015 passed by the respondent authority is also hereby quashed and set aside. The detenu is ordered to be set at liberty forthwith if not required in any other case. Direct service is permitted.